4 The constitutional disputes between
Baghdad and Erbil
22. The launch of our inquiry in late February last
year coincided with a point when relations between the KRG and
the federal government of Nouri al-Maliki, seldom less than strained,
were sliding into the abyss. In the eyes of the KRG, the main
points of the dispute all relate to the proper interpretation
of the 2005 constitution.
23. Kurds were by far the most enthusiastic supporters
of Iraq's new constitution, with 99% of voters in the three mainly
Kurdish governorates approving it by referendum. The then KRG
High Representative to the UK told us that it was "the best
document that had ever been produced in Iraq".[20]
According to one of our witnesses, an adviser to the Kurdish leadership
at the time, Kurds supported the constitution because they saw
it as guaranteeing that the very strong autonomy they already
enjoyed would continue.[21]
At the conclusion of the 2003 Iraq War, it was the instinct of
many Kurds to press for independence. Whether that was a realistic
prospect may be debated, but Kurds are likely to have seen the
conditions they secured in the constitution as a necessary price
for agreeing to be partners in a new, federal and democratic Iraq.[22]
It is unlikely that Iraq's Arabs would have seen it in those terms.
24. Over the course of the inquiry, the KRG has quite
properly taken the opportunity to present its grievances to the
Committee, and has been an articulate advocate in its own cause.
Its fundamental charge is that the federal government has, in
bad faith, consistently failed to honour the constitution, and
that because of this, the KRG has been forced to reconsider whether
it wishes to remain within Iraq on current terms.[23]
Its specific complaints (some of which we return to in more detail
in the report) include:
· That
Baghdad has, since January 2014 failed to assign to the KRG the
equitable proportion of the budget (fixed by statute at 17%) to
which it is constitutionally entitled to help pay for public services;
· That
Baghdad has wilfully misinterpreted relevant provisions of the
constitution on hydrocarbons, wrongly insisting that they reserve
to the federal government the sole right to export oil and gas;
· That
Baghdad has not adequately supported the Peshmerga, as the constitutionally
recognised national guard of the Kurdistan Region.
· That
Baghdad has failed to hold local plebiscites to determine whether
disputed territories south of the Green Line wish to join the
Kurdistan Region, as the constitution mandated should have been
done by November 2007.
We note that significant progress has recently been
made on a number of these issues, particularly on of oil and gas
and the national budget, and we deal with these issues in more
detail in paragraphs 32 and elsewhere.
25. The intensification of these disputes, combined
with ISIL's June offensive, cutting Iraq almost in half, led President
Barzani of the KRG to announce in early July that Iraq's Kurds
could no longer be prisoners of the country's "tragic situation"
and that he would put a proposal for a formal referendum on independence
before the Kurdistan National Assembly.[24]
(The proposal is currently suspended following an intensification
of the security crisis in August.)
26. It was perhaps a symptom of the turmoil and division
of the federal administration during the time of the inquiry that
we tended to lack interlocutors who could formally present the
Iraqi Government's case, and its positions on the various constitutional
disputes, although we are familiar with some of the arguments
which it would deploy. We do not attempt to come to a definitive
view about the proper interpretation of the constitution, but
where it appears that the KRG has reason on its side, we say so
in this report, and we suggest that this be reflected in the approach
of the UK Government. In most cases, we expect that this would
be best done through private and informal channels. From our discussions
with the KRG's leadership, we sense a pragmatic acceptance that
the UK Government is unlikely to take a strong public stance on
what it may perceive (with some justification) to be the internal
affairs of a sovereign country.
The UK as mediator?
27. We have sought views during this inquiry on whether
it would be appropriate for the UK Government to help mediate
any disputes between the federal and regional governments. We
left Baghdad in October with an impression of a UK Embassy that
is well connected to federal policy-makers at very senior level,
and appears to have their confidence, indicating that it may be
well placed to facilitate such a role, although such is the nature
of Iraqi politics, with its many centres of power and bitter political
enmities, that we do not imagine it to be easy for the UK's diplomats
to simultaneously retain the confidence of all of the country's
main power-brokers.[25]
We are also uncertain as to whether the Embassy currently has
the depth of human resources that would be required for the complex
role of mediating between Baghdad and Erbil.
28. In order to act effectively as mediator the UK
should ideally be perceived as an honest broker by all sides.
As noted earlier, our blemished role in the earlier history of
Iraq is still remembered, as is our much more recent role in the
2003 Iraq War and the period of occupation that followed. We have
already mentioned that for the Kurds, the war was one of liberation.
Shias take a more ambivalent view (and may be more cynical as
to the motives of the Western powers) and for many Sunnis the
war was a disaster.
29. It appears to be the Kurds who nowadays in Iraq
hold the most uniformly positive view of the UK and its government.
A strong message we have taken from the inquiry is that official
representatives of the Kurdistan Region, politicians, soldiers,
and public servants, respect the UK and see it as a valued partner.[26]
We sense that this also reflects wider grassroots feeling. Senior
interlocutors from the KRG told us in Erbil that if the UK wished
to help mediate then it would be welcome. However, they said that
they doubted whether Baghdad currently had the confidence or sense
of unity to lay itself open to international mediation.
30. On our visit to Baghdad in October, we enjoyed
constructive exchanges with senior federal politicians, who welcomed
our interest; but we took away the message that they saw resolution
of disputes between the two administrations as an internal matter
and that the unity of Iraq was non-negotiable.
31. An additional consideration is whether there
is anything for the UK to be gained from holding itself out as
a mediator. Amongst witnesses, there was some doubt, because of
the level of bitterness between the two sides and because of the
UK's history in Iraq.[27]
Professor Charles Tripp contrasted perceptions of that history
within Iraq: for Kurds, it was, in part, a "history of the
letting down of the Kurdish people at various moments", whereas
in Baghdad, the UK was seen as a more devious presence: "you
can never displease people by casting the British as a sinister
force in Iraq".[28]
Professor Tripp remarked that the UK's relations with the Kurdistan
Region would be carefully analysed by politicians in Baghdad,
and that any gesture appearing to confer legitimacy on the now
avowedly separatist KRG would be "seized upon in the rest
of Iraq".[29] We
note that the UK Government has been consistently clear throughout
the unfolding crisis that it wishes Iraq to remain strong and
united, but that it wishes to see a more "inclusive"
government in Baghdad.[30]
The deal on oil and gas
32. Towards the end of our inquiry, the KRG and the
new federal administration reached what appears to have been a
breakthrough agreement in relation to the first three of the four
points of dispute set out in paragraph 24; oil, the national budget,
and federal support for the Peshmerga.[31]
We note, and welcome, the evidence of the Minister Mr Ellwood
(addressing us after the announcement of the first, interim, deal
rather than the second agreement, which would last for a year[32])
that UK diplomats had had some involvement in helping the two
sides reach agreement.[33]
It is to be hoped that the agreement holds, as it would appear
to benefit both sides, and to contribute to the strengthening
of Iraq.[34] The KRG
is in need of federal support to shore up its crisis-hit economy,
whereas a vigorous oil export industry, with revenues accruing
both to the KRG and to the state coffers in Baghdad is in the
interest of all Iraqis.[35]
Financial support for the Peshmerga as they hold the line against
ISIL is likewise to the benefit of all Iraqis, and of the wider
world. In view of the evidence we received that the release of
the Kurdistan Region's natural gas reserves onto the international
market could help strengthen continental Europe's energy security,[36]
and reduce its dependency on other sources, it is in the wider
interests of the UK, and Europe, that Baghdad and Erbil come to
a mutually acceptable and more permanent arrangement on hydrocarbon
resources, and we hope that UK diplomatic efforts continue to
be directed towards helping achieve this outcome.
33. It is for the people of Iraq, and their governments,
to sort out their disagreements, and by constitutional means.
Where the UK considers that Iraq's constitution is not being respected,
by either the federal or Kurdistan Regional Government, it should
not be afraid to express views, but should be mindful that the
UK's complex history of involvement in Iraq may not always make
it best placed to be a candid friend. We expect that in the vast
majority of cases, it is best that advice and views are offered
through private and informal channels, as appears to currently
be the case. Whatever Iraq's long-term future, we agree with the
UK Government that its current diplomatic priority should be to
help all of Iraq's communities and democratic institutions, including
the federal and Kurdistan Regional Governments, mend fences and
unite against the threat from ISIL.
20 Q92 Back
21
Peter W Galbraith, The End of Iraq (New York, 2006), pages
161-169 and 205. See also Q130 [Peter Galbraith] Back
22
APPG Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KUR 12) , paragraphs 36-40 Back
23
Q92-96 [KRG High Representative to the UK] KRG High Representative
to the UK (KUR 15), paragraphs 14-15 Back
24
"Iraq Kurdistan independence referendum planned",
BBC News Online,
1 July 2014 Back
25
Q13; Q15; Q19 [Professor Charles Tripp] Back
26
Q8 [Professor Gareth Stansfield] Back
27
Q17 [Professor Gareth Stansfield] John Roberts cautioned against
the UK Government becoming too involved on the ground that "We
have too much of a history in Iraq to be regarded either as a
neutral arbiter in any way or as a disinterested absentee"
(Q39) Back
28
Q9 Back
29
Q9 Back
30
HC Deb, 14 July 2014, col 563 [Commons Chamber]; "Iraq is in last-chance saloon as a single state, says Philip Hammond",
The Telegraph, 14 October 2014. Tweet by Foreign Secretary,
5 January 2014: "Good meeting with Iraqi Foreign Minister al-Jaafari to discuss fight against #ISIL. UK supports inclusive, sovereign & democratic #Iraq" Back
31
Under the deal, the KRG will provide the federal government with
550,000 BPD, for sale by the state seller SOMO: 250,000 from fields
in the Kurdistan Region and 300,000 from Kirkuk fields controlled
by the North Oil Company. (It appears that the KRG is free to
trade surplus oil on the international markets, although this
is not expressly spelt out in the formal communiqué.) In
return, the federal government will resume paying the KRG the
17% of the national budget to which it is entitled, plus additional
funds for withheld budget payments. Baghdad has agreed to make
payments to help cover the Peshmerga's expenses for fighting ISIL Back
32
We note that, as at the time of agreeing to publish this report,
the Iraqi Parliament has yet to formally ratify the 12-month deal Back
33
Q143 Back
34
See also Genel Energy (KUR 2) paragraphs 9-14 (submitted before
the agreement was reached) Back
35
Q38 [John Roberts] Back
36
KRG High Representative to the UK (KUR 15), paragraph 20; British
Council (KUR 4) paragraph 1; John Roberts (KUR 19), page 11; Q36
[John Roberts] Back
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