House of Commons - UK Government policy on the Kurdistan Region of Iraq

UK Government policy on the Kurdistan Region of Iraq - Foreign Affairs Contents

6 Iraq's security crisis and its impact on the Kurdistan Region

80. ISIL's surge into northern Iraq in the summer of 2014 has had a massive impact on the Kurdistan Region. In this chapter we discuss how the KRG has responded and the implications for UK foreign policy. Our colleagues in the Defence Committee are preparing a report on the UK Government's response to ISIL, which is likely to discuss in some detail the UK's military support for the KRG and the federal government in Baghdad. These issues are touched on below, but with the main focus on foreign policy considerations, taking into account Iraq's complex and combustible political environment.

UK Government policy

81. We understand the key aspects of UK policy to remain those announced to the House by the Prime Minister when he reported to the House on 8 September 2014 on the recent NATO summit in south Wales: to press for the formation of a truly inclusive Iraqi government; to provide the Peshmerga with arms and, if requested, training to fight ISIL (we note that the UK has also recently begun to offer training to the Iraqi army[130]); and to help build a regional anti-IS alliance that would include Sunni states.[131] Following an affirmatory Commons vote on 26 September, UK military engagement has expanded to include RAF sorties in northern Iraq, attacking ISIL positions, although on a far smaller scale than the US air force. The resolution of 26 September also set out commitments not to deploy troops in "ground combat operations" in either Iraq or Syria, and not to carry out air strikes into Syria without further Commons debate.[132] The Government has acknowledged that UK drones have flown over Syrian airspace.[133]

EVOLUTION OF UK POLICY

82. This was not a policy that emerged fully formed but which evolved in response to unfolding events on the ground over the summer. It is evident that the UK has been careful to remain publicly in step with its allies, in particular the US. Throughout this period of evolution, one constant has been the UK Government's insistence that there will be no UK troops deployed in ground combat operations in Iraq;[134] and we should add that we took from our visit to Iraq in October the message that Iraqi politicians and military leaders (Arabs and Kurds alike) are not asking the UK or its western allies to send their solders to fight in Iraq.

83. In outline, following the fall of Mosul (an event which the KRG told us they had warned both the Iraqi government and Western governments was imminent[135]), the UK limited itself to urging Iraqis to come together to fight ISIL under an inclusive political process, and made clear that there would be no UK military intervention or assistance offered.[136] A further ISIL surge in August exposed the Peshmerga as much more vulnerable than had apparently been realised by Western intelligence,[137] raising the prospect of ISIL reaching the gates of Erbil, and led to the broadcast round the world, over many days, of horrifying images of ISIL besieging tens of thousands of defenceless Yezidis on Mount Sinjar. The US decided to begin attacking ISIL from the air; initially only for the narrow purpose of protecting its "assets" in Iraq,[138] and UK policy shifted in parallel. The RAF was made available for humanitarian missions on Mount Sinjar (in the end, very few RAF sorties were made[139]), and the UK Government began publicly to explore the possibility of assisting the Peshmerga.[140] Initially, the UK's involvement was limited to helping courier Soviet-era weaponry to the Peshmerga because, according to briefings given to journalists over the summer, this was what they were more accustomed to using.[141] (We should add that at no point during our visit to the Kurdistan Region did anyone from the KRG or the Peshmerga tell us that their preference had ever been to be supplied with Soviet-era weaponry: they wanted the best and most up-to-date weapons available in order to take on ISIL.) By early September, senior military staff were being sent to Erbil to advise and co-ordinate with the Peshmerga, 40 heavy machine guns had been gifted to them, and a training programme on using the weapons was being put in place.[142] (By December, training was being offered, and on a larger scale, to the Iraqi army as well.[143]) By this point UK Ministers were publicly echoing President Obama's language of the need to "degrade and destroy" ISIL,[144] in Syria as well as in Iraq, with the Prime Minister indicating that air strikes in both countries would be lawful.[145] The last major shift in policy occurred in late September, when the Commons endorsed the Government's position that the RAF should join the air campaign against ISIL in Iraq.[146] According to the Ministry of Defence, RAF jets have made a number of decisive interventions since they joined the campaign, although the RAF's involvement is by any yardstick limited and is dwarfed by that of the US air force.[147] Allied intervention has clearly succeeded in repelling ISIL's advances and some territory has been recovered from them in Iraq, mainly of their more peripheral conquests, in or on the edge of Kurdish or Shia-majority districts. Few inroads have yet been made into Sunni-majority districts held by ISIL

THE CASE FOR INTERVENTION

84. The grounds for UK military involvement in Iraq have been discussed in the House on a number of occasions since the current crisis broke, in particular in the debate on 26 September, when the House, by a clear majority, voted to endorse UK Government policy. We do not rehearse the discussion in this report, other than to note that information we have gathered during the second half of the inquiry confirms that the risk of an ISIL land invasion of the Kurdistan Region in August was real. The aerial intervention spear-headed by the US in August undoubtedly arrested ISIL's advance, helping to avert the risk of a land war in the heart of the Kurdistan Region, with all the potentially catastrophic consequences that might have entailed, for the Region's economy and energy supplies, and for the people of the Region, including the over 1 million displaced people living in sanctuary there. Politicians and soldiers we met in the Kurdistan Region were united in welcoming the UK's assistance in the defence of their land. We encountered similar support and thanks from politicians, of all backgrounds, in Baghdad. The effect on morale of the allies' decision to engage in the war and to begin attacking ISIL targets from the air was seen as particularly vital.

85. As regards ISIL, again there has been much debate already as to its origins, strength, aims, and so on, as well as how best to combat the movement, and again we do not propose here to add extensively to the discussion. Gathering information for this inquiry has, however, underlined for us the unusual cruelty of a movement whose main apparent motivation appears to be inflicting suffering on the innocent, in pursuit of its totalitarian world view. For example, in a camp near Sulaymaniyah, we met Yezidi families whose wives and daughters had been stolen from them earlier in the summer to be used as slaves. It is chilling to contemplate that cruelty of this nature has been inflicted on entire communities across Iraq and Syria, with religious minorities such as Yezidis, Shia Turcomans and Christian Assyrians facing extermination in their ancient homeland, on the basis simply of their beliefs and backgrounds. It was accordingly a surprise to note the Foreign Secretary's recent description of ISIL as an organisation that "makes no distinction between cultures, countries and religions"[148] as the evidence clearly shows that ISIL adopts an avowedly sectarian ideology.[149]

86. The overall impression given by the UK Government's policy on ISIL in Iraq during 2014 is one of caution, responding to events as they unfolded rather than anticipating them, and we note that UK military assistance has been limited. However, we recognise that it was not unreasonable for the Government to proceed with caution, given the complexities of Iraqi politics and the UK's Iraq War legacy. It was right for the UK Government to assist the Peshmerga and to join in air strikes; on strategic grounds, because it was vital to support our friends and allies in the Kurdistan Region and to help build their morale, and on humanitarian grounds; to prevent appalling acts of violence and cruelty against whole communities, that call to mind some of the worst atrocities of the totalitarian regimes of the 20th century. We encourage the UK Government to use its influence to ensure that there is a proper record of the atrocities that have been committed so that, in due course, offenders may be brought to justice.

87. Allied countries, led by the US, are to be commended for responding urgently following the ISIL surge of early August 2014, but, with hindsight, it appears to have been a miscalculation for the UK Government and its allies not to have assessed that the Peshmerga would require military assistance in order to defend a border of over 1000 kilometres against ISIL. With allied support, the Peshmerga now, happily, appear to be recovering territory lost to ISIL in August.

Iraq and Syria: one battlefield

88. Given this inquiry's terms of reference, our focus is on the impact of ISIL on the Kurdistan Region, but there is clearly a wider context. At least until US-led airstrikes began to check their progress, ISIL had been moving up and down the Euphrates valley from their main base in the Syrian city of Raqqa, underlining that the Iraq-Syria border is practically non-existent. Politicians and military leaders we met both in Baghdad and in the Kurdistan Region told us that at present Iraq and Syria are one battlefield and said they would welcome the UK joining any military strategy against ISIL within Syria.[150]

89. That Iraq and Syria are effectively one battlefield is not denied by the UK Government; and we recognise the web of factors, including UK domestic politics, that has led the UK to restrict its current aerial engagement to Iraq, and not to arm militias in Syria. The Minister, Mr Ellwood, sought to argue that the UK's position of bombing ISIL in Iraq but not Syria is not inconsistent, in that the campaign to degrade ISIL in both countries is a common effort, and that the UK's allies had not requested RAF engagement in Syria.[151] We note that the UK Government has undertaken to return to the Commons should it decide that the UK should join airstrikes in Syria.[152]

90. Iraq and Syria are at present one indivisible battlefield and there is unlikely to be any real peace in the Kurdistan Region or the rest of Iraq unless ISIL in Syria is destroyed or, at the very least, badly degraded and starved of the capacity to move freely across the border.

Sunni disengagement and the need for an "inclusive" political process

91. Another wider aspect of the conflict that it is relevant to mention is Sunni Arab disengagement. Evidence and information we have gathered during the inquiry have made disconcertingly clear that the common factor that has enabled ISIL to thrive in both Iraq and Syria is demographic: the presence of a bitter and alienated local Sunni Arab population. ISIL's rise to power in Iraq is neither an invasion by a foreign army nor a grassroots uprising but a lethal combination of the two.[153] Whether ISIL is actively or tacitly supported by 5%, 20% or 50% of any given community of Iraqi or Syrian Sunnis is practically unknowable, but it is clear that it would not have had the success it has had unless it had been able to take advantage of popular grassroots anger with a political system perceived as illegitimate and broken.[154] In Iraq as in Syria, this has involved ISIL forming alliances with local power brokers, such as Sunni tribal leaders (it should be added that some other tribes have fought ISIL and made enormous sacrifices in so doing) and with neo-Baathist militias, such as the Naqshbandi Army, led by one of the senior figures in the ostensibly "secular" regime of Saddam Hussein. These apparent alliances of convenience may well break in time, but one of the main messages that we took from our visit to Iraq was not to under-estimate either the strength and resilience of ISIL (including its ability, once entrenched to maintain power predominantly through the use of fear) or the degree of alienation present in the Sunni Arab community.

92. The deep roots of Sunni discontent cannot be discussed in detail here, and are perhaps partially irrelevant: that the anger exists is a "fact on the ground" which policymakers must deal with, rather than asking whether it is reasonable or justifiable. Many in Western diplomatic circles have privately cited the second term of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki as disastrous, particularly for national unity, a view with which most interlocutors we met in Iraq (of all backgrounds) did not demur.[155] The sectarian, centralising and increasingly paranoiacal manner in which Mr Maliki had exercised power had led an increasingly poisonous climate of mutual contempt between the administration and the Sunni and Kurdish political leaderships. Many also hold Maliki personally to blame for the Iraqi army's catastrophic decline in morale and professionalism.[156] However, the roots of Sunni discontent clearly precede any political figure on the stage today. The advent of democracy in Iraq has, if anything, entrenched sectarian and ethnic identities in Iraq at the expense of national identity, with a political system that thus far appears to have reinforced rather than healed divisions.[157] The Sunni community has from the outset been, at best, ambivalent about Iraq's post-Baathist dispensation, and it could certainly be argued that many within the community have never come to terms with the loss of privilege that attended the advent of democracy. Whereas Kurdish political leaders have in key debates and negotiations usually presented a united front in the federal arena, Sunni politicians have been more divided.[158] Following ISIL's takeover by stealth of Anbar province in 2013 and its 2014 surge over much of the rest of Sunni Iraq, most Sunni leaders are now physically alienated from the communities they purport to represent.[159]

93. The UK (and US) government's support for a more "inclusive" political process over the summer, when Iraq's politician were negotiating the post-electoral settlement, was widely interpreted as a thinly coded message to the main power-brokers to look past Maliki when choosing a new Prime Minister if they wanted Western help in beating ISIL.[160] The price of that policy included lost time, during which ISIL were able to continue their advance without hindrance from aerial attacks, an impression (rightly or wrongly) of hesitancy or vacillation on the part of Western powers whilst ISIL ran riot in the heart of Iraq, which may have helped ISIL morale, and a golden opportunity for Iran to increase its military and intelligence presence within Iraq and its influence within the Shia political bloc, which it unhesitatingly took.[161] Balanced against this is the likelihood of the US, UK and other powers being seen in the Sunni Arab world, including Sunni Iraq, as (in the words of General David Petraeus) "the air force of Shia militias" had they agreed to come to Mr Maliki's aid.[162] Mr Maliki is also now out of office as Prime Minister, replaced by a more conciliatory figure, Haider al-Abadi. and we consider it likely that the UK and other governments' policy of withholding military and practical support for the federal administration pending the advent of a more inclusive government would have been a factor in the political bargaining that went on in Baghdad before the appointment of a new Prime Minister.

94. We are under no illusions as to the political and military obstacles Mr Abadi will face as Prime Minister of a deeply divided Iraq. Toxic political divisions, both between and within the main sectarian blocs, still remain; and some familiar faces from the past, including Mr Maliki (now one of three Vice-Presidents, and apparently now a very rich man, as many whom we met in Iraq pointedly noted) remain on the political scene. Mr Abadi must also find a way to defend and, it is to be hoped, recover territory from ISIL without over-reliance on Shia militias and on Iranian military intelligence, which in the longer term is only likely to increase national divisions. But he has made a good start; building a more balanced cabinet, filling the Defence and Interior Minister posts that Mr Maliki had left vacant, and reaching a deal on oil with the KRG that it is to be hoped may signal the start of better relations between the two administrations. He has also agreed to sponsor a programme for national reconciliation in Iraq, headed by Vice-President Ayad Allawi, likely to include measures to reach out to the Sunni community (for instance by seeking to repeal aspects of the controversial anti-Baathist and anti-terrorism statutes that many Sunni see as unfairly targeting them, and to rebuild the army on a non-sectarian basis), as Dr Allawi himself told us on our visit to Baghdad.

95. There was a price to be paid for the UK and other governments opting not to provide military assistance to the Iraqi government more quickly, including the increase of Iranian influence in the country. However, on balance, we consider that the UK Government was correct not to assist the heavily discredited government of Nouri al-Maliki, assessing, rightly, that it was part of the problem, not part of the solution. The UK Government is correct to have placed emphasis on the importance of an "inclusive" political process in Iraq on the need for Sunnis to recover faith in the country's democratic institutions. Diagnosing the problem is, in this instance, likely to prove far easier than prescribing the cure. The task of rebuilding Sunni confidence in Iraq is a formidable one: it requires political leadership from within the Sunni community and collective engagement, across the sectarian and ethnic divide, from Baghdad's political elites.

Helping the Peshmerga

96. As noted earlier, the UK gifted 40 heavy machine guns to the Peshmerga in September sending army trainers to train local fighters on how to use them. The Defence Secretary announced in November that the pilot programme would be continued, and extended to include infantry skills. He also said that the UK planned to issue more equipment to the Peshmerga and to offer training in countering improvised explosive devices. The UK Government appointed a security envoy to the Kurdistan Region in August: in November, the Defence Secretary announced that further "advisory personnel" from the UK military would be sent to Iraqi headquarters.[163]

97. We met the trainers, at that time from the Yorkshire Regiment, when we visited Erbil in October, and they provided us with an upbeat assessment of the how the training programme was progressing, praising the attitude of Peshmerga trainees. We were also pleased to note that the training programme was being made available not only to Kurdish Peshmerga, but to Yezidi and Christians volunteers tasked with defending their communities from ISIL. This aspect of the scheme should be maintained.

98. The Peshmerga's reputation for competence and bravery was borne out in their initial response to the ISIL takeover of Mosul in June, where it held the line against ISIL advances all across its long southern border. However, we were told on our visit to Iraq that its inability to hold the line in Sinjar and the Ninevah Plains in August, combined with the perceived wobble in resistance to ISIL advances on the road to Erbil at around the same time, had provoked some internal debate about its discipline, chain of command, and battle-readiness. Political and military leaders in the Kurdistan Region told us that most internal concerns had since been addressed, and that the Peshmerga were in good morale, in part because they knew that they were no longer alone in the fight against ISIL. Practically everyone we spoke to about the Peshmerga told us that the key problem at that time was a lack of military hardware, and in particular that the Peshmerga lacked the heavy weaponry they needed to take out captured armoured cars and tanks that had been key to ISIL's military advance over the summer.

99. We understand that the events of August also led to fresh questions about the continuing existence of political factionalism within the Peshmerga. Soldiers allied to the KDP and PUK parties, who receive state salaries, outnumber by around three to one so-called "government" Peshmerga, a legacy of both parties' long histories as resistance movements and guerrilla fighters in the pre-democratic era, and sometimes as antagonists in internal conflicts (for instance in the Kurdistan Region's brief civil war in the mid-1990s, the last time violence between the two sides erupted on a significant scale).[164]

100. Following the formation of a new KRG government in June 2014, the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs is now in the hands of the Goran party, a party committed to uniting the Peshmerga. We met both the Minister, Mr Qadir (a respected former Peshmerga leader) and the head of Goran, Mr Mustafa, at separate meetings in the Kurdistan Region in October. Both told us that the de-factionalisation of the Peshmerga remained a priority to which all parties in government were committed and that a programme for reform was in place, including of the Peshmerga's opaque finances. The end result would be a truly united national guard with a single chain of command. Sources in Erbil told us that there did appear to be a genuine cross-party commitment to achieve reform, but also remarked that factionalism within the Peshmerga was deeply ingrained and would not easily be removed, as it was almost as much a quasi-tribal mindset as an institutional phenomenon.

101. Mr Qadir told us that the Peshmerga would be willing to co-ordinate with the Iraqi army to take on ISIL on Iraqi territory, but said that the Peshmerga would not, in general, work with the Iraqi army in territory that it does not consider to be part of Iraqi Kurdistan, as the Peshmerga have no role defending non-Kurdish territory. (We note that there are exceptions: the Peshmerga played a key role in taking the Mosul dam off ISIL, and, we understand, continue to defend it, even though the dam is not in territory claimed by the KRG.). The Minister, Mr Ellwood, told us in November that the UK Government wanted to see more evidence of "synergy" between the Peshmerga and the Iraqi army.[165]

102. Another issue raised with us by KRG politicians was the current requirement for any equipment (lethal or non-lethal) gifted to the KRG to be first checked by federal government inspectors in Baghdad, putting back receipt of the gift by several days. They said there was no reason why such inspections could not go ahead at an airport in the Kurdistan Region on the day of inspection.[166] In an evidence session with the Foreign Secretary in September, he implied that this was normal practice, as the federal government is the sovereign power.[167]

103. We put the Peshmerga's request for more weaponry to Mr Ellwood when he gave evidence in November. He agreed that military support should continue, but appeared to express a degree of scepticism about whether the Peshmerga were as short of adequate weaponry as was being claimed. The Minister identified factionalism as a problem that needed to be addressed, remarking that the emergence of Goran as a major political player raised at least the potential of the problem becoming worse not better. Mr Ellwood referred to Libya as an extreme example of a country where arms proliferation had helped ruin its political system. The Minister appeared to agree with the proposition that there should be a degree of linkage between continuing military support for the Peshmerga and evidence of progress in Peshmerga reform.[168]

104. The UK's offer of equipment and training for the Peshmerga has been warmly welcomed in the Kurdistan Region and is helping the Peshmerga take on ISIL. Military assistance should be continued, on the basis of evidence that progress on the unification of the Peshmerga is continuing satisfactorily. The Government may also be minded to take into account the extent to which the Peshmerga and the Iraqi army are co-ordinating to take on ISIL in contemplating future gifting of equipment. We appreciate that Iraq's delicate constitutional situation is an element that the UK Government must take into account in determining whether and in what manner to make future gifts of military equipment.

105. We seek clarification from the UK Government as to whether it would be possible for gifts to the Kurdistan Regional Government to be made direct to territory of the KRG or whether the federal government is within its right to insist that all gifts are routed via Baghdad.

Helping the Syrian Kurds

106. The Kurdistan Region's formal land border with Syria is tiny but it currently controls a larger area of border territory to the west of Mosul, an area that has been fiercely contested with ISIL since the summer. We understand that up until the summer, the KRG's approach to the Syrian conflict had been to insulate itself as best it could.[169] A berm was erected close to the border; its purpose, the then KRG High Representative to the UK told us, was to keep Islamist militants out rather than Syrian refugees.[170] (The KRG has in fact accepted some 250,000 Syrian refugees, mainly ethnic Kurds.[171]) This strategy became increasingly difficult to maintain throughout 2014, as ISIL became increasingly an Iraqi as well as a Syrian problem. This is illustrated by two events from the second half of the year: first, at Sinjar in August, when territory held, as we understand it, by KDP factions of the Peshmerga, fell to ISIL. When the siege was eventually lifted, it was militias attached to the Syrian-Kurdish PYD Party, who relieved it, liberating trapped civilians, as well as a few KDP Peshmerga trapped with them, via a land corridor into Kurdish-held territory in Syria.[172] The second event was the KRG's agreement to assist the Syrian Kurdish resistance to ISIL in Kobane, by sending around 200 Peshmerga via the Turkish border to help defend the town; amounting to a small but symbolically important recognition by the KRG that engagement in Syria had become practically unavoidable.

107. The events of the past year have placed increased focus on the PYD. The party controls three non-contiguous pockets of Kurdish-majority in northern Syria—the so-called "cantons"—that amount to practically the only significant non-regime resistance to ISIL and other Islamist militias in northern Syria. The eastern-most and largest canton, centred on the Kurdish-Syriac town of Qamishli, borders the Kurdistan Region, and has a significant population of recently displaced people. When we met the PYD leadership during the inquiry, they told us that foreign governments, including the UK had offered them little help in their fight against ISIL. The FCO confirmed to us in informal briefings that it has given the PYD only very limited recognition.[173] We understand that the PYD's refusal to join the official Syrian opposition (which it sees as unrepresentative and dominated by Arab nationalists) counts against it in the UK Government's eyes. The PYD's acknowledged links to the Turkish-Kurdish PKK party, which the EU, as well as Turkey, formally proscribes as a terrorist organisation, may not help.[174]

108. The PYD describes itself as a social democratic, secular and cross-communal movement; no longer Kurdish nationalist in orientation but instead favouring the decentralisation of Syria. Those who are suspicious of the PYD, including the KDP of President Barzani, have accused it of observing an informal truce with the Assad regime, an allegation it strongly denies, and of having a monopolistic approach to power. There have been allegations made of human rights abuses within the cantons. While the democratic credentials of the PYD may be disputed, it is undoubtedly a secular movement that has absolutely no truck with the extremism of ISIL and is its only serious adversary in much of northern Syria.[175] Its fighters played an honourable and brave role in relieving the crisis on Mount Sinjar. For most of the past year it has been on the back foot against ISIL, with the central canton of Kobane all but falling. Were Qamishli also to be threatened this could have serious consequences for the strategic balance in the wider region, as well as making the Kurdistan Region more vulnerable.

109. We ask the Government to clarify its policy on recognising and working with Syrian-Kurdish groups such as the PYD party that are resisting ISIL in northern Syria. We also ask it to clarify whether its categorisation of the Turkish-Kurdish PKK as a terrorist group or the PYD's decision not to join the Syrian National Coalition are considered reasons not to recognise or assist the PYD.

The humanitarian crisis in the Kurdistan Region

110. Since 2003, the KRG and the people of the Kurdistan Region have responded generously to an influx of displaced people, of various religions or ethnicities, escaping conflict or persecution elsewhere in Iraq or, increasingly, Syria. The steady flow of refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) in 2014 became a flood, with hundreds of thousands of Iraqis, of many ethnicities and religions escaping instability in the rest of Iraq for the relative safety of the Kurdistan Region. Well over one million refugees and IDPs[176] are living all over the Region, in camps, private homes and hotels, schools, churches and temples, parks, building sites and waste ground. The condition of the refugees and IDPs, and the effect of their presence on the Region, was a subject raised constantly with us on our visit to Iraq. We also visited an IDP camp near Sulaymaniyah, speaking to the camp administration and briefly to the Yezidis who had been living there since ISIL forced them to flee their homes in the summer.

111. The views of relevant NGOs and agencies that we spoke to was that the KRG was doing a decent job of dealing with the crisis, and was responsive to their advice. However they and KRG ministers themselves told us that (as of late October, at the onset of winter) the KRG was operating at the very limits of its capacity and was running out of the outside support it needed to provide basic adequate services.[177] There was also real pessimism as to whether refugees or IDPs would be able to return home soon; and we note US and UK policymakers' estimates that it may years rather than months to successfully prosecute a war against ISIL.[178] The influx of so many refugees and IDPs has put massive pressure on public services: we were informed, for instance, that nearly half of the Region's schools had not yet opened for the summer term because they were being used as emergency accommodation. The view of one well-placed agency was that one more significant surge of displaced people could "break" the Region's economy.

112. The UK has responded to the humanitarian crisis in the Kurdistan Region and the rest of Iraq by contributing £39.5 million in emergency aid thus far; more than any other EU member, except Germany.[179]

113. The Kurdistan Regional Government and the people of the Region have responded with generosity and sacrifice to the influx of hundreds of thousands of displaced people from Syria and Iraq. Their continuing presence threatens to overwhelm the Region's economy and public service particularly if, as appears likely, conflict in Syria and Iraq continues for the foreseeable future. It would be disastrous if this ongoing crisis were to seriously destabilise the Region's economy or political system, and accordingly is in the foreign policy interests of the UK to work with allies in the UN, EU, NATO and other international organisations to ensure that the KRG is well-supported to deal with this crisis. Whilst we agree that patience is likely to be crucial in order to defeat ISIL, the UK Government should note that a "long war" carries its own risks, amongst these a prolonged and economically debilitating humanitarian crisis, with hundreds of thousands of people unable to return to their homes, and the possibility of increased tensions between displaced people and the host community.

The disputed territories

114. Practically overnight following ISIL's capture of Mosul on 10 June, territories south of the Green Line that the KRG has coveted since the start of Iraq's democratic era were captured by the Peshmerga as the Iraqi army retreated. For the KRG, these districts are an integral part of Iraqi Kurdistan but because they did not form part of the safe haven vacated by Saddam's troops in 1991, they do not form part of the Kurdistan Region.[180]

115. Article 140 of Iraq's constitution, agreed in 2005, provided that the status of disputed territories should have been resolved by November 2007, through local plebiscites, but by the time we commenced the inquiry, the votes, already deferred several times, had been postponed indefinitely.[181] The status of the disputed territories arouses strong emotions on both sides.[182] For most Kurds, they are historically Kurdish territories that Saddam sought to steal from the Kurds, and the failure to implement Article 140 is another example of bad faith from the federal government.[183] The Peshmerga's capture of the disputed territories in June led to what turned out to be a terminal breakdown of relations between the federal government and the KRG, with Mr Maliki alleging that the KRG and ISIL were working together to divide up northern Iraq.[184]

116. In late June, the then KRG High Representative to the UK told us that the KRG planned to implement article 140 as soon as possible, in order to resolve the territories' status once and for all. She told us that the KRG would ensure that elections took place in accordance with international standards and that foreign observers would be invited, although she expressed doubt about asking the UN to have a role, on the ground that the UN was sometimes a "corrupt" organisation and still had questions to answer over their handling of the Saddam-era oil-for-food programme. The High Representative told us that the KRG would respect the results.[185] Former Ambassador Peter Galbraith told us in June that he had received assurances from Kurdish leaders he had met recently in Kirkuk that if any district did not vote to join the Region it would not have to, a message reiterated on our visit to the Region in October. This is reassuring, although we are not certain what this would lead to in practice if plebiscites produced a ragged pattern of Yes and No votes in neighbouring districts. Mr Galbraith said that he would favour the UN being involved in running the vote as it would give the process greater credibility, including with Iraqi Arabs.[186]

117. By the time we visited the Kurdistan region in October, it was apparent that the timetable for holding local plebiscites had been pushed back several months, following the worsening of the crisis in August. This may be no bad thing if it provides a breathing space for careful consideration of next steps.

KIRKUK AND "ARABISATION"

118. The disputed territories include towns and districts that are, or were, amongst the most diverse in Iraq, with Kurds living alongside Arabs, Assyrians and Turcomans, as well as distinctive Kurdish minorities such as the Yezidis and Shabaks. A number of districts considered important for strategic or economic reasons by the regime in Baghdad were, from the 1960s onwards, intermittently subjected to its "Arabisation" policy, with Arabs from the south moved in, and local people (Kurds, and in some cases, Assyrians or Turcomans) forced out. This happened particularly in Kirkuk; the largest city in the area, sitting astride the largest crude oil field in northern Iraq. Thousands of Kurds were forced to leave. Many Kurds moved back after 2003, and today Kurdish parties run the local council.[187] For many Kurds, Kirkuk is the future capital of an independent South Kurdistan, but for local Arabs, Turcomans and Assyrians it is their city too.[188] A similar story is repeated in smaller communities across the disputed territories.

119. Kurdish leaders negotiating Iraq's constitution secured a provision to enable victims of Arabisation policies in northern Iraq to have a vote in any referendums under Article 140, and for families who had been moved in to be given financial encouragement to move back to their original area. The very existence of such a provision does raise questions as to how the right to vote in any local referendum would be determined. We understand that there has been a partial "unwinding" of Arabisation over recent years, with some Kurds, as in Kirkuk, returning to their homes, but that very few Arab "settler" families have taken up the option of being rehoused elsewhere, because the federal government never properly funded the resettlement scheme.[189]

COMMUNAL RELATIONS AND PROTECTION OF VULNERABLE COMMUNITIES

120. The conflict which has ravaged the area in the last year has led to further mass displacement of populations, including the uprooting of entire communities, all of which impacts on the future of the disputed territories, including any future vote on their status. We are far from certain, following our visit to the Kurdistan Region that many of these people will be returning to their homes soon, or indeed whether they will still have homes to go to. We understand that many Christian and Yezidi families in particular have lost almost everything to ISIL.

121. The conflict has raised ethnic tensions in mixed areas in northern Iraq.[190] Sunni Arab frustration and disillusionment with the Maliki government, discussed elsewhere, is understandable, but it was disturbing to hear, as we did during the visit, of collaboration between ISIL and local Arabs when the former moved into areas over the summer, with some of the latter betraying their non-Sunni neighbours and appropriating their property.[191] Given the outrage in the Region at the acts of ISIL and their supporters, there may be a risk of reprisals, if and when ISIL are finally forced out of ethnically mixed areas. If emotions are left unchecked, there is a risk of the innocent being punished alongside the guilty, and of the cycle of reprisals continuing. The prospect of referendums taking place in such an atmosphere is not an attractive one.

122. In Erbil, we met representatives of minority communities who told us that ordinary people were frightened of going back to their homes, even if and when ISIL were removed. They told us that they had felt let down by the Peshmerga, alleging that they had not defended them as stoutly they would have fellow Kurdish Muslims. They asked us to support the stationing of international peace-keeping forces in parts of northern Iraq in order to ensure that minority communities felt protected and able to go on living there. When we put this plea to the Minister, Mr Ellwood, he said that there were no UK Government plans to support international peacekeepers in northern Iraq, saying that he saw as the way forward Iraqi Government plans to develop a national guard composed of local militias, each reflecting the composition of the area they are charged to defend.[192]

123. The allegation that the Peshmerga abandoned the minority communities they were supposed to be protecting in August has been made elsewhere, and we know that it troubles both the KRG and the Peshmerga.[193] The KRG and Peshmerga representatives we have met during the inquiry have been very clear that they see it as their duty to defend from attack by ISIL everyone under their protection, of all religions and ethnicities, and want to help displaced communities of Christians and Yezidis get back in their homes as soon as possible.[194] We do not doubt this, although something clearly went wrong in the summer, when Yezidi, Christian and Shia Turcoman towns fell to ISIL. Peshmerga commanders told us that the main problem was simply of local fighters running out of ammunition after being outgunned by ISIL. It is perhaps worth adding that most of the districts overrun in August were outside the formal boundaries of the Kurdistan Region, closest to ISIL's Mosul stronghold, and at the furthest edge of Peshmerga control. We are pleased to note that the Peshmerga appear to be gradually gaining the upper hand in much of this area.

124. The Kurdistan Regional Government deserves credit for swiftly directing the Peshmerga to occupy Kirkuk and other disputed areas of northern Iraq at a moment of crisis in June 2014. The question now is what happens next. The KRG is right to insist on adherence to the Iraqi constitution, and to votes on the status of the disputed territories finally going ahead. However, there is much that could go wrong if the voting process is seen as unfair or lacking in transparency. The UK Government should use its influence to ensure that the voting process is transparent, addresses the various practical problems that the issue engages, is respectful of the rights of minorities as equal citizens of Iraq, and overall inspires the confidence of those taking part in it. Ideally the process would also proceed with the acceptance, or even involvement, of the federal government, and again we would encourage the UK Government to use what influence it has to this end.

125. For the time being, much of the disputed territories are effectively a war zone, with entire communities still displaced from their homes. The KRG has rightly put back plans for local plebiscites for the time being, and we would encourage the UK Government to use its influence to try to prevent a peremptory vote.

130 Ministry of Defence, "UK to provide further support to forces fighting ISIL", 5 November 2014 Back

131 HC Debs, 8 September 2014, cols 653-656 cols 653-656 Back

132 The Relevant part of the resolution reads that the House "acknowledges the request of the Government of Iraq for international support to defend itself against the threat ISIL poses to Iraq and its citizens and the clear legal basis that this provides for action in Iraq; notes that this motion does not endorse UK air strikes in Syria as part of this campaign and any proposal to do so would be subject to a separate vote in Parliament; accordingly supports Her Majesty's Government, working with allies, in supporting the Government of Iraq in protecting civilians and restoring its territorial integrity, including the use of UK air strikes to support Iraqi, including Kurdish, security forces' efforts against ISIL in Iraq; notes that Her Majesty's Government will not deploy UK troops in ground combat operations…" Back

133 Q162 [Edward Oakden] Back

134 Q159 [Tobias Ellwood MP] Back

135 Q58-59 [KRG High Representative to the UK]. In May 2014, Professors Stansfield and Tripp also warned us of spiralling violence in northern Iraq and of ISIL's growing strength there. Professor Stansfield warned that Iraq's integrity was threatened (Q19). See also APPG Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KUR 16), paragraph 5 Back

136 HC Deb 16 June 2014, cols 852-853 Back

138 "Obama Allows Limited Airstrikes on ISIS", New York Times, 7 August 2014 Back

139 HC Deb, Written Question 211264, answered 28 October 2014 Back

140 HC (Debs), 1 September 2014, col 47 [Commons Chamber] Back

141 "UK prepares to supply arms directly to Kurdish forces fighting Isis" The Guardian, 14 August 2014. In his first Commons statement on ISIL following the events of the summer, the Prime Minister said that the UK had acted as a courier for weapons from Albania and Jordan but stood ready to provide UK weapons if asked (HC (Debs), 1 September 2014, col 35). See also APPG Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KUR 16), paragraph 12 Back

142 HC Debs, 9 September 2014, col 33WS [Commons written ministerial statement]; HC Debs, 13 October 2014, col 9WS [Commons written ministerial statement]; Back