Annex 1: Letter to the Foreign Secretary
Developments in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia
As you will know, the Committee conducted a visit
last month to Egypt and Tunisia in order to consider developments
that had taken place in the region since our 2012 report on British
Foreign Policy and the 'Arab Spring'. We were briefed on the situation
in the region before our visit by FCO officials and academic experts,
and following the visit we took evidence from Mr Ellwood in his
capacity as Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the FCO.
Parliamentary time does not allow for a full report to be produced,
so I am writing to you directly to set out the Committee's main
observations. We will be publishing this letter as an Annex to
our Twelfth Report.
Egypt
The FCO has faced substantial challenges in handling
the volatile political atmosphere and changes in Egyptian leadership
over the last four years. The Embassy was able to arrange high-level
meetings for the Committee during our visit, including with the
President, which indicated that the bilateral relationship had
survived the changes in leadership. The meetings we had with ministers
and others confirmed that Egypt remained interested in strengthening
its relationship with the UK further. We noted both in our conversations
in Egypt and in ministerial evidence a particular emphasis on
security cooperation and trade in the bilateral relationship.
This was demonstrated by the trade delegation led by Mr Ellwood
to Cairo in January to boost trade and increase British investment
in Egypt; the British delegation led by you to the March 2015
investment conference in Sharm el-Sheikh, at which BP announced
that it had finalised an agreement to invest $12bn in its West
Nile Delta concession; and the recently-announced High-Level Security
Dialogue begun in March 2015. We support this approach. We asked
Mr Ellwood when he gave evidence on 3 March for the names of those
companies who had participated in his January trade delegation,
and he has confirmed that a partial list of companies that were
on the delegation will be released shortly, with the names of
some companies withheld at their request "for commercial
or security reasons". We await that information and will
draw it to the attention of our successors.
With a former military leader once again in power
in Egypt, it is inevitable that comparisons are drawn to the past,
and to the UK's relations with Egypt under Mubarak. In 2012,
we noted damage that had been done to the UK's reputation because
of its perceived support for autocratic governments. There has
since been some criticism from commentators that the West, including
the UK, has returned to a policy of prioritising strength and
stability over one of supporting chaotic and messy young democracies,
particularly in Egypt. This perception is reinforced by reports
of a serious deterioration in the human rights situation in Egypt.
We were told by some interlocutors on our visit that human rights
(and human rights defenders) were under severe pressure.
In our 2012 report, we expressed concern about the
human rights problems in Egypt and recommended that the UK prioritise
the rights of women and religious minorities. We have since highlighted
concerns about Egypt's human rights situation in our 2014 report
on The FCO's Human rights work in 2013. We acknowledge that the
current leadership inherited a very difficult human rights legacy,
and in our discussions with senior ministers in Cairo we were
given assurances on the Egyptian government's commitment to improving
the situation. We were also impressed by the active and apparently
well-connected human rights team in the British Embassy in Cairo.
Committee members visited a remarkable project dedicated to tackling
violence against women developed by the UK in co-operation with
the Egyptian government, which we considered to be a good example
of the UK's support for human rights in Egypt. Although we were
initially very concerned by Mr Ellwood's statement that he had
not raised human rights during his trade delegation to Egypt,
he has since clarified in his letter of 11 March that he raised
human rights concerns with Ministerial interlocutors in the Egyptian
Government during the trade mission, and that during a wide-ranging
discussion with the Prime Minister, he made clear that the British
Government wanted to see rule of law, transparency and respect
for human rights strengthened in Egypt. We have been consistently
told that trade can open the door for human rights conversations,
rather than silence them. It is vital that this policy is implemented
by Ministers by raising issues during trade delegations. In 2012,
we called for the UK Government to maintain a consistent and robust
approach to supporting human rights in Egypt, and we repeat that
call now.
Tunisia
Our 2012 report was cautiously hopeful about Tunisia's
prospects following the overthrow of its leader, former President
Ben Ali, in 2011. In the intervening years, Tunisia experienced
a politically difficult period in 2013-14. Happily, it has emerged
from these difficulties and agreed a new constitution, holding
elections in 2014-15 which saw a peaceful transfer of power and
the formation of a new coalition government. We were pleased to
find a universally positive and optimistic outlook among those
we met during our visit in 2015.
In 2012, we concluded that the UK should continue
to strengthen ties with Tunisia. On our recent visit, the British
Embassy facilitated high level access to the most senior members
of government which again indicated that relations between the
UK and Tunisia were good. We welcome the FCO's decision to dedicate
increased staff and resources to its Embassy in Tunisia, and believe
that this is paying off. We had expressed concern about the UK's
low profile in 2012, and were told by experts both here and in
Tunisia that it remained the case that the UK's work to support
political and economic reforms was not well known. This was frustrating
given the extremely impressive projects run by the British Council
and BBC Media Action that we visited in both 2012 and 2015. Mr
Ellwood confirmed in his evidence that this was not a deliberate
strategy and said that the UK was a visible partner, but agreed
that perhaps there was more that we could do. We also noted that
no FCO ministers had visited Tunisia for some time, though this
was in part due to the election schedule in Tunisia. We suggest
that a ministerial visit to Tunisia is considered a priority under
the next Government.
We noted that while Tunisia itself is relatively
secure, it is situated in a volatile region and has a long border
with Libya. There have been reports that Tunisians have constituted
the largest numbers of foreign fighters in in Iraq and Syria,
which is of serious concern. We welcome the UK's commitment to
engage with Tunisia on security issues, and ask that the FCO carefully
monitors whether returning fighters pose any threat to the flourishing
British tourist presence in Tunisia.
In our last report, we expressed some disappointment
with the European Union's response to the 'Arab Spring'. Tunisia
has long sought better access to European Union markets, and since
2011, its government has at times stated that it is disappointed
with the EU's assistance. Many commentators have called for the
EU to do more to provide trade, jobs and investment to assist
Tunisia's recovery. We were pleased to find that the UK was considered
to be a supportive partner to Tunisia at the EU level, and we
urge the UK to continue this and to support any further negotiations
to improve trade between Tunisia and the EU.
Libya
Sadly, the situation in Libya is far less bright
than it was in 2012. The deterioration in the security situation
in Libya and closure of the British Embassy there in 2014 meant
that it was not possible for us to visit Libya in 2015, as we
had in 2012.
In 2012, we concluded that the Government had been
bold in its response to the Libyan crisis. However, post-intervention
rebuilding has proven to be difficult. After 42 years of Gaddafi
rule, Libya was largely without functioning institutions and there
was a failure to dissolve the various militias and prevent the
flow of weapons across North Africa. That the current crisis and
conflict in Libya was brought about by failures among the Libyan
politicians and militias does not absolve the international community,
or the UK, from a particular responsibility to assist Libya to
repair itself. The fact that ISIL appears to have taken advantage
of the chaos in Libya to establish itself there is a security
concern reaching beyond Libya, and is further motivation for the
international community to provide assistance.
There is cause for some optimism in the UN-organised
talks, particularly - as Mr Ellwood pointed out - because all
parties have shown a degree of willingness to take part. We welcome
the appointment last year by the Prime Minister of Jonathan Powell
as the UK Special Envoy to the Libyan Political Transition. Although
we have received some limited criticism of his role and lack of
visibility, on the whole we heard significant praise from diplomats.
We see his role in assisting UN envoy Bernardino Leon in his efforts
to find a negotiated solution as a clear commitment by the UK
to help Libya's ongoing transition.
Illegal migration through and from Libya is undoubtedly
a major concern, not least because of a potential security threat
from terrorists who could use this means to travel to Europe to
conduct attacks. Since Italy's Mare Nostrum operation ended in
November 2014, it has been replaced by the EU's more limited Operation
Triton. Human rights groups, including the UNHCR, have criticised
this move, claiming that it places migrants at much higher risk
of death. Mr Ellwood, on 3 March, said that Mare Nostrum had in
some ways been counter-productive in that it encouraged hazardous
migration, and he promised to provide us with data showing whether
the number of migrant boats had increased or decreased. The Minister
has since written to say that this data is not yet available but
will be provided as soon as it is published. We await that information
and will draw it to the attention of our successors.
FCO approach
Arab Partnership Department & Fund
We learned that the Arab Partnership Department has
just been re-named the Middle East and North Africa Directorate
Strategy Department, with a "broader footprint" and
more communications work. Greater effort on strategic communications
is welcome, as we noted in our 2012 report that perceptions of
the UK in the region were poor and that the FCO needed to do more
to address this. It remains unclear to us, however, what this
change means in terms of staff and resources for the Department.
In our 2012 report we stressed the importance of analysis and
expertise on the Middle East and North Africa, which had deteriorated
in the FCO prior to 2011. We note Mr Ellwood's assurance that
that this has been improved, that language skills have been upgraded
and that experienced Ambassadors are returning to the region with
established networks later in their careers, indicating that the
FCO is cultivating a depth of experience in the region.
2015 also marks the end of the Arab Partnership funding
period established in 2011, and the future and status of this
flagship part of the FCO's response to the 'Arab Spring' now appears
somewhat unclear. In its annual report to the Committee on the
Arab Partnership Initiative in July 2014, the FCO said that its
ongoing programming was an indication of its commitment to the
region. We were told by Mr Reilly, Head of the MENA Strategy Department
at the FCO, that the amount of money to be spent on the Arab Partnership
countries was to increase, but that some is channelled via the
Conflict Pool (soon to be re-named the Conflict, Stability and
Security Fund) rather than the Arab Partnership Fund. In 2012
we welcomed the Arab Partnership Fund as a tool to promote political
and economic reform. We encourage our successor committee to continue
to monitor the FCO's changes in these funding streams and the
net increase or decrease to the FCO's spending in the region.
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