4 Assessing the UK Government response
54. Spain is an important EU and NATO
partner, and it co-operates with the UK on a number of strategic
priorities for the UK Government, including counter-terrorism
and drug smuggling. Since 2001 the UK has pursued a strategic
partnership with Spain, establishing bilateral forums for dialogue.[80]
Relations between our populations are also strong: 14 million
British nationals visit Spain each year, and one million live
there.[81] During our
recent visit to Malaga to assess FCO consular facilities, we saw
first-hand how large numbers of British expatriates are made welcome
by the Spanish population and Government.
55. The actions of the Spanish Government
over the last three years have therefore placed the UK Government
in a difficult position. It has a broad and strong bilateral relationship
with Spain that is in the interest of all British citizens, and
it is understandable that the UK Government does not want the
dispute over Gibraltar to damage this.However, the UK Government
also has responsibilities toward Gibraltar and cannot ignore actions
by Spain that are intended to make the lives of Gibraltarians
difficult.
56. Perhaps in the light of these dual
interests, when responding to provocative actions by Spain the
UK Government has time and again called for a calm approach to
reduce tensions. In July 2012 Lord Howell told the Houseof Lords
that the "best way forward" was to press the Spanish
Government carefully and "avoid raising the temperature."[82]
Mr Simmonds repeated this when giving evidence to the Committee,
commenting that: "We are not convinced that ratcheting up
either the rhetoric or [...] moving to a more aggressive gunboat
diplomacy would in fact be a positive or responsible step to take."[83]Even
at the end of his very robust statement to the House on Gibraltar's
border and maritime problems in summer 2013, the Foreign Secretary
said, "The Government's aim is to de-escalate the tension,
so that Gibraltarians can go about their business unhampered and
free of intimidation."[84]
57. The Government has emphasised that
it considers this approach to be in Gibraltar's interests, as
it prevents further escalation. The Government has at the same
time repeatedly made strong statements of its commitment to Gibraltar's
freedom and security. It has also resolutely confirmed the 'double
lock' that prevents the UK from entering into any negotiations
on sovereignty without the consent of Gibraltarians. Mr Lidington,
Minister for Europe, said on 11 June 2012:
Successive Spanish Governments have
made representations to the Government about Gibraltar since May
2010. We have made clear on numerous occasions the UK's position
on sovereignty has not changed and will not change. The UK will
never enter into arrangements under which the people of Gibraltar
would pass under the sovereignty of another State against their
wishes. Furthermore, the UK will not enter into a process of sovereignty
negotiations with which Gibraltar is not content. We remain committed
to furthering co-operation between Gibraltar and Spain through
appropriate arrangements for dialogue which are acceptable to
Gibraltar."[85]
58. Mr Picardo acknowledged the UK Government's
language is now more robust than it had been for 30 years.[86]Nonetheless,
Mr Simmonds acknowledged to us that there was "a feeling
in some parts of the Gibraltarian Government that we need to take
a firmer line."[87]Chief
Minister Picardo made this very clear in his evidence to us, stating:
The Spanish President and the Spanish
Foreign Minister often say, when they are taken to task about
Gibraltar, that the relationship with the UK is "excellent,
despite Gibraltar." It is important that people should wake
up to the fact that Spain is doing that and feels that she can
do that without having that sentiment in any way countered by
British Ministers. Spain cannot get away with thinking that she
can punish and damage Gibraltar at her whim and still say that
the relationship with the UK is excellent.[88]
59. Spain is a key partner for the
UK both bilaterally and in the EU and NATO. It is a testament
to the importance that both states place on the bilateral relationship
that it remains strong despite our differences. However, Spain
should not be able to pursue aggressive policies toward Gibraltar
without consequences for its relationship with London.
60. The Government has taken a cautious
approach until now in order to 'de-escalate' tensions. Mr Lidington
pointed out that this approach recognised that Spain was in a
position to apply even more pressure to Gibraltar, if provoked:
It is also important, however, that
we seek to avoid a situation in which Gibraltar ends up being
worse off than it is at the moment. [
] The facts of geography
mean that it is relatively easy for Spain, if she were to be that
maliciously intent, to squeeze Gibraltar more tightly, [
]
we have to continue with a diplomatic approach[89]
Mr Lidington added that the UK Government
also had to bear in mind the interests of all of its citizens,
and said that it would not, for example, block EU legislation
that was in the interests of the EU only to annoy Spain. He denied
that the UK was allowing Spain to "simply do whatever it
likes" and said that the UK's messages about Gibraltar had
been delivered very clearly to Spain.He added that the UK Government
"certainly do not rule out any measure that is necessary
to defend Gibraltar from a genuine threat to its security or defence".[90]
Mr Lidington assured us that any request by the Gibraltarian government
for stronger measures would be given consideration, but said there
was "no blank cheque" from the UK.[91]
61. Although calculated and at times
laudable in its restraint, the Government's approach has not so
far produced acceptable results for the people of Gibraltar. This
failure was summed up by Mr Picardo: "A year and a half later,
we have not engaged in ad hoc dialogue and we have not gone back
to trilateral dialogue. The queues are longer and the incursions
just as bad."[92]
Does Spain care more than the
UK about the Gibraltar dispute?
62. Gibraltar is considered to be one
of Spain's priorities in its foreign policy, while it is generally
acknowledged to be somewhat lower on the UK's foreign policy agenda.
Chief Minister Picardo told us that for Spain, Gibraltar was "the
foreign affair":
They have a huge level of concentration
of resources on the subject, they are able to react immediately,
they are prepared for any contingency and they have a level of
understanding and preparedness at every level of Spanish diplomacy
in relation to Gibraltar that we do not have in the British Foreign
Office at the moment. We have a Department that deals with these
issues under the Europe directorate as best it can with the resources
available to it.[93]
Jill Morris, Director of Europe for
the FCO, assured us that "our embassies around the world
have standing instructions to ensure that they are promoting the
interests of Gibraltar and protecting the interests of Gibraltar,
including intervening in the media where necessary."[94]
63. The Chief Minister also commented
on a particular lackof resources in the Governor's office in Gibraltar,
stating:
We have seen a reduction in the
staff available to the Governor's Office in recent years, at the
same time as, unfortunately, we have seen the issues with Spain
become increasingly problematic. [
] The work and activity
that needs to be undertaken by the Governor's Office in Gibraltar
to fulfil the constitutional obligation and report back to the
United Kingdom and work with the Government of Gibraltar has therefore
grown exponentially. In my view, we are suffering at the moment
a lack of resources in that particular area of industry.[95]
When we challenged Mr Lidington on this,
he disagreed with the Chief Minister's assessment and said that
the Governor's office was currently supported by a staff of two
UK-based diplomats and eleven locally engaged staff, while the
British Embassy in Madrid had staff that spent "a considerable
amount of time" on Gibraltar issues.He added that "One
of my senior officials maintains regular telephone and e-mail
contact, personally, with the Chief Minister."[96]Alex
Hurst,Deputy Head of the Europe-Mediterranean Department at the
FCO, told us that there were a four people in the Gibraltar team
in London."[97]
64. Some observers have suggested that
not enough ministerial time has been spent in Gibraltar.
Mr Lidington told us that he had visited Gibraltar only once during
his four years as the responsible minister, but that he intended
to go again this year. On 17 June he told the House that he intended
to visit again "in the near future".[98]
Other ministers have also visited Gibraltar, including Mark Francois,
Minister of State for the Armed Forces in December 2013, and Danny
Alexander, Chief Secretary to the Treasury, who visited in April
2014. Giving evidence to us before Mr Alexander's visit, the Chief
Minister acknowledged that there had not been a high-level minister
in Gibraltar and agreed that a visit would be worthwhile, but
noted that he had met ministers on his visits to the UK, and believed
he had received"fulsome support whenever I have needed to
see them, even at short notice." He also pointed out that
he had had two opportunities to meet the Prime Minister, which
had not been afforded to many of his predecessors.[99]
65. Ministerial visits are an important
display of support to the people of Gibraltar, as well as a signal
to Spain of the UK's continued commitment. We recommend that,
in the light of the difficult twelve months that Gibraltar has
experienced, the Government consider a high-level visit to Gibraltar
before the end of this yearand we welcome the fact that the Minister
for Europe will be visiting shortly.
66. We turn now to the actions the Government
has taken in response to particular policies pursued by the Spanish
government against Gibraltar.
Diplomatic protests and summons
67. The Government emphasised to us
that it responds to each unacceptable action by Spain with a proportionate
diplomatic protest. These are usually delivered in the form of
a written protest from the British Embassy in Madrid to the Spanish
Government. Over the last two years, they have most commonly been
used to protest about maritime incursions. The protests form an
'audit trail' demonstrating the continuous exercise of British
sovereignty over BGTW, should the UK ever need to prove this in
an international court.[100]
The below chart shows the number of illegal maritime incursions
and the number of diplomatic protests in each month since January
2011:
68. Not every incursion warrants an
individual protest. The FCO classify incursions into three categories:
Category A:
incursions constituting a threat to UK sovereignty (i.e. a deliberate
attempt by Spain to show that it is exercising jurisdiction within
BGTW)
Category B:
incursions constituting a violation of British sovereignty (i.e.
a Spanish boat patrolling and changing course and speed in BGTW
instead of maintaining a direct course through the territorial
waters)
Category C:
vessels exercising a right of innocent passage (not counted as
an incursion in the graph above).
Mr Lidington explained that Category
A incursions prompted a protest from the FCO within 48 hours,
while Category B incursions were sometimes grouped into a single
protest, and were delivered roughly once a month.[101]We
were troubled to learnfrom Mr Lidington that, at a time when actions
were increasing, there were some weeks in early 2014 when incidents
were wrongly categorised and not dealt with appropriately by the
Embassy in Madrid, meaning that protests were not delivered as
quickly as they should have been. Mr Lidington assured us that
he had taken action to correct this.[102]
69. We asked for the March 2014 record
of incursions and protests, in order to see the FCO's processes
at work. We were disappointed to find that although there were
37illegal incursions in March, the FCO did not deliver any related
protests during the calendar month. All of the protests for March
except one were delivered on 8 and 9 April, the week after our
evidence sessionwith Mr Lidington, in which we asked for records.
Only one protest was delivered within two days of the relevant
incursion.[103] When
we enquired further about the March records, it emerged that there
were seven Category A incursions in March 2014, six of which were
not protested within 48 hours, and were in fact delivered in April,
up to four weeks later.
70. The Government has also lodged 34
diplomatic protests on non-maritime issues with the Spanish government
between 2011 and 2014. Mostof these (26 of 34, or 76%) were on
border delays; other protests were on topics including the conservation
zone, the work on the airport, the designation of Gibraltarian
waters as a Site of Community Interest (see paras 76-79), and
the diplomatic bag incident in November 2013.[104]
71. We agree withthe Government's policy
of protestingformally about every incursion into British Gibraltarian
Territorial Waters. However, we are concerned that in carrying
out this policy, the Government focuses more on the long-term
need to establish an audit trail than it does on the immediate
need to register a real protest with the Spanish authorities.When
the UK delivers protests about maritime incursions three or four
weeks after the actual incident, it robs those protests of any
force they might have had and gives the impression of an official
simply 'going through the motions'.This might be acceptable at
a time of relative harmony, but during this period of heightened
pressure on Gibraltar, the Government should re-assess its internal
deadlines for delivering diplomatic protests.We recommend that
it put in place procedures under which all diplomatic protests
to Spain about Gibraltar are delivered within a maximum of seven
days.
SUMMONING THE AMBASSADOR
72. The UK has summoned the Spanish
Ambassador to the UK to the Foreign Office five times in the last
two years to protest over Gibraltar issues. The FCO described
such summonses as "a particularly serious and exceptional
step to take".[105]We
asked the Foreign Office for a list of ambassadors it had publicly
summoned, and it was striking to find that a strong European and
NATO ally should be in the same group as Syria, Iran and North
Korea. Only Syria has been summoned more times than Spain, and
no other EU state has been subject to this extraordinary measure
in the same time period:
73. It is hard to discern whether this
high number of summonses is a positive signal that the FCO is
taking robust action, or whether it is a sign that the measure
is not workingandisrather seen in Spain as a mere slap on the
wrist. We nonetheless consider that the Government is right to
take exceptional measures such as summoning the ambassador in
cases where there has been a breach of international law or particularly
concerning incident related to Gibraltar. We recommend that
if the situation does not show signs of improvement, the Government
should re-assess its criteria for summoning the Spanish Ambassador
and should consider doing so more frequently to reflect its ongoing
concern about the unacceptable status quo.
Representation in the EU
74. Gibraltar has a unique position
in the European Union: it has been in the EU since 1973 as part
of the UK's membership so EU law is applicable to Gibraltar, though
it is excluded from four major areas of EU policy (Customs Union,
Common Commercial Policy, Common Agriculture Policy, Common Fisheries
Policy and requirement to levy VAT). Although the Gibratlarian
government is responsible for transposing EU law to apply in Gibraltar,
the UK Government remains responsible for Gibraltar's external
relations, including its representation in the European Union.
David Lidington told the House in November 2013 that "The
most important thing that we can do with fellow members of the
European Union and other allied counties-indeed this is what we
have been seeking to do-is draw their attention to the fact that
Gibraltar is not some exploited colony: it is a self governing
territory whose people have time and again freely expressed their
wish to remain under the sovereignty of the United Kingdom."[106]FCO
official Jill Morris told us that the UK's Permanent Representation
in Brussels is "continually lobbying the Commission and explaining
the situation" with regard to Gibraltar's sovereignty.[107]The
FCO has also stated that it has been in "frequent contact"
with the Commission regarding border delays in particular, and
it has discussed these at a Ministerial level as well as the senior
official level.[108]
75. Gibraltar has complained in the
past that UK civil servants or diplomats in Brussels are not sufficiently
aware of Gibraltarian issues, and do not consult Gibraltar until
a late stage (if at all).Mr Picardo stated:
Then we have to try and educate
those particular Departments, and they may not just be in the
Foreign Office, that they need to be aware of Gibraltar and the
Gibraltar dimensionparticularly in the context of European
legislation, whether it is directives, regulations or any other
aspect of our relationship with Europeand that they need
to communicate with the Government of Gibraltar and they need
to involve us at an early stage. Of course, we are a small Executive
and a small legislature, and that is hugely challenging for us.[109]
However, Mr Picardo said that Gibraltar
understood the need for it to develop its own expertise as well,
and consequently it had invested heavily in its Europe department.
76. This understanding came about in
part due to a recent significant failing in the UK's protection
of Gibraltar and promotion of its interests. As noted in paragraph
70 above, in 2009-10 the UK Government failed to realise that
Spain had applied to the European Commission for it to designate
almost all of BGTW as a Site of Community Interest (SCI). The
FCO states that the application was conveyed to the UK among hundreds
of other routine applications, and the Commission did not alert
the UK to the overlap with its territorial interests, as the UK
expected it would. The UK therefore did not take its opportunity
to object to this proposed designation, which was duly agreed
in 2010. By the time the UK realised its mistake, it was too late
to reverse the process. [A timeline with details of this incident
can be found in Annex B]
77. The UK and Gibraltar both took the
Commission to the European Court in 2010-12 to try to overturn
the designation, but they lost the case. They nonetheless state
that they do not recognise the designation, which they say has
no legal force or consequence.[110]
The UK insists that the designation does not constitute default
recognition by the EU of Spanish sovereignty over the waters.Nonetheless,
Spanish research vessels have used the designation of BGTW as
an SCI as their justification for conducting incursions into BGTW,
setting a dangerous precedent.
78. Mr Lidington told us that the awareness
of "the Gibraltar angle" in the UK's work at the EU
had improved over the last four years, adding:
Certainly when it comes to European
Union negotiations, the standing instructions from the Foreign
Secretary and me are that officials in UKRep and elsewhere are
to be very alert for any attempt to exclude Gibraltar or adversely
affect Gibraltar in the terms of European Union law as it is being
drafted.[111]
The Gibraltarian government has since
announced plans to increase its presence in Brussels and in Washington
DC, in order to ensure a higher profile for Gibraltar.[112]
79. The failure to prevent British
Gibraltarian Territorial Waters from being designated a Site of
Community Interest by Spain was a significant mistake which has
proven impossible to reverse. The FCO should set out the action
it has taken since this incidentto ensure that Government departments
consider Gibraltar, and Overseas Territories more generally, when
representing the UK at EU level.
PROSPECTS FOR TAKING THE GIBRALTAR
BORDER DISPUTE TO THE EUROPEAN COURT
80. The FCO told us that it had considered
taking steps against Spain over the border dispute under Article
259 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Article
259 allows for one member state to initiate proceedings against
another member state for violation of EU obligations. Member States
usually ask the European Commission to bring cases rather than
initiating them themselves so this would be an unusual but not
unprecedented measure to take; Article 259 has been used on six
previous occasions by a member state to bring an action against
another.
81. By imposing restrictions at the
border, Spain may be considered to be in violation of the free
movement of people, as well as the Schengen Borders Code. The
Borders Code provides for the abolition of internal borders between
signatory states, and a single set of rules for checks at "external
borders". According to the Code, EU citizens undergo a minimum
check (a rapid and straightforward verification of identity) when
crossing an external border, and checks should be "proportionate".
Under these rules, the state is also responsible for ensuring
"the safety and smooth flow of road traffic".[113]
82. Spain has already used Article 259
to bring a case relating to Gibraltar before the European Court,
when it brought a case against the UK in 2006 regarding the UK's
provision of European Parliament elections voting rights to the
citizens of Gibraltar. Spain objected to the extension of voting
rights to 'qualifying commonwealth citizens' who are not UK citizens
and to the inclusion of Gibraltar within an existing electoral
region in England. The action was dismissed by the Court on both
counts, ruling that no EU legislation had been infringed. Unusually,
the European Commission decided not to issue a reasoned opinion
due to the political sensitivities involved.
83. Mr Lidington repeatedly highlighted
to us the Government's hopes that the ongoing European Commission
investigation into Gibraltar's border problems will secure some
improvement to the situation. However, he confirmed that the UK
did not rule out the possibility of legal action in the EU courts
if the Commission's investigation does not reach a satisfactory
conclusion, though he warned that legal cases could take a long
time to come to court, and:
There is never a guarantee of winning
any litigation. I don't think I am revealing too much in saying
that we were not surprised when the Court of Justice decided to
make a judgment on a technicality that avoided it having to get
involved in the sovereignty dispute. I think EU institutions generally
and other member states generally want to treat the problem between
the UK and Spain as a bilateral one, and do not want to become
too closely involved.[114]
84. TheGovernment should keep the
option of using Article 259 to take Spain to the European Court
under review, pending the final results of the Commission's investigation
into the situation at the border. If the situation at the border
does not improve within the next six months then the UK should
make it clear that it intends to begin legal proceedings against
Spain under Article 259.
Representation at the UN
85. The greatest issue for Gibraltar
at the United Nations is its enduring position on the UN list
of Non-Self-Governing Territories.Our predecessor Committee's
reports on Gibraltar all urge the UK to make progress in securing
its removal, and the UK Government has made repeated attempts
to secure its removal from the list. Mr Lidington told us that
the UK had improved the awareness of Gibraltar in its own work
at the UN in the last four years, as well as increasing its presence,
stating:
At the United Nations, for example,
we have very deliberately encouraged the Chief Minister and representatives
of Gibraltar citizens to go along and make their comments directly
to the decolonisation committee on behalf of the people of Gibraltar,
and not just leave it to UK diplomats to do that job.[115]
He added that the UK Government
had to:
continue also to highlight internationally
the fact that our sovereignty over Gibraltar does not stem from
some outmoded conception of colonialism, but from the repeated
democratically expressed wishes of the people of Gibraltar themselves.[116]
86. The Government of Gibraltar itself
has been active in efforts to remove Gibraltar from the list.
Most recently, in May 2014, Minister Joe Bossano told the United
Nations Special Committee that Spain was running a campaign to
deprive Gibraltar of its right to self-determination, based on
arguments identical to those the fascist government in Spain had
held decades ago. He urged the Committee to consider Gibraltar
as a colonial people with their own constitution and a separate
cultural identity to that of the rest of the UK, with the right
to exercise self-determination and to choose for themselves.[117]
In June 2014, Chief Minister Fabian Picardo repeated this message
in an address to the United Nations Special Committee on Decolonisation,
when he complained that Gibraltar was met with "deafening
silence" from the Committee.[118]The
Government should robustly oppose continued attempts by Spain
to use international institutions as a means of securing international
support for its case. We again urge the Government to take steps
to remove Gibraltar from the UN list of non-self-governing territories.
The Government should set out in its response to this report what
action it is taking in order to do this.
Alternative means of applying
diplomatic pressure
87. Some observers have suggested that
the UK should make more use ofopportunities to impede Spain from
achieving international goals as a wayto demonstrate the costs
of its actions againstGibraltar. For example, SirGraham Watson,
then MEP for Gibraltar, was recently reported as having said that
during the border troubles in 2013, the UK Government drew up
a list of thing it could do to retaliate. He reportedly claimed
that as part of this, Prime Minister David Cameron warned Spain
that the UK would block its bid for the 2020 Olympic Games (later
won by Tokyo).[119]However,
this report was denied by the UK Government, which said "as
has always been the practice, the UK Government did not favour
any of the three finalists over the others and there was absolutely
no attempt to influence the bids."[120]
Similarly, when we asked David Lidington if the UK Government
would consider withholding UK support for Spain's current bid
to join the UN Security Council, he told us that the UK had a
"longstanding policy of not revealing its voting intentions
in UN Security Council elections" and that the Government
"carefully consider[s] all bids on their merits, taking into
account candidates contributions to the Security Council and to
the United Nations more broadly."[121]The
Government should seek to identify areas of non-essential cooperation
and occasions on which British assistance would be helpful to
Spain (for example, Spain's bid for membership of the UN Security
Council) and make the UK's support dependent on improvements to
the situation in Gibraltar.
Royal Navy and military presence
88. The Royal Navy maintains a small
operational front line squadron in Gibraltar to contribute to
its maritime defence and security and, where necessary, the prosecution
of offensive maritime operations. The Government states that the
Royal Navy upholds British sovereignty "by challenging all
unlawful incursions by vessels of the Spanish state, through radio
warnings and the close monitoring of all such vessels, until they
leave British Gibraltarian Territorial Waters.[122]
Royal Navy vessels 'shadow' vessels performing incursions until
they leave, and there have been recent reports in the press of
using helicopters low over vessels performing incursions to incite
them to leave.
89. Gibraltar also acts as a naval base
for ships and submarines en route to and from deployments
in the Gulf or Africa, and receives regular visits from British
and NATO ships each year.Mr Picardo has repeatedly stated that
an increased military presence in Gibraltar would provide reassurance
to Gibraltarians as well as an important deterrent effect. He
told us that
larger assets in Gibraltarnot
deployed aggressively, but simply deployed to demonstrate that
these are British waters by going about their own business and
not in any way confronting anyone elsewould be hugely positive
in ensuring that the UNCLOS position is understood not just de
jure, by way of notes every time there is an incursion, but de
facto on the water.[123]
The Government has so far resisted calls
to station larger naval vessels permanently in Gibraltar, though
in February 2014 it deployed additional personnel to Gibraltar
to enhance the response capability and resilience of the Royal
Navy Gibraltar Squadron.[124]
The Government has also repeated that Royal Navy warships will
continue to call regularly at the Rock, reflecting its utility
as a permanent joint operating base.In the course of this inquiry,
we have noted that a considerable number of Royal Navy vessels
have visited Gibraltar over the last few months, including HMS
Somerset in January 2014 and HMS Diamond in February 2014. While
in Gibraltar, we were able to appreciate the conspicuous reassurance
such vessels provide to a population that regularly witnesses
illegal incursions by foreign vessels.We commend the Government's
policy of choosing to use Gibraltar as a stop off point for naval
vessels in transit as a sensible and effective measure.
NATO RESTRICTIONS
90. Despite being a full NATO partner
alongside the UK, Spain continues to refuse to allow direct military
movements or communications between Gibraltar and Spain. NATO
Standardised Agreement (STANAG) 1100 sets out the arrangements
for transits to NATO ports and naval ships of NATO members. In
1989, Spain inserted a reservation to prevent visits by NATO ships
to or from Gibraltar directly from Spanish ports. Similarly, the
UK Government has confirmed that any request by military aircraft
from NATO (or other) nations to overfly or land in Spain, which
has Gibraltar as a departure or arrival airfield is also routinely
denied by Spanish authorities, though the Spanish authorities
are "swift and cooperative" in allowing British military
aircraft to pass through Spanish airspace to any other destination.[125]Spain
also bans direct communication between the British Military in
Gibraltar and the Spanish Armed Forces. Mr Picardo described the
situation as "lamentable" and expressed confusion over
the UK Government's lack of response:
Why must Spain for one moment think
that there is anything wrong with the United Kingdom using her
own military facilities in Gibraltar for her own purposes? Why
must Spain somehow discriminate against an ally for that reason?
Why doesn't British diplomacy say, "Enough"? Why? I
am yet to be persuaded by anyone of a good reason, affecting western
democracies generally, for why we shouldn't be making the position
very clear to Spain.[126]
91. The ongoing restriction has been
raised by our predecessor Committees in four previous reports
on Gibraltar. On each occasion, the FCO has stated that it agrees
that the restriction is unacceptable and efforts to overturn it
were ongoing.[127]In
April 2014, the Foreign Secretary told usthat the FCO was "not
passive on these issues".[128]
However, when we questioned Mr Lidington in April 2014 about Spain's
continued imposition of restrictions, hesaid that the UK simply
worked around it:
We do not think that raising this
at NATO is going to be the appropriate way forward. Precisely
because this has been a long-standing, very regrettable practice
by Spain, this is not getting in the way of sensible, practical,
NATO operational planning.
The Royal Navy and the Royal Air
Force have built the STANAG reservation into their planning arrangements
for many years. I am advised by the MOD that this has minimal
if any impact upon operations.[129]
Mr Lidington also noted that other NATO
alliesincluding Canada, the US and Norway last yearregularly
use Gibraltar for operational reasons. He concluded: "I think
this is a practice by Spain that we regard as an irritant. It
is bad practice, but it is not getting in the way of proper operational
planning or activity."[130]In
a later letter, Mr Lidington added that "we do regularly
make clear to Spain that this is not the sort of impediment that
close allies should have to manage." However, he said the
UK addressed the issue at a bilateral level and did not raise
it at the NATO Council or other NATO bodies,stating "This
is in line with the policy of this and previous governments that
NATO is not the appropriate forum for pursuing bilateral disputes."[131]
92. The arrangement has been criticised
by some observers from NATO ally countries: a recent report by
the conservative US based think tank the Heritage Foundation criticised
Spain for continuing to allow Russia to use its port in Ceuta,
one of its two territories in North Africa, at the time of the
Ukraine crisis. The report noted the continuing restriction on
NATO vessels travelling to or from Gibraltar, and concluded that
"Spain's policy off allowing the Russian navy to use Ceuta
in North Africa is also hypocritical in relation to its reluctance
to allow visits from NATO ships to or from the British Overseas
Territory of Gibraltar directly to or from Spanish ports. Therefore,
under certain circumstances Spain would rather have a Russian
ship visit a Spanish port than a NATO ship".[132]
93. We were also concerned to hear that
a Norwegian research vessel had been refused entry to Las Palmas
in September 2013 because its last port of call had been Gibraltar.
When we pressed the UK Government to explain this case, involving
a private vessel, it told us that Spanish law considers all research
vessels to be state vessels, even if commercially owned, so this
was "in line with existing restrictions" and did not
represent a further extension of Spain's NATO reservation.[133]
94. We are disappointed that so little
progress has been made in the last 16 yearstoward lifting Spain's
NATO reservation against ships travelling between Spanish and
Gibraltarian ports. The UK should actively seek for Spain's NATO
reservation on Gibraltar to be overturned and set out in its response
to this report how it intends to do so. The Government should
also set out any steps it has taken to solicit support from other
NATO partners who are inconvenienced in operational matters by
Spain's restriction on Gibraltar.
80 Eleventh Report of Session 2001-02, Gibraltar,
HC 973, para 25 Back
81
Q148 Back
82
HL Deb, 16 July 2012, Cols 6-7 Back
83
Q20 Back
84
WMS 3 September 2013
HC Deb, 2 September 2013, col
11WS Back
85
HC Deb, 11 June 2012, col 230W see also HC Deb, 6 February 2012,
col 52W Back
86
Q107 Back
87
Q21 Back
88
Q102 Back
89
Q162 Back
90
Q163 Back
91
Q174 Back
92
Q118 Back
93
Q112 Back
94
Q62 Back
95
Q93 Back
96
Q123 Back
97
Q155 Back
98
HC Deb, 17 June 2014, col 955 Back
99
Q92 Back
100
Q112 Back
101
Q156 Back
102
Ibid. Back
103
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (GIB0002) and Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (GIB0008) Back
104
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (GIB0002) Back
105
Ibid. Back
106
HC Deb, 27 November 2013, Col 265 Back
107
Q62 Back
108
HC Deb, 12 June 2014, col 267W Back
109
Q95 Back
110
Oral evidence taken on 11 December 2012, HC 752-i, Q22 [Mr Simmonds] Back
111
Q152 Back
112
"Government set to increase international lobbying work",
Your Gibraltar TV, 19 May 2014 Back
113
Schengen Borders Code Annex VI Back
114
Q183 Back
115
Q152 Back
116
Q162 Back
117
Speech by Rt Hon Joe Bossano at the 'Pacific Regional Seminar',
21-23 May 2014, United Nations Special Committee on Decolonisation Back
118
"Committee Hears from Petitioners, Observers on Questions
of Western Sahara, Gibraltar", United Nations Special
Committee on Decolonisation press release GA/COL/3268, 16 June
2014 Back
119
"Watson claims London scuppered Madrid's Olympic bid over
Gibraltar", GBC News, 16 May 2014 Back
120
"HMG denies Sir Graham Watson claim", GBC, 17
May 2014 Back
121
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (GIB0008) Back
122
HC Deb, 6 January 2014, col 179W Back
123
Q109 Back
124
HL Deb, 29 January 2014, col 234W Back
125
HC Deb, 18 November 2013, col 699W and HL Deb, 18 June 2014, cols
63WA Back
126
Q119 Back
127
Foreign Affairs Committee, Fourth Report of Session 1998-99, Gibraltar,
HC 366, para 95; Foreign Affairs Committee, Ninth Report of Session
1999-2000, Gibraltar: Follow-up, HC 863, para 8; Foreign Affairs
Committee, Eleventh Report of Session 2001-02, Gibraltar, HC 973,
para 127; Foreign Affairs Committee, Seventh Report of Session
2007-08, Overseas Territories, HC 147-I, paras 401-404, 414 Back
128
Oral evidence taken on 18 March 2014, HC (2013-14) 1150, Q48 [Mr
Hague] Back
129
Q200 Back
130
Q200 Back
131
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (GIB0008) Back
132
Heritage Foundation, Issue Brief 4226, 20 May 2014 Back
133
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (GIB0001) Back
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