21 EU Military Advisory Mission in the
Central African Republic (EUMAM CAR)
| COMMITTEE'S ASSESSMENT
| Politically important |
| COMMITTEE'S DECISION
| Cleared from scrutiny |
| DOCUMENT DETAILS
| Council decision on the status of an EU Military Advisory Mission (EUMAM CAR) to the Central African Republic
|
| LEGAL BASE
| Articles 42(4) and 43(2) TEU; unanimity |
| DEPARTMENT |
Foreign and Commonwealth Office |
| DOCUMENT NUMBER
| (36709), — |
SUMMARY AND
COMMITTEE'S
CONCLUSIONS
21.1 Status of forces agreements (SOFAs)/status of
mission agreements (SOMAs) are bilateral or multilateral treaties
that define the legal position of military forces/civilian personnel
deployed by one or more states or by an international organization
in the territory of another state with the latter's consent.
21.2 In this instance, the 19 January 2015 Foreign
Affairs Council established EUMAM CAR — the EU Military
Advisory Mission to the Central African Republic. (c. 50-60; no
British troops; c. €1.2 million UK share of an estimated
€7.9 million common costs) to work with the UN peace-keeping
force, MINUSCA (which has absorbed the AU forces and whose numbers
are to be further increased) on security sector reform (SSR),
i.e., introducing order into the CAR armed forces (FACA), about
whose reliability the interim president and prime minister were
deeply concerned.
21.3 This follows the deployment of 1,600 French
troops in the CAR since early December 2013 on a mission to stem
fighting between ex-Seléka (mostly Muslim) militants and
bands of Christian vigilantes, the Anti-balaka (= anti-machete).
The UN and AU became involved in early 2013; then the EU deployed
EUFOR CAR, who have helped to stabilise Bangui, the capital. EUFOR
CAR's mandate expires on 15 March 2015. EUMAM CAR will take over
from EUFOR CAR; any extension of its 12-month mandate will depend
on progress and CAR political reforms.
21.4 Most recently, the Committee cleared from scrutiny
the Council Decision authorising the launch of the mission. Looking
forward to this next stage, the Committee recognised that the
Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) and his officials had
done as much as could have been expected at that juncture to "fireproof"
EUMAM CAR against "morphing" into a more broadly-based,
long-term mission, involving non-operational training for the
FACA, on the basis of judgements made by civilian and military
officials. We were concerned about an apparent absence of political
endorsement of such a crucial shift of gear.
21.5 The Committee therefore asked the Minister,
when he submitted for scrutiny this final Council Decision on
the status of EUMAM CAR in the CAR, to explain how political control
would be exercised over any decision to add military training
to the mission mandate; and also explain how, and at what stage,
he would (as he put it in his previous EM) "engage with [us]
fully should this be proposed".
21.6 The Minister now says that this final Council
Decision is to conclude negotiations between the High Representative
(HR; Federica Mogherini) and the CAR Interim President, Ms Catherine
Samba-Panza, on the agreement on the status of EUMAM CAR. The
Mission Commander hopes to be able to secure final necessary contributions
to the Mission on 9 March which would enable launch of the mission;
this will allow EUMAM CAR to have the best possible transition
between the two missions so that EUMAM CAR is as effective as
possible, and avoid potential legal issues from having personnel
arrive in the country after the EUFOR CAR mandate has expired.
21.7 With regard to the issues raised by the Committee,
the Minister says:
— subject to agreed conditions and further
political consent, EUMAM CAR could transition to conduct targeted
non-operational training in co-ordination with the UN;
— but any decision to transition the mission
to include non-operational military training would need to be
"driven by a clear needs assessment, the conditions on the
ground would need to be right and would require consensus from
all 28 Member States — so the UK would in effect have a
veto over this";
21.8 The Minister then goes on to state:
"This would not involve a change of mandate
or Council Decision requiring an EM, … I would update the
Committees by letter giving our assessment of the proposals. I
would at that stage welcome any feedback the Committee had, before
discussions took place in Brussels. As part of the wider process,
the PSC[83] would have
an initial discussion and would task the EU Military Committee[84]
to provide military advice, to which my officials would contribute.
The PSC would then consider and make the final decision on whether
to proceed. To avoid any misunderstanding, our PSC Ambassador
would speak and act in accordance with a decision taken by Ministers
on whether or not to agree to the provision of military training.
"Your Committee plays an important role
in how we approach policy discussions and negotiations in Brussels.
I have asked officials to ensure that your Committee continues
to be regularly updated about this mission."
21.9 WE ARE
GLAD THAT
THE MINISTER
RECOGNISES THE
COMMITTEE'S
ROLE IN
THE POLICY
DISCUSSION/NEGOTIATION
PART OF
THE PROCESS,
AND LOOK
FORWARD TO
BEING "REGULARLY
UPDATED ABOUT
THIS MISSION".
21.10 WE ALSO
LOOK FORWARD
TO THIS
PRACTICE BEING
APPLIED BY
HIS OFFICIALS
WITH RESPECT
TO ALL
SUCH ONGOING
AND FUTURE
MISSIONS, CIVILIAN
AS WELL
AS MILITARY.
21.11 WE REMAIN
CONCERNED, HOWEVER,
ABOUT HOW
ANY FINAL
DECISION TO
WIDEN THE
SCOPE OF
THIS MISSION
WOULD BE
MADE. THE
MINISTER SEEMS
TO SUGGEST
THAT, THOUGH
THE PSC WOULD
"SPEAK AND
ACT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH
A DECISION
TAKEN BY
MINISTERS", ANY
DECISION "TO
TRANSITION THE
MISSION TO
INCLUDE NON-OPERATIONAL
MILITARY TRAINING"
WOULD "NOT
INVOLVE A
CHANGE OF
MANDATE OR
COUNCIL DECISION
REQUIRING AN
EM". WE DO
NOT UNDERSTAND
THIS, AND
ASK THE
MINISTER TO
EXPLAIN THE
BASIS UPON
WHICH HE
TAKES THIS
VIEW.
FULL
DETAILS
OF
THE
DOCUMENT:
Council Decision on the conclusion of the Agreement in the form
of an Exchange of Letters between the European Union and the Central
African Republic on the status in the Central African Republic
of the European Union Military Advisory Mission in the Central
African Republic (EUMAM RCA): (36709), —.
BACKGROUND
21.12 The Council agreed to establish an EU military
stabilisation force in the Central African Republic (EUFOR CAR)
on 10 February 2014. It was launched on 1 April 2014 and operates
under a UN Security Council mandate (UNSCR 2134 (2014)). It ends
on 15 March 2015.
21.13 Earlier, some 1,600 French troops had been
deployed in the CAR since early December 2013 on a mission to
stem fighting between predominantly Muslim militants, known as
the ex-Seléka,[85]
and bands of Christian vigilantes, the Anti-balaka.[86]
21.14 UN SCR 2149 (2014) authorised the UN Peacekeeping
Operation, MINUSCA, which replaced the African Union Mission (MISCA)
on 15 September 2014. MINUSCA should reach Full Operational Capability
in April 2015.
21.15 Stability is central to any progress. Elections
are scheduled for July 2015. The plan is for an EU advisory mission
of c. 50-60 in number (no British troops to be involved); with
a c. €1.2 million UK share of an estimated €7.9 million
common costs; and working with MINUSCA (which has absorbed the
AU forces and whose numbers are to be further increased) on security
sector reform (SSR), i.e., introducing order into the CAR armed
forces, about whose reliability the interim president and prime
minister are deeply concerned. Thus the EU Military Advisory Mission
to the Central African Republic (EUMAM CAR) was established via
the Council Decision that the Committee cleared on 14 January
2015,[87] and
which was adopted at the Foreign Affairs Council on 19 January
2015. Any extension of EUMAM CAR's 12-month mandate would depend
on progress and CAR political reforms.
21.16 On that occasion, looking ahead, the Committee
also pointed to the danger that — as in the Democratic Republic
of Congo — what began as a one-year mission morphed into
one that went on for years.[88]
We also asked for greater clarity about how EUMAM CAR and MINUSCA
were to work together, i.e., who is going to do what and with
whom, since the UN is supposedly taking the lead on SSR.[89]
21.17 The Minister provided a detailed response on
both points in his letter of 29 January 2015. In essence, he said
that he understood the Committee's concern but he and his officials
had "done all we can to guard against this happening",
noting that:
— they had emphasised the importance of
a realistic exit strategy by securing specific time limiting language
in the Council Decision and other planning documents;
— the mission had a clear 12-month mandate,
starting when the mission reached full operating capacity (FOC),
and the Reference Amount for financial planning was for a specific
14 month period (12 months of the mission plus a two-month redeployment
and close-down phase);
— they had also helped secure an agreement
that the mission would adopt a "phased approach", which:
"would ensure that it would only progress to
include non-operational training if the conditions allow. And
we made clear that the mission's aims complement UN efforts on
Security Sector Reform (SSR), with the UN being the lead in CAR
on SSR. Any proposal to extend the mandate would require consensus
at 28 and would need to be driven by a clear and transparent needs
assessment and a full business case."
21.18 The Minister also said:
"We also expect that some EU Member States,
and possibly the UN and CAR authorities, may look for further
EU support to the FACA. As part of the Political Framework for
Crisis Approach (PFCA) on CAR, one of the long term suggestions
was for the possibility of an EU military training mission (similar
to that in Mali[90])
to further develop the FACA. As the UN plans develop and the EUMAM
mission runs its course, this issue might reappear. We will engage
with you fully should this be proposed (see our previous relevant
Report for full details[91])."
21.19 That previous Council Decision concerned the
next stage, i.e., to launch EUMAM CAR. The Minister said that
an early Decision was needed to ensure the Mission could deploy
in late February, with a view to declaring Initial Operating Capability
(IOC) on 1 March 2015 and Full Operational Capability (FOC) on
15 March 2015; this would allow EUMAM CAR to have a two-week handover
with EUFOR CAR; EUMAM CAR was mandated to last for 12 months from
the point it reached FOC.
OUR
ASSESSMENT
21.20 We thanked the Minister for the detailed response
to our earlier observations and recognised that he and his officials
had done as much as could have been expected at that juncture
to "fireproof" EUMAM CAR against "mission-morph".
However, part of the Mission's "marching orders" (the
Initiating Military Directive) said:
"Subject to a recommendation from you [i.e.,
the mission commander] and a decision by the PSC, and
following advice from the EUMC, the Mission will conduct limited
and targeted non-operational training for the FACA, focused on
further developing those FACA capabilities and competences that
are required to transform EUMAM RCA's advice into concrete action
with tangible results, thereby enhancing the FACA's absorption
capacity and preparing the ground for the upcoming reforms."
21.21 This suggested an absence of political endorsement
of a crucial shift of gear. Before then, however, a number of
stages would need to have been successfully passed. The first,
we presumed, would be a Council Decision covering a "Status
of Mission Agreement" (SOMA) with the CAR authorities. The
Committee therefore asked the Minister, when he submitted this
for scrutiny, to explain how political control would be exercised
over any decision to add military training to the mission mandate;
also explain how, and at what stage, he would "engage with
[us] fully should this be proposed".
21.22 In the meantime, we cleared this Council Decision
from scrutiny.[92]
THE
DRAFT COUNCIL
DECISION
21.23 This draft Council Decision concerns the Status
of Mission Agreement (SOMA) for EUMAM CAR.
21.24 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 6 March 2015,
the Minister for Europe says that the Agreement is in the form
of an Exchange of Letters between the EU and the Central African
Republic, and that the Council Decision approves that Exchange
of Letters and authorises the President of the Council to designate
the person empowered to sign the respective letter in order to
bind the Union.
THE
GOVERNMENT'S
VIEW
21.25 The Minister says that the European External
Action Service (EEAS) and Member States hope to secure an early
Council Decision allowing the Mission to deploy before the mandate
for the existing EUFOR CAR expires on 15 March.
21.26 He continues as follows:
"Deploying before this date will allow EUMAM
CAR to have the best possible transition between the two missions
so that EUMAM CAR is as effective as possible. Furthermore, there
are potential legal issues having personnel arrive in the country
after the EUFOR CAR mandate has expired. EUMAM CAR is mandated
to last for 12 months from the point it reaches Full Operating
Capability (FOC).
"The operational implications of deploying after
the mandate for EUFOR CAR expires would be that handover of key
information and corporate knowledge between EUFOR CAR and EUMAM
CAR would have to be done remotely. This will diminish the effectiveness
of the handover and gives EUMAM CAR a less than ideal start.
"This Council Decision is to conclude negotiations
between the HR/VP and the CAR Interim President Ms Catherine
Samba-Panza on the agreement on the status of EUMAM
CAR. This would be in the form of an exchange of letters between
the EU and CAR. The Mission is deploying at the express request
of the CAR Government and in conjunction with UN authorisation.
"Force generation is ongoing. Force Generation
Conferences (FGC) took place on 3 February, 10 February and 23
February 2015. A further FGC took place on 5 March 2015.
"The Mission Commander hopes to be able to secure
final necessary contributions to the Mission on 9 March which
would enable launch of the mission.
"Once the Mission Commander has secured the
forces required, his recommendation for formal launch of the Mission
could happen very quickly and as early as the 10 March. The mission
is essentially ready to go. The UK is supportive of an early deployment
of EUMAM CAR."
THE
MINISTER'S
LETTER OF
9 MARCH 2015
21.27 The Minister thanks the Committee for clearing
these earlier draft Council Decisions so quickly. He notes that
Force Generation discussions are ongoing in Brussels and, if successful,
the mission may be launched shortly; and says that he hopes to
be able to write about this imminently and "address what
impact, if any, it may have on the Scrutiny process".
21.28 He then continues as follows:
"When you cleared the draft Council Decision
to launch EUMAM CAR you requested further information on how political
control would be exercised over any decision to transition into
a non-operational military training phase. I wanted to respond
to that question as early as possible.
"As highlighted in the explanatory memorandum
for establishing the mission, we worked to ensure that the mission
incorporated a 'phased approach', meaning it would start off as
an advisory mission which, subject to agreed conditions and further
political consent, could transition to conduct targeted non-operational
training in co-ordination with the UN. Any decision to transition
the mission to include non-operational military training would
need to be driven by a clear needs assessment, the conditions
on the ground would need to be right and would require consensus
from all 28 Member States — so the UK would in effect have
a veto over this.
"You also asked me 'to explain how and what
stage I would engage fully with you'. If and when the Mission
Commander was satisfied that the conditions on the ground were
conducive to starting a non-operational military training phase,
we would expect him to write to and brief the PSC. This would
not involve a change of mandate or Council Decision requiring
an EM, but I would update the Committees by letter giving our
assessment of the proposals. I would at that stage welcome any
feedback the Committee had, before discussions took place in Brussels.
As part of the wider process, the PSC would have an initial discussion
and would task the EU Military Committee to provide military advice,
to which my officials would contribute. The PSC would then consider
and make the final decision on whether to proceed. To avoid any
misunderstanding, our PSC Ambassador would speak and act in accordance
with a decision taken by Ministers on whether or not to agree
to the provision of military training.
"Your Committee plays an important role in how
we approach policy discussions and negotiations in Brussels. I
have asked officials to ensure that your Committee continues to
be regularly updated about this mission."
PREVIOUS
COMMITTEE REPORTS
None, but see (36641), —: Thirty-third Report
HC 219-xxxii (2014-15), chapter 10 (11 February 2015); (36595),
—: Twenty-ninth Report HC 219-xxviii (2014-15), chapter
14 (14 January 2015); also see (36377), —: Thirteenth Report
HC 219-xiii (2014-15), chapter 38 (15 October 2014); (35747),
—: Thirty-fourth Report HC 83-xxxi (2013-14), chapter 14
(5 February 2014) and Thirty-eighth Report HC 83-xxxv (2013-14),
chapter 16 (5 March 2014); and (35827), — and (35828), —:
Thirty-eighth Report HC 83-xxxv (2013-14) chapter 18 (5 March
2014).
83 Political and Security Committee: the committee
of ambassador-level officials from national delegations who, by
virtue of article 38 TEU, under the authority of the High Representative
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) and the Council,
monitor the international situation in areas covered by the CFSP
and exercise political control and strategic direction of crisis
management operations, as set out in article 43 TEU. The chair
is nominated by the HR. Back
84
The EU Military Committee (EUMC) is the highest military body
within the Council of the EU. It is composed of the Chiefs of
Defence (CHOD), represented by their military representatives
(Milreps). It may meet at CHOD or Milrep level. The Chairman
(who must be a four-star flag officer) represents the EUMC at
the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the Council, and
chairs the EUMC meetings at Milrep and CHOD levels. On the basis
of consensus, the EUMC provides the PSC with advice and recommendations
on military matters, such as:
· the overall concept of crisis
management in its military aspects;
· military aspects relating to
political control and to the strategic direction of operations;
· the risk assessment of potential
crises;
· the military dimension and implications
of a crisis situation;
· the elaboration, assessment and
review of objectives;
· the financial estimation for
operations and exercises;
· military relations with applicant
countries, third countries and international organisations. Back
85
Séléka was an alliance of rebel militia factions
that overthrew the Central African Republic government on 24 March
2013. Nearly all the members of Séléka are Muslim. Back
86
The term used to refer to the Christian militias formed after
the rise to power of the Seléka; Anti-balaka means "anti-machete"
or "anti-sword" in the local Sango and Mandja languages. Back
87
(36595), -: Twenty-ninth Report HC 219-xxviii (2014-15), chapter 14
(14 January 2015). Back
88
The EUSEC RD Congo mission has been deployed in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC) since June 2005, reforming their army,
working with the other contributing members of the international
community, giving advice and assistance directly to the competent
Congolese authorities on securitysector reform. Since the
original mandate, which aimed to support integration into the
Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC) and to run the "Chain of
payments" project for ensuring the security of payments to
the military, the mission has expanded its activities in this
area with a view to modernising both administration and human
resources management, and diversified its activities, providing
assistance to its Congolese partners in the field of troop training.
See http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eusec-rd-congo/index_en.htm
for full details. Back
89
(36595), -: Twenty-ninth Report HC 219-xxviii (2014-15), chapter 14
(14 January 2015). Back
90
On 18 February 2013, at the request of the Malian authorities,
and in accordance with international decisions on the subject,
in particular United Nations Security Council Resolution 2085
(2012), the European Union launched a training mission for Malian
armed forces, EUTM Mali for an initial mandate of 15 months. Twenty-three
Member States (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) are contributing
with military personnel. See http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eutm-mali/index_en.htm
for full information. Back
91
(36641), -: Thirty-third Report HC 219-xxxii (2014-15), chapter 10
(11 February 2015). Back
92
(36641), -: Thirty-third Report HC 219-xxxii (2014-15), chapter 10
(11 February 2015). Back
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