5 Political and constitutional reform
Evolution
of election procedures for the Chief Executive
43. The Sino-British Joint Declaration did not specify
the precise procedures for electing Hong Kong's government after
the handover of sovereignty, stipulating only that the Chief Executive
would be "appointed by the Central People's Government on
the basis of the results of elections or consultations to be held
locally."[90] These
procedures, including the goal of introducing universal suffrage,
were subsequently established in Article 45 of the Basic Law,
which states:
The method for selecting the Chief Executive
shall be specified in the light of the actual situation in the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and in accordance with
the principle of gradual and orderly progress. The ultimate aim
is the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage
upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee
in accordance with democratic procedures.[91]
Annex I to the Basic Law provided a more detailed
breakdown of the selection method for the Chief Executive, who
would be elected every five years by a "broadly representative
Election Committee".[92]
This Committee initially had 400 members, doubling for the next
election in 2002 and reaching 1200 for the 2012 elections. Its
members are chosen by four main "sectors", each of which
is comprised of numerous "sub-sectors": the industrial,
commercial and financial sectors; the professions; labour, social
services, religious and other sectors; and representatives of
various political bodies including LegCo, District Councils and
the Chinese National People's Congress.[93]
In 2012, a total of 233,572 people across all sub-sectors were
registered to elect representatives of the Election Committee,[94]
giving about 3% of Hong Kong's 7.15 million people a direct say
in determining the Committee's members.[95]
The vast majority (over 200,000) of these individual voters were
concentrated in the second sector, representing professions like
accountancy, law and medicine.[96]
In several other sub-sectors including finance, financial services,
tourism and transport, companies rather than individuals voted
for Election Committee members. In effect, this enabled major
shareholders with business interests in several different industries
to vote multiple times.[97]
As a result of this structure, as well as the relative weight
afforded to the different sub-sectors, the Committee has from
the outset had a de facto "pro-Beijing" majority.[98]
Although advocates of greater democratic reform won enough support,
largely from the second sector, to stand as official candidates
in 2007 and 2012, none has ever been elected to the Chief Executive
position. The current Chief Executive, Leung Chun-ying, was elected
by the Committee in 2012 with 689 votes.
44. Although the Basic Law acts as Hong Kong's mini-constitution,
it is a Chinese law that can only be changed or amended by a decision
of the National People's Congress in Beijing. In 2007, the Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress adopted a decision
on procedures for the election of the Chief Executive in 2012
and 2017, and for the election of Legislative Council (LegCo)
members thereafter. It declared that the election of the Chief
Executive in 2017 "may be implemented by the method of universal
suffrage", and that after universal suffrage had been introduced
for the Chief Executive, it could also be used to elect all members
of LegCo.[99] The details
of the electoral procedure were left open, to be decided by the
NPC following several rounds of public consultation in Hong Kong.
The proposed electoral package would then be presented to LegCo,
requiring a two-thirds majority in order to pass. If LegCo were
to reject the proposal, the election procedure would remain that
used in 2012: selection by committee with no public vote.
45. In late 2013, the Hong Kong government launched
a public consultation process on the 2017 Chief Executive elections,
inviting submissions from stakeholders in Hong Kong about a range
of specific issues including the potential size, composition and
selection of the nominating committee; constituency sizes; makeup
of constituencies and voting arrangements. From the outset many
had low expectations of the consultation process, assuming that
whatever its outcome, Beijing would not allow Hong Kong to have
a fully democratic election in 2017. In 2013, law professor Benny
Tai founded "Occupy Central with Love and Peace", a
civil disobedience movement inspired by the "occupy"
demonstrations in New York, London and elsewhere, promising to
launch protests if the consultation process and subsequent NPC
decision failed to deliver what the movement considered to be
genuine democracy. In July 2014, before the NPC issued its decision
on electoral procedures, Martin Lee QC and the Hon. Anson Chan
told us that they expected Beijing to introduce strict controls
on the nomination process for candidates.[100]
The White Paper
46. Concerns in Hong Kong about the prospects for
democratic reform rose further in June 2014 with the publication
of a White Paper by the Chinese State Council, entitled "The
Practice of the 'One Country, Two Systems' Policy in the Hong
Kong SAR." The paper re-iterated that Hong Kong enjoyed a
high degree of autonomy. It also insisted, however, that this
autonomy was not "an inherent power", but rather granted
by the central leadership in Beijing and subject to its authorisation.[101]
It sparked protests by the Hong Kong Bar Association, due to a
line stressing that all those who "administrate" Hong
Kongwhich appeared to include judges and judicial personnelmust
be patriots and "loyal to the country". Martin Lee,
who was at the forefront of the lawyers' protests, told us that
this constituted a direct threat to the independence of Hong Kong's
judiciary.[102]
47. We heard a range of views on whether the White
Paper marked a shift in or tightening of Beijing's policy towards
Hong Kong. The "pan-democrat" legislators to whom we
spoke characterised it as a warning from Beijing that Hong Kong's
autonomy was contingent on Beijing's support and could be taken
away if the Chinese government wished.[103]
This position was shared by many who submitted written evidence.[104]
Dr Margaret Ng, a prominent Hong Kong barrister and former legislator,
wrote:
What [the White Paper] means is that the autonomy
enjoyed by Hong Kong is not contained in the four corners of the
Basic Law, but to be controlled by Beijing from day to day as
it pleases. Autonomy is not to be exercised freely under the law
interpreted by an independent judiciary, but as authorised by
the central leadership who has the power to interpret the law
as it considers politically expedient.[105]
Jonathan Fenby, former editor of the South China
Morning Post, said the White Paper formed part of a more general
trend of Beijing asserting the prominence of "one country"
over "two systems", in line with the broader evolution
of President Xi's leadership of China.[106]
Others, however, suggested that the furore over the White Paper
was a matter of misunderstanding and poor communication between
two very different legal systems, and that the White Paper did
not mark any practical change in Beijing's attitude to "one
country, two systems".[107]
48. The FCO's six-monthly report on Hong Kong covering
January to June 2014 summarised the contents of the White Paper
and described the debate it sparked in Hong Kong, but conspicuously
avoided expressing a view on the substance of the paper.[108]
The report covering the latter half of 2014 noted that debate
over the White Paper had continued during the reporting period,
but again did not take a position on the paper's contents.[109]
This approach was criticised by Lord Patten, who told us that
he thought the UK Government could have made clearer statements
to the effect that the views expressed in the White Paper were
"extremely unwise and not in line with what is meant by the
rule of law."[110]
In her written submission, Dr Ng said that the British Government
had "either failed to understand" or "chosen not
to understand" the real intent of the White Paper, which
she argued was to tear up the Joint Declaration.[111]
Dr Tim Summers also criticised the FCO's ambiguous response but
from the opposite perspective, telling us that the Government
was "fence-sitting" and should have said openly that
the White Paper did not represent a change in Beijing's policy
or a threat to judicial independence in Hong Kong.[112]
49. In its written evidence to this inquiry, the
FCO "noted the assurances" by the Chinese and Hong Kong
governments that the White Paper did not mark a change in policy,
and stated: "It is the Government's assessment that the White
Paper has not undermined judicial independence or breached the
1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration".[113]
We judge that the White Paper did not breach the letter of
the Joint Declaration, but neither was it wholly consistent with
the spirit of the treaty. The alarm that the White Paper engendered
should not be brushed aside. There is widespread concern in Hong
Kong that Beijing is tightening its grip on Hong Kong's autonomy
in ways both overt and subtle, and we consider that the White
Paper constitutes further indication of that trend. This should
have been more clearly acknowledged by the FCO in its statements
on the White Paper and in the six-monthly reports.
The 31 August SCNPC decision
on 2017 elections
50. On 31 August 2014, the Standing Committee of
the National People's Congress (SCNPC) issued its decision on
methods for electing the Chief Executive in 2017. It re-asserted
that universal suffrageallowing each individual to vote
directly for his or her preferred candidate, choosing from a pre-determined
listwould be introduced. It also, as expected, insisted
on the role of a "broadly representative nominating committee",
the composition and formation method of which would be "made
in accordance with" that of the Election Committee that had
selected the Chief Executive in 2012. The decision limited the
number of candidates to two or three, each requiring the endorsement
of more than half of all members of the nominating committee.[114]
This provision represented a significant deviation from the 2012
arrangements, when a candidate required only 150 votes out of
1200 to gain official nomination. Due to this high threshold,
any candidate advocating significant democratic reform would be
unlikely to obtain enough support to stand for election, so long
as the 2017 Election Committee retained the "pro-Beijing"
majority of the 2012 Committee.
51. We received a considerable volume of evidence
arguing that the SCNPC's decision was too restrictive and was
not in line with how Beijing's 2007 promise of universal suffrage
was generally understood in Hong Kong. Anson Chan's Hong Kong
2020 organisation said the decision gave Beijing "carte blanche
to rig the outcome", while one former legislator called it
"a travesty
not even a half-way house to universal
suffrage."[115]
Professor Simon Young and Democratic Party leader Emily Lau told
us that the proposals were more conservative and restrictive than
people in Hong Kong, including the Hong Kong government, had expected.[116]
Many pro-democratic witnesses described Beijing's commitment to
universal suffrage in Hong Kong as a "promise" that
had been broken by the SCNPC's decision.[117]
52. We also received some evidence disagreeing with
this point of view.[118]
Those who took this stance asserted that the SCNPC decision was
fully compliant with the letter of Article 45 of the Basic Law,
which does stipulate a role for a "broadly representative
nominating committee."[119]
But, as Dr Tim Summers told us, the "broken promise"
narrative was very strong in Hong Kong, and had developed quickly.[120]
It was clear from this debate that the ambiguity built in to both
the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law has facilitated the development
of very divergent interpretations and expectations of the constitutional
reform process in Hong Kong.
THE UK'S RESPONSE TO THE SCNPC DECISION
53. This divergence of expectations was also reflected
in the evidence we received from British witnesses about the UK's
position on the pace of constitutional reform. Lord Patten said
that the pace of democratisation in Hong Kong to date had been
slower than anyone in the UK had expected at the time of the handover.[121]
Our predecessor Committees also repeatedly argued for a faster
pace of democratic reform. In 1998, 2000 and 2006, they recommended
that universal suffrage should be introduced in Hong Kong as soon
as possible, and asked the FCO to urge the governments of Hong
Kong and China to take significant steps toward that goal.[122]
However, former FCO officials who had been involved in negotiating
the Joint Declaration indicated that the UK Government had not
envisaged that Hong Kong would necessarily enjoy a fully free
and democratic political system 18 years after the handover.[123]
Asked for his views on the pace of reform, the Minister of State
told us that he thought the process of democratisation would be
a "slow, tortuous path".[124]
54. On 4 September 2014, the FCO released a statement
responding to the SCNPC decision, "welcoming" the commitment
to universal suffrage. Although the statement recognised that
the terms of the decision would "disappoint those who [were]
arguing for a more open nomination process", it insisted
that the detail of constitutional reform should be decided by
the governments of Hong Kong and China, as well as the people
of Hong Kong, in line with the Basic Law.[125]
The statement said it was important that the people of Hong Kong
have a "genuine choice and a real stake in the outcome"
of the Chief Executive elections, but did not indicate whether
the FCO considered the SCNPC decision to offer either genuine
choice or a real stake for voters. By contrast, the US State Department
used stronger language in expressing its views on the SCNPC's
decision. US Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Daniel Russel told the Senate subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific
Affairs that the US government had been "disappointed"
with the 31 August decision, adding that the decision "could
and should have gone much further" in allowing a more open
nomination process.[126]
55. The vast majority of submissions we received
criticised the perceived meekness of the UK's response to the
SCNPC decision, and called on the UK to stand up to Beijing to
support greater democratic reform in Hong Kong.[127]
Human Rights Watch called the FCO's statement of 4 September "embarrassingly
weak", saying it was "palpably obvious" that the
decision did not offer genuine choice to the people of Hong Kong.[128]
56. We invited the Minister of State and FCO officials
to clarify how they defined the terms "genuine choice",
"real stake in the outcome" and "universal suffrage",
but found their responses evasive.[129]
The Minister told us that, in his view:
A genuine choice can mean something different
from what we would regard as a genuine choice and from what other
democracies around the world regard as a genuine choice [
]
There is no exact template, but clearly choice is important. The
first thing is universal suffrageeveryone can voteand
widening the levels of choice is another issue.[130]
After several rounds of questioning Stephen Lillie,
Director of Asia Pacific at the FCO, admitted that the FCO does
consider the terms of the SCNPC decision to offer "genuine
choice" to the people of Hong Kong.[131]
In his foreword to the six-monthly report covering July to December
2014, the Foreign Secretary wrote that the parameters of the decision
were "clearly more restrictive than many anticipated",
but said he believes "that there remains space within them
for a meaningful step forward for democracy."[132]
57. We agree with the FCO that the specific details
of constitutional reform are for the governments of China and
Hong Kong to decide together with the people of Hong Kong, but
the UK can and should take a position on the overall pace and
degree of democratic reform. We consider that the FCO has stopped
some way short of expressing a clear view. Compared with previous
selection methods for the Chief Executive, allowing every eligible
Hong Kong citizen to cast a vote is an important step forward.
We acknowledge that the precise meaning of the term "universal
suffrage" is a matter for interpretation, and Article 45
of the Basic Law clearly states that the nominating committee
must play a role in selecting candidates for election to the position
of Chief Executive. But the people of Hong Kong cannot have confidence
in a nominating committee with such a limited and unrepresentative
composition, especially when candidates must secure the support
of over half its members. We do not consider that the terms of
the 31 August SCNPC decision offer "genuine choice"
in any meaningful sense of the phrase, nor do we consider the
decision consistent with the principle that Hong Kong should enjoy
a high degree of autonomy. If the FCO is content with the SCNPC
decision, it should make its views plain and avoid misleading
language.
Student protests and Occupy Central
58. On 22 September 2014, the Hong Kong Federation
of Students (HKFS) launched a week-long boycott of classes to
protest against the 31 August SCNPC decision on electoral reform.
This protest gathered momentum so quickly that Occupy Central
announced that it would launch its own planned demonstration on
Friday 28 September, rather than on 1 October as originally planned.
This immediately brought tens of thousands of people to the streets.
Later that evening, riot police fired tear gas on the protesters
in an attempt to disperse the crowds. The numbers of protesters
continued to grow, reaching well over 100,000 during the first
few days of October before beginning to dwindle.[133]
By Monday 6 October the crowds had reduced enough to allow many
schools and offices to re-open, although the campaign continued.
59. Throughout the rest of October and most of November,
hundreds of demonstrators remained camped out in makeshift tent
cities on several key thoroughfares on Hong Kong Island and in
Mong Kok. Formal talks between the Hong Kong government and five
HKFS leaders took place on 21 October, but were widely seen as
unsuccessful. Although public support for the protests was initially
high, polls suggested that by the end of November a majority of
Hong Kong people wanted the campaign to end.[134]
Several businesses and groups also won court injunctions requiring
the demonstrators to move, although they refused to comply. From
26 November onwards, police began to clear out the major protest
sites in line with the injunctions, beginning with Mong Kok. Hundreds
of people were arrested over the following weekssome more
than oncealthough almost all were released without charge
within the mandated 48-hour period. By the end of December all
major protest sites had been cleared by the police, bringing the
campaign to an end. However, there are likely to be more demonstrations
in the coming months as debate over the electoral proposals continues.
The first major rally since the end of the Occupy Campaign took
place on 1 February, although turnoutestimated to have
been between 8,000 and 13,000, depending on the sourcewas
lower than organisers had anticipated.[135]
One of the leaders of the HKFS, Yvonne Leung, told us that her
organisation is likely to stage further protests when the electoral
package is sent to LegCo for consideration (expected to take place
in summer 2015).[136]
THE UK GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE
PROTESTS
60. The FCO issued a number of press releases and
a written ministerial statement during the peak of the Occupy
campaign in late September and early October, all of which contained
the same messages, often repeated verbatim: that the FCO was monitoring
the situation closely, that it was important to preserve the rights
of Hong Kong people to demonstrate peacefully in accordance with
the law, and that all parties should engage constructively in
dialogue.[137] The
same statements about the protests, using identical language,
were repeated in Parliament.[138]
On 22 October, Richard Graham MP secured a Westminster Hall debate
on Hong Kong, during which many members expressed concern about
the protests and the prospects for democratic reform. Mr Graham
also asked the Minister of State to explain why it took so long
for the Government to produce a written ministerial statement
setting out the Government's position on the protests.[139]
In response, Mr Swire said that the UK had been "addressing
this all year", and added that the UK was monitoring events
closely and was "raising Hong Kong at senior levels through
official channels in Beijing, Hong Kong and London".[140]
Mr Swire delivered the same message again on 2 December,
in response to an Emergency Debate on China's decision to bar
us from entering Hong Kong in connection with this inquiry.[141]
61. Many of our witnesses were highly critical of
the UK Government's response to the Occupy protests, saying that
it had not gone far enough in supporting the demonstrators. Lord
Patten said that the Government's failure to give the protesters
the "support they think they deserve" had potentially
made the debate more difficult to resolve, by making the protesters
feel as though they were backed into a corner.[142]
Democratic Party leader Emily Lau, Civic Party leader Alan Leung,
activist Avery Ng and student leader Yvonne Leung all told us
they felt the UK Government had a special responsibility to speak
up for democracy in Hong Kong, but said it was not honouring that
responsibility.[143]
This message was also delivered by two representatives of a small
group of student demonstrators who camped in front of the UK Consulate-General
in Hong Kong throughout the protests, asking the UK to take stronger
action to support the pro-democratic movement.[144]
62. This was not, however, a unanimous view. Some
academics and business leaders said that the UK Government had
largely struck the correct balance in responding to the protests,
particularly given Beijing's sensitivity toward what it perceives
as interference by a former colonial power.[145]
Dr Tim Summers, for example, emphasised that it was not the UK's
place to become too involved in local debates so long as the Joint
Declaration had not been breached.[146]
Duncan Innes-Ker, an analyst at the Economist Intelligence Unit,
and Lord Powell of Bayswater, representing the Hong Kong Association,
suggested that more vocal UK Government support for the protests
would have little effect, and might make the Chinese government
less rather than more inclined to offer compromises on the electoral
process.[147] Professor
Simon Young, a Hong Kong-based lawyer and academic, said that
it was "probably wise not to say too much" in support
of the protesters, given the Chinese government's allegations
of foreign involvement in the demonstrations.[148]
FCO officials implied that they had taken into account this consideration
in formulating the FCO's response to the protests.[149]
They also told us that the FCO was not prepared to support all
of the protesters' demands, as some groups (including the Hong
Kong Federation of Students) had called for the resignation of
Chief Executive C Y Leung.[150]
63. The FCO and UK Government had to strike a
careful tone in responding to the recent protest movement in Hong
Kong, taking into account the potential unintended effects their
statements might have had on a volatile situation. On the whole
we consider the FCO's response to have been appropriate and well-balanced,
and we especially welcome their support for the right of Hong
Kong people to demonstrate peacefully. At the same time, we acknowledge
that many of the demonstrators were disappointed by what they
perceived as equivocal language and a lack of support from the
UK.
Prospects for electoral reform
in 2017 and thereafter
64. On 7 January 2015 the Hong Kong government announced
the launch of a second round of public consultation on aspects
of the 2017 electoral package. The consultation document included
questions relating to the specific composition of the nominating
committee, as well as a proposal for the introduction of a two-stage
process for nominating candidates for Chief Executive (potentially
with a lower threshold of entry than that needed for the final
nomination phase). The Minister of State and FCO officials were
positive about the potential for this round of consultation to
produce a compromise solution that would "improve" the
level of democracy on offer for the 2017 election.[151]
The FCO reiterated this stance in the six-monthly report covering
July to December 2014, stating that it continued to take the view
that there was scope within the parameters of the SCNPC decision
"for a consensus that will deliver a meaningful advance for
democracy in Hong Kong, consistent with the Basic Law and the
long-standing wishes of the Hong Kong people."[152]
65. In our judgment, this confidence may be misplaced.
Professor Simon Young told us in December that he thought there
was still scope to develop arrangements consistent with the idea
of universal suffrage, but said his position was probably a minority
view and would require both sides to be willing to compromise.[153]
Emily Lau, leader of the Democratic Party in LegCo, meanwhile
said that her party intended to boycott the consultation as they
believed it would not lead to anything meaningful.[154]
The consultation document published by the Hong Kong government
was considered quite conservative, signalling the authorities'
unwillingness to consider significant reforms that might win over
the "pan-democrats".[155]
The document emphasised that any reforms to the nominating committee
would need to obtain widespread support from the mostly "pro-Beijing"
sub-sectors already represented, indicating that proposals to
make the committee more representative could be rejected due to
lack of support from those invested in the maintenance of the
status quo.[156]
A poll of 1,018 people conducted by the University of Hong Kong
in January 2015 showed that 35% were unhappy with the proposals
laid out in the document (versus 22% who said they were satisfied).
43% of respondents said that the proposals would mean "fake
universal suffrage."[157]
Another poll commissioned by the South China Morning Post,
the largest English-language newspaper in Hong Kong, showed
approximately 46% of the 907 respondents wanting LegCo to reject
the electoral proposal.[158]
At the time of this report's consideration, there is considerable
doubt as to whether the proposals will be passed.
66. The FCO has not made any official statement urging
LegCo to pass the electoral package for 2017. However, the Minister
of State seemed to take this position in evidence to the Committee.
He said:
My view is that LegCo need to ask themselves,
if they do not get any move on the status quo, if they
do not get any improvement on what is on the table now, are they
better endorsing what is on the table? Does that take them further
down the road toward democracy or not? My answer would be pretty
simple: if they do not endorse the proposals on the table now,
or those that may be on the table in a few months' time, after
this period of consultation, then the status quo applies;
then, you will have a Chief Executive elected in 2017 by the existing
nomination committee of 1,200, which is not, I would suggest,
as democratic as it could be, and that's an understatement; and
you will not have universal suffragethe ultimate goal for
LegCoin 2020. So you have to ask yourself: does that take
us further down the road towards representative, understandable,
transparent democracy, or not? I think it answers itself.[159]
Later, the Minister added that many "pan-democratic"
legislators privately recognise "that something is better
than nothing", and that although the proposals "may
not be pure or perfect", they did represent "a genuine
improvement on the status quo."[160]
This statement was reported in the South China Morning Post
as a clear endorsement of the reform proposals.[161]
In his foreword to the six-monthly report for July to December
2014, the Foreign Secretary similarly appeared to imply that the
"pan-democrats" should accept the electoral package,
stating:
I hope that the Hong Kong SAR Government and
legislators can work together to achieve a consensus that is acceptable
to the people of Hong Kong, so paving the way for approval of
electoral reforms in 2015.[162]
The FCO repeatedly emphasised to us that it viewed
the electoral package for 2017 as part of a longer-term process
toward greater democracy rather than as a "final destination",[163]
although neither the Hong Kong government nor Beijing have thus
far outlined concrete plans to implement further reform after
2020.[164] The Minister
also suggested that the UK was bringing different groups together
in the Consulate-General in Hong Kong to discuss political and
constitutional issues.[165]
He later added that the UK was good at "bringing people together
to get them to discuss matters" and that this was a role
the UK continued to play.[166]
67. We were surprised that the Minister of State
said the UK was bringing different sides of Hong Kong's constitutional
debate together in the Consulate-General. If this is the case,
in its response to this report the FCO should list the groups
or individuals who attended these discussions and explain why
it considers this to be an advisable role for the UK to play.
We broadly agree with the Minister of State's view that even gradual
progress toward more democratic electoral arrangements is preferable
to the status quo. Should the current electoral proposals stand,
we recommend that the FCO press the authorities in Hong Kong and
Beijing to lay out specific proposals and a timetable for further
democratic reform after 2017 and 2020.
90 Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong,
para 3.4 Back
91
The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of
the People's Republic of China, Chapter IV, Article 45 Back
92
The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of
the People's Republic of China, Annex I, Article 1 Back
93
In 2012, there were a total of 38 sub-sectors. Each has its own
method for nominating and selecting members of the Election Committee.
Many, although not all, sub-sectors correspond to the "functional
constituencies" that currently elect half of the members
of LegCo (the other half are currently elected directly in geographical
constituencies). Back
94
Electoral Affairs Commission of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, "Report on the 2012 Chief Executive Election,"
Appendix II: 2011 Election Committee subsector elections - breakdown of voters for Election Committee subsectors,
8 June 2012, p. 108 Back
95
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, "Hong Kong: the facts - Population factsheet",
accessed 10 February 2015 Back
96
Electoral Affairs Commission of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, "Report on the 2012 Chief Executive Election,"
Appendix II: 2011 Election Committee subsector elections - breakdown of voters for Election Committee subsectors,
8 June 2012, p. 108 Back
97
Jacky Wong, "How Hong Kong's Chief Executive is elected",
Wall Street Journal, 17 October 2014 Back
98
Asia Public Affairs and Social Services Society, University of
Manchester (HNG 0549) paras 20-21 and 25-26; Margaret Ng (HNG 0477)
para 12; Tony Cheung, "Hong Kong's candidate nominating system out of balance, says Beijing scholar",
South China Morning Post, 31 August 2014 Back
99
Decision of the Standing Committee of the National people's Congress on Issues Relating to the Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and for Forming the legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 2012 and on Issues Relating to Universal Suffrage,
29 December 2007 Back
100
Oral evidence taken on 16 July 2014, HC (2014 - 15) 575, Q3 [The
Hon Anson Chan] Back
101
State Council of the People's Republic of China, "The Practice of the "One Country, Two Systems" Policy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region",
Beijing, June 2014 Back
102
Oral evidence taken on 16 July 2014, HC (2014 - 15) 575, Q9 [Martin
Lee QC] Back
103
Qq194, 212 Back
104
Human Rights Watch (HNG 0741) paras 7-8; Chan Sheung Man (HNG 0487)
para 8; Mavis Lung (and 177 others in similar petition) (HNG 0075)
para 3; Yiu Shing Ching (and 290 others in similar petition) (HNG 0296)
para 2.1 Back
105
Margaret Ng (HNG 0477) para 20 Back
106
Q81 Back
107
Qq161-62, 222; Dr Tim Summers (HNG 0607) para 9 Back
108
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The Six-monthly Report on Hong Kong: 1 January to 30 June 2014,
July 2014, pp 9-10 Back
109
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The Six-monthly Report on Hong Kong: 1 July to 31 December 2014,
February 2015, pp 12-13 Back
110
Q18 Back
111
Margaret Ng (HNG 0477) para 20 Back
112
Q237 Back
113
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (HNG 0748) paras 15-16 Back
114
Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress
on Issues Relating to the Selection of the Chief Executive of
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region by Universal Suffrage
and on the Method for Forming the Legislative Council of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 2016 (text reprinted in Xinhua News),
31 August 2014 Back
115
Hong Kong 2020 (HNG 0490) para 4.11; Margaret Ng (HNG 0477) para
21 Back
116
Qq160, 198 Back
117
Qq160, 180, 198, 201, 240; Human Rights Watch (HNG 0741) para
10; Hong Kong 2020 (HNG 0490) para 4.7; Yiu Shing Ching (and 290
others in similar petition) (HNG 0296) para 9 Back
118
Q229; Alan Paul CMG (HNG 0618) para 28; London Chinatown Chinese
Association (HNG 0750) paras 3a-c Back
119
The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of
the People's Republic of China, Chapter IV, Article 45 Back
120
Q229 Back
121
Q3 Back
122
Foreign Affairs Committee, Third Report of Session 1997-98, Hong Kong,
HC 710, paras 17-19; Foreign Affairs Committee, Tenth Report of
Session 1999-2000, China, HC 574-I, paras 158-160; Foreign Affairs
Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2005-06, East Asia, HC 860-I,
paras 399-402 Back
123
Q286; Alan Paul CMG (HNG 0618) paras 8-14 Back
124
Q361 Back
125
"Foreign Office response to Hong Kong reform plans",
FCO Press release, 4 September 2014 Back
126
United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee
on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, video of hearing on 3 December
2014,http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/120314am, accessed
19 January 2015 Back
127
For example: Hong Kong Democratic Foundation (HNG 0385) paras
39-42; Alvin Y H Cheung (HNG 0270) paras 25-26; Hong Kong 2020
(HNG 0490) para 4.15; Paul Phillips (HNG 0491) para IV; Lee Faulkner
(HNG 0570) para 4.3; Chan Sheung Man (HNG 0487) paras 19-20; Mavis
Lung (and 177 others in similar petition) (HNG 0075) para 1 Back
128
Human Rights Watch (HNG 0741) para 6 Back
129
Qq362-70 Back
130
Qq362-63 Back
131
Q371 Back
132
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The Six-monthly Report on Hong Kong: 1 July to 31 December 2014,
February 2015, p 2 Back
133
1 October is the National Day of the People's Republic of China,
and a public holiday in both Hong Kong and the Chinese mainland.
It is also the start of a week-long holiday in China known as
"Golden Week", during which large numbers of tourists
from the mainland typically visit Hong Kong to shop. Back
134
Shirley Zhao, "More than two-thirds say Occupiers should go home now as support wanes: poll",
South China Morning Post, 17 November 2014 Back
135
Tony Cheung, Phila Siu, Ernest Kao and Samuel Chan, "Hong Kong democracy movement back on road, but turnout down",
South China Morning Post, 1 February 2015 Back
136
Qq178-79 Back
137
"Foreign Office monitoring events in Hong Kong", Foreign and Commonwealth Office press release,
29 September 2014; "Foreign Office expresses concern about
Hong Kong and welcomes offer of talks", Foreign and Commonwealth Office press release,
2 October 2014; HC Deb, 13 October 2014, col 12WS [written ministerial
statement] Back
138
HC Deb, 22 October 2014, col 294WH;
HC Deb, 2 December 2014, cols 205-206 Back
139
HC Deb, 22 October 2014, col 279WH Back
140
HC Deb, 22 October 2014, col 294WH Back
141
HC Deb, 2 December 2014, cols 205-206 Back
142
Q25 Back
143
Qq127, 186, 204, 219, 254 Back
144
Qq129-33 Back
145
Qq99, 167, 234-46, 298-99 Back
146
Q234 Back
147
Qq167-68, 277, 295-97 Back
148
Q167 Back
149
Q370 Back
150
Q377 Back
151
Qq331, 370 Back
152
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The Six-monthly Report on Hong Kong: 1 July to 31 December 2014,
February 2015, p 7 Back
153
Q166 Back
154
Q197 Back
155
Simon Denyer, "Hong Kong begins 'public consultations' on reform, but signals intransigence",
Washington Post, 7 January 2015 Back
156
Simon Young, "Pan-democrats must seek talks, as a veto is likely to serve Beijing's interests most",
South China Morning Post, 15 January 2015 Back
157
Tony Cheung, "35pc of respondents in Hong Kong poll 'unhappy' with government's political reform proposals",
South China Morning Post, 26 January 2015 Back
158
Gary Cheung and Peter So, "Almost half of Hongkongers want lawmakers to vote down Beijing's electoral reforms: SCMP poll",
South China Morning Post, 27 January 2015 Back
159
Q353 Back
160
Q364 Back
161
Danny Lee, "'It's better than nothing': British Foreign Office backs Beijing's reform framework for Hong Kong",
South China Morning Post, 14 January 2015 Back
162
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The Six-monthly Report on Hong Kong: 1 July to 31 December 2014,
February 2015, pp 2-3 Back
163
Qq373, 376-77 Back
164
According to the Basic Law, the introduction of universal suffrage
for LegCo elections can only take place after it has already been
implemented for electing the Chief Executive. If the current proposed
reforms fail, universal suffrage for LegCo elections could not
be introduced until 2024 at the earliest (with the next election
for CE after 2017 due to be held in 2022). Back
165
Q340 Back
166
Q384 Back
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