5 The Kurdistan Regional Government
as a partner for the UK Government
34. During the inquiry, the KRG informed us that
it views the UK Government as its "partner of choice".[37]
It is debatable what this would mean in practice, but we take
from it that the KRG views its relationship with the UK as important
and in some way special, because of our intertwined histories
and diaspora links: because of the UK's practical help for the
Iraqi Kurds at difficult times in the recent past; and because
the KRG considers that the UK Government may be especially well-placed
to contribute to the Region's development as a stable and thriving
democracy.[38] This section
of the report considers the evidence and information we have gathered
during the inquiry on the strategic value and strength of that
relationship.
Working with the KRG
35. In previous work during the course of the 2010-15
Parliament, we have given consideration to what is sometimes summarised
as the "interests versus values" debate in foreign policy;
whether there may be instances where, for all that we may have
interests in common with a foreign government, we do not share
its values and may seriously compromise our own by working or
trading with it.[39]
36. It is very clear that the KRG is not such a government:
it is the government of a society that remains traditional, conservative
and patriarchal in many ways, and its level of political probity
are, as one of our witnesses put it, "not Scandinavian"[40]
but the values of the government and its people are not so very
different from ours, and any shortcomings there may be are of
a lesser order of magnitude than those of some other governments
with which the UK does business. Any observations or criticisms
we make below should be considered in that context. Anyone who
has visited the Kurdistan Region will have been struck, as we
were, by most Kurds' evident openness to the rest of the world,
and their keenness to stress their democratic, and "modern"
credentials (in contrast, by implication, to some of their neighbours).
English is increasingly the second language of choice amongst
the political class and the younger generation.[41]
It is a matter of pride to Iraqi Kurds that home-bred extremism
is a relatively marginal problem, and that the violent targeting
of Westerners is practically unknown. The advent of ISIL has placed
renewed and urgent emphasis on Iraqi Kurds' insistence that they
are on the same side as the West, with the same common enemy.
As a KRG Minister told us in Erbil, there is probably nowhere
else in the wider region where, at almost every level of society,
there is a more positive view of the West in general, and of the
UK in particular.[42]
We found this attitude reflected in our dealings with the KRG
itselfnot that the KRG was without criticism of some aspects
of the bilateral relationship.
The Kurdistan Region's politics
and democratic culture
37. The Kurdistan Region's three main parties are
the moderate nationalist KDP, the ostensibly more left-leaning
PUK, and Goran ("Change"), a new party that has recently
emerged to challenge corruption and campaign for institutional
and public sector reform. In elections in 2013, Goran supplanted
the PUK as second party, winning the most votes in the Region's
second city of Sulaymaniyah, formerly a PUK stronghold. Previously
the sole opposition party, in 2014 Goran agreed to take up posts
in government, including the critical ministries of Finance and
Peshmerga Affairs.
38. "Big tent" government has been the
norm in the Region since the advent of democracy, with practically
every party having a seat at the cabinet table. We understand
that this has been seen as a means of building consensus and delivering
greater political stability in a society with painful memories
of splits in the past that other powers had exploited, and which
caused civil war as recently as the mid-1990s.
39. Aspects of the Region's political culture give
rise to concerns. One is that the PUK and KDP, nowadays ostensibly
"normal" and constitutional political parties, both
retain militias, an issue to which we will return.[43]
Others include the existence of multi-party coalition government,
and with it the apparent absence of an effective opposition to
hold Ministers to account; a very clear tendency towards dynastic
political rule and towards voting on the basis of tribal or regional
allegiance rather than informed policy choice; and evidence of
much of the Region's new wealth accruing to a politically connected
elite or of patronage being used as an instrument of political
power.[44] These should
certainly concern the UK and other Western partners of the Kurdistan
Region, but it is not trite to observe that if these are defects
then they are not absent from the UK or other Western democracies.[45]
Any objective assessment of the Region's politics must also make
allowances for the unstable environment in which the Kurdistan
Region has had to operate for much of its history, and its neighbours'
poor record in developing effective democratic cultures by comparison.
40. Most evidence we have received portrays the Kurdistan
Region as an imperfect but genuine and developing democracy,[46]
with systems for relatively effective scrutiny, elections that
are generally free and fair, respect for the general separation
of religion and state, and sufficient dynamism in the political
system to enable new movements, such as Goran, to emerge. We were
also pleased to note, on our visit to Erbil, that the Westminster
Foundation for Democracy, which has, since late 2010, been running
a programme to help parliamentary committees and individual deputies
improve their audit, scrutiny and consultative capacities, provided
a positive report of the extent to which politicians in the Region
engaged with the programme.[47]
41. However, in the words of one witness (addressing
us in May 2014, shortly before the current security crisis), the
Region's politics have reached "an important inflection point",[48]
following elections in 2013, in which Goran had broken the two
party KDP-PUK hegemony, and amidst signs of rising public discontent
with corruption, nepotism and public sector inefficiency that
the KRG itself acknowledges are all problematic.[49]
The test would be what the Region's political establishment did
next: would it respond positively to such public demands, with
political and public sector reforms, or would it try to put the
genie of protest politics back in the bottle, seeing it as a threat
to its own interests?[50]
42. The security crisis that erupted in summer 2014
has put domestic political concerns largely on a back-burner,
as political factions united to fight a common enemy but it was
made clear to us on our visit in October that an increasingly
sophisticated electorate is unlikely to allow the debate over
what sort of politics people want to have to be postponed indefinitely.
HUMAN AND CIVIL RIGHTS AND GENDER
EQUALITY
43. In Erbil, we met representatives of local human
rights organisations and NGOs, and of the KRG's High Council for
Women's Affairs, who largely corroborated the evidence we received
during the inquiry of a government and society on the right trajectory
with regards to human and civil rights and gender equality.[51]
They told us that this was in part down to reforms instigated
by the KRG (for instance, laws on press freedom or for the criminalisation
of domestic violence) and in part to wider societal changes over
which the KRG has had only partial control: the impacts of globalisation
and digital media, and the growth of a young urban middle class,
better educated and more travelled than their parents. We were
also informed, however, that these liberalisations had encouraged
conservative and reactionary forces in the Kurdistan Region to
mobilise in response, and to seek to resist further reforms. A
number of outstanding concerns were brought to our attention:
the continuing presence (though apparently in marked decline)
of female genital mutilation;[52]
instances of differential treatment of men and women by the criminal
justice system because of the continuing influence of Islamic
or customary law, including instances, albeit apparently now rare,
of women being imprisoned for the "crime" of adultery;
and the use of violence by the police against peaceful protestors
or people in detention.[53]
There have occasionally been disturbing cases of investigative
reporters or editors being murdered or "disappeared".[54]
It was also disappointing to note the extent to which the political
process remains overwhelmingly male-dominated, with just one woman
in a cabinet of 27.[55]
In a meeting with the KRG's High Council for Women's Affairs,
we were informed that progress was being made in tackling discrimination
and violence against women, but that the passing of progressive
laws did not always lead to grassroots changes or to new laws
actually being enforced in the courts, and that more education
was needed. The KRG has told us that it recognises its promotion
of better human rights as a work in progress, and would welcome
the UK's mentoring and support in addressing some of the issues.[56]
The (female) then KRG High Representative to the UK singled out
help from the UK in advancing gender equality as something the
KRG would particularly welcome.[57]
MINORITY COMMUNITIES
44. The image of the Kurdistan Region that the KRG
projects to the wider world is of a haven of tolerance and moderation
in the wider Middle East.[58]
We found this to be largely confirmed in the evidence we received.[59]
Centuries of uneasy co-existence between Kurds and their Assyrian
and Turcoman neighbours that on occasion led to tragic violence
appear to have been replaced with relative harmony, and members
of both minorities sit at the cabinet table. Christians appear
to be largely free from the intimidation and persecution that
has been a dismal feature of life in the rest of Iraq since 2003:
we understand that a significant component of the Christian community
is in fact made up of post-2003 arrivals from the rest of Iraq,
seeking a more tolerant environment in which they can live in
peace.[60] Witnesses
also told us that there was, if anything increasing respect for
Yezidism and other local religions as indigenous, ancient and
authentic expressions of the faith of the Kurdish people.[61]
We do not doubt that there may still be some religious or ethnic-based
discrimination at the grassroots,[62]
but if there is any institutionalised discrimination within the
Kurdistan Region then it was not brought to our attention during
the inquiry. We have more concerns as regards relations between
Kurds and Sunni Arabs in borderland districts, as discussed later
in the report.
45. Islam is a background presence in the law and
in the conservative culture of wider Kurdish society, but we found
there to be a general respect for the separation of religion and
state, particularly among the political elite, who made clear
to us that they view the intrusion of literalist and ultra-conservative
versions of Islam into party politics as toxic.[63]
There are Islamist parties with seats in the Kurdistan National
Assembly but they are a more marginal presence than in the rest
of Iraq or in most other countries of the Middle East.
46. The KRG's response to the recent massive influx
of displaced people-including persecuted Yezidis, Christians,
Shabaks[64] and Shia-escaping
violence in Syria and Iraq also speaks for the generosity and
openness of the KRG, and of the people of the Kurdistan Region
in general.
47. The Kurdistan Region of Iraq is a genuine
democracy, albeit an imperfect and still developing one, and a
beacon of tolerance and moderation in a wider region where extremism
and instability are on the rise. Its values are broadly our values.
The UK is fortunate to have in such a volatile part of the world
a partner as relatively moderate, pragmatic, stable, democratic,
secular and reflexively pro-Western as the KRG. It is emphatically
in the best interests of the UK that the Kurdistan Region continues
on its path of democratic development, and has friends and supporters
as it does so, particularly at this time of crisis for the Region,
when the progress it has achieved over the last 20 years is under
threat. The UK Government should engage with it on that basis.
48. The Kurdistan Regional Government acknowledges
ongoing challenges in developing its democratic institutions and
its human and civil rights culture, and in advancing gender equality,
and should be judged on how it responds to these challenges. There
are also concerns as to public corruption and media freedom that
it must address. In addition, as the Kurdistan Regional Government
has stated that it would welcome the UK's mentoring and support
in connection with some of these areas, we urge the UK Government
to respond positively to this invitation.
Strategic aspects of the relationship
49. The KRG's use of the term "partner of choice"
implies awareness, and perhaps carries an implicit warning to
the UK Government, that there are other potential partners available
for the KRG and that, if the UK were not to reciprocate the offer
of closer ties, the KRG might be reluctantly compelled to look
elsewhere, including to regimes whose values and interests do
not always match ours.[65]
The Kurdistan Region's positioning, at the crossroads of Turkey,
Iran, the Arab world and the Caucasus, its access to water resources,
growing economy and relatively educated workforce, and its status
as a rising energy power mean that it is unlikely to lack potential
suitors, at least for as long as the Iraqi federal government
remains weak and unable to fully assert its authority over Iraq's
foreign relations.[66]
These same factors make the KRG a potentially valued intermediary
for dialogue with regional powers with whom the UK has sometimes
struggled to communicate, but which it needs to work with in order
to achieve some of its core policies.[67]
RELATIONS WITH IRAN
50. We noted during the inquiry that the KRG's relationship
with Iran is strong and, if anything, appears to be growing, despite
ideological differences and the Islamic Republic's opposition
to Kurdish nationalism (including public rhetoric opposing the
separation of the Kurdistan Region from Iraq[68])
and perceived poor record in recognising the civil rights of its
Kurdish minority. Iran has been the main buyer so far of the KRG's
oil products,[69] and
the two governments signed a long-term energy deal in April 2014
(although details of the deal remain somewhat vague[70]).
We noted when we visited the Kurdistan Region that Tehran's prompt
offer of humanitarian, military and intelligence support to the
KRG in June whilst the Western world, including the UK, equivocated
over how to respond had had a powerful positive impact at governmental
level.
51. It is only rational for the KRG to seek to have
effective relations with its powerful neighbour and we do not
consider that the apparent deepening of relations should be concerning
in itself. The UK Government is itself in a phase of relative
optimism over future relations with the Islamic Republic, as we
noted in a report last year;[71]
however, a return to more normal diplomatic relations continues
to be delayed, meaning that, in the run-up to what it is hoped
will be a landmark deal on Iran's nuclear programme in 2015, channels
of communication between the UK and Iran are still not fully open.
Iran is also an ally, of sorts, for the West in the conflict with
ISIL, although it is in the current interests of both sides to
play that relationship down. We are under no illusions that Tehran
is ultimately pursuing its own interests in the Kurdistan Region,
as it is in Iraq as a whole. Sources in Baghdad told us that elements
at very senior levels of the Iranian regime would prefer Iraq
as an Iranian satrapy rather than a sovereign state in control
of its foreign policy.[72]
RELATIONS WITH TURKEY
52. In a report published in 2012, we noted that
Turkish democracy had reached a "critical phase";[73]
a view that subsequent developments have confirmed. Questions
have also been raised as to its foreign policy: Ankara's conviction
that Syria has no future under Assad is widely shared (including
by the UK Government), but the manner in which it has pursued
this aim has raised concerns that its regional goals have become
increasingly divergent from those of its NATO partners and other
Western allies. There are also concerns as to the extent to which
Western diplomats still have purchase on the Erdogan government.[74]
There is no doubt, however, that Turkish involvement would be
crucial if the Syrian crisis is ever to be resolved.
53. Turkey is by far the Kurdistan Region's most
important foreign trading partner.[75]
Tens of thousands of Turkish expatriatesethnic Turks and
Kurds alikelive and work in the Region. Presidents Barzani
and Erdogan have both invested personally in the relationship,
with the former on one occasion even appearing at an election
rally for then Prime Minister Erdogan and his AKP party in a Kurdish
district of southern Turkey. Ankara and Erbil are also joint signatories
(against the express opposition of the Iraqi federal government)
of what the governments' publicity describes as a "50-year
deal"[76] to make
Turkey the main client for the Region's gas, and provide the Region
with a sea route to market for its oil. The development of relations
between the Kurdistan Region and Turkey, a state which has its
own Kurdish "problem" and which, until comparatively
recently, did not even formally recognise the Kurds as a people,
is superficially remarkable. However, as witnesses told us, the
relationship is grounded on both sides in hard-headed self-interest,
with each seeing the energy deal as potentially transformative:
for Turkey's energy security, and ambitions to be the energy hub
of the eastern Mediterranean region, and for the Kurdistan Region's
economic self-sufficiency.[77]
54. Turkey has come under fire from many Iraqi Kurds
for its perceived failure to support the besieged Kurds of northern
Syria against ISIL. At the root of the problem, for many Iraqi
Kurds, is Turkey's ideological objection to formally recognising
the full rights of its Kurdish citizens, including the right to
local autonomy, and its criminalisation of the Turkish-Kurdish
PKK Party, which is allied to Kurdish resistance leaders in Syria.
We understand that within the KRG itself tensions at times arise
between the KDP and other political factions as to whether the
relationship with the Erdogan administration has become too close,
or whether there should be a more public discussion of discontent
with Turkey's Syria policy[78]
but KRG ministers made clear to us on our visit to Erbil that
the relationship between the KRG and Turkey remains solid and
that both sides are committed to the full implementation of the
energy agreement.[79]
It was also made clear that there is frequent dialogue on wider
issues, including the war against ISIL and developments in Syria.[80]
Our visit to Erbil in October coincided with a diplomatic breakthrough
in relation to the siege of Kobane, the mainly Kurdish city on
Syria's border with Turkey, which had been encircled by ISIL forces
since the summer and had appeared to be on the point of falling.
Turkey apparently withdrew objections to the US air-dropping weapons
to Kurdish resistance fighters in the city, and also agreed to
open its borders to let Peshmerga in from Iraq to help defend
the city. We understand that the KRG was closely involved in the
relevant discussions.[81]
As we publish this report three months later, Kobane remains besieged,
but it has not fallen to ISIL, and scores of ISIL fighters have
been killed. This marks a relatively rare setback in ISIL's Syrian
ground war.
55. The Kurdistan Regional Government has strategic
value for the UK Government as a bridge to other regional powers
with whom direct dialogue may be difficult, but which the UK must
work with in order to achieve the policies to which it is committed.
We urge the UK Government to be mindful that if it is unable fully
to reciprocate the Kurdistan Regional Government's offer of closer
partnership, the KRG might be reluctantly compelled to look elsewhere
for support including to regimes whose values and interests do
not always match those of the UK.
Strength of current UK Government
relations with the KRG
56. The KRG clearly thinks highly of the UK and is
grateful for the support present and past governments have offered.
But it also took the opportunity afforded by the inquiry to raise
with us some concerns about aspects of the bilateral relationship.
The underlying message we received was of concerns that the relationship
is not deepening at the rate that the KRG would like it to, and
of some frustration that some relatively obvious obstacles to
improved links between the UK and the Kurdistan Region have not
yet been cleared.[82]
This is despite the UK Government stating in evidence that it
too sees the KRG at its "partner of choice".[83]
57. In its written evidence, the KRG raised diverse
concerns about a number of matters, such as the perceived lack
of visibility of the British Council in Erbil and a perceived
failure by the UK to reciprocate the Kurdistan Region's significant
investment in and support for UK universities.[84]
The KRG also commented on a visa system for entry into the UK
that appeared to be needlessly cumbersome, despite the opening
in 2013 of a Visa Application Centre in Erbil.[85]
(Written evidence from other organisations noted the unusually
high number of rejections produced by the UK's visa application
process in the Kurdistan Region, suggesting that the UK Government
look into it.[86]). On
our visit to Erbil, the KRG also remarked to us on a lack of progress
in establishing a joint ministerial committee that had been agreed
to during a KRG visit to London in May 2014 led by Prime Minister
Barzani. When we put these comments to the FCO, the rather unconvincing
response was that the committee was now in existence but (as of
November) had not yet met.[87]
KRG representatives also expressed some disappointment that a
proposed collaboration with the National School of Government
International for mentoring in public service reform had not yet
come to anything. The Minister, Mr Ellwood, told us that the UK
Government was "training civil servants in various ministries
and working with them in order to improve the Government's transparency
and accountability".[88]
58. We request a progress report from the UK Government
on whether the joint ministerial committee agreed with the KRG
in May 2014 has yet met and has an agreed programme, and on progress
made so far in mentoring the KRG in civil service and public sector
reform.
THE FCO'S PRESENCE IN THE KURDISTAN
REGION
59. There is a UK Consulate-General in Erbil, the
only permanently-staffed FCO premises in Iraq other than the Embassy
in Baghdad's Green Zone. In October 2012, after a period of uncertainty,
the FCO decided to retain the Erbil CG. (The Basra CG in the south
of Iraq was closed.[89])
60. The Erbil Consulate-General, which has fewer
than 5 UK-based staff,[90]
is run out of a business hotel on the outskirts of the city: staff
occupy one floor. We visited the Consulate-General in October:
it is evident that it is not optimal either as a working consulate,
as the UK's window on the Kurdistan Region, or as a shop-window
for the UK in Erbil. The FCO acknowledged this when it gave evidence
in November.[91] We do
accept that security concerns partly dictate the Consulate-General's
set-up, and that the safety of staff must come first, particularly
in a city situated so close to the border with ISIL-held territory.
61. The FCO's written evidence, submitted in April
2014, stated that a purpose-built Consulate-General was on schedule
to open in the first half of 2015, on land gifted by the KRG.[92]
By the time of our visit, it was clear that this deadline would
not be met. When we questioned the FCO in November, we were informed
that the deteriorating security situation, plus a desire for larger
premises to reflect Erbil's growing strategic importance, had
sent the FCO back to the drawing board. It told us that it was
still committed to opening a bespoke Consulate-General, but that
it would not open in 2015.[93]
62. The blunt view of senior KRG figures we met in
Erbil was that the UK's failure to secure proper premises gave
a poor impression of the UK, and signalled a deeper ambivalence
about its commitment to the Kurdistan Region, this in a culture
where first impressions matter. They told us that other countries
had long ago opened permanent consular offices, and said that
over-cautiousness and excessive bureaucracy on the part of the
FCO appeared to be partly behind the delay. When we took evidence
in London in November, the FCO implied that any bureaucratic problems
were more on the Kurdish side.[94]
Wherever the truth lies, we would like to see some progress being
made. It is very welcome that the UK Government is now committed
not only to retaining the Consulate-General but to expanding it.
It is difficult to conceive of consular premises anywhere else
in the FCO's network that are more strategically important to
the UK than those at Erbil, close to the terrorist frontier and
to the Syrian border (a country in which we currently have no
diplomatic presence), and in the regional capital of one of our
most reliable and militarily robust local allies.
63. In a number of previous reports, we have queried
whether the FCO has allocated sufficient human resources to a
particular embassy or office, or has achieved the right balance
of expertise, including specialist country knowledge or language
skills. We acknowledge that the FCO has faced an almost impossible
challenge in maintaining adequately staffed embassies and consulates
in the face of the cuts that have been forced upon it following
the 2010 Spending Review. It is welcome that the UK has strengthened
human resources in Erbil in response to recent developments,[95]
although it was a matter of concern to note, during our visit
to Iraq that a long-term vacancy in the Erbil office was being
covered only on a part-time basis by existing UK diplomatic staff
in Iraq: this at a period of critical importance for the future
of the Kurdistan Region, Iraq and Syria. We also take the opportunity
to pass on concerns of senior KRG figures that the FCO's rotation
policy for Iraq staff had tended to inhibit the development of
effective working relationships at government-to-government level.
We are aware that Iraq is a difficult posting and that the FCO
has a pastoral duty to its staff, but these observations should
be taken seriously.
64. The FCO has stated that it is committed to
having a permanent consular presence in Erbil for the foreseeable
future. This is welcome, given the strategic importance of the
Kurdistan Region and the importance of strengthening links with
its government and people. However, current consular arrangements
are simply not acceptable for the UK: a permanent Security Council
member deeply involved in diplomatic and military efforts to repel
Islamist terrorism in Iraq and Syria and to resolve both countries'
political crises, particularly given that other states, less deeply
involved in these issues than the UK government, have some time
ago secured bespoke premises. The FCO must now make it its priority
to ensure that work proceeds on new consular premises, as a concrete
demonstration of the UK's commitment to relations with the Kurdistan
Region and in recognition of the importance of the Region and
its government to the UK, particularly as partners in the fight
against terrorism. We also ask the UK Government to take steps
to ensure that the Consulate General is staffed to a level commensurate
with its current importance to UK interests.
TRADE AND ECONOMIC LINKS
65. The development of the Kurdistan Region's democratic
culture has been achieved in parallel with swift and impressive
economic development.[96]
The crisis of the last year has struck the economy hard, but annual
growth had averaged over 8% for most of the preceding decade,[97]
with major urban centres such as Erbil and Sulaymaniyah physically
transformed by an almost non-stop construction boom, and the appearance
of downtown apartment blocks, hotels and shopping malls. There
is, or until recently was, a growing tourism industry. Unemployment
is around half that in the rest of Iraq.[98]
Two international airports have been built almost from scratch,
and the higher education sector has flourished, with 12 public
universities in the Region where, prior to 2003, there were just
two.[99] We note evidence
describing the Region as one of the most business-friendly places
for foreign investors in the Middle East, thanks to its light
tax regime and regulatory framework, stable political climate
and safe working environment.[100]
66. We sought evidence and views on whether the UK
has been making the most of these opportunities, and we spoke
to a number of representatives of the business sector in Erbil
who were either British expatriates themselves or had connections
to British-based businesses. The overall impression conveyed was
of a sense of under-achievement, and of UK-based businesses failing
to take advantage of the opportunities on offer, though whether
the blame for this should attach primarily to the UK Government
for insufficient dynamism or to a risk-averse British business
community was less clear.[101]
Written evidence noted that, whilst British companies could not
expect to undercut competitors from countries such as Turkey or
China, the UK was considered to have the edge when it came to
providing high quality goods and services.[102]
Areas including banking, agriculture and food technology, tourism
and services, and IT were all seen as offering significant opportunities
for UK businesses in the Kurdistan Region, but there were calls
for the UK Government to do more to publicise them.[103]
It was suggested that the UK Government's sensitivity to the delicate
constitutional position in Iraq may have led it, perhaps over-cautiously,
to hold back from committing to a deepening of trade links, allowing
other countries to steal a march.[104]
KRG ministers spoke of a general sense of UK businesses hanging
back from full engagement in the Kurdistan Region, but they were
uncertain what the underlying causes were. Some aspects of the
economy were brought to our attention that may not attract investors;
difficulties in borrowing because of the Region's non-sovereign
status and the uncertainty over its future, past crashes in the
property market, the perceived need for political patronage, and
a public sector that is still apparently monopolistic in some
areas and resistant to reform.[105]
We are also aware of concerns that the Region's economic fortunes
are too closely linked to the political and trading relationship
with the Erdogan government in Turkey,[106]
although to a large extent this is a relationship borne of necessity,
given the Region's lack of reliable local partners.[107]
67. The UK Government has pointed, amongst other
things to its sponsorship of the Iraq-British Business Council,
to a number of UK trade initiatives in Erbil, and to the appointment
of Baroness Nicholson as UK Trade Envoy to Iraq in early 2014
as policies intended to maximise British trade with the Kurdistan
Region,[108] but we
sense from the lack of feedback we received on these initiatives
that their impact thus far has been relatively low.[109]
68. In relation to the Kurdistan Region's burgeoning
oil and gas industry (discussed in more detail later), the only
major British, or part-British, business investor in the sector
is the British-Turkish joint venture, Genel Energy. With most
of the main drilling contracts now apparently signed, and the
local giant KAR dominating the downstream sector, it would appear
that significant opportunities for UK companies are now limited,
although when we had an informal meeting with the KRG's natural
resources minister, Dr Hawrami in the summer, he told us that
there were still plenty of opportunities for niche service providers,
a sector in which the UK was seen as a leader. He expressed surprise
at the relative absence of UK firms in the sector. In November,
the Minister, Mr Ellwood, told us that the dispute over oil and
exports between Baghdad and Erbil may have led British companies
to focus their attention on the south of Iraq.[110]
TRAVEL ADVICE AND DIRECT AIR LINKS
69. Several business representatives we spoke in
Erbil referred to what they perceived as a false and unhelpful
perception that the Kurdistan Region was insecure and unsafe;
and they and interlocutors from the KRG suggested that the FCO's
Iraq travel advice, which in 2014 was amended to advise against
all but essential travel to the Region, sent out the wrong message
and hurt businesses. When we put this to the Minister in November,
he acknowledged these concerns, noting that travel advice was
under frequent review.[111]
It is salutary to note that on the day following Mr Ellwood's
testimony, a suicide bomber killed six people close to the historic
citadel at the centre of Erbil. We understand this to be the most
lethal terrorist attack to have struck the city in many years,[112]
but it underlines both the fragility of the relative peace in
Erbil at present and the challenge of getting travel advice right.
We acknowledge that the FCO faces a difficult task in providing
travel advice that, on the one hand, acknowledges that the Kurdistan
Region has not yet returned to normal, and is unlikely to do so
for some time, and on the other does not become one of the very
factors that prevents the Region from getting back to normal,
by inhibiting business engagement.
70. An issue that was raised with us several times
during the inquiry, in particular by various representatives of
the KRG, was the absence of direct flights between the UK and
the Kurdistan Region.[113]
We had understood the UK Government's general position to be that
that it does not see it as its role to promote the setting-up
of particular routes, and to leave decisions to commercial carriers.
(We understand that at least one carrier has, in the recent past,
expressed potential interest in launching a London-Erbil route.)
However, when the Minister gave evidence, he told us that the
absence of direct links was "frustrating", and that
"direct air links need to happen".[114]
We learned during the inquiry that there is a technical barrier
to setting up at a direct route in that the UK Border Agency must
first inspect Erbil airport and satisfy itself that it meets UK
border security requirements.[115]
As of November, when Mr Ellwood gave evidence, this was yet to
happen.
71. Given the interest there appears to be in
establishing a direct UK-Erbil air link, it is disappointing that
this may have been held up by the need for a UK Border Agency
inspection of Erbil airport. We press for such an inspection to
be made at the earliest opportunity.
UK GOVERNMENT POLICY ON THE ANFAL
72. The UK Government's formal stance on the Anfal
has been raised with us during the inquiry as relevant to consideration
of the UK-KRG bilateral relationship. In the words of one of our
witnesses, Professor Gareth Stansfield, UK policy on this issue
is "not only insulting but deeply upsetting" and damages
the UK's standing in the Kurdistan Region.[116]
73. The Anfal campaign of 1987-88 was a deliberate
strategy to terrorise the Kurdish population of northern Iraq
through a mass collective punishment, and to destroy Kurdish resistance
to Saddam Hussein's regime once and for all. There were several
strands to the campaign; the destruction of thousands of villages
and collectivisation of the rural population; sexual violence
against women and girls; the forced recruitment of some working-age
males as jash (government collaborators) and the mass execution
of many men and boys. In the most notorious single incident of
the Anfal, Iraqi planes dropped poison gas on the town of Halabja
on 16-17 March 1987, indiscriminately killing some 4000 men, women
and children. Official estimates put the total number of people
killed in the campaign upwards of 50,000: the KRG considers that
it may be as much as 182,000.[117]
The vast majority of victims were Kurds, but Assyrians and other
minorities were also killed.
74. The UN defines "genocide" as, in summary,
an intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic,
racial or religious group.[118]
For the KRG, as for ordinary Iraqi Kurds, it is self-evident that
a campaign of such brutality and enormity as the Anfal, directed
primarily at the Kurdish people was a genocide. Indeed, in the
KRG's view, it was merely the culmination of a sequence of genocidal
policies pursued by Baathist Iraq over three decades.[119]
For Kurds today, the Anfal is an event not yet confined to the
history books: it is a continuing source of pain, particularly
for families whose relatives were "disappeared" and
whose bodies have never been found. As we learned in Erbil, where
we heard from the International Commission on Missing Persons,
the work of identifying the hundreds of thousands of anonymous
victims of Saddam's tyranny, buried all over the country has barely
begun, despite considerable international investment in the previous
decade, including by the UK, to help Iraq improve its forensic
identification techniques.[120]
75. A small number of parliaments, governments and
other international bodies have in recent years come to formally
recognise the Anfal as genocide, as have various Iraqi tribunals
and federal institutions. On 28 February 2013, the UK House of
Commons agreed to a motion "that this House formally recognises
the genocide against the people of Iraqi Kurdistan".[121]
76. The UK Government chose not to divide the House
when the motion was debated, but its formal stance is not to take
a view on whether the Anfal was a genocide. This is in line with
long-standing UK policy that the recognition of genocide is, in
the words of the FCO's submission to this inquiry, "primarily
a matter for judicial decision, rather than for Government or
non-judicial bodies".[122]
As genocide recognition is not part of UK jurisprudence, this
means that in practice the UK would be likely to take its lead
from the International Criminal Court, the only international
tribunal vested with authority to determine whether particular
events were genocide. The ICC, which heard its first case in 2003,
is not empowered to make determinations on events dating before
its creation. As the KRG and others have pointed out to us, it
would therefore appear that, unless there is some unexpected legal
change (most obviously, if the ICC's jurisdiction were made retrospective),
there is little prospect of the UK Government formally recognising
the Anfal as genocide under its current policy.[123]
This was confirmed in the Minister's oral evidence in November,
when he appeared to imply that the UK Government's hands were
tied on the question of genocide recognition, as it was an issue
of international law.[124]
We suggest that this view is not strictly correct. It would be
open for the UK Government to decide to recognise historic events
as genocide, notwithstanding the absence of an ICC verdict, as
other governments have done in the case of other historic events,
and as the Minister's predecessor, Alistair Burt, effectively
acknowledged when he spoke in the Commons debate on 28 February
2013.[125]
77. A further question is whether the Government's
precautionary approach is understandable and justified. Mr Burt's
speech in February 2013 referred to "implications for both
today and yesterday" were the Government to agree to recognise
the Anfal as genocide, echoing similar views from the opposition
front bench. He did not elaborate further, but it could be argued
that the UK's current position at least has the virtue of clarity,
and that recognising one series of historic events as genocide,
absent a judgment from the ICC, would put pressure on the UK Government,
in the interests of consistency, to recognise others.[126]
These are potentially manifold. In an Iraqi and Kurdish context
alone, this would include the terrible suffering of the Armenian
and Assyrian communities in the first half of the 20th
century; Saddam's persecution of the Marsh Arabs and Mandaeans
of southern Iraq in the 1990s; and ISIL's deliberately targeted
attacks on the Assyrian and Yezidi communities of northern Iraq
only a few months ago. We cannot but note that the issue of genocide
recognition has at times proven diplomatically problematic, particularly
with regard to Ottoman Turkey's treatment of its Armenian and
Assyrian communities. We learned during the inquiry that the KRG
itself refrains from taking a formal view on whether these events
were acts of genocide, even though descendants of those caught
up in that tragedy (both protagonists and victims) are living
in the Kurdistan Region today.[127]
78. The KRG is clearly disappointed with the UK's
policy, with the then High Representative to the UK telling us
that it was "crucial" for the Kurdish people that the
Anfal be recognised as genocide. However, the KRG's written evidence
welcomed the FCO for being active in marking Anfal Day[128]
and other commemorative events, and commended Mr Burt's "finessing"
of the UK Government's position during the February 2013 debate.[129]
In his speech Mr Burt had acknowledged that the Government's position
was "clear" but "not necessarily comfortable or
sufficient" and had indicated willingness, on behalf of the
FCO, to continue the discussion with the KRG. In this connection,
we note that the government's position, quoted in paragraph 76
above, is that genocide recognition is "primarily
a matter for judicial decision" [emphasis added] indicating
that the Government may be open to dialogue about whether non-judicial
factors could be taken into consideration.
79. The terrible events of the Anfal campaign
conducted against the Kurdish people in the 1980s appear to meet
the UN definition of "genocide". We understand the reasons
that have caused the Government not to formally recognise the
Anfal as a genocide, but also note that its approach has caused
disappointment in the Kurdistan Region and that foreign governments
have chosen to recognise past atrocities as genocide, notwithstanding
the absence of a legal ruling by a recognised international tribunal.
We encourage the UK Government to maintain a dialogue with the
Kurdistan Regional Government on the issue, including on what
judicial and non-judicial criteria the UK Government may use to
determine whether acts constitute genocide. We welcome the Government's
recognition of Anfal Day and would encourage it to continue to
reflect on other ways in which it could help commemorate the Anfal,
in order to show its identification with the suffering endured
by the Kurdish people.
37 KRG High Representative to the UK (KUR 15), paragraph
44 Back
38
KRG High Representative to the UK (KUR 15), paragraphs 48-56.
See also Dlawer Ala'Aldeen (KUR 1), paragraphs 7 and 14 Back
39
Foreign Affairs Committee, Third Report of Session 2012-13, The FCO's Human Rights Work in 2011,
HC 116, paragraph 45; Foreign Affairs Committee, Fifth Report
of Session 2013-14, The UK's Relations with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, HC
88, paragraph 134. See also Professor Gareth Stansfield (KUR 14),
paragraph 8 Back
40
Q137 [Dr Ali Allawi] Back
41
See also Dlawer Ala'Aldeen (KUR 1), paragraphs 14 and 15; British
Council (KUR 4) paragraphs 4.1 and 4.2 Back
42
See also British Council (KUR 4) paragraph 3.3; Professor Dlawer
Ala'Aldeen (KUR 1), paragraph 7 Back
43
See also Ranj Alaaldin (KUR 18), page 3 Back
44
Q6-7 [Professor Gareth Stansfield and Professor Charles Tripp] Back
45
The multi-party system of government that has evolved informally
in the Kurdistan Region is similar to the system formally enshrined
in procedures for the Northern Ireland Assembly. In both cases,
an unusually inclusive form of governance, though recognised as
imperfect, was thought to be necessary in order to shore up an
inherently fragile political process, in part by ensuring that
the "spoils" of government are shared out widely. In
Germany, a governing "grand coalition" currently holds
80% of Bundestag seats. Back
46
Q1-5 [Professor Gareth Stansfield and Professor Charles Tripp];
Q7 [Professor Gareth Stansfield]; APPG Kurdistan Region of Iraq
(KUR 12) paragraphs 48-51; Genel Energy (KUR 2), paragraph 5;
Professor Dlawer Ala'Aldeen (KUR 1), paragraph 4 Back
47
See also KRG High Representative to the UK (KUR 15), paragraph
51; Foreign and Commonwealth Office (KUR 6), paragraphs 19-21 Back
48
Q2 [Professor Gareth Stansfield] Back
49
Q136 [KRG High Representative to the UK] Back
50
Q1-3 [Professor Gareth Stansfield] Professor Gareth Stansfield
(KUR 14), paragraph 8. See also Q136 [Peter Galbraith] Back
51
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (KUR 6), paragraphs 4 and 25 Back
52
Q103 [KRG High Representative to the UK] Back
53
See also "Anger Lingers in Iraqi Kurdistan After a Crackdown",
New York Times, 18 May 2011 Back
54
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (KUR 6), paragraph 26; HC Deb,
15 January 2014, cols 286WH and 294WH [Westminster Hall] Back
55
Q103 [KRG High Representative to the UK] Back
56
KRG High Representative to the UK (KUR 15),paragraphs 60 and 61 Back
57
Q104-105 Back
58
Q75 [KRG High Representative to the UK] Back
59
Q28 [Professor Gareth Stansfield]; Genel Energy (KUR 2), paragraph
4 Back
60
KRG High Representative to the UK (KUR 15), paragraph 34 Back
61
Q28-29 [Professor Gareth Stansfield] Back
62
Q28 [Professor Gareth Stansfield] Back
63
Q62-63 [KRG High Representative to the UK] Back
64
Shabaks are an ethno-religious community of northern Iraq, speaking
a language related to Kurdish. Their religious practice is syncretic,
containing elements of Islamic and pre-Islamic beliefs. ISIL have
persecuted them Back
65
See also KRG High Representative to the UK (KUR 15), paragraphs
45 and 62 Back
66
British Council (KUR 4) paragraph 3.2 Back
67
The FCO is currently committed, amongst other things, to "leading
international efforts to resolve concerns about Iran's nuclear
programme", "protecting the UK against terrorism, and
"working for peace and long-term stability in the Middle
East and North Africa", including, in Syria, "supporting
diplomatic efforts that lead to an end to violence and process
of genuine political transition, and investigations into the grave
human rights situation." (Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
"FCO Policies" [accessed January 2015]) Back
68
"Iran warns of fallout from Iraq disintegration", Press
TV Online, 30 June 2014. See also APPG Kurdistan Region of
Iraq (KUR 16), paragraph 20 Back
69
Q35 [John Roberts] Back
70
Q49 [John Roberts] Back
71
Foreign Affairs Committee, Third Report of Session 2013-14, UK Policy Towards Iran,
HC 547 Back
72
Edward Oakden of the FCO told us that "the sort of Iraq that
Iran wants to see is very different from the sort of inclusive
Iraq
which we want to see" (Q155) Back
73
Foreign Affairs Committee, Twelfth Report of Session 2010-12,
UK-Turkey relations and Turkey's Regional Role, summary. HC 1567 Back
74
"Biden to meet with Erdogan as divide between US and Turkey widens",
The Guardian, 21 November 2014 Back
75
Q134 [Dr Ali Allawi]; KRG High Representative to the UK (KUR 15),paragraph
24 Back
76
"Turkey's Best Ally: The Kurds", New York Times,
22 June 2014 Back
77
Q23-24 [Professor Gareth Stansfield] Q36 and Q44 [John Roberts];
Q90-91 [KRG High Representative to the UK] Q133 [Peter Galbraith];
Professor Gareth Stansfield (KUR 14), paragraph 10; APPG Kurdistan
Region of Iraq (KUR 12), paragraph 41 Back
78
We understand that the KDP tends to shares Ankara's hostility
to and suspicion of the PKK's Syrian-Kurdish sister party, the
PYD, whilst other parties in the coalition want the PYD to be
given more support in its fight with ISIL. Back
79
In June, the KRG Representatives told us that recent events in
Mosul and Syria had made the bilateral relationship with Ankara
stronger, not weaker (Q106) Back
80
See also KRG High Representative to the UK (KUR 15),paragraphs
24-27 Back
81
See also Ranj Alaaldin (KUR 18), page 2 Back
82
See also Dlawer Ala'Aldeen, a former KRG Minister (KUR 1), paragraph
8 Back
83
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (KUR 6), paragraph 3 Back
84
KRG High Representative to the UK (KUR 15),paragraphs 45 and 54
Cf British Council (KUR 4), paragraphs 5.3-5.4 and Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (KUR 6), paragraph 31 Back
85
KRG High Representative to the UK (KUR 15),paragraph 58 Back
86
APPG Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KUR 12) paragraphs 28-32; British
Expertise (KUR 3), paragraph 10 Back
87
Q198-199 Back
88
Q201. The FCO's written evidence states that the National School
of Government International has, since 2007, been working at senior
levels of the KRG civil service to help improve service delivery.
(Foreign and Commonwealth Office (KUR 6), paragraphs 15-18) Back
89
HC Deb 16 October 2012, cols 18-9 WS. See also APPG Kurdistan
Region of Iraq (KUR 12) , paragraph 27 Back
90
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (KUR 6), paragraph 39. (As of
April 2014, when the evidence was submitted). Where UK-based staff
number fewer than 5, the FCO does not, for operational and security
reasons, disclose exact numbers Back
91
Q191 and 197 [Tobias Ellwood MP] Back
92
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (KUR 6), paragraph 38 Back
93
Q192-197 [Tobias Ellwood MP and Edward Oakden] Back
94
Q193 Back
95
Q191 [Tobias Ellwood MP] Back
96
Genel Energy (KUR 2), paragraph 2 Back
97
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (KUR 6), paragraph 8 Back
98
"Unemployment Increases in Kurdistan Region", Iraq
Business News, 12 September 2014. UNDP in Iraq website provides
national figures. [Accessed January 2015] Back
99
Ebiz Guides, "Kurdistan Region of Iraq" (2012),
page 195. See also Dlawer Ala'Aldeen (KUR 1), Back
100
Genel Energy (KUR 2), page 1 Back
101
Q10 [Professor Gareth Stansfield] Back
102
KRG High Representative to the UK (KUR 15), paragraph 44 Professor
Gareth Stansfield (KUR 14), paragraphs 15 and 16; APPG Kurdistan
Region of Iraq (KUR 12), paragraphs 18-24 Back
103
Genel Energy (KUR 2), paragraph 16 Back
104
Q10-11 [Professor Gareth Stansfield] Back
105
APPG Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KUR 12) paragraph 6; Genel Energy
(KUR 2), paragraph 17; Q135-136 [Peter Galbraith] Back
106
Q24 [Professor Gareth Stansfield]; Q 134 [Dr Ali Allawi] Back
107
Q 132 [Peter Galbraith] Back
108
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (KUR 6), paragraphs 10-12 Back
109
See also KRG High Representative to the UK (KUR 15), paragraphs
42, 46 and 47; APPG Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KUR 12), paragraphs
13 and 14 Back
110
See also KRG High Representative to the UK (KUR 15), paragraph
43 Back
111
Q207 Back
112
APPG Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KUR 12), paragraph 8; Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (KUR 6), paragraph 4 Back
113
APPG Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KUR 12),
paragraph 33 Back
114
Q206 Back
115
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (KUR 6), paragraph 13 Back
116
Q30 Back
117
KRG High Representative to the UK (KUR 15), paragraph 7. The UK
Government considers that up to around 100,000 Kurds may have
died (HC Debs, 28 February 2013, col 559) Back
118
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(adopted in 1948). Back
119
Q108 [KRG High Representative to the UK] [Wesminster Hall] Back
120
See also KRG High Representative to the UK (KUR 15), paragraph
59 Back
121
HC Debs, 28 February 2013, cols 529-565WS
[Wesminster Hall] Back
122
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (KUR 6), paragraph 40 Back
123
KRG High Representative to the UK (KUR 15), paragraph 37; Professor
Michael Bohlander (KUR 5), paragraphs 3 and 16-23 Back
124
Q216 Back
125
See also Professor Michael Bohlander (KUR 5), paragraph 5-15 Back
126
Q30 [Professor Charles Tripp] Back
127
Q110 [KRG High Representative to the UK] Back
128
The KRG declared Anfal Day in 2007 as a commemorative event for
victims of the campaign, taking place each year on 14 April. It
is marked by expatriate Kurdish communities and their friends
and supporters around the world. Back
129
KRG High Representative to the UK (KUR 15), paragraphs 37 and
38 Back
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