3 The UK, Iraq and the Kurdistan Region
18. The UK has been more than a bystander to the
history outlined in the previous chapter. The UK is the midwife
of modern Iraq: it was the UK that in 1921 decided to unite into
one state the three Mesopotamian vilayets (governorates)—Mosul,
Baghdad, and Basra—that it held under a League of Nations
mandate following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end
of World War One. Shia and Sunni Arabs, Kurds, and smaller communities
were thus melded into one nation. This in itself has drawn criticism;
in any discussion of Iraq's troubled history, the charge that
the UK (with the connivance of the other great powers of the time)
created an "artificial" or weak state—perhaps
deliberately so, so as to weaken the Arab people or the Ummah
(the community or "nation" of Islamic believers)—is
still sometimes levelled.[10]
It has been a feature of ISIL propaganda.[11]
19. It was also the UK's decision that Iraq should
be a monarchy ruled by a Sunni king and that its political class
should be dominated by Sunni Arabs, the community which Foreign
Office policymakers at the time considered the most politically
mature, and with whom they could most readily do business. This
was not good news for Iraq's Kurds[12]
and, with hindsight, can be seen as setting a precedent of minority
Sunni Arab rule that would last almost continuously until Saddam's
overthrow in 2003.[13]
It may partially explain why Iraq has struggled ever since to
forge a transcendent, unifying national identity, and also explain
(though not excuse) Iraq's slide towards sectarian autocracy under
Nouri al-Maliki, a long-delayed pendulum swing towards Shia majoritarian
rule after decades of Sunni-led authoritarianism.
The UK and Iraq's Kurds
20. The UK was definitely no friend of Kurdish nationalism
during the period in which it had significant influence in Iraq,
which lasted up until the republican coup of 1958. Kurdish uprisings
were crushed, whilst the UK put no pressure on the Iraqi government
to implement 1925 League of Nations recommendations on the status
of Kurds in the Mosul vilayet. This has not been forgotten in
Iraqi Kurdistan, nor the collapse in 1923 of the Treaty of Sèvres,
which had laid out putative proposals for the creation of an independent
Kurdish state, in what is now south-east Turkey or the UK's role
in the Sykes-Picot agreement, to divide much of the Middle East
into French, British and Russian spheres of influence, with no
proposal for a Kurdish state. (The agreement has not been forgotten
in Baghdad or other Arab capitals either.) It should be added
that the Sykes-Picot plan, which would have split what is now
Iraq in two, was never implemented (though the concept of French
and British spheres of influence in the Middle East survived),
and that Sèvres did not collapse because of the machinations
of the UK or other European powers, but because of Turkey's victory
in its War of Independence—in which, as it happens, many
Ottoman Kurds fought for the Turks. The UK also mulled at length
over the status of the Mosul governorate of Iraq because of its
strong Kurdish character,[14]
and gave serious thought to uniting it with the new Kurdish state
envisaged at Sèvres. When the UK finally decided, in 1925,
that Mosul should remain part of Iraq, this decision aligned with
UK interests at the time, but also followed the recommendations
of a League of Nations commission. We make these comments to underline
that, whilst UK policy at the time may legitimately be seen as
flawed, and to have either created or exacerbated problems that
have still not been solved today, the UK—even at the height
of its imperial powers in the early 20th century—took
decisions on the shape and future of Iraq not in a vacuum but
in response to events on the ground over which it may have had
little or no control. In a report published in 2015, it is necessary
to underline these points because of the extent to which this
history is still being contested in modern Iraq.
From the Baathist era to the present
day
21. If Iraqi Kurds today take a largely positive
view of the British, it is in large part thanks to the UK's more
recent record.[15] From
the late 1970s, the UK began to acquire a reputation as a safe
haven for Kurds (and other Iraqi dissidents) forced into exile
by the increasingly brutal rule of Saddam Hussein. These exiles
include several among the current generation of Kurdish leaders
or their children. (Today there are thought to be tens of thousands
of Kurds living in the UK, although many will be of Turkish origin.
Over two out of every three Iraqi Kurds studying abroad are studying
in the UK.[16]) The UK
also takes much credit from Iraqi Kurds for another safe haven:
that set up under UN auspices in 1991, and which ultimately evolved
into today's Kurdistan Region.[17]
The UK's key role in the creation and policing of the zone is
still remembered with much gratitude, as we noted on our visit
to the Region. The UK is also thanked for the behind-the-scenes
role our diplomats and politicians played in brokering peace and
restoring trust after KDP-PUK relations violently collapsed in
the mid-90s.[18] There
is also the 2003 Iraq War: it divides Iraqis as it divides the
UK, but for Kurds it was a war of liberation and the UK was on
the right side.[19]
10 See also London Kurdish Institute (KUR 7), paragraph
7 (providing a Kurdish rather than Arab perspective) Back
11
ISIL released a video titled The End of Sykes-Picot in
late June 2014, around the same time that it proclaimed a new
caliphate straddling the Iraq-Syria border ("ISIS declares Caliphate in Iraq and Syria",
The Guardian, 30 June 2014) Back
12
We acknowledge the view of one of our witnesses, Dr Ali Allawi
(a biographer of Iraq's first king) that Kurdish leaders had had
a voice within the political system during the monarchical period:
it was after the 1958 revolution that Kurds (and Shia) became
increasingly marginalised. (Q124) Back
13
See also Peter Galbraith (KUR 017), paragraph 7 and London Kurdish
Institute (KUR 7), paragraph 2 Back
14
Mosul was by far the most ethnically mixed of the three vilayets.
Kurds were the largest ethnic grouping in Mosul although they
may not have been in the majority. Back
15
Q8 [Professor Gareth Stansfield]; APPG Kurdistan Region of Iraq
(KUR 12) , paragraph 4 Back
16
KRG High Representative to the UK (KUR 15), paragraph 45; APPG
Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KUR 12), paragraph 15 Back
17
Q11 [Professor Gareth Stansfield]; KRG High Representative to
the UK (KUR 15), paragraph 9; Professor Gareth Stansfield (KUR 14),
paragraph 1 Back
18
Professor Gareth Stansfield (KUR 14), paragraph 3 Back
19
KRG High Representative to the UK (KUR 15), paragraph 9 Back
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