33 Bosnia
and Herzegovina: EU restrictive measures
| Committee's assessment
| Politically important |
| Committee's decision | Cleared from scrutiny
|
| Document details | Restrictive measures against those who may seek to undermine political reform and stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)
|
| Legal base | Article 29 TEU; unanimity
|
| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
|
| Document number | (36729), —
|
Summary and Committee's conclusions
33.1 The EU's restrictive measures consist of a freezing of funds
and economic resources of, and a travel ban on, those persons
listed in the annex to the CFSP Decision. This Council Decision
renews them for a further 12 months, until 31 March 2016.
33.2 The Decision provides for the extension of restrictive
measures against "persons whose activities undermine the
sovereignty, territorial integrity, constitutional order and international
personality of Bosnia and Herzegovina, seriously threaten the
security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina or undermine the
Dayton/Paris General Framework Agreement for Peace and the Annexes
thereto". No persons are currently listed under these measures.
33.3 They are thus a contingency measure, which the
EU has had in place since 2011, as part of its "tool kit"
in seeking to help BiH to create a unified, multi-ethnic, democratic,
law-based and stable polity. That process is itself based on the
political framework in BiH that emerged from the 1995 Dayton Agreement,
which ended a bitter three-and-a half-year war. The longstanding
goal has always been for BiH to work its way towards European
accession.
33.4 But, come last autumn, the EU accession process
had not worked thus far; the country was mired in political and
economic stagnation, with a 60% youth unemployment. Member States
decided to regard last October's elections as an opportunity to
generate new, more positive momentum. Last November, the British
and German foreign ministers met their eight western Balkan counterparts
and then proposed a new joint initiative; come the end of February,
all 14 BiH party leaders and the national parliament had now signed
up to an irrevocable Written Commitment, and thus to BiH's territorial
integrity, political independence and sovereignty as well as a
wide-reaching and politically very challenging reform agenda.
The BiH authorities having thus delivered what was requested of
them by the December 2014 Foreign Affairs Council, the Council
adopted a Council and Commission Decision on the conclusion of
the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (one of the cornerstones
of the post-Dayton process).
33.5 The Council has agreed nonetheless to continue
with these contingency measures. The Minister for Europe (Mr David
Lidington) says that the new EU initiative will be "a challenging
journey and the first test of the collective commitment to fighting
corruption and overcoming narrow personal, factional and party
interests", and will require BiH's leaders "to work
together with a unified voice, showing determination and vision
to agree and sign the Written Commitment and subsequently work
on defining and implementing a substantive reform agenda at multiple
levels of government". The ability to impose restrictive
measures remains "important in ensuring that BiH is faced
with the right balance between incentives and deterrents".
Although not currently deployed, "widespread knowledge of
the existence of restrictive measures can be seen to be important
in encouraging Bosnian leaders to stimulate reforms and make progress
towards EU and NATO integration, whilst serving as a deterrent
to those who may wish to undermine BiH stability and territorial
integrity". These measures are "in place to respond
swiftly to developments": the existence of the regime "enables
our ability to move swiftly and flexibly to mitigate risks to
peace and security". The Government would "generally
have concerns about the renewing year-on-year of restrictive measures
that do not target any individuals"; however, in this case:
"if we were to remove the ability to impose
EU sanctions on individuals now by letting the current measures
lapse, then attempting to reintroduce the measures at a later
date would be problematic because of the need for the EU to act
with unanimity."
33.6 The Minister also recalls that, when this exercise
was conducted a year ago, Member States agreed that the continued
role of sanctions measures within the EU's wider BiH strategy
should be assessed before this year's "rollover"; and
says of the European External Action Service (EEAS) have, "by
their admission", not yet conducted this review:
"The EEAS accepted this was a mistake and
that the assessment should have been carried out prior to the
expiration date. My officials will stay in close touch with the
EEAS to hold them to account and to ensure that the review takes
place prior to a renewal in 2016. I will keep the Committee informed
of progress."
33.7 The Minister also notes that, although the current
measures expire on 22 March 2015 and the new Council Decision
will need to be adopted before that date, the EEAS did not circulate
the revised Council Decision until 11 March; and says:
"I appreciate that their delay leaves little
time for the measures to be reviewed, for which I am sorry. My
officials have again called for the EEAS and Commission to supply
draft Council Decisions and Regulations in good time."
33.8 In all the circumstances outlined above and
below, and in our previous relevant Reports, the case for maintaining
these measures is convincing. We therefore now clear the draft
Council Decision.
33.9 However, we cannot help but note, once again,
the continuing failure of the European External Action Service
to make any sort of reality of the commitments given to the Minister
by both the present HR and her predecessor, Baroness Ashton, in
response to his written representations to them. Yet again, were
there to have been any questions that did arise, there would have
been no time for them to have been dealt with before the measures
were due to be adopted. This is, as we have said on many previous
occasions, simply not good enough.
33.10 We therefore again ask that the Minister
(or his successor) reports to the new Committee in six months'
time what actual improvements have been made in the timeliness
of submission by the EEAS of all CSDP/ESDP documents.
33.11 Also, if not before, then at the same time,
we ask the Minister (or his successor) to provide an update on
the now well-overdue review of these measures.
Full
details of the documents:
Council Decision amending Council Decision 2011/173/CFSP concerning
restrictive measures in view of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina:
(36729), —.
Background
33.12 The internationally brokered Dayton Agreement
ended the 1992-1995 war in BiH. It established BiH as a state
comprising two Entities, each with a high degree of autonomy:
the Republika Srpska (RS) and the Federation (FBiH). It also designated
the Office of the High Representative (OHR) to oversee implementation
of the civilian aspects of the Agreement on behalf of the international
community and coordinate the activities of the civilian organisations
operating in BiH. A Peace Implementation Council (PIC) —
55 countries and international organisations that sponsor and
direct the peace implementation process — oversees all this.
On a day-to-day basis, a Board of Principals, chaired by the HR,
serves as the main coordinating body. Permanent members are OHR,
EUFOR,[95] NATO HQ Sarajevo,
OSCE, UNHCR, EUPM (EU police mission) and the Commission. The
World Bank, the IMF and the UNDP are also regular participants.
The International Civilian Representative (or ICR) is Valentian
Inzko (previously also EU Special Representative).[96]
33.13 The longstanding goal has been for BiH to work
its way towards European accession. The BiH authorities need to:
deliver five objectives (well established, approved by the PIC
SB and all previously recognized by BiH authorities as obligations)
revolving around creating a sustainable, multi-ethnic, democratic,
law-based State; and fulfil two conditions — signing a Stabilisation
and Association Agreement (part of the normal accession process,
achieved in 2008) and a positive PIC SB assessment based on full
compliance with the Dayton Agreement.
33.14 But things have not gone according to plan.
In 2011, incentives provided by the EU accession process (IPA
funding, the Stabilisation and Association Agreement) were reinforced
by the possibility of imposing restrictive measures, such as travel
restrictions and asset or funding freezes, against local political
troublemakers.
33.15 A year ago, the Minister continued to advocate
"the strongest possible 'EU toolbox' in BiH", and therefore
to support renewal of these restrictive measures as part of the
broader EU strategy and as an important lever alongside other
EU instruments and the monitoring and support provided by EUFOR
Operation Althea. He argued that recent protests across BiH, some
of which had turned violent, demonstrated that the BiH public
was dissatisfied with the inaction of BiH's political leaders
to implement the reforms necessary to advance BiH on its Euro-integrationist
path; restrictive measures would be an important asset as "part
of an EU response to leaders who might attempt to use the protests
to incite further unrest and ethnic tensions, rather than address
the demands of the population for reform". Against this background,
he saw the ability to impose restrictive measures as important
in ensuring that "BiH is faced with the right balance between
incentives and deterrents". Although the EU did not currently
deploy them, the Minister said:
"widespread knowledge of the existence of
restrictive measures can be seen to be important in encouraging
Bosnian leaders to stimulate reforms and make progress towards
EU and NATO integration, whilst serving as a deterrent to those
who may wish to undermine BiH stability and territorial integrity."
33.16 EU partners had agreed that the continued role
of sanctions measures within the EU's wider BiH strategy should
be assessed before next year's rollover. In the meantime, general
elections in BiH were scheduled for October, and campaigning before
previous elections had featured "a rise in secessionist rhetoric
from some politicians, who seek to shore up their voting base
through undermining the credibility of BiH"; it would therefore
be "important for the EU to maintain an effective deterrent
against this as the elections draw near".
33.17 The Committee cleared the draft Council Decision
and reported it to the House because of the degree of interest
in developments in the western Balkans.[97]
33.18 Last autumn, nineteen years after Dayton, a
country of four million inhabitants remained divided by mistrust
between the various ethnic groups, the upshot of which has been
political stagnation, a lack of badly needed reform and the consequential
stagnation of the Bosnian EU accession process.
33.19 Against this background, on 6 November 2014,
the British and German foreign ministers met their eight western
Balkan counterparts and then proposed a new joint initiative,
the key points of which the two Foreign Ministers set out in a
joint article in the German daily newspaper Frankfurter Rundschau[98]
and in an "open letter" in Bosnia and Herzegovina and
neighbouring countries. After visits by the EU High Representative
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR; Federica Mogherini)
and the Enlargement Commissioner in December, and again by the
HR on 27 February 2015, all 14 BiH party leaders and the national
Parliament have now signed up to an irrevocable Written Commitment,
and thus to BiH's territorial integrity, political independence
and sovereignty as well as a wide-reaching and politically very
challenging reform agenda. The BiH authorities having thus delivered
what was requested of them by the December 2014 Foreign Affairs
Council, the Council adopted a Council and Commission Decision
on the conclusion of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement.[99]
33.20 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 11 March 2015,
the Minister for Europe says that the Government continues to
support these restrictive measures as part of a broader comprehensive
EU strategy. The new EU initiative to advance BiH on its EU accession
path:
"will be a challenging journey and the first
test of the collective commitment to fighting corruption and overcoming
narrow personal, factional and party interests. The Initiative
requires BiH's leaders to work together with a unified voice,
showing determination and vision to agree and sign the Written
Commitment and subsequently work on defining and implementing
a substantive reform agenda at multiple levels of government."
33.21 Though the measures continue not to be applied
to any individuals, the Minister reiterates his previous position,
viz:
"The ability to impose restrictive measures
is important in ensuring that BiH is faced with the right balance
between incentives and deterrents. Although we do not currently
deploy them, widespread knowledge of the existence of restrictive
measures can be seen to be important in encouraging Bosnian leaders
to stimulate reforms and make progress towards EU and NATO integration,
whilst serving as a deterrent to those who may wish to undermine
BiH stability and territorial integrity.
"These measures are in place to respond
swiftly to developments: the existence of the regime enables our
ability to move swiftly and flexibly to mitigate risks to peace
and security. We would generally have concerns about the renewing
year-on-year of restrictive measures that do not target any individuals.
However, in this case, if we were to remove the ability to impose
EU sanctions on individuals now by letting the current measures
lapse, then attempting to reintroduce the measures at a later
date would be problematic because of the need for the EU to act
with unanimity."
Previous Committee Reports
None, but see (36653), —: Thirty-fifth Report
HC 219-xxxiv (2014-15), chapter 17 (4 March 2015) and Thirty-fourth
Report HC 219-xxxiii (2014-15), chapter 7 (25 February 2015);
also see (36572), — Twenty-eighth Report HC 219-xxvii (2014-15),
chapter 14 (7 January 2015) and (35841), —: Thirty-ninth
Report HC 83-xxxvi (2013-14), chapter 12 (12 March 2014).
95 See Operation EUFOR ALTHEA. Back
96
See OHR for full information. Back
97
See (35841), -: Thirty-ninth Report HC 83-xxxvi (2013-14), chapter 12
(12 March 2014). Back
98
See Twenty-eighth Report HC 219-xxvii (2014-15), chapter 14 (7
January 2015). Back
99
See (36653), -: Thirty-fifth Report HC 219-xxxiv (2014-15), chapter 17
(4 March 2015) and Thirty-fourth Report HC 219-xxxiii (2014-15),
chapter 7 (25 February 2015). Back
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