1 Introduction
The
events of 2014
1. When, in February 2014, we began the inquiry that
has led to this report, it was because we judged that the Kurdistan
Region, and its relationship with the rest of Iraq, merited increased
attention. Events since then have brought grim vindication of
that judgment.
2. Following the surge of the Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant (ISIL)[1]
into the northern Iraqi city of Mosul in June, the security and
political landscape of the Kurdistan Region, and of Iraq as a
whole, has been transformed. ISIL terrorists now control virtually
the whole of Iraq's Sunni Arab heartland, from the Syrian border
to the edge of greater Baghdad. ISIL's advance exposed catastrophic
weakness in an Iraqi army strong on paper but hollowed out by
years of corruption and political meddling under the authoritarian
and sectarian government of Nouri al-Maliki. Shamefully, its leaders
fled rather than take on ISIL. The army's sudden retreat left
a vacuum along the Kurdistan Region's border with the rest of
Iraq that Kurdish forces, the Peshmerga, rushed to fill literally
overnight.
3. As a result, the Kurdistan Regional Government
(KRG) finds itself in control of swathes of territory bitterly
disputed with Baghdad over many years, including the oil-rich
city of Kirkuk; but the price of these gains is a tense 1000-kilometre
frontier with the terrorists stretching across almost the entire
breadth of northern Iraq, with only a short land corridor connecting
the Kurdistan Region to Baghdad and the rest of unoccupied Iraq.
ISIL's advances have forced hundreds of thousands of Iraqis to
flee to the relative safety of the Kurdistan Region. The KRG's
humane response to the influx has brought it great international
credit, but, as we heard when we visited Iraq, it also risks "breaking"
its slowing economy and over-stretched public services.
4. Meanwhile in Baghdad, ISIL's advance hastened
the removal from office of the increasingly discredited Mr Maliki,
after a period in which disputes over the budget and oil exports
had brought relations between the Kurdistan Region and the federal
government to a new low. There are early signs of improved and
more inclusive governance under his successor, Haider al-Abadi.
However, there are also fears that the new administration may
have only limited time to assert its authority, repel ISIL, rebuild
the army, and win the confidence of Iraq's diverse constituencies.
With ISIL in control of most of Sunni Arab Iraq, Shia militias
directed by Iranian commanders doing the work of the Iraqi army
in much of the country, and the Kurdistan Region's President having
tabled proposals for a referendum on independence, Iraq's future
is in question as never before.
Terms of reference and evidence
gathered by the Committee
5. We launched our inquiry last year with these terms
of reference: to consider the UK Government's policy on the Kurdistan
Region of Iraq, in the wider Iraqi and regional context; and specifically
to seek evidence on:
· The
implications for UK foreign policy of the existence of the Kurdistan
Region of Iraq and the development of its relations with the rest
of Iraq and with neighbouring countries;
· The
role of the UK Government in facilitating the development of a
relationship between the Kurdistan Region and the rest of Iraq
which helps to realise the economic potential of both and to strengthen
security and democratic government in Iraq and the wider region;
· The
UK Government's approach to trade and investment with, in and
from the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, and the priorities that should
be pursued there by the Prime Minister's new Trade Envoy to Iraq,
Lady Nicholson of Winterbourne;
· The
financial and other assistance being offered in the Kurdistan
Region of Iraq by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and associated
public bodies (including the Westminster Foundation for Democracy
and the British Council) to support the further development of
parliamentary and governance capacity, democratic institutions
(including a free media), civil society and the rights of ethnic
and religious minorities, and to promote cultural and educational
links with the UK;
· How
the FCO is organising its presence and resources in Iraq, in the
light of the developing relationship between the Kurdistan Region
and the rest of the country.
6. Over the course of the inquiry, we held three
formal evidence-taking sessions, along with a number of informal
meetings relevant to the inquiry, all at Westminster. Full details
of these meetings are listed in Annex A. We visited Iraq in October,
meeting senior politicians in Baghdad and the Kurdistan Region,
and representatives of the military, minorities, the UN, and humanitarian
and human rights groups, amongst others. A full list of all meetings
that took place during the visit is provided in Annex B. We also
received 19 submissions of written evidence over the course of
the inquiry.
7. We are grateful to all of those who took time
to provide evidence and to all those who volunteered their time
to meet and assist us on our visit to Iraq.
Key themes of the report
8. The fall of Mosul in June and the other events
that it triggered clearly provoked a change of emphasis in our
inquiry, and we found ourselves spending more time considering
security and military issues than we might have anticipated at
the outset. However, we consider that the terms of reference announced
in February remain an effective prism through which to judge the
effectiveness of relevant UK foreign policy and the appropriateness
of its resources. Three key, and inter-related, themes emerged
during the inquiry and accordingly form the main aspects of this
report:
· The
nature of the bilateral relationship between the UK and the Kurdistan
Region, and its strengths and weaknesses;
· The
FCO's response to the current security crisis in and around the
Kurdistan Region, and its support for the KRG;
· The
FCO's approach to the KRG's disputes with the Iraqi federal government
and its attitude as to the Region's constitutional status.
9. To put these issues in context, we begin with
a brief survey of the Kurdistan Region and its history.
1 Also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shams
(Arabic: literally, the sun) or ISIS: "Shams" is an
historical geographical term denoting a region of "Greater
Syria", usually translated into English as the Levant.
In Arabic, ISIL is usually known by its acronym DAESH (or DA'ISH),
which has derogatory connotations. Since early July 2014, ISIL
has designated itself by the shorter title of "the Islamic
State" to signify its ultimate ambition of a global caliphate. Back
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