Conclusions and recommendations
The Kurdistan Region's dispute with Baghdad, and
the UK's role
1. It
is for the people of Iraq, and their governments, to sort out
their disagreements, and by constitutional means. Where the UK
considers that Iraq's constitution is not being respected, by
either the federal or Kurdistan Regional Government, it should
not be afraid to express views, but should be mindful that the
UK's complex history of involvement in Iraq may not always make
it best placed to be a candid friend. We expect that in the vast
majority of cases, it is best that advice and views are offered
through private and informal channels, as appears to currently
be the case. Whatever Iraq's long-term future, we agree with the
UK Government that its current diplomatic priority should be to
help all of Iraq's communities and democratic institutions, including
the federal and Kurdistan Regional Governments, mend fences and
unite against the threat from ISIL. (Paragraph 33)
The Kurdistan Regional Government as a partner for
the UK Government, and its record on democracy and human rights
2. The
Kurdistan Region of Iraq is a genuine democracy, albeit an imperfect
and still developing one, and a beacon of tolerance and moderation
in a wider region where extremism and instability are on the rise.
Its values are broadly our values. The UK is fortunate to have
in such a volatile part of the world a partner as relatively moderate,
pragmatic, stable, democratic, secular and reflexively pro-Western
as the KRG. It is emphatically in the best interests of the UK
that the Kurdistan Region continues on its path of democratic
development, and has friends and supporters as it does so, particularly
at this time of crisis for the Region, when the progress it has
achieved over the last 20 years is under threat. The UK Government
should engage with it on that basis. (Paragraph 47)
3. The Kurdistan Regional
Government acknowledges ongoing challenges in developing its democratic
institutions and its human and civil rights culture, and in advancing
gender equality, and should be judged on how it responds to these
challenges. There are also concerns as to public corruption and
media freedom that it must address. In addition, as the Kurdistan
Regional Government has stated that it would welcome the UK's
mentoring and support in connection with some of these areas,
we urge the UK Government to respond positively to this invitation.
(Paragraph 48)
Strategic value of the UK-Kurdistan Region relationship
4. The
Kurdistan Regional Government has strategic value for the UK Government
as a bridge to other regional powers with whom direct dialogue
may be difficult, but which the UK must work with in order to
achieve the policies to which it is committed. We urge the UK
Government to be mindful that if it is unable fully to reciprocate
the Kurdistan Regional Government's offer of closer partnership,
the KRG might be reluctantly compelled to look elsewhere for support
including to regimes whose values and interests do not always
match those of the UK. (Paragraph 55)
UK-Kurdistan Region governmental links
5. We
request a progress report from the UK Government on whether the
joint ministerial committee agreed with the KRG in May 2014 has
yet met and has an agreed programme, and on progress made so far
in mentoring the KRG in civil service and public sector reform.
(Paragraph 58)
The FCO's presence in the Kurdistan Region
6. The
FCO has stated that it is committed to having a permanent consular
presence in Erbil for the foreseeable future. This is welcome,
given the strategic importance of the Kurdistan Region and the
importance of strengthening links with its government and people.
However, current consular arrangements are simply not acceptable
for the UK: a permanent Security Council member deeply involved
in diplomatic and military efforts to repel Islamist terrorism
in Iraq and Syria and to resolve both countries' political crises,
particularly given that other states, less deeply involved in
these issues than the UK government, have some time ago secured
bespoke premises. The FCO must now make it its priority to ensure
that work proceeds on new consular premises, as a concrete demonstration
of the UK's commitment to relations with the Kurdistan Region
and in recognition of the importance of the Region and its government
to the UK, particularly as partners in the fight against terrorism.
We also ask the UK Government to take steps to ensure that the
Consulate General is staffed to a level commensurate with its
current importance to UK interests. (Paragraph 64)
Direct air links
7. Given
the interest there appears to be in establishing a direct UK-Erbil
air link, it is disappointing that this may have been held up
by the need for a UK Border Agency inspection of Erbil airport.
We press for such an inspection to be made at the earliest opportunity.
(Paragraph 71)
UK Government policy on the Anfal
8. The
terrible events of the Anfal campaign conducted against the Kurdish
people in the 1980s appear to meet the UN definition of "genocide".
We understand the reasons that have caused the Government not
to formally recognise the Anfal as a genocide, but also note that
its approach has caused disappointment in the Kurdistan Region
and that foreign governments have chosen to recognise past atrocities
as genocide, notwithstanding the absence of a legal ruling by
a recognised international tribunal. We encourage the UK Government
to maintain a dialogue with the Kurdistan Regional Government
on the issue, including on what judicial and non-judicial criteria
the UK Government may use to determine whether acts constitute
genocide. We welcome the Government's recognition of Anfal Day
and would encourage it to continue to reflect on other ways in
which it could help commemorate the Anfal, in order to show its
identification with the suffering endured by the Kurdish people.
(Paragraph 79)
UK policy on combatting ISIL in Iraq
9. The
overall impression given by the UK Government's policy on ISIL
in Iraq during 2014 is one of caution, responding to events as
they unfolded rather than anticipating them, and we note that
UK military assistance has been limited. However, we recognise
that it was not unreasonable for the Government to proceed with
caution, given the complexities of Iraqi politics and the UK's
Iraq War legacy. It was right for the UK Government to assist
the Peshmerga and to join in air strikes; on strategic grounds,
because it was vital to support our friends and allies in the
Kurdistan Region and to help build their morale, and on humanitarian
grounds; to prevent appalling acts of violence and cruelty against
whole communities, that call to mind some of the worst atrocities
of the totalitarian regimes of the 20th century. We encourage
the UK Government to use its influence to ensure that there is
a proper record of the atrocities that have been committed so
that, in due course, offenders may be brought to justice. (Paragraph
86)
10. Allied countries,
led by the US, are to be commended for responding urgently following
the ISIL surge of early August 2014, but, with hindsight, it appears
to have been a miscalculation for the UK Government and its allies
not to have assessed that the Peshmerga would require military
assistance in order to defend a border of over 1000 kilometres
against ISIL. With allied support, the Peshmerga now, happily,
appear to be recovering territory lost to ISIL in August. (Paragraph
87)
Iraq and Syria: one battlefield
11. Iraq
and Syria are at present one indivisible battlefield and there
is unlikely to be any real peace in the Kurdistan Region or the
rest of Iraq unless ISIL in Syria is destroyed or, at the very
least, badly degraded and starved of the capacity to move freely
across the border. (Paragraph 90)
Assisting the Iraqi federal government against ISIL
12. There
was a price to be paid for the UK and other governments opting
not to provide military assistance to the Iraqi government more
quickly, including the increase of Iranian influence in the country.
However, on balance, we consider that the UK Government was correct
not to assist the heavily discredited government of Nouri al-Maliki,
assessing, rightly, that it was part of the problem, not part
of the solution. The UK Government is correct to have placed emphasis
on the importance of an "inclusive" political process
in Iraq on the need for Sunnis to recover faith in the country's
democratic institutions. Diagnosing the problem is, in this instance,
likely to prove far easier than prescribing the cure. The task
of rebuilding Sunni confidence in Iraq is a formidable one: it
requires political leadership from within the Sunni community
and collective engagement, across the sectarian and ethnic divide,
from Baghdad's political elites. (Paragraph 95)
Helping the Peshmerga
13. The
UK's offer of equipment and training for the Peshmerga has been
warmly welcomed in the Kurdistan Region and is helping the Peshmerga
take on ISIL. Military assistance should be continued, on the
basis of evidence that progress on the unification of the Peshmerga
is continuing satisfactorily. The Government may also be minded
to take into account the extent to which the Peshmerga and the
Iraqi army are co-ordinating to take on ISIL in contemplating
future gifting of equipment. We appreciate that Iraq's delicate
constitutional situation is an element that the UK Government
must take into account in determining whether and in what manner
to make future gifts of military equipment. (Paragraph 104)
14. We seek clarification
from the UK Government as to whether it would be possible for
gifts to the Kurdistan Regional Government to be made direct to
territory of the KRG or whether the federal government is within
its right to insist that all gifts are routed via Baghdad. (Paragraph
105)
Helping the Syrian Kurds
15. We
ask the Government to clarify its policy on recognising and working
with Syrian-Kurdish groups such as the PYD party that are resisting
ISIL in northern Syria. We also ask it to clarify whether its
categorisation of the Turkish-Kurdish PKK as a terrorist group
or the PYD's decision not to join the Syrian National Coalition
are considered reasons not to recognise or assist the PYD. (Paragraph
109)
The humanitarian crisis in the Kurdistan Region
16. The
Kurdistan Regional Government and the people of the Region have
responded with generosity and sacrifice to the influx of hundreds
of thousands of displaced people from Syria and Iraq. Their continuing
presence threatens to overwhelm the Region's economy and public
service particularly if, as appears likely, conflict in Syria
and Iraq continues for the foreseeable future. It would be disastrous
if this ongoing crisis were to seriously destabilise the Region's
economy or political system, and accordingly is in the foreign
policy interests of the UK to work with allies in the UN, EU,
NATO and other international organisations to ensure that the
KRG is well-supported to deal with this crisis. Whilst we agree
that patience is likely to be crucial in order to defeat ISIL,
the UK Government should note that a "long war" carries
its own risks, amongst these a prolonged and economically debilitating
humanitarian crisis, with hundreds of thousands of people unable
to return to their homes, and the possibility of increased tensions
between displaced people and the host community. (Paragraph 113)
Resolving the status of the disputed territories
17. The
Kurdistan Regional Government deserves credit for swiftly directing
the Peshmerga to occupy Kirkuk and other disputed areas of northern
Iraq at a moment of crisis in June 2014. The question now is what
happens next. The KRG is right to insist on adherence to the Iraqi
constitution, and to votes on the status of the disputed territories
finally going ahead. However, there is much that could go wrong
if the voting process is seen as unfair or lacking in transparency.
The UK Government should use its influence to ensure that the
voting process is transparent, addresses the various practical
problems that the issue engages, is respectful of the rights of
minorities as equal citizens of Iraq, and overall inspires the
confidence of those taking part in it. Ideally the process would
also proceed with the acceptance, or even involvement, of the
federal government, and again we would encourage the UK Government
to use what influence it has to this end. (Paragraph 124)
18. For the time being,
much of the disputed territories are effectively a war zone, with
entire communities still displaced from their homes. The KRG has
rightly put back plans for local plebiscites for the time being,
and we would encourage the UK Government to use its influence
to try to prevent a peremptory vote. (Paragraph 125)
The constitutional future of the Kurdistan Region
and of Iraq as a whole
19. We
agree with the UK Government that for the time being it is far
better that Iraq seeks to recover its unity and strength in order
to defeat the common enemy of ISIL. It is also rational to be
concerned about the possible consequences of Iraq's break-up.
But the Kurdistan Region's desire for increased self-governance,
or even independence, is itself rational, given its economic potential
and demonstrable capacity for effective self-governance, and also
understandable, given its recent history. We do not judge that
independence is imminent, but it is a medium-term possibility,
depending in large part on the Kurdistan Region's energy export
strategy, for which the UK Government should be prepared. (Paragraph
141)
20. It is for the
Iraqi people to decide their future, but it appears to us that
a looser federal model, permitting greater self-governance by
its diverse mosaic of communities, offers best hope for Iraq remaining
united and sovereign. Highly centralised rule under a "strongman"
in Baghdad will never work. (Paragraph 142)
21. If the Kurdistan
Region is to become independent, it should be with the consent
of the rest of Iraq. But the UK and its international partners
should stand ready to help ensure that any clear expression of
will in favour of independence, and on reasonable terms, is accepted
and respected. (Paragraph 143)
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