Conclusions and recommendations
Criteria for designating countries of concern
1. We welcome the
FCO's efforts to draw upon a wider range of indices in assessing
and reaching decisions on human rights standards in individual
countries. We note, however, that there is still an element of
subjectivity in making the final decision on the countries of
concern, and the level of UK influence in a country, and the impact
on its interests there, are factors in determining the final designation.
The FCO's list of countries of concern is therefore not an objective
league table of the world's worst human rights offenders but a
subset of these countries on which the FCO will focus. (Paragraph
8)
Bahrain
2. We see little or
no evidence that Bahrain has made enough progress in implementing
political reform and safeguarding human rights, and we believe
that the FCO should have bitten the bullet and designated Bahrain
as a country of concern. (Paragraph 13)
Egypt
3. We recognise, however,
that attempts are being made, through a new constitution and setting
up of parliamentary elections, to lay the foundations for a more
democratic and representative Egypt. We attach key importance
to the promised reforms being implemented. (Paragraph 17)
Case study countries
4. There is merit
in a 'halfway house' concept and in flagging countries where there
is a risk of deterioration in human rights severe enough to warrant
future designation as country of concern. However, we are not
convinced that 'case study' is an appropriate term for such countries.
It is misleadingly soft on countries that would benefit from a
more critical assessment by the FCO. We recommend that the FCO
use the term case study purely for illustrating FCO activity and
human rights programmes. A different term should be used for countries
which the FCO is signalling are at risk of being designated country
of concern in future. (Paragraph 18)
Accountability of the FCO's human rights work
5. We believe that
human rights policy, like any other aspect of government policy,
would benefit from the establishment of clearly defined objectives
and benchmarks to measure outcomes. We recommend that FCO, in
next year's report, include short sections outlining objectives
for, and evaluation of, each of its key initiatives, and we reiterate
our recommendation from our report on the FCO's work in 2011,
that the FCO should assess its work and should experiment with
accountability measures for its human rights programmes. (Paragraph
24)
6. We believe that
it would be in the interests of transparency if summaries of discussions
at meetings of the Advisory Group on Human Rights and its sub-groups
were published. (Paragraph 25)
7. While we recognise
the difficulty in estimating total costs of the FCO's human rights
work, an annual figure compiled on a consistent basis, even if
inexact, would be useful in showing trends in spending over the
years. We believe that the FCO analysis was useful and encourage
the FCO to provide equivalent figures in future years. (Paragraph
26)
8. We recommend that
the FCO review the configuration of its funding mechanisms for
human rights programmes. The FCO should provide funding to longer-term
human rights projects that extend beyond the current 12 month
timeframe. (Paragraph 27)
Sri Lanka
9. We recommend that
the FCO, in its response to this report, outline how it monitored
whether people who spoke with the Prime Minister about human rights
have faced reprisals, and whether the FCO has any knowledge of
reprisal attacks on people who met the British delegation during
its visit to Sri Lanka in November 2013. (Paragraph 30)
10. We recommend that
the Government encourages the new Indian administration to give
public support to the OHCHR international investigation on Sri
Lanka. (Paragraph 35)
11. We recommend that
the Government negotiates with its EU partners to remove GSP status
from Sri Lanka, if the Government of Sri Lanka does not allow
the OHCHR investigating team into the country and uphold the right
of human right defenders to engage with the UN human rights system.
(Paragraph 37)
Burma
12. We recommend that
the Government reiterate to the Government of Burma that the current
situation is still highly unsatisfactory, and that the UK will
strongly advocate the re-imposition of sanctions by the EU if
there is no progress over the next 12 months in improving the
conditions of the Rohingya community, and in securing the unconditional
release of all political prisoners. We also recommend that the
UK Government closely monitors whether former political prisoners
who wish to stand for elections in 2015 are able to do so. (Paragraph
45)
Bedouins of Israel
13. We believe the
British Government should play a more prominent part in helping
to resolve the conflict between Israel and the Bedouin community,
and should use its standing with the Israeli government and the
Bedouin community to promote a peaceful, negotiated settlement.
(Paragraph 52)
The Prevention of Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative
14. We recommend that
the Government bring forward proposals in its response to this
report for tracking implementation of commitments under the Preventing
Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative. We see advantage in an
accountability exercise funded by the Government but undertaken
by a non-governmental body, rather than by the FCO itself, reporting
to this Committee on the implementation of commitments. (Paragraph
58)
Women, peace and security
15. We recommend that,
in future, the implementation plan for women, peace and security
should be published in conjunction with each new National Action
Plan to ensure that it is not just words, and that action will
follow. (Paragraph 60)
16. The UK is lagging
behind its Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) partners in using the OECD's Gender Equality Policy Marker.
The Marker is used by OECD countries to check whether their aid-related
activities promote women's rights. We recommend that the Government
should use the Marker to identify all aid which supports the advancement
of gender equality, as a way of increasing transparency of expenditure.
(Paragraph 63)
17. We believe that
the Government's initiative to increase the involvement of women
in peace and security discussions would have benefited from greater
participation of women at the NATO Summit, including participation
by women representing civil society who would suffer as a result
of any deterioration in the security situation. (Paragraph 64)
Children's human rights
18. The FCO should
do more to demonstrate publicly its support for children's rights.
As we observed last year, one simple way for the FCO to improve
engagement with child rights groups is for the Foreign Secretary
to appoint a child rights expert to his Advisory Group on Human
Rights. This would provide reassurance that children's rights
are represented at the FCO, and the FCO has the necessary support
to deal with these issues. (Paragraph 67)
FCO's work on freedom of religion or belief
19. We welcome the
steps taken by the FCO in promoting the right to freedom of religion
or belief. Given the rising trend in restrictions on the right
to freedom of religion or belief and the role religious intolerance
plays in fuelling conflict, we also welcome the FCO's indication
that spending on project work to support freedom of religion or
belief will rise from 2013-14 levels. The formation of a sub-group
of the Secretary of State's Advisory Group on Human Rights to
advise specifically on freedom of religion or belief is a sensible
and worthwhile step. We recommend that the FCO publish the strategy
being drawn up by the sub-group specifying what the FCO is trying
to achieve and how it plans to spend the funding allocated to
project work. The strategy should specify which countries the
FCO is targeting, if any, which partners it plans to engage with,
and what practical steps it will take to bring about change. (Paragraph
76)
UK's participation in the UN Human Rights Council
20. Whilst we recognise
the difficulties of garnering support at the UN Security Council
for action against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North
Korea), the gravity of the human rights violations by North Korea
is so severe that the UK and its partners at the UN Security Council
should not be seen to stand by. We encourage the FCO not to give
up on using UN organs, including the Security Council, to bring
pressure to bear on North Korea to improve the human rights of
the population, and to work towards securing referral of North
Korea to the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity.
(Paragraph 83)
21. There is a clearly
a difference of opinion between the UK Government and the UN Special
Rapporteur on whether there is international consensus on the
legal parameters surrounding the use of drones. We believe that
the Government should acknowledge this and provide a written response
detailing its points of disagreement with the UN Special Rapporteur's
findings to both Parliament and the UN Human Rights Council. (Paragraph
88)
22. We find it surprising
that the Home Office was unable to facilitate a request, even
at short notice, from a UN Special Rapporteur to visit Yarl's
Wood immigration detention centre. It sets a dangerous precedent
for other countries to follow suit and has caused embarrassment
to the UK. We welcome the Minister's assurance that the FCO is
developing a new process to work with other government departments
to improve cross-Whitehall preparations for future visits by UN
Special Rapporteurs. (Paragraph 91)
Business and human rights
23. We note support
for the National Action Plan on Business and Human Rights from
some human rights organisations such as Amnesty International
UK, but we also note concerns about whether it will be fully implemented,
whether there is political will to develop it, and whether it
lacks teeth. If the Action Plan is to command confidence, the
Government should indicate that mandatory measures are being held
in reserve if voluntary measures are not effective in improving
business respect for human rights. (Paragraph 95)
24. The Government
maintains that human rights and business interests go hand in
hand. This was undermined by UK Government Ministers sending conflicting
messages that appeared to indicate that advocating human rights
was subservient to promoting UK trade and investment. The Government
should recognise that this conflict exists: by doing so, the Government
would be better able to articulate how it is able to achieve both
of its legitimate foreign policy objectives. In cases where a
conflict arises, such as when the Government engages in business
with an authoritarian regime, and particularly when it sells arms
to such a regime, the Government should set out explicitly how
UK trade and investment would help to influence positive change
in human rights in that country. (Paragraph 98)
| 
