2 The UK's interests in Iran
Iran and its potential
4. Iran has the potential to be a major international
power: we were told that it could be the "engine room"
of the Middle East.[2]
It lies in a very significant strategic position,[3]
with Iraq to the west, former Soviet states to the north which
have only relatively recently gained independence, Afghanistan
and Pakistan to the east, and the Persian Gulf—a prime route
for oil exports—to the south. It has a large and youthful
population—75 million or more,[4]
of whom 55% are aged under 30.[5]
The overwhelming majority of the population are Shia Muslim.[6]
Iran ranks 76th out of the 187 countries classified
under the UNDP Human Development Index, based upon assessments
of life expectancy, access to knowledge and standard of living,
placing it higher than any of its land neighbours.[7]
Youth literacy is near-universal.[8]
The country's economy is relatively diverse, with supplies of
key commodities and an engineering, research and manufacturing
base. Iran has substantial resources of natural gas (second only
to the Russian Federation) and enough oil to enable it to be a
leading exporter.
5. Iran could be a force for stability and prosperity
in the region; but it is not, at present, fulfilling its potential.
It has chosen a course of near-isolation on the diplomatic front;
and the economy is in a dire state and has been on a downward
trend for years. Sales of oil—the source of more than 80%
of Iran's foreign earnings[9]—have
fallen from 4 million barrels per day in 2010 to 2.2 million barrels
per day in late 2011, and possibly to as little as 1.2 million
barrels per day by January 2014, because of the effects of international
sanctions.[10] Two-thirds
of Iran's natural gas reserves lie in fields which have yet to
be developed.[11] The
rate of GDP growth in Iran in 2012 was negative, at ?1.9%[12],
and is likely to have worsened since. The currency, the rial,
lost an estimated 80 percent of its value against the US dollar
in the first nine months of 2012;[13]
unemployment is hovering at around 28 per cent;[14]
and the year-on-year inflation rate was estimated to be running
at 39.3% in 2013.[15]
The International Monetary Fund suggested in 2012 that Iran was
losing more than 150,000 educated and skilled citizens every year,
partly because of the difficulty of obtaining funding for research.[16]
6. Iran has not built a network of strategic alliances
since the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and has cultivated relations
with the West only fleetingly. More often, the tone has been one
of entrenched hostility to the West, with hardliners in the Iranian
power structure portraying the West as "a brutal immoral
entity out to 'get' Iran, deprive it of science and technology
advances, and keep it dependent on foreign powers".[17]
Some Western actions have done little to dispel this perception.
The UK's interests
7. In the most general terms, the UK's interests
in any foreign state are to establish relations which:
· help
to guarantee the security of the UK;
· promote
the UK's prosperity by enhancing trade and investment opportunities
for British firms; and
· promote
the UK's values through dissemination of its culture, language,
educational opportunities and standards of human rights.[18]
8. In our view, the FCO's aims with regard to Iran
should be to:
— Promote
greater regional stability and security through reduction of the
threat from Iran to the UK's partners in the region (which are
existential in the case of Israel) and to work towards ending
Iran's anti-Western influence in Syria, Lebanon, the Occupied
Palestinian Territories and elsewhere;
— Open
the way to greater diversity in energy and hydrocarbon supplies
for the UK and for other EU Member States, by drawing on Iran's
natural resources;
— Protect
UK commercial interests in the wider region, particularly in the
Gulf;
— Enable
the development of the UK's commercial interests in Iran, from
a base where the volume of bilateral trade is a fraction of what
it might be, and where the value of Iran as an export market and
as a location for British firms to operate is hardly explored;
— Bring
about improvements in human rights standards in Iran, notably
in relation to the use of the death penalty and in media freedom;
and
— Build
cultural and educational links which allow Iranians to see directly
what the UK has to offer, and vice versa.
This is, at present, little more than a wish list,
for reasons which we explore below.
IRAN AND THE SECURITY OF THE UK AND
ITS ALLIES IN THE REGION
9. Iran has for decades been seen as a threat to
the security of the UK and its regional partners in the Middle
East and in the Gulf. It was first designated by the US as a state
sponsor of terrorism in 1984;[19]
it supports organisations which have been proscribed by the UK
as terrorist organisations;[20]
it is ideologically committed to the destruction of the state
of Israel and has described it as the "cancer of the Middle
East";[21] it has
provided manpower, equipment and advice (including support for
intelligence-gathering capability) and billions of dollars' worth
of funding[22] to a regime
in Syria which the West regards as guilty of heinous crimes against
its own populace; it provides direct support to militias (such
as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza and the West Bank) seeking
to undermine more democratic institutions;[23]
it has threatened to force the closure of the Straits of Hormuz,
between the Gulf and the Indian Ocean, disrupting commercial shipping
(17% of the world's oil supplies pass through the Gulf every day);[24]
and it is accused of fomenting unrest in Yemen and amongst the
Shia majority in Bahrain.[25]
Iran is also alleged to have been involved in attacks against
Israeli and Jewish targets internationally.[26]
The Henry Jackson Society said simply that whereas Western governments
prized stability, the Iranian regime saw its interests as served
by instability across the Middle East and the world.[27]
10. Iran has also embarked upon a nuclear programme
which, despite assurances to the contrary from Iran, is seen by
many as having a military purpose and as being a threat to regional
security. Both Israel, which believes it would be the target of
any attack by Iran, and Saudi Arabia, which sees Iran as a rival
to its influence, have exerted pressure on Western allies to limit
that programme. There have been many years of negotiations with
Iran, initially led by a group of three EU Member States (the
UK, France and Germany) and latterly complemented by the US, Russia
and China. Recent negotiations have led to an agreement—the
Joint Plan of Action—which sets out a path which could lead
to resolution of points of difference between the two sides. Negotiations
continue and are reaching a critical stage, and the matters under
discussion are of such significance that we devote much of this
Report to them (see Chapters 3 and 4).
11. Iran's influence in Syria has potential value
to the UK but, regrettably, that potential has not been fulfilled.
The FCO suggested that Iran might, for instance, have used its
influence with the Syrian regime to secure humanitarian access
in Syria; but it had not done so.[28]
It might also have played a part in the talks in Geneva in January
and February 2014 which were designed to try to secure a democratic
transition for Syria. A belated invitation to Iran to participate
was withdrawn when it became clear that Iran was not committed
to the terms of the 2012 Geneva Communique on which the talks
were based.[29] Professor
Ansari told us that "in an ideal world", Iran should
have been represented at the talks,[30]
and the Rt Hon Jack Straw MP believed that it would have been
more helpful to have Iran "inside the wheel of negotiations"
than outside it.[31]
12. It should be noted that the foreign policy interests
of the UK and Iran have occasionally converged since 1979 and
continue to converge in some areas, for instance in bringing about
greater stability in Afghanistan (Iran's role in the 2001 Bonn
Conference, which led to the creation of a transitional government
for Afghanistan following the overthrow of the Taliban, was described
to us as "instrumental")[32]
and in combating drug trafficking in the region.[33]
Iran and the UK also share a common concern about recent advances
by ISIL[34] forces in
Iraq, although their views may differ on how that concern should
be addressed. We note that Iran is seen as the most influential
external player in domestic Iraqi affairs and has strengthened
its position in the country over the years as UK and US troops
have withdrawn.[35] The
Government has stressed the role which it expects governments
in the region to play in tackling the threat from extremism.[36]
DEVELOPMENT OF COMMERCIAL POTENTIAL
13. Iran is potentially a major export and investment
market for the UK. One witness described it as "the world's
largest largely untapped market".[37]
We were told of several sectors in which the UK had expertise
which was of particular value to Iran: these included development
of financial markets and professionalisation of the banking and
insurance sectors, rebuilding of energy infrastructure, development
of the tertiary education sector, telecommunications and IT, joint
manufacturing ventures (particularly vehicle manufacturing), water
projects, and service industries.[38]
14. For these to be taken forward, trade sanctions
currently imposed on Iran in response to its nuclear programme
would need to be lifted, and Iran would need to set aside its
reservations about foreign commercial influence in the country.
In the meantime, the Government does not encourage trade with,
or investment in, the country, describing it as "inappropriate".[39]
The Foreign Secretary told us that "we do not support, facilitate
or promote trade with Iran, and we communicate that to British
businesses".[40]
It is no surprise, therefore, that the UK is less visible in the
country,[41] and we note
that the UK's exports to Iran fell from £464 million in 2005
to just £83 million in the year to May 2011[42]
and just under £80 million in 2013,[43]
reflecting the rigorous sanctions imposed on trade with Iran.
15. We note, however, signs that Iran may be beginning
to present itself as being more open to foreign investment. At
the Davos Economic Forum in January 2014, the Iranian President,
Hassan Rouhani, and the Iranian Minister for Oil, Bijan Zanganeh,
told senior oil executives that the new administration in Iran
was keen to open up to new investments and technology.[44]
Mr Zanganeh had previously identified seven petroleum companies
that Iran might do business with, including BP.[45]
16. Businesses in some countries have already begun
to explore scope for increasing their commercial activity in Iran.
Mr Straw told us in January that planes from western Europe to
Tehran were "packed full of Italian, German, Scandinavian
and French business people reviving their business links",
and he did not understand why the UK was "going out of its
way, gratuitously and unnecessarily, to make a completely hopeless
point to the Iranians".[46]
17. A revived trading relationship between the UK
and Iran would also allow Iran to play a potentially significant
role in diversifying the UK's sources of energy and helping to
assure its energy security through supplies of oil and natural
gas. The Iranian Oil Minister was reported in May as having said
that Iran would be willing to supply Europe with gas "either
through pipeline or in liquefied natural gas form" if Russia
were to halt supplies to Europe.[47]
DISSEMINATING THE UK'S VALUES
Human rights standards
18. By all accounts, standards of human rights in
Iran are very low: we note recent descriptions of the human rights
situation in the country as "dire" and "appalling".[48]
Iran has consistently been designated by the FCO as a "country
of concern" in its annual reports on human rights and democracy.
Iran has the highest execution rate per capita in the world: according
to the FCO, at least 400 executions (largely for drug offences)
were carried out in 2013,[49]
but the true total is probably far higher. According to Amnesty
International, Iran officially acknowledged 369 executions in
2013; but Amnesty added that "hundreds more" had taken
place that year.[50]
Human Rights Watch cited reports from "reliable sources"
that indicated that the total number of executions in Iran in
2013 was over 700.[51]
The FCO notes that those executed include persons aged under 18
at the time of their alleged offence and that executions are reported
to take place without due process.[52]
19. Freedom of expression continues to be severely
restricted: the National Union of Journalists told us that radio
and television in Iran were both owned by the state and that the
private sector was not permitted to acquire or manage radio or
television services. Over 90% of the press is directly or indirectly
associated with the government, and more than 30 newspapers and
magazines not owned by the state have been banned since 2009.[53]
Iran has the second highest number of journalists in prison in
the world.[54] As we
note below, BBC World Service broadcasts and internet-based services
are subject to regular jamming and blocking.
20. The Iranian constitution (under Article 13) recognises
only three faiths other than Islam: Judaism, Christianity and
Zoroastrianism. There is nonetheless plentiful evidence of persecution
of Christians, including harassment and imprisonment on the basis
of their faith.[55] The
All-Party Parliamentary Group on the Bahá'í Faith
told us that members of the Bahá'í community—believed
to number over 300,000 in Iran—had been subjected to "a
wide-ranging, multifaceted, state-sponsored campaign of persecution
aimed at elimination of the community as a viable entity in Iran"
and were denied most rights of citizenship. It cited judgments
by courts in Iran denying Bahá'ís the right to seek
justice, redress or protection against killings, assaults or property
theft, and classifying them as "those whose blood may be
shed with impunity". The Group argued that the FCO should
press Iran to remedy this by amending or repealing Article 13
of the Iranian constitution.[56]
21. Hopes were raised by the election of President
Rouhani in June 2013, and there have been some small signs of
improvement. Various promises were made by President Rouhani during
his campaign to improve social justice; a number of political
prisoners were released in September 2013;[57]
and various media publications previously banned have been allowed
to resume publication.[58]
The Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance has also described
as "ridiculous" many of the policies adopted by Iran
to control the flow of information, including Internet filtering,
saying that "we cannot restrict the advance of [such technology]
under the pretext of protecting Islamic values."[59]
Overall, however, the FCO and others have not detected any substantive
change in the human rights situation in the country. In April
2014 there was no sign that a draft Charter of Citizens Rights
published in November 2013 had led to changes to the law or to
a different approach by judicial or security forces. Iran has
refused to accept reports by the UN Special Rapporteur on Human
Rights in Iran, Dr Ahmed Shaheed, and has denied him entry to
the country.[60]
22. The UK Government's concerns in a number of fields,
including the death penalty, freedom of religion and the workings
of the criminal justice system, were raised by the UK Chargé
d'Affaires with Iranian government officials during his visit
to Iran in March 2014; and the Foreign Secretary raised Iran's
human rights record with the Iranian Foreign Minister at the UN
General Assembly in September 2013.[61]
The FCO has contributed to international pressure on Iran to improve
its human rights record, through imposition of sanctions, support
for critical human rights resolutions at the United Nations, and
direct support for the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in
Iran.[62] We
recognise the enormous difficulties faced by the FCO in its attempts
to bring about an improvement in human rights standards in Iran.
We encourage the FCO to continue to take any opportunities that
arise, whether bilaterally or multilaterally, to reiterate the
UK's objection to unacceptable practices, including executions,
persecution of people on the grounds of their faith, and severe
restrictions on freedom of expression. No concessions should
be made on human rights in the interests of making progress in
negotiations in other fields.
Cultural and educational values
23. The principal vehicles for the UK's 'soft power'
overseas are the BBC World Service, which offers a BBC Persian
television service in Farsi, short-wave and medium-wave radio
services in Farsi, radio services in English, and a web-based
service (BBCpersian.com), in Farsi;[63]
and the British Council, which aims to promote a wider knowledge
of the UK and of the English language, and to encourage cultural,
scientific, technological and other co-operation between the UK
and other countries.[64]
In the late 1970s, the British Council's operations in Iran were
larger than in any other country in the world: it ran six country
offices and employed over 100 UK staff. However the British Council
offices in Tehran were closed in 2009 when threats and harassment
towards its locally engaged staff made operations unsustainable,[65]
and the BBC World Service has suffered regular jamming of its
broadcasts on both radio and television in Iran. Access to the
BBC Persian website has been routinely blocked.[66]
The British Council has nonetheless continued its cultural relations
work from London, working through digital means or with Iranian
stakeholders in third countries who return to Iran and pass on
knowledge and training. It told us that it had "received
indications through senior Iranian cultural relations stakeholders"
that Iran might be open to re-engagement with the Council, and
it said in its memorandum (submitted in January) that it was in
discussion with the FCO on when conditions might be right to pursue
openings.[67]
Pursuing the UK's interests
24. The challenges to the UK's relationship with
Iran are multiple and profound. Progress in pursuing the UK's
interests within Iran seems a remote prospect until a more trusting
bilateral relationship has been established, and that will require
at least partial resolution of concerns held by the UK about Iran's
role in regional security and stability. Many of those concerns
are widely shared and are being addressed in international fora,
through the UN and through negotiations alongside other UN Security
Council members and Germany (the "P5+1") on Iran's nuclear
programme. Pursuing commercial interests and UK values, however,
is more of a bilateral task for the FCO and its partners; but
that has been difficult while diplomatic relations have been minimal
and the opportunities to exert influence within Iran have been
almost nil.
DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION
25. The history of bilateral diplomatic relations
between the UK and Iran since the Islamic Revolution in 1979 is
chequered, and the relationship has not been an easy one for the
FCO to manage. The UK closed its embassy in Tehran in 1980, following
the Islamic Revolution, since when diplomatic representation in
Tehran has been intermittent:
— Sept
1980: Embassy closed; a British Interests Section was maintained
in the Swedish Embassy;
— June
1987: Representation reduced even further, to one Visa Officer;
— Dec
1988 to Feb 1989: re-opening of Embassy, staffed by a Chargé
d'Affaires;
— Feb
1989: closure again due to the fatwa against Salman Rushdie;
— Oct
1990 to May 1999: Embassy re-opened and staffed by a Chargé
d'Affaires;[68]
— May
1999 to Nov 2011: Full diplomatic relations re-established, with
Ambassador.
26. The latest rupture in UK-Iran relations was on
29 November 2011, when the British Embassy premises in Tehran
were stormed by a mob, in response to a decision by the EU to
extend sanctions. The Ambassador's residence and the homes of
staff in the city-centre compound were vandalised and looted,
and the main Embassy office building was set on fire. A second
Embassy compound in north Tehran was also attacked, and staff
homes were looted. Iranian police belatedly gave assistance, and
all staff were accounted for.[69]
The Iranian Foreign Minister expressed regret over the attack.[70]
The UK closed the Embassy as soon as staff had left and required
the immediate closure of the Iranian Embassy in London. "Protecting
powers" were appointed: Sweden looked after British interests
(as it had done in the 1980s), while Oman looked after Iranian
interests in the UK.
27. While the Tehran Embassy has been closed, the
FCO's Iran operations have been run from FCO premises in Dubai.
However, on 8 October 2013, the Foreign Secretary announced to
the House of Commons that the UK and Iran would each appoint a
non-resident chargé d'affaires "tasked with implementing
the building of relations, including interim steps on the way
towards eventual re-opening of both our embassies, as well as
dialogue on other issues of mutual concern".[71]
The newly-appointed Chargé d'Affaires, Mr Ajay Sharma,
visited Tehran on 3 December 2013 and held discussions with the
Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs about "taking forward
the bilateral relationship on a step by step and reciprocal basis";
and he also visited the damaged British Embassy compounds in Tehran.[72]
Mr Sharma has made a number of subsequent visits to Tehran, and,
in a further sign of steady restoration of relations, the temporary
appointment of Sweden and Oman as protecting powers was brought
to a close on 24 February this year.[73]
28. We asked the Foreign Secretary in March what
steps would need to be taken before the UK would be prepared to
reopen the Embassy in Tehran. He replied that "we have to
go on our judgment of behaviour and [Iranians'] readiness to allow
an embassy to perform its normal diplomatic functions and for
its staff to be safe and secure". He did not believe that
there was "a crucial form of words or piece of paper",
and he added that he had told the Iranian Foreign Minister in
January that he hoped to make a decision "within a few months"
about further steps about the reopening "even in a small
way" of the Embassy. [74]
He made it clear that while the Foreign Ministry might be well-disposed
to the re-opening of the Embassy—the previous Foreign Minister
had sounded "horrified" on the day the Embassy was stormed
in November 2011—the UK was looking for signs that other
centres of power in Iran were willing to provide genuine reassurances.[75]
29. Shortly before we agreed this Report, the FCO
announced that the circumstances were "right" to reopen
the Embassy in Tehran, once a range of practical issues had been
resolved; and it was expected that Iran would choose to reopen
their Embassy in London. Only a limited range of services would
at first be offered by the Embassy in Tehran, and applicants for
visas for entry to the UK would still have to apply to Abu Dhabi
or Istanbul.[76]
CONSEQUENCES OF REDUCED DIPLOMATIC
REPRESENTATION
30. The decision to close the UK Embassy in Tehran
in November 2011 was a necessary one, and the Government had no
choice in the matter. However, it brought yet another interruption
to the UK's ability to understand the Iranian outlook and to maintain
and build the personal contacts which are essential to constructive
diplomatic relations. During the closure, the FCO has been largely
reliant upon third parties, media reports, intelligence reports
and missions of other countries for information on public opinion
and shifts in political power. It seems that the UK did not expect
Mr Rouhani to win the presidency,[77]
but then nor did others who are seasoned Iran-watchers.
31. The problem faced by the FCO in gaining country
knowledge while diplomatic relations are at a low level is not
a recent one in Iran. Professor Ansari (Director of the Institute
for Iranian Studies at the University of St. Andrews) believed
that there had been periods in the 1990s when the UK's 'readings'
of Iran "had not been as good as they could have been".
Part of the reason had been that many of the "old hands"
at the Foreign Office were retiring, and there was no functioning
embassy in Tehran, and therefore no new people were coming up
to take those positions.[78]
Ben Wallace MP (Co-Chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group
on Iran) described knowledge on Iran within the FCO as having
been "intermittent";[79]
but Mr Straw said that there was still a cadre of Farsi speakers
with experience in Tehran,[80]
and Professor Ansari believed that there was still "good
and growing expertise" on Iran in the UK.[81]
32. Not only has the flow of information to the FCO
been disrupted: the projection within Iran of the UK and what
it has to offer is currently minimal. The British Council said
in its submission to this inquiry that "the prolonged period
of silence between the UK and Iran has resulted in the UK being
less visible in the country" and that as a result, other
countries "are now looked at as better choice partners in
international relations".[82]
This is disappointing, given the extent and power of British influence
in Iran in the past and the respect which the UK commanded then
and continues to command in some quarters, however grudgingly.[83]
Professor Ansari has written of "the intimacy of a historical
relationship [between the UK and Iran] which is profound, frequently
affectionate and essentially respectful".[84]
33. Unsurprisingly, we found little evidence to suggest
that the UK now has much individual leverage in Iran, although
that observation is qualified, as we did not visit Iran and so
were unable to talk to key figures in the country. The reasons
for the apparent lack of leverage lie partly in historic suspicion
of the UK's motives—Mr Straw said that Iran had portrayed
the UK as "a villain of the piece for at least a century
and a half"[85]—and
partly in Iran's decision at the time of the Islamic Revolution
in 1979 to detach itself from Western influence.
34. A further difficulty arising from the interruptions
in direct diplomatic representation in Tehran and London was put
forward by Professor Anoush Ehteshami, Chair in International
Relations at Durham University, who argued that the UK needed
to be seen to have a presence in Tehran and to have direct access
to the Iranian leadership if it was to be able to reassure regional
allies that any deal with Iran on the nuclear programme would
not be at their expense.[86]
We were made aware of concerns in Saudi Arabia on this point
in our recent inquiry into relations with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.[87]
35. The FCO told us that, partly driven by concerns
about Iranian activity, it had in recent years sought to deepen
existing defence and security cooperation with allies in the Gulf,
through "basing arrangements for UK military assets, strategic
dialogue on security matters, training and partnering arrangements
(including on countering violent extremism) and defence equipment
sales".[88] The
Foreign Secretary gave a personal assurance in a speech at the
Manama Dialogue[89] in
Bahrain in December 2013:
I assure you that the agreement [the Joint Plan
of Action] does not for us in the UK imply any diminution in the
commitments of external powers to our alliances in the region,
or to the security of its vital sea lanes, or to the struggle
against terrorism. Engagement on the nuclear question should not
mean a free pass for Iran on other issues in the region.[90]
The Prime Minister told the Knesset in March that
he shared Israel's "deep scepticism and great concern about
Iran" and was not "starry-eyed" about the new regime,
adding that Britain would never allow "a nuclear-armed Iran".[91]
36. The
storming of the UK Embassy by an Iranian mob in Tehran in 2011
was reprehensible and should never have been permitted by Iranian
security forces. We welcome the recent decision to re-open the
Embassy in Tehran, and we understand why the Foreign Secretary
adopted a cautious approach towards the revival of diplomatic
relations. We question, however, whether the UK waited too long
for assurances on security which were never going to be forthcoming
from all quarters of the Iranian hierarchy. The lack of full diplomatic
representation in Iran hinders the UK's ability to shape events,
gather information, and reassure its regional allies that it could
make fully informed assessments of Iranian opinion and intentions.
37. There is
a serious risk that longstanding allies in the Gulf and elsewhere
in the region will feel overlooked if the UK does not invest considerable
diplomatic effort in reassurance. The UK and others need to be
able to show an early dividend from the Joint Plan of Action if
they are to retain confidence in the initiative amongst their
regional allies.
HAS THE UK ALLOWED ITSELF TO BE TOO
CLOSELY IDENTIFIED WITH THE US?
38. The UK has been bracketed in many Iranian minds
with the US, the ultimate bogeyman for Iran. We asked witnesses
whether the UK might, over the years, have benefited from taking
a policy line which was more independent from that of the US.
Sir Robert Cooper, a former Counsellor for the European External
Action Service from 2010 to 2012, and someone who had been closely
involved in negotiations with Iran on its nuclear programme, pointed
out that the UK had acted independently from the US in 2002 and
2003 when the extent of the Iranian nuclear programme first became
known and when it became clear that Iran had breached obligations
under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. Then
it was EU Member States, in the shape of Foreign Ministers from
the UK, France and Germany, that reached an agreement in October
2003 in Tehran with Dr Rouhani, then Secretary of Iran's Supreme
National Security Council, on suspension of Iran's enrichment
and processing activities. That initiative had been made with
the knowledge of the US but, as Sir Robert told us, "it was
not US policy at the time to talk to Iran at all".[92]
39. However, Mr Straw told us that two years later,
when the French and German governments were prepared to discuss
a deal (which would have entailed the conversion of Iranian low-enriched
uranium to fuel rods) the US had blocked attempts to reach a deal.
According to a former senior Iranian negotiator, Seyed Moussavian,
the UK had vetoed the proposal at the insistence of the United
States: "They were ready to compromise but the US was an
obstacle".[93] Mr
Straw has argued forcefully that the failure of the deal in 2005
strengthened the hardliners in Iran and helped pave the way for
a far less co-operative regime under the new President Ahmadinejad.[94]
40. US policy on Iran subsequently evolved from a
policy of insistence on "red lines" to a point where
it was prepared to take part in negotiations; and, under the Obama
Administration, it has sought to take more of an initiative to
engage Iran in meaningful negotiations on the nuclear issue. Discreet
bilateral talks in Oman from March 2013 onwards helped to pave
the way for the latest negotiations on the nuclear programme.[95]
Mr Kessler, representing the Henry Jackson Society, told us (with
a hint of regret) that the UK had essentially "toed the Obama
Administration's line on Iran, on engagement", and that it
had been France which had taken the toughest position, insisting
on concessions from Iran before the Joint Plan of Action was finally
agreed. He suggested that "perhaps a worse Joint Plan of
Action would have been drafted if not for French intervention".[96]
When we asked the Foreign Secretary about the measure of the UK's
independence from US policy towards Iran, he stressed that policy
on Iran could not succeed without strong international co-ordination
and unity, and he believed that if European policy were to be
detached from US policy, attempts to bring Iran towards an agreement
would be neither effective nor successful.[97]
41. There are
signs that the UK's willingness to follow the lead of the US in
opposing a possible deal with Iran in 2005 meant that an opportunity
to make progress in resolving concerns about Iran's nuclear programme
was lost, although we cannot know whether an acceptable compromise
could actually have been reached at the time. We welcome the subsequent
convergence of UK and US policy on Iran and its nuclear programme.
We see it as a considerable success that a united front has been
maintained by the P5+1 countries in recent negotiations, and that
Iran has been presented with little or no obvious opportunity
to prey on differences between members of the P5+1 negotiating
team. We commend the FCO for its work in cementing the combined
approach.
POSSIBLE STEPS TO INDICATE GOODWILL
TO IRAN: RECOGNISING PAST EVENTS
42. At a round table event on Iran hosted by the
British Academy in February and attended by several former senior
diplomats, Members and leading figures from academic institutions,
several people spoke of the value of symbolic gestures which the
UK might make at little or no cost but which could nonetheless
send a welcome signal to Iran and generate goodwill. It was said,
for instance, that the UK could do more to recognise publicly
the scale of Iranian suffering in its war with Iraq from 1980
to 1988 (a war in which Iraq was the provocateur and in which
Iran lost an estimated 1 million lives).
43. More controversially, perhaps, the UK could acknowledge
its part—alongside the US—in fomenting the unrest
which led to the overthrow of Prime Minister Mossadeq in Tehran
in 1953, something which rankles still in Iran. The British Government
at the time saw Mr Mossadeq as a serious threat to its strategic
and economic interests after he had nationalised the British-owned
Anglo-Persian Oil Company, latterly known as BP. A joint operation
by the CIA and by British intelligence services helped to depose
Mr Mossadeq and to install a more pro-Western government. President
Obama acknowledged the US role in a speech in Cairo in 2009, and
US papers revealing the CIA role (and indeed British involvement)
were declassified last year; but the UK has not yet formally acknowledged
its role.[98]
44. Iran sets store by reciprocity, and the chances
of securing any concession from Iran are higher if it can be seen
to match an equivalent concession from the UK. While it should
be for the FCO to judge when the right time might be for a gesture
such as a statement by the UK recognising the scale of Iranian
suffering during the Iran-Iraq war, or acknowledgement of any
UK role in the overthrow of Prime Minister Mossadeq in 1953, we
believe that the FCO should be prepared to take such a step if
the circumstances warrant it and if Iran also makes a similar
public gesture recognising its own support for terrorism, attack
on the British Embassy or other past behaviour.
VISAS FOR IRANIANS TO ENTER THE
UK
45. The closure of the British Embassy in Tehran
in 2011 and the downgrading of diplomatic relations led to the
withdrawal of facilities in Tehran to issue visas to enter the
UK; so applicants from Iran have had to visit Istanbul or Abu
Dhabi, at considerable cost. The closure of the visa office and
the difficulties in making international transfers of funds under
the sanctions regime have combined to reduce numbers of Iranian
students studying in the UK to below 4,000.[99]
Entry clearance visas issued to Iranian nationals for study in
the UK have fallen from 3,247 in 2010 to just 915 in 2013.[100]
The British Council told us that countries which had maintained
embassies and cultural centres in Iran had enjoyed consistent
growth in student numbers, and it cited Germany, which now has
almost 5,000 Iranian students studying at its universities, as
having overtaken the UK.[101]
46. The FCO regrets the consequences of the closure
of its visa office and acknowledges the drop in the number of
students applying for visas, although it says it remains committed
to fostering educational links.[102]
However, the UK has not taken steps to simplify the process for
Iranians who have to travel to other countries to apply for visas.
It has not, for instance, made arrangements for passports to be
returned to applications at the outset, once details have been
verified, rather than at the end of the process; nor does it seem
willing to consider contracting out the handling of applications
to a third party in Tehran. Any action on this front would be
a matter primarily for the Home Office; but the FCO could if it
chose make the case for easing the application process while maintaining
its rigour, in the interests of strengthening educational and
cultural links between the UK and Iran and showing goodwill. It
is not clear how long it will be before a UK visa section re-opens
in Tehran. In the meantime, we recommend that the FCO press
the Home Office to agree to practical measures which would reduce
the burden on Iranians applying for entry clearance to the UK
while maintaining the rigour of the process.
2 Professor Ansari Q 45 Back
3
Sir Robert Cooper Q 40 Back
4
United Nations Population Fund figure Back
5
Memorandum from the British Council, paragraph 4.2 Back
6
It is estimated that there are between 66 million and 70 million
Shia Muslims in Iran: see Pew Research Center, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/06/18/the-sunni-shia-divide-where-they-live-what-they-believe-and-how-they-view-each-other/ Back
7
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2013_en_summary.pdf
Back
8
Memorandum from the British Council, paragraph 4.2 Back
9
HC Deb 24 January 2012 col 169 Back
10
See memorandum from Professor Ehteshami, paragraph 7, also http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/22/us-iran-oil-exports-idUSBREA0L12520140122
and http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/31/us-iran-oil-exports-idUSBRE90U01Y20130131 Back
11
http://www.bicc.org.uk/in-iran.html#link08 Back
12
World Bank figure Back
13
See New York Times 10 October 2012 Back
14
Memorandum from Professor Ehteshami, paragraph 7 Back
15
World Bank figure. See also memorandum from Mal Craghill, para 1 Back
16
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/09/19/us-iran-unemployment-idUSBRE88I0TA20120919 Back
17
Memorandum from the National Iranian American Council, paragraph 2 Back
18
Adapted from the FCO's Purpose and Priorities 2013-14: see FCO
Annual Report and Accounts 2013-14, pages 9 and 10 Back
19
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm; see also memorandum from the Community Security Trust,
paragraph 2 Back
20
Memorandum from the Henry Jackson Society, paragraph 36 Back
21
Professor Johnson Q 161, memorandum from BICOM paragraph 12 Back
22
HC Deb, 13 March 2014, col 277W Back
23
Memorandum from the FCO, page 10 Back
24
HL Deb, 24 January 2012, col 946; see also FCO memorandum section 5 Back
25
See memorandum from the FCO, section 5; also Committee's Fifth Report of Session 2013-14,
The UK's relations with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, HC 88,paragraph
216 Back
26
Memorandum from BICOM paragraph 19 Back
27
Memorandum from the Henry Jackson Society, paragraph 35 Back
28
Memorandum from the FCO, page 10 Back
29
HC Deb 21 January 2014 col 140 Back
30
Q 73 Back
31
Q 109 Back
32
Memorandum from the National Iranian American Council, paragraph 8 Back
33
Memorandum from the FCO, sections 1 and 5. See also HC Deb 16 June 2014 col 858 Back
34
ISIL and ISIS are acronyms for alternative translations of the
Arabic name for the main jihadist militant group active in parts
of Iraq and Syria. ISIL stands for the Islamic State of Iraq and
the Levant; ISIS stands for the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham.
We use ISIL in this Report, on the basis that "Levant"
is the most accurate translation for "al-Sham". Back
35
It has been argued that Iran was instrumental in convincing rival
Shia groups in Iraq to form an alliance which became the core
of the government after the national elections in Iraq in 2010.
See Iraq Ten Years On, Chapter 12, Chatham House, 2013,
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Middle%20East/0513pr_iraqtenyearson.pdf Back
36
HL Deb 25 June 2014 col 1317 Back
37
Mr Kessler Q 190 Back
38
Memorandum from Professor Ehteshami, paragraph 4, memorandum from Mal Craghill, paragraph 4,
memorandum from the British Council, paragraph 3.5 Back
39
https://www.gov.uk/sanctions-on-iran. See
also HC Deb 7 April 2014 col 140W Back
40
Q 218 Back
41
Memorandum from the British Council, paragraph 3.5 Back
42
http://ibchamber.org/ibchamber/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=9&Itemid=34 Back
43
Information supplied by the House of Commons Library, using data
drawn from https://www.uktradeinfo.com/Pages/Home.aspx. See also
Lord Lamont, Chairman of the British Iranian Chamber of Commerce,
http://www.bicc.org.uk/ab-chairman.html Back
44
See Financial Times 23 January 2014
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6323be74-842d-11e3-b72e-00144feab7de.html#axzz36EbNOeWs Back
45
Memorandum from Mal Craghill, paragraph 4; also Daily Telegraph
4 December 2013 Back
46
Q 95. See also http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/the_eus_sanctions_regime_against_iran_in_the_aftermath_of_the_jpa310
Back
47
Work on text of Iran deal starts, European Voice, 8 May
2014 Back
48
Mr Hague Q 197; also HL Deb 3 March 2014 col WA 288 Back
49
Human Rights and Democracy: 2013 FCO Report, Command Paper 8870,
April 2014, page 215 Back
50
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ACT50/001/2014/en/652ac5b3-3979-43e2-b1a1-6c4919e7a518/act500012014en.pdf Back
51
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/06/12/iran-halt-execution-33-sunnis Back
52
Human Rights and Democracy: 2013 FCO Report, Command Paper 8870,
April 2014, page 216 Back
53
Memorandum from the NUJ Back
54
Memorandum from the FCO, section 6 Back
55
Human Rights and Democracy: 2013 FCO Report, Command Paper 8870,
April 2014, page 216 to 217 Back
56
Memorandum from the All-Party Parliamentary Group on the Bahá'í Faith, paragraph 7.2 Back
57
HL Deb 3 March 2014 col WA 288 Back
58
Human Rights and Democracy: 2013 FCO Report, Command Paper 8870,
April 2014, page 214 Back
59 http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/in-iran-a-battle-over-control-of-media-and-culture-is-heating-up/2014/03/13/a01e89f8-7468-4916-8939-643cce16498e_story.html Back
60
Human Rights and Democracy: 2013 FCO Report, Command Paper 8870,
April 2014, page 213 Back
61
See HL Deb 13 May 2014 col 482WA and HC Deb 12 May 2014 col 352W Back
62
Memorandum from the FCO, section 6 Back
63
Evidence submitted by the BBC World Service to The FCO's human
rights work in 2012, Fourth Report of Session 2013-14, HC
267 Back
64
See Royal Charter at http://www.britishcouncil.org/sites/britishcouncil.uk2/files/royalcharter.pdf Back
65
Memorandum from the British Council, paragraph 2.1 Back
66
Evidence submitted by the BBC World Service to The FCO's human
rights work in 2012, Fourth Report of Session 2013-14, HC
267 Back
67
Memorandum from the British Council, paragraph 3.6 Back
68
Except from a six-month period in 1997 when all Heads of Mission
from EU Member States in Tehran were withdrawn following the conviction
by a German court of four Iranians for the murder of a group of
Iranian exiles in Berlin in 1992, and the finding that Iranian
state agencies had participated. Back
69
HC Deb 30 November 2011 col 959 Back
70
HC Deb 30 November 2011 col 960 Back
71
HC Deb 8 October 2013 col 28 Back
72
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ajay-sharma-makes-first-visit-to-iran-as-non-resident-charge-daffaires Back
73
HC Deb 24 February 2014 col 29 Back
74
Q 217 Back
75
Q 216; also HC Deb 24 February 2014 col 41 Back
76
HC Deb 17 June 2014 col 80WS Back
77
Q 196 Back
78
Q 46 Back
79
Q 92 Back
80
Q 93 Back
81
Q 46 Back
82
Memorandum from the British Council, paragraph 3.5 Back
83
Professor Ansari Q 46-47. See also memorandum submitted to our
predecessors in 2000 by Professor Ali Ansari, published with Iran:
Interim Report, Second Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee,
HC 80, Session 2000-01. Back
84
The Myth of 'Perfidious Albion': Anglo-Iranian Relations in
Historical Perspective, Asian Affairs, Vol XLIV, no. III Back
85
Q 98 Back
86
Memorandum from Professor Ehteshami, paragraph 11 Back
87
Neil Partrick, Associate Fellow, RUSI, evidence given on 22 January
2013, Q 30, published with the Fifth Report of the Committee,
HC 88 (Session 2013-14) Back
88
Memorandum from the FCO, section 5 Back
89
The Manama Dialogue is a forum for the national security establishments
of participating states (states in the Middle East and outside
powers with security interests in the Gulf) to exchange views
on regional security challenges. Back
90
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/2014-making-the-wheels-of-diplomacy-turn Back
91
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/david-camerons-speech-to-the-knesset-in-israel
Back
92
Q 9 Back
93
See http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/06/u-s-rejected-2005-iranian-offer-ensuring-no-nuclear-weapons/;
also http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/18/us-iran-nuclear-talks-idUSBREA4H05Q20140518 Back
94
Q 82 and Q 101 Back
95
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25086236; see also
Mr Hague, Q 202 Back
96
Q 170. See 'Not there yet' The Economist, 16 November 2013,
for an account of the French negotiating position. Back
97
Q 201 Back
98
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23762970 Back
99
Memorandum from the British Council, para 4.6 Back
100
Figures supplied by the House of Commons Library, drawn from Immigration
Statistics January-March 2014, Table be_06_q_s, Home Office Back
101
Memorandum from the British Council, paragraph 4.6 Back
102
Memorandum from the FCO, section 1 Back
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