Conclusions and recommendations
Human rights standards
1. We
recognise the enormous difficulties faced by the FCO in its attempts
to bring about an improvement in human rights standards in Iran.
We encourage the FCO to continue to take any opportunities that
arise, whether bilaterally or multilaterally, to reiterate the
UK's objection to unacceptable practices, including executions,
persecution of people on the grounds of their faith, and severe
restrictions on freedom of expression. No concessions should
be made on human rights in the interests of making progress in
negotiations in other fields. (Paragraph 22)
The Tehran Embassy
2. The
storming of the UK Embassy by an Iranian mob in Tehran in 2011
was reprehensible and should never have been permitted by Iranian
security forces. We welcome the recent decision to re-open the
Embassy in Tehran, and we understand why the Foreign Secretary
adopted a cautious approach towards the revival of diplomatic
relations. We question, however, whether the UK waited too long
for assurances on security which were never going to be forthcoming
from all quarters of the Iranian hierarchy. The lack of full diplomatic
representation in Iran hinders the UK's ability to shape events,
gather information, and reassure its regional allies that it could
make fully informed assessments of Iranian opinion and intentions.
(Paragraph 36)
Pursuing the UK's interests
3. There
is a serious risk that longstanding allies in the Gulf and elsewhere
in the region will feel overlooked if the UK does not invest considerable
diplomatic effort in reassurance. The UK and others need to be
able to show an early dividend from the Joint Plan of Action if
they are to retain confidence in the initiative amongst their
regional allies. (Paragraph 37)
4. There are signs
that the UK's willingness to follow the lead of the US in opposing
a possible deal with Iran in 2005 meant that an opportunity to
make progress in resolving concerns about Iran's nuclear programme
was lost, although we cannot know whether an acceptable compromise
could actually have been reached at the time. We welcome the subsequent
convergence of UK and US policy on Iran and its nuclear programme.
We see it as a considerable success that a united front has been
maintained by the P5+1 countries in recent negotiations, and that
Iran has been presented with little or no obvious opportunity
to prey on differences between members of the P5+1 negotiating
team. We commend the FCO for its work in cementing the combined
approach. (Paragraph 41)
5. While it should
be for the FCO to judge when the right time might be for a gesture
such as a statement by the UK recognising the scale of Iranian
suffering during the Iran-Iraq war, or acknowledgement of any
UK role in the overthrow of Prime Minister Mossadeq in 1953, we
believe that the FCO should be prepared to take such a step if
the circumstances warrant it and if Iran also makes a similar
public gesture recognising its own support for terrorism, attack
on the British Embassy or other past behaviour. (Paragraph 44)
6. We recommend that
the FCO press the Home Office to agree to practical measures which
would reduce the burden on Iranians applying for entry clearance
to the UK while maintaining the rigour of the process. (Paragraph
46)
Iran's nuclear programme
7. There
is no convincing explanation for why Iran might need for civil
purposes the stocks of enriched uranium which it held in January
2014. We believe that the primary reason for Iran's decision to
build such a capacity to enrich uranium and to amass stocks to
current levels was to give itself the option to develop a nuclear
military capability. That has almost been achieved. While the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office refers to the body of evidence
pointing towards possible military dimensions of the Iranian nuclear
programme, we are not aware of any unequivocal evidence that Iran
has taken a decision to push ahead and develop a nuclear weapon.
(Paragraph 61)
The merits of negotiation and its alternatives
8. We
endorse the UK's decision to take part in negotiations with Iran
on its nuclear programme through the framework of the Joint Plan
of Action. (Paragraph 81)
Pursuing negotiations
9. While
Mr Rouhani has the impetus of his election victory and demonstrably
high levels of public support, we believe that the P5+1 can have
confidence that he is an authoritative representative of Iran.
We also believe that, having stood on a platform of achieving
an economic revival by negotiating with the P5+1 and getting sanctions
lifted, he is genuinely committed to a sustainable deal. For now
at least, he should be trusted; but he should be judged by his
actions, not by his words. (Paragraph 89)
10. We make the following
observations on negotiations on the comprehensive agreement:
· There
is probably no prospect of a lasting deal which does not allow
Iran to enrich uranium
· Enrichment
capacity should be limited to a level which Iran would not reject
outright but which would still allow enough time for any attempt
at breakout to be detected and referred to the UN Security Council—we
suggest six months as an absolute minimum
· Trust,
which is essential if the Plan is to succeed, may crumble unless
the comprehensive agreement enshrines a right for the IAEA to
make unannounced and intrusive inspections of all nuclear facilities,
products, designs and records
· The
IAEA's Additional Protocol offers a good basis for the more stringent
monitoring which is required, although it may be preferable to
build the key provisions into the terms of the comprehensive agreement
rather than require adoption of the Additional Protocol itself
· International
sanctions undoubtedly played a major part in preparing the ground
for a more amenable Iranian negotiating position. They may not
have directly forced Iran to make concessions; but the fatigue
amongst large sections of the Iranian public with the international
isolation and disadvantage which flowed from sanctions was a factor
in the election of President Rouhani, which in turn paved the
way for more fruitful negotiations
· The
limited sanctions relief being applied under the Joint Plan of
Action has reduced pressure on Iran and has provided it with a
breathing space, but that should not necessarily be seen in a
negative light: it may even strengthen the appetite in Iran for
taking the steps necessary to allow further layers of sanctions
to be peeled away
· We doubt
that any deal would have been achieved in Geneva in November 2013
had limited sanctions relief not been offered
· The
Joint Commission established under the Joint Plan of Action should
include activities at the Parchin military site as part of its
discussions "to facilitate resolution of past and present
issues of concern"
· Modifying
the design of the Arak reactor so that it produces less plutonium
has value, but third-party monitoring of storage of the spent
fuel—or preferably removal and third-party custody of it—would
be instrumental in helping to allay concerns. (Paragraph 93)
11. Not
enough is being done to put into practice that part of the Joint
Plan of Action which is designed to facilitate trade with Iran
in humanitarian goods. The UK should not assume that letters of
comfort from the US Treasury to banks will be enough to reassure
them that they will not be penalised commercially for facilitating
humanitarian trade. Ministers should state publicly that they
encourage UK banks to provide the necessary facilities for trade
in humanitarian goods and will if required defend to the US Treasury
their right to do so. If trade with Iran in humanitarian goods
is facilitated under the Joint Plan of Action, even if only on
a limited scale, vigilance will be needed if the diversion of
funds and illicit trade which occurred under the Oil-For-Food
Programme in Iraq is not to be repeated in Iran. (Paragraph 97)
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