6 A Modern Governance Structure |
be taken now
135. Our inquiry has shone a light on areas of weakness
in the House's current capability to manage the challenges it
will face in the future and identified areas for improvement.
The prospect of R&R has additionally focussed minds on what
the House will need if it is to handle a major programme involving
136. Some capacity building might be achieved through
changes to structures and responsibilities, including introducing
a greater focus on follow-up and delivery, but, if these changes
are to work, there must also be a culture change both in the approach
of the House service to transparency and accountability and among
Members in taking responsibility for strategic decisions and supporting
the staff responsible for their operational delivery.
137. The House is a unique institution in which the
distinct and special constitutional position of its Members must
be protected, but that must not be used as an excuse for poor
management or confused decision-making and accountability. However,
clear decision-making does not necessarily mean quick decision-making.
There is merit, in an organisation as complex as the House of
Commons with 650 Members as well as many other stakeholders,
in taking time to reach a decision with as broad support as possible
and whose wider consequences are properly understood and managed.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKERS
138. We believe that the election of the Deputy Speakers
is a powerful argument for increasing their involvement in non-Chamber
issues (the Chairman of Ways and Means is separately responsible
for private business and business in Westminster Hall). We also
believe that there would be wider benefits from developing the
concept of a Speakership team. A modest first step in this
direction might be a widening of the agenda of the daily conferences,
perhaps initially just on Mondays which both starts the working
week and is the day on which the House sits latest. This might
be an effective way of bringing the Deputy Speakers' experience
and wisdom to bear on wider House issues, including managerial
HOUSE OF COMMONS COMMISSION
139. Our recommendations for reform of the Commission
focus first on ensuring that its remit adequately covers those
responsibilities which should properly fall to the senior governance
body and second on giving it the capability to discharge those
140. They are that:
a) the Commission should be additionally responsible
under statute for setting the strategic framework for the delivery
of services to Members, staff and the public, without prejudice
to the right of the House to control its own procedures;
b) its members should be:
the Speaker, the Leader of the House
and the Shadow Leader of the House (as at present);
four other Members, one from each
of the three largest parties represented in the House and one
from the remaining membership, elected for a Parliament by the
two external members appointed by
fair and open competition (and confirmed by motion in the House);
two official members (see paragraph
141. We see no need for statutory change in respect
of the procedures of the Commission. The Speaker should continue
to be its statutory chair. However, there may be occasions when
s/he does not wish, or is for some reason unable, to fulfil that
role. In such circumstances, on a proposition from the Speaker,
the Commission should be able to agree to one of the elected backbench
members taking the chair in the Speaker's place. The Leader of
the House, William Hague, told us that the Commission proceeded
on a collective basis.
Andrew Lansley was clear that the Commission should be a consensus-seeking
body, willing to 'refer back and reconsider and consult more on
things where there was no consensus.'
We agree and would expect the prospect of formal voting in the
Commission to be an extremely rare occurrence. However, if it
were to arise, we are clear that neither the external nor the
official members should formally have a vote, although if necessary
they should be able to record their dissent.
142. If the Commission is to take on the role
of setting the strategic framework for the delivery of services
and then providing strategic oversight of how they are delivered,
it follows that its compass should include all matters relating
to the House administration including those for which the Speaker
has ex officio responsibility, such as his role as 'householder'
and in respect of Freedom of Information policy. We recommend
that the Speaker, as far as possible, consults the Commission
in the exercise of these responsibilities and powers.
143. Increasing the backbench members to four should
achieve two ends. It should increase the ability of the Commission
to represent the full spectrum of views in the House and it should
decrease the likelihood that any future Government will inadvertently
end up with a majority on the Commission (a concern raised with
us by the Shadow Leader of the House).
We support the idea of portfolio responsibilities for the elected
members of the Commission. In respect of finance this is in
effect a role already filled by the Chair of F&S. The Chair
of the Administration Committee recommended that the occupant
of his post should also be on the Commission. Chair of the Administration
Committee would be an appropriate position to be held by a portfolio
lead on services to Members and their staff. The chair
of neither committee is currently subject to House-wide election.
Appointing elected backbench members of the Commission to the
posts would in our view increase their legitimacy and authority
within the House.
144. The overlap between F&S and Administration
is unfortunate, and the former's role in assessing recommendations
of the latter has not worked well. Sir Kevin Tebbit counselled
us against a three-tier structure.
If a version of the present committee structure is to work, it
will be important that the two committees (F&S and Administration)
have equal status and clear and distinct remits. Finance can never
be separated entirely from services, but if our recommendations
relating to the chairs of the committees are implemented, the
Commission will be an effective place for them to come together.
The existing protocol between the Commission and the Administration
Committee (originally agreed in 2005) will need to be reviewed.
Both the committees are essentially advisory and their remits
and the delineation of responsibilities will need to be agreed
with the Commission. Experience in the present Parliament, for
example in respect of the savings programme for F&S and catering
and retail for Administration, has shown that their advice can
be compelling. Sir Alan Haselhurst told us that 77 per cent of
the Administration Committee's recommendations had been accepted.
145. We recommend that the Finance and Services
Committee be renamed the Finance Committee to distinguish its
responsibilities from those of the Administration Committee. We
recommend that the Administration Committee membership be no more
than 11 Members. We recommend that the Chairs of both the new
Finance Committee and the Administration Committee be drawn from
the elected backbench members of the Commission.
146. The portfolio responsibilities of the other
two elected backbench members of the Commission should be allocated
to them by the Commission and may change over time. They should
reflect the Commission's responsibilities for setting the strategic
framework. One of them, for example, might have a role in respect
of preparations for R&R. Another area of importance is the
interests of constituents and other members of the public. Our
constituents sent us here: it is their Parliament. It is important
to capture and act on their experience of engaging with the House,
whether in person or digitally. In our view the long-running saga
of queues at the Cromwell Green entrance might have been gripped
more effectively and more quickly if there had been a strong voice
on the Commission speaking up for those left standing in the rain.
147. If the backbench members are also to be portfolio
leads, we believe it should be incumbent on any Member standing
for election to the Commission to state that s/he will be prepared
to devote a significant amount of time (at least two or three
days a month) to Commission duties. We also expect each of them
to answer oral and written parliamentary questions relevant to
their portfolios. We have noted the suggestion from Lord Kirkwood,
who was a member of the Commission between 1997 and 2005, drawing
on his experience as a member of the General Medical Council,
that members of the Commission:
should be expected to submit themselves
to continuous professional development during their term of office
and be invited to take appropriate courses in for example Auditing
& Risk analysis and any other subjects that would better equip
them as members of the Commission.
In light of this commitment and the increased role
which we envisage for the Commission itself, we believe that the
backbench members of the Commission who are not select committee
chairs should still have the status of select committee chairs.
We propose that these members of the Commission should be referred
to as 'Commons Commissioners'.
148. We have referred above to the potential for
involving the Deputy Speakers more in House administration. We
have not discussed with them or taken evidence on the best way
of achieving this, but we note that the Chairman of Ways and Means
is currently a member of F&S. There may be scope to include
the others on the new Administration Committee, or possibly the
149. The Commission should also consider how knowledge
of its work can be better disseminated to Members and staff, including
publishing papers and minutes. For example, Hazel Blears told
Work could be done to ensure that the decisions
that you make and the matters that you are considering are highlighted
to Parliament. If people realised what the work entailed, you
might then get more of them wanting to be a part of what is going
on. It is shrouded in mystery at the moment and there needs to
be much more transparency.
150. The suggestion that the Commission might hold
regular informal events to meet groups of staff and to listen
to their concerns was endorsed by Lawrence Ward, Serjeant at Arms,
and Robin Fell, Principal Doorkeeper.
The Commission might also consider meeting in public on appropriate
occasions. Interestingly, the South African Parliament holds quarterly
Consultative Forums to facilitate the input of Members of Parliament
on matters related to Members' facilities which are attended by
the chairs of committees of the National Assembly and the National
Council of Provinces as well as chairs of party caucuses and party
151. It is important to emphasise that our recommendation
for portfolio leads is not a recommendation that they should be
representatives or delegates for those interests on the Commission.
Rather their responsibility should be to ensure that the decisions
of the Commission are properly informed by those interests. Dame
Rosemary Butler, Presiding Officer of the National Assembly for
Wales, told us in written evidence that asking Commissioners to
specialise in a part of the administration had been effective
in the National Assembly for Wales.
MEMBERS' ESTIMATE COMMITTEE
152. Currently the Members' Estimate Committee (MEC)
has the same membership as the Commission and generally meets
at the same time. Indeed meetings can move between Commission
and MEC business almost seamlessly. However, because the MEC is
a committee of the House, including non-Members in its membership
would not be straightforward. There are three options:
a) make no changes: MEC business would need to
be taken separately from Commission business, with non-MEC members
of the Commission taking no part;
b) adopt a similar approach to that taken with
lay members of the Standards Committee: non-Member members attend
but cannot vote;
c) amend the 1978 Act to make the Commission
responsible for MEC business (Members' allowances/salaries not
covered by IPSA, Members' pension fund, Short money).
153. MEC business is a small and decreasing proportion
of total Commission/MEC business. Option a) is a practicable solution
in the short term. But if the Commission wishes to propose option
b) or c), we would be happy to support their decision.
154. Under our proposals the Commission will take
a more active responsibility for setting the strategic direction
while delegating its implementation to officials. The body to
which that delegation is made needs
i) To have a closer but more clearly defined
relationship with the Commission; and
ii) To be more directly focused on driving implementation.
155. We have heard criticisms from staff and members
that the Management Board is too remote. Lawrence Ward told us
that it was 'quite distant from Members' activities' and that
'on more occasions than not, it has become fairly irrelevant to
the running of the House.'
The Speaker told us that the Management Board needed a clearer
role and to interact more effectively with the Commission.
156. Our proposal is to replace the Management
Board with an Executive Committee, which would act as a sub-committee
of the Commission. Its core membership would be the official members
of the Commission together with the Director of Finance. Up to
three other officials could be added by the Commission. The official
members would be the Director General of the House of Commons
and the Clerk of the House. The Director General would chair the
157. The Director General of the House of Commons
would be a new post. S/he would be responsible for the delivery
of the resources needed to support the House in its work, including
its parliamentary and outward facing functions. The Clerk would
retain responsibility for the quality of support for parliamentary
functions, and for development of the skills, experience and expertise
to maintain the professionalism of the parliamentary service.
This distinction has similarities with the division of responsibilities
between the Cabinet Secretary and the Chief Executive of the Civil
Service, with that operating in the NAO between the Comptroller
and Auditor General (C&AG) and the Chief Operating Officer,
which was described to us by Michael Whitehouse,
and with the arrangements in many professional services firms.
The role of Director General of the House of Commons has some
elements of a Chief Executive and some of a Chief Operating Officer.
But it does not exactly mirror either. It is a solution which
responds to the particular challenges of the unique parliamentary
environment of the House of Commons. It is for this reason that
we have proposed a different title, one that emphasises the authority
of the post and will also allow it to evolve unburdened by preconceptions.
Consideration might be given to whether s/he should be an additional
Accounting Officer on the model which was adopted in the Crown
Prosecution Service (see paragraph 16).
158. One consequence of calling the new role Director
General of the House of Commons is that existing Director General
posts for departments might be conveniently re-named as Directors.
This would then reflect the fact of the seniority and status of
the Director General. This would be a good moment to make this
change as several of these posts are currently held by Acting
159. We have heard that there has been a proliferation
of boards and groups below the Management Board level, but their
roles and their relationships to each other and to the Management
Board are not always clearly understood. The two Houses are currently
in the process of establishing a new bicameral Digital Service,
but there are also separate proposals for a new bicameral Investment
Board which given the importance of investment in ICT could have
overlapping responsibilities. The Executive Committee will need
to rationalise this situation and establish clear and transparent
lines of management accountability. The priority must be to
reduce layers of bureaucracy not increase them.
THE ROLES OF CLERK AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
160. The Leader of the House, William Hague, emphasised
the importance of the role of the Clerk of the House:
The House has to be able to have confidence in
the Clerk in so many different ways, and in the quality of adviceindeed,
not only this House: since the advice of the Clerk is sought on
occasions by Parliaments across the Commonwealth, there has to
be international confidence in the expertise of the Clerk.
I think the independence of the Clerk is of paramount importance.
Appointment by letters patent is intended to entrench that. It
is important that the Clerk can give advice without fear or favour
to all Members of the House, including the Speaker. I think it
would be very regrettable if any official or executive were able
to hire or fire the Clerk at any stage, so independence is important.
None of our witnesses has dissented from this view.
Although formally the Clerk's accountability is to the Crown in
Parliament, in practice his or her performance is subject to daily
scrutiny in and by the House. In this respect absolute constitutional
independence is tempered by political and parliamentary reality.
We have taken it as a matter of first importance that any changes
we might recommend do nothing to undermine the position of the
Clerk in this respect.
161. If our recommendations for the reinforcement
of the role of the House of Commons Commission and for the introduction
of clear and public delegations of decision-making authority are
accepted, the House administration will be better led and more
capable of delivering responsive and effective services to Members,
staff and the public. These changes should go a long way to address
the problems of confused decision-making and slow and inadequate
follow-up which have sometimes been cited in support of the case
for a separate Chief Executive equivalent or senior to the Clerk.
162. Under our proposals the Clerk and the Director
General of the House of Commons would operate visibly as a team/partnership.
Michael Whitehouse emphasised that one of the strengths of the
NAO model was that he and the C&AG were 'very much a team.'Being
able to demonstrate the skills and aptitude necessary to do so
effectively should be a key element of the job specification of
The selection process for both jobs would select
someone who was good at working with other people, good at delegating,
someone who was not going to interfere the whole time.
163. Staff from whom we received (formal and informal)
evidence varied widely in their opinions as to whether the Clerk,
or a Chief Executive should be the senior, but were generally
agreed that there would be considerable problems of accountability
if neither was even primus inter pares. Many of them argued
strongly for a single unified service and believed that two equal
heads would militate against its achievement.
It is apparent that significant progress has been made towards
this objective in recent years, but, as others have told us, there
is still a long way to go. A single head of service was urged
upon us by most of our outside witnesses, who also argued that
the post should be filled by someone focussed on the organisation's
primary purpose. We fully support the objective of securing
a fully unified House service. Indeed, we have seen its benefits
at first hand: the staff supporting this committee were drawn
from different departments across the House service.
164. The temporary arrangements put in place following
the retirement of Sir Robert Rogers should not be allowed to continue
any longer than is absolutely necessary. As Dame Janet Gaymer
told us, the House service is 'effectively leaderless'.
Our first priority, therefore, must be to find a way of resolving
this situation as soon as possible. The primary purpose of the
House of Commons is to fulfil is role as a democratic parliamentary
assembly. To introduce a Chief Executive above the Clerk would
require the development of mechanisms to ensure the Clerk's continuing
independence in matters relating to parliamentary procedure and
privilege. It is not clear how this would be achieved;
or what unintended consequences of trying to achieve it there
might be. Direct interaction between the House and the judiciary
is and should be rare. Rt Hon Lord Judge said he could remember
'only one occasion when such an issue had arisen.' He told us
that 'from the point of view of the judiciary
I would say
that we need somebody who exercises the functions that the Clerk
165. Furthermore, as Sir Alan Beith explained, the
Clerk's independence is 'reflected in the authority held by the
Clerk of each Select Committee
you need not only very good
knowledge of the procedures and rules, but unquestioned authority:
if the Clerk of the House says this, it must be acted upon.'
166. We have therefore concluded that the Clerk
should continue to be the Head of the House service (and thus
formally the line manager of the Director General). However, since
delivery will be the responsibility of the Director General of
the House of Commons, s/he should chair the Executive Committee
and take lead responsibility for its agenda. Membership of the
Commission will also give him or her direct access to the Speaker
and other Commission members. S/he should be a very visible presence
to Members. We recommend that the Commission consider what arrangements
might be made to enable the Director General of the House of Commons
to be visibly present in his or her official capacity in the Chamber
when business relating to his or her responsibilities is under
167. For this model to work there will need to be
clear delineation between the responsibilities of the Clerk and
the Director General of the House of Commons together with transparent
and detailed delegations.
168. The Director General of the House of Commons
will have responsibility for resource allocation and delivery
across the House service. In this respect the role will achieve
what Sir Kevin Tebbit told us he would have liked to have been
able to do:
Had other things been different I would have
created a much stronger role for the finance and administration
function, and probably put that in a much stronger position in
relation to the Clerk.
But, as a member of the Commission, the Director
General of the House of Commons will also be its executive arm,
accountable to it, but also acting with its delegated authority.
The Director General of the House of Commons will be responsible
for determining the level of resources required to support the
House across all its functions and to provide assurance to the
Clerk, as Accounting Officer, that they have been used effectively
169. A key role of the Clerk of the House, as Head
of the House service, will be to provide strategic leadership
to the service overall. S/he will need to develop his or her role
as the representative and figurehead of all parts of the House
and a thorough understanding of how the challenges facing each
area of service delivery might impact on the core work of Parliament.
Members and staff should be able to recognise a step-change in
the wider knowledge this role displays in the future.
170. We have heard evidence that the post is currently
overloaded; that neither part of it is therefore given the attention
it deserves. Two important areas which would benefit from more
attention (and for which the Clerk should be responsible) are
stewardship and strategic thinking. The weakness of both functions
in the House has been raised by several witnesses;
the Clerk would be well-placed to support the Commission in the
development and effective communication of an overarching framework
in both areas. The Clerk will need to be demonstrably expert in
parliament's core business and s/he will have more time to devote
to procedural and related issues. It is likely in the context
of the parliamentary and constitutional challenges (described
above) that this will become more acute. Two other important matters
for the Clerk will be R&R (for which s/he will have shared
responsibility with the Director General of the House of Commons)
and relations with the House of Lords. However, we recognise the
strength of the argument, which informed the Tebbit recommendations,
that in a unified service the Head of the Service should not also
be a head of one of the component departments.
171. We have therefore concluded that there would
have to be strong countervailing arguments if the Clerk of the
House were to revert to being the Head of the DCCS. However, s/he
will be much more closely engaged in the day to day Chamber-related
work which is currently the primary responsibility of the Clerk
Assistant. The Clerk of the House of course will remain 'Head
of Profession' and guarantor that the legislative and scrutiny
roles of the House are protected. We take very seriously the Leader
of the House's argument that we should not 'increase the cost
of the overall system'
and we come back to this point in paragraphs 206 to 207 below.
We expect the House service to ensure that the changes in the
responsibilities of the most senior posts in DCCS are fully reflected
in the number and grading of those posts. We recommend that
within six months of the appointment of the Director General of
the House of Commons, the Executive Committee submits proposals
to the Commission to restructure the senior management of the
House which should include reductions in the number of senior
posts both in DCCS and elsewhere.
OUR PROPOSALS AS A PACKAGE
172. Our proposals for reform to the Commission,
to Member committees, to the Management Board and to senior posts
are intended to be a coherent whole. They are a package in which
each part supports the others. Overall they will deliver the following
· A coherent management and strategic leadership
structure in which the Member and official elements are properly
integrated for the first time;
· Clarity in the respective roles of Members
· The Clerk and Director General of the
House of Commons are explicitly a leadership team;
· The small size of the Executive Committee
will require a clearer and more transparent system of delegations
to individuals including heads of departments with responsibility
for particular services;
· They can be implemented without immediate
organisational restructuring: the Executive Committee would be
expected to review structures and implement any changes within
a specific timescale;
· An Executive Committee focussed on corporate
leadership should reinforce the message that the House is supported
by a unified service (and the Clerk and Director General of the
House of Commons should give a joint commitment to moving staff
between departments and to collaborative working).
173. However, there will also be challenges. Our
proposals introduce significant changes which will need to be
carefully and sensitively managed. The non-departmental structure
of the Executive Committee may be perceived as diminishing the
roles of Heads of Departments. This could be a challenging change
of culture for staff who have invested much of their loyalty in
their departments. We discuss implementation in more detail in
the next chapter.
174. In due course, as part of or following R&R,
this structure would be well placed both organisationally and
individually to evolve into the Commons components of a Parliamentary
175. The Executive Committee must be an effective
decision-making body. It must also be at the head of a structure
of delegations: delegations both of authority and responsibility
to key members of staff, who can then be accountable for their
exercise of those delegated powers.
176. A proper system of delegations is fundamental
to transparent decision-making and accountability. Decision makers
at all levels need to understand the extent of their delegated
authority, be clear on their accountability for their decisions
and be confident of the support of those above them in the exercise
of that authority.
177. Delegations should be published so that Members,
staff and others can see who is responsible for what. They should
be accompanied by clear timetables for delivery. And in order
to demonstrate that the responsibility is accompanied by authority,
the overall system of delegations should be reviewed and approved
annually by the Executive Committee.
178. The staff of the House are its most important
resource. We have heard tributes to their professionalism and
expertise from many quarters. Many of our witnesses, and in particular
Members, told us that the House employs capable and talented staff
with a wide range of skills. They noted that the House is not
the only place that employs people for life: long service and
experience can often be positive.
179. We discussed earlier the range of development
opportunities available to staff. We have heard from many staff
how important it is to them that the most senior posts should
not be accessible only to staff who have entered the service by
a particular route or into a particular department or directorate.
It is equally important that the House should make every effort
to remove any barriers, or perceived barriers, in respect of diversity.
We recommend that the Commission and the Executive Committee
make a joint commitment to the development of all staff and the
active promotion of diversity throughout the House service. In
particular we recommend that the opportunities for external secondments,
to government departments and to the wider public sector including
local authorities, but also to the private and third sectors,
should be substantially increased. It should be a strong expectation
that members of staff seeking promotion to the Senior Commons
Service (SCS) should have been encouraged to have undertaken at
least one such secondment and that SCS staff should undertake
at least one secondment every ten years. If this is balanced
with a willingness to receive secondments into the House service,
and we were pleased to hear that this is also an area of growth,
the net costs will not be great. As Andrew Kennon told us, 'It
costs a bit of money, but not a lot.'
180. David Natzler told us that the Management Board
was in the process of consulting on a strategy for the House service
which would have 'customer service' at its heart.
Our own inquiry has, we believe, opened up a valuable dialogue
between Members and staff. It is clear that many Members would
welcome and find useful more opportunities to engage with staff,
as would staff with Members. We have made a number of recommendations
which we hope will further encourage such developments. We welcome
the Management Board's decision to pilot the use of name badges
by senior staff. A key theme of our report is the need to find
more and better ways for staff and Members to get to know and
understand each other.
181. Our recommendations for structural changes will
need to be underpinned by cultural change. For some witnesses
cultural change was the first priority. Bernard Jenkin told us:
All the advice that we have seeneverything
that we have learnedhas shown that organisations tend to
fail not because of structural reasons but because of reasons
of culture, behaviour or attitude. The questions we need to ask
to understand what is going wrong and why are therefore about
those things. When we get to the end of those questions and understand
why things are going wrong there may be some consequent changes
to structure or governance.
182. We believe that the two need to go hand in hand.
In the course of our recommendations relating to governance structures
we have drawn attention to the cultural changes which will be
needed to make them effective. Underpinning all these changes
is a requirement to move to an environment in which clarity and
openness, in terms of decision-making and accountability, are
the key elements. This is a significant change, not least because
it challenges some of the features and consequences of the House's
traditional collegiate and consensual approach. The promotion
of a collegiate approach and consensual decision-making is not
itself a bad thing, but the evidence is that it has too often
translated into a lack of accountability and a tendency to pass
183. No system in which officials are encouraged
to take responsibility and to be accountable for decisions within
authorities delegated to them can work, if accountability becomes
synonymous with blame. In our discussions with staff, we were
told about some examples of disrespectful behaviour by a few Members.
In the summer all parts of the House agreed to a new Respect policy
covering both sides of the Member/staff relationship. We welcome
this but policies alone do not solve cultural problems.
171 Q72 Back
The 1978 Act provides for one member to be nominated by the Leader
of the Opposition. In practice this has always been the Shadow
Q312 [Andrew Lansley MP] Back
Lord Kirkwood (GOV061) para 5. See also Simon Cramp (GOV079) para
Q309 [Hazel Blears MP] Back
Masibulele Xaso, Secretary to the National Assembly, South Africa
Dame Rosemary Butler, Presiding Officer National Assembly for
Wales (GOV068) Back
Julia Vanoli, House of Commons staff (GOV015), House of Commons
staff (GOV016), Lord Blencathra (GOV040) Back
Qq393, 397 [Oonagh Gay], Qq614, 619. See also Research Directorate,
DIS, House of Commons (GOV070) para 8 Back
Q90 [Sir Alan Beith MP] Back
Martin Horwood MP (GOV003), House of Commons staff (GOV020), House
of Commons staff (GOV035) Back
Q787 [Sir Kevin Tebbit] Back
Qq141, 139 Back
Q252. See also House of Commons staff (GOV014), James Camp, House
of Commons staff (GOV018), House of Commons staff (GOV059) Back
Q153 [Bernard Jenkin MP] Back