Appendix: Government response
Letter from James Brokenshire
MP, Minister for Immigration and Security, 21 July 2014
I am writing to thank the Committee for their report
'The Work of the UK Border Agency (April to September 2013)'.
Please find enclosed a copy of the Government's response to this
report. I apologise for the delay in providing this response.
Introduction
The Home Office would like to thank the Committee
for its report published in March on the work of the immigration
directorates. The Government has been clear that the UK Border
Agency was a troubled organisation since its formation in 2008
and its performance was not good enough. That is why we created
Border Force and then split the Agency, bringing its work back
into the Home Office under Ministerial oversight.
We have seen a year of solid progress. Border Force
is delivering 100% checks and almost no queues; Immigration Enforcement
is a visible law enforcement operation; and UKVI has removed backlogs
in migration casework. There has also been progress towards replacing
the old-fashioned, fragile and fragmented IT with more resilient,
integrated and digital systems.
But there is much more for us to do. Our reforms
have helped to stabilise the border and immigration system. We
must now accelerate root and branch reform of what was a broken
system, to deliver the improvements the public and Parliament
expect.
The Home Office has considered the recommendations
of the report and the Government response is below.
Migration Statistics
Conclusion/Recommendation 1
It is a travesty that, despite successive recommendations of
this Committee, the collection of data of people entering and
leaving this country has not happened. The goal set by the Government
of full exit checks by the General Election in 2015 is unrealistic.
We repeat our previous recommendation that the Home Office set
out immediately its timetable for documenting the identity and
nationality of all those entering and exiting the UK.
Government response
The Government is committed to implementing Exit
Checks by 2015, and this will provide the basis for clearer and
more comprehensive data that will help us go significantly further
over time to reduce the risk of overstaying and tackle those who
do. That capability for this will be founded on Advance Passenger
Information (API) coverage. API is collected for passengers who
travel to and from the UK on routes connected to Semaphore, the
system that processes API. The current estimated proportion of
passengers who travel to and from the UK on routes connected to
Semaphore has increased to in excess of 95% for scheduled air
travel and 80% overall. This is a significant improvement on the
position at the end of 2009, where API coverage was just under
60%. Exit checks capability will also be supplemented, where necessary,
with embarkation checks at ports to bolster border security. Powers
in the current Immigration Act will enable those already involved
in outbound passenger processes, such as carrier and port operator
staff, to carry out these embarkation checks where required.
Conclusion/Recommendation 2
The Committee continues to believe that the Government's
decision not to commission estimates on the number of Romanians
and Bulgarians who would come here at the ending of transitional
migration controls was wrong. We are concerned that the decision
not to commission has increased anti-immigrant prejudice and has
been commandeered by those who wish to inflame tensions about
immigration for political gain.
Government response
The Government disagrees with the Committee's suggestion
on forecasting the number of Romanians and Bulgarians who might
come to the UK. There is no reason to suppose that publication
of such a forecast would have provided a significant degree of
reassurance. Previous, inaccurate forecasts have misled debate
about uncontrolled immigration.
This Government has focused on work to ensure that
our controls on access to benefits and services - including the
NHS and social housing - are among the tightest in Europe and
not open to abuse, so that British citizens can have confidence
that those EU nationals who come to the UK do so for the right
reasons — to work hard and contribute to society.
Conclusion/Recommendation 3
We recommend that the Government commission the
Migration Advisory Committee to carry out research on the number
of Romanians and Bulgarians in the UK with two strands. First
to assess those who arrived during the transitional period (1
January 2007 to 31 December 2013), their social and economic impact
upon the UK, and the balance between their contribution and their
usage of the social security system. Secondly, to assess the number
of those who have arrived since 1 January 2014, and, on the basis
of this data, make an assessment of how many are likely to come
in the near future. The Committee has seen no evidence to suggest
that there has been an increase in migration from Romania and
Bulgaria. It would appear rather more a trickle than a flood.
Government response
The National Institute of Economic and Social Research
('NIESR') report on the potential impacts on the UK of future
migration from Bulgaria and Romania, commissioned by the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office, was published in April 2013. The report
drew together existing research on the migration patterns and
social impact of Romanians and Bulgarians resident in the UK,
as well as the potential impacts of future migration. The report
concluded, "It is not possible to predict the scale of migration
from Bulgaria and Romania to the UK with any degree of certainty
because of the lack of accurate data on current migration and
because of the many factors which determine migration decisions
and patterns" [pg 43][1]
Assessments for the period since 1 January 2014 will
be published in the normal way by the Office for National Statistics
and the Department for Work and Pensions.
On 14 May 2014 the Office for National Statistics
(ONS) released the Labour Force Statistics for the first quarter
of 2014. This release included employment numbers and rates by
nationality and country of birth, covering the period January
to March 2014.
On 22 May the Department for Work and Pensions and
Office for National Statistics published statistics for National
Insurance Number allocations to adult overseas nationals for the
first quarter of 2014.
Neither the Labour Force Statistics nor the statistics
on National Insurance Number allocations indicated that there
had been a large increase in Romanian and Bulgarian immigration
in the period from January to March 2014. The Labour Force Statistics
(14 May) showed a slight decrease in the number of Romanians and
Bulgarians employed in the UK in the first quarter of 2014 when
compared to the final quarter of 2013.
On 28 August 2014 the Office for National Statistics
will publish the Migration Statistics Quarterly Report, which
will include provisional estimates of long term international
migration for the year ending March 2014, including estimates
for the European Union.
Given these statistics will be published on a quarterly
basis, and the conclusions from the NIESR report, the Government
does not intend to forecast future arrivals.
Conclusion/Recommendation 4
We recommend that for any future enlargements
the Migration Advisory Committee be tasked by the Government to
provide an estimate of the numbers arriving in our country, including
how many people have already arrived from these countries under
EU treaties. Had they done so for the 2007 enlargement, they would
have discovered that 144,000 Romanians and Bulgarians were already
working in the UK in December 2013. If the Government refuses
to task the Migration Advisory Committee to commission estimates,
we will request that they do so.
Government response
Estimates of the numbers of people arriving in the
UK from other countries and who become usually resident here are
published routinely by the Office for National Statistics. For
any future enlargements, the number of people arriving from any
new Member State, under EU treaties, after the date of accession,
will also be reported by the Office for National Statistics which
publishes data on the resident population of the UK by country
of birth and nationality.
As the Prime Minister announced in November 2013,
the Government will be working to ensure that there are effective
arrangements in place for any future enlargement, for example,
by considering alternatives to the previous time-limited formulations
for transitional controls.
EU Immigration and Access to Benefits
Conclusion/Recommendation 5
We accept that it is difficult to assess the actual
impact of restricting access to benefits upon migration between
individual countries in the EU and the UK, not least because we
are unable to measure the nationality of individuals claiming
benefits in the UK. The limited evidence that does exist suggests
that the scale of so-called 'benefits tourism' is at much lower
levels than claimed by the Government.
Government response
DWP and the Office for National Statistics now release
quarterly statistics on the allocation of National Insurance Numbers
to adult overseas nationals. The latest set of data, which covered
the period to March 2014, was published on 22 May 2014 and provided
a breakdown of the allocation of National Insurance Numbers by
quarter and by region (EU/ other parts of the world), and also
the allocation by nationality.
In August 2014, DWP will also release data on the
nationality, at the point of registration for a National Insurance
number, of DWP benefit claimants.
Seasonal Agricultural Workers
Scheme
Conclusion/Recommendation 6
With the lifting of transitional controls on Romania
and Bulgaria, it seems likely that there will be a shortage of
labour in what were the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme and
the Sector Based Scheme (food processing) in the near future.
It is not clear what the Government's position is on how to address
this problem, particularly as there are no obvious alternative
European accession countries that might provide sufficient workers.
The previous immigration Minister told us that, where it has proven
difficult to entice British workers to take on jobs, such as pizza
delivery staff, the answer was for employers to offer better pay.
The Government must explain how it intends to fill the void left
with the end of the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme so that
farmers can find willing workers, or if it expects the void to
be filled simply by farmers offering higher wages.
Government response
The Government's position was set out in Mark Harper
MP's Written Ministerial Statement of 13 September. The MAC's
finding was that there was little evidence that the horticultural
sector would experience a shortage of seasonal labour in the short-term
but recruitment difficulties were more likely to develop over
time. The Government's view was that there should be sufficient
labour from the UK and EU labour market to meet the horticultural
sector's needs for the present, and that there was an insufficient
case for the introduction of a new seasonal labour scheme which
would amount to preferential treatment for this particular sector.
The Government does nevertheless recognise that the
horticultural sector faces some specific issues in ensuring a
reliable supply of labour, and reducing its dependence on migrant
labour over the longer term, and that this is not reducible solely
to the issue of pay. That is why the Government has established
a DEFRA- led working group, involving other government departments,
to examine what other steps can be taken to address obstacles
to the recruitment of labour (including the role of Job Centre
Plus and other recruitment channels, perceptions of work in the
industry and accommodation and transport issues) and to monitor
the labour supply situation in the sector. The Government's Agricultural
Technologies Strategy will also support innovation in the horticultural
sector in order to mitigate levels of seasonal labour need.
The Migration Advisory Committee
Conclusion/Recommendation 7
We are not convinced that the Government has got
the right balance between restricting immigration and attracting
skilled people in some sectors that have a skills gap.
Taken with
Conclusion/Recommendation 8
We are concerned that in areas such as restaurants,
there are many small businesses that can neither afford the wage
required under Tier 2, nor have enough time to train the chefs
of the future. Skills level assessments must be based on realistic
vocational knowledge. Otherwise, this will lead, and has done
so already, to the closure of businesses and negative effects
on the economy. The Committee recommends that the Migration Advisory
Committee and the Home Office should consult with industry, including
caterers' associations and restaurateurs in order to better understand
the effects of this policy, with a single focus on the Asian/Oriental
restaurant sector.
Government response
The annual limit applied to applications in the Tier
2 category has been undersubscribed since its inception in 2011
and consequently has not prevented a single employer recruiting
a skilled migrant worker.
Under Tier 2, employers are able to recruit migrant
workers to fill graduate-level jobs that are in recognised shortage
occupations, or where they are unable to find enough suitable
resident workers. Where jobs are skilled to below graduate level,
the Government considers it is reasonable to ask employers to
recruit, and if necessary train, resident workers.
The Government's view is that the UK continues to
make an excellent offer for students who wish to work in the UK
after their studies. All students have four months following the
end of their course in which to apply in a work route. Those with
an offer of a graduate level job, paying an appropriate salary,
can switch into Tier 2 with no limit on numbers and no resident
labour market test. The Tier 1 (Graduate Entrepreneur) route,
Tier 4 (Doctorate Extension Scheme) for PhD graduates, and opportunities
for professional training or internships in Tier 5 (Government
Authorised Exchange) provide further options.
With regard to the restaurant sector, successive
Governments and the Migration Advisory Committee have been saying
for many years that the sector needs to reduce its reliance on
migrant workers and invest in the resident workforce. Tier 2 continues
to provide opportunities for skilled chefs who will develop innovative
cuisine, but the criteria are set high intentionally. The Government
does not intend that employers should be able to recruit migrant
workers for low-paid jobs in standard fare restaurants. It is
true that skills in this sector are based more on vocational knowledge
than academic qualifications, but that is all the more reason
for employers and sector bodies to invest in training. The Government
has not seen evidence to suggest that closures of restaurants
in the Asian/Oriental sector in recent years have been attributable
to their inability to obtain permission to work for staff recruited
from overseas.
Conclusion/Recommendation 9
The Migration Advisory Committee is due to present
the results of its study into migrants and low skilled work to
the Minister by April 2014. We look forward to the publication
of this research and intend to take evidence from the MAC on the
results as soon as possible afterwards.
Government response
None needed
Conclusion/Recommendation 10
The Committee was alarmed by Professor Sir David
Metcalf's admission about the purchase of gilts for citizenship.
The current evidence suggests that there appears to be very little
benefit. While the Government considers the options for a system
more beneficial to the UK, as outlined in the MAC report, we recommend
the Home Office suspend the Tier 1 (Investor) visa route. The
practice of other European Union Member States selling citizenship
is extremely worrying. As the Minister for Immigration pointed
out, the UK has neither power nor control over the policies of
other EU States in this regard. We do not believe Britain should
follow the example of Malta, for the reasons stated in evidence.
The Committee recommends that the Home Office seek urgently to
petition the European Commission about this practice. Otherwise
Britain's immigration controls would be in danger of being sidestepped
by those with sufficient wealth.
Taken with
Conclusion/Recommendation 11
We are perturbed at the new recommendations by
the Migration Advisory Committee to sell British settlement by
auction. This process is riddled with difficulties and combined
with the reduction in standards required of those gaining citizenship,
including limited or no English or Welsh language skills, will
be a recipe for disaster. A requirement to speak English or Welsh
has been a cornerstone of the development of immigration policy
under successive Governments. If the Home Office are to accept
these proposals, there must be thorough and robust due diligence
applied to these potential new citizens to ensure that they are
fit and proper persons to be admitted to settle in this country
and placed on the path of citizenship. We will examine the Home
Secretary on this when she next appears before the Committee.
Government response
The Government is currently giving careful consideration
to the MAC's findings in respect of the Tier 1 (Investor) category
and the extent to which the route delivers its intended benefits
to the UK. On auctions, the MAC did not seek to present a fully
worked out scheme but it was clear that the proposed bidding system
should not substitute for the usual due diligence checks on prospective
migrants. Nor did it suggest that its proposal should involve
any dilution of the language requirements applied to those seeking
citizenship.
On the policies adopted by other Member States, other
countries have the right to determine their own citizenship laws.
The Government will monitor the schemes adopted by other Member
States and will make clear its concerns if it appears those schemes
will give rise to the abuse of free movement rights.
The Migration Refusal Pool and
Capita
Conclusion/Recommendation 12
We remain seriously concerned about the cost of
outsourcing this contract to Capita. The changes to the contract
suggest that Capita are being remunerated for identifying those
who have left and not for action leading to these departures.
The Committee cannot understand why this work could not have been
undertaken by the Home Office directly. We reiterate our call
for the terms of the contract to be immediately made public.
Government response
Engaging a contractor to pursue contact management
work, perform checks, analyse the results and update individual
records has allowed for the work to be completed speedily. The
benefits of swift mobilisation of a contractor result in quicker
delivery. It also means that the work can be scaled down quickly
if required. There is no commitment to provide further work through
the contract if it is not required.
The work that Capita has been contracted to undertake
includes making checks on cases to identify if there is evidence
to show people have left the UK. Cases are closed where it is
clear that no further enforcement activity is required, regardless
of the dates on the immigration case in respect to the contract.
The purpose of the work is to close off cases and progress others
as far as possible prior to passing them to Home Office teams
for further work, as well as delivering a contact management solution
that encourages and supports voluntary departures. Capita has
delivered above prediction on departures, having recorded 47,300
departures by the end of Q4, 2013.
Conclusion/Recommendation 13
The Home Office should make clear why changes
were made to the contract with Capita regarding their work on
the Migration Refusal Pool, and what led to the "significant
increase" in the number of barrier cases being passed back
to the Home Office. The barrier cases have to go back into the
system to be addressed by Home Office staff, presumably back in
to the established Migration Refusal Pool backlog. We welcome
the fact that the Capita exercise appears to have been successful
in removing duplicate and erroneous records. The next test is
to see how quickly the cases which have been identified with barriers
to removal are addressed and closed.
Government response
There have been no major changes to the contract
with Capita since it commenced in December 2012 (there have been
a small number of minor contract amendments).
Between Q3 (September) and Q4 (December) the Committee
will have noticed a significant increase in the number of cases
reported as being returned to the Department as having a barrier
to further contact. This was not due to a contract change, but
rather that the contact cycle had not been concluded for cases
until after the end of Q3.
The Committee was provided with figures up to the
end of Q4 by letter in March. This shows that to date, Capita
has completed its work on 218,400 cases. Of these, 22% (47,300)
have been confirmed departures, 23% (50,000) have resulted in
no contact being made, and 55% (121,100) have been identified
as having barriers to contact management. This includes updating
and closing cases where there are duplicate records or errors.
The contract involves progressing large volumes of
cases utilising both Home Office systems and the contractor's
contact management technology. In the earlier stages of working
through the first 150,000 cases, many were in the contact cycle
as the contractor either (i) worked with the individuals to progress
their cases, or (ii) because the contractor made further checks
against other databases in order to source updated contact information.
The period during the middle of last year saw a combination
of impacts on the contact cycle. Some cases, where contact had
not led to a voluntary departure and an enforced return was required,
were passed back to the Home Office. Many cases saw a barrier
put up by the individual as a result of the contact process. As
larger numbers of cases were worked by the contractor following
the initial mobilisation period, the numbers of duplicate and
error cases also increased as the stock of the work was completed.
Cases with barriers that are passed back into the
Home Office may remain in the Migration Refusal Pool report, but
the report is not a backlog. In many cases individuals within
the MRP have already submitted further applications for leave
to remain, or have raised fresh legal barriers to removal that
are under consideration. Cases are progressed and prioritised
for enforcement action by the newly established, dedicated removals
casework teams.
Allegations Database
Conclusion/Recommendation 14
The Committee recognises that action on illegal
immigration should be intelligence led. We have commented in the
past about the risk of the Home Office developing communication
strategies to encourage reporting but those strategies undermining
confidence in the system if they do not lead to action being taken.
At the moment only a small proportion of allegations are investigated.
The Committee finds it completely unacceptable that only 1.5%
to 2.5% of allegations lead to a removal.
Taken with
Conclusion/Recommendation 15
The Committee recognises that action on illegal
immigration should be intelligence led. We have commented in the
past about the risk of the Home Office developing communication
strategies to encourage reporting but those strategies undermining
confidence in the system if they do not lead to action being taken.
At the moment only a small proportion of allegations are investigated.
The Committee finds it completely unacceptable that only 1.5%
to 2.5% of allegations lead to a removal. The Home Office should
be clear whether this is because most allegations are unfounded
or because they are not taking action. We are concerned that a
whole unit exists to deal with these allegations, yet the results
are so poor. The Government must clarify why this figure is so
low, what is the cost of policing these allegations and what further
action they are taking to improve the proportion leading to a
removal.
Government response
The Home Office takes reports of immigration abuse
very seriously and is committed to achieving the best results
from the information it receives from the public. The Intelligence
Management System (formerly Allegation Management system) was
rolled out in September 2012 and, since then, all allegations
received from the public are recorded on one central, searchable
database.
Regrettably, around 30% of the information we receive
cannot be processed further either because it is incomplete or
as a result of its quality. When this is taken into account, the
arrest levels we achieve are very similar to the results the police
achieve from Crimestoppers information. For example, in 2013 8.5%
of the actionable information we received resulted in an arrest,
compared with 7% of the actionable information received by Crimestoppers.
We will be delivering further improvements
to IMS in 2 phases during the summer and autumn of this year.
These will include a new version of the online form for the public
to use. The changes follow public user-testing and will help to
ensure that we are receiving more comprehensive information to
act on. We are also making changes to improve the management information
available so that we can prioritise our activity to get better
results.
Foreign National Offenders
Conclusion/Recommendation 16
We are astonished that the Home Office has not
learnt the lessons from the Raed Salah case. The Bushati case
reinforces the necessity of ensuring that systems are put in place
that can identify individuals that the UK does not want to allow
in. If Baksim Bushati had been listed on the National Warnings
Index, his re-entry and subsequent criminality could have been
prevented. It is clear that the National Warnings Index is not
being properly maintained. To allow Baksim Bushati back into the
country was a serious and unacceptable failure. This should never
be allowed to happen again. Despite the provisions made to prevent
foreign offenders returning to the UK after deportation, it is
clear more needs to be done. Further steps should be taken immediately
to close the gaps in the process. There is a real possibility
that other dangerous criminals may have been able to enter the
UK in a similar way. The Home Office needs to publish its list
of co-operation agreements with all other countries to enable
convictions to be shared.
Government response
Baksim Bushati entered the UK by clandestine means.
Clandestine entry has been and remains a threat to the UK border.
Border Force has invested heavily in the latest available technology
and has initiated significant operations, both in number and in
scope, focused on preventing and detecting clandestines. Border
Force is also working with the French Government on options for
further enhancing security in the Nord-pas-de-Calais which is
often targeted by would-be clandestines.
Asylum
Conclusion/Recommendation 17
We recommend that the Home Office and the Ministry
of Justice make clear that the exemption for children from the
residency test does apply for all civil proceedings, and ask the
Government to make clear as to when the change will be implemented.
Government response
The Government believes that, in principle, individuals
should have a strong connection to the UK in order to benefit
from the civil legal aid scheme and that the residence test we
have proposed is a fair and appropriate way to demonstrate that
connection. A draft statutory instrument which would implement
the test was laid before Parliament on 31 March 2014. Subject
to Parliamentary approval, the test will come into effect from
4 August 2014.
There will not be an exception to the residence test
for children for all civil proceedings. As set out in the Government
Response to the Joint Committee on Human Rights' (JCHR's) report
on the implications for access to justice of the Government's
proposals to reform legal aid, the Government has made a number
of exceptions to the residence test for certain types of case
involving protection of children issues. These are in addition
to the other exceptions proposed for specific types of case, which
may also be relevant for children. Having listened to the concerns
raised by the JCHR, the Government has made a number of further
exceptions for certain other types of community care case involving
protection of children issues under the Children Act 1989. The
full list of exceptions is set out in further detail at paragraphs
7.4-7.5 in the draft Explanatory Memorandum published alongside
the draft statutory instrument.
The draft statutory instrument and draft explanatory
memorandum can be viewed at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukdsi/2014/9780111113073/contents
Visa Applications
Conclusion/Recommendation 18
A major reason for the creation of UKVI is so
that it has room to create its own distinct culture, one with
a customer focus. We welcome the clarity offered by the new service
standards for UKVI. We also note that UKVI has said it will report
quarterly on its performance against all applications. We look
forward to assessing UKVIs performance against these new standards
and will expect the UKVI to improve.
Government response
None needed.
Sponsors and Licensing
Conclusion/Recommendation 19
In our last report we commented on the significant
decline in the proportion of post-license visits that were unannounced
in all sponsor Tiers, and reiterate our previous recommendation
that the Home Office must undertake 100% unannounced visits on
sponsors where it suspects non-compliance as this is the most
effective way of dealing with bogus student applications.
Government response
The overall proportion of our unannounced visits
continues to increase. Where we suspect potential non-compliance,
an unannounced visit is the default response.
New Asylum Cases
Conclusion/Recommendation 20
In our last Report we commented on the increase
in the number of asylum cases waiting more than six months for
an initial decision. This trend has continued throughout 2013.
The Government told us that "getting to grips" with
the older cases would allow more resources to be used to address
new asylum applications and thus make initial decisions more quickly,
but this is not currently happening. This must not happen at the
expense of consistency in decision making.
Government response
Initial decisions should be taken within 6 months,
in general. In 2012-13, 78% of initial decisions were taken within
6 months, and 2013 as a whole saw a 5% increase in total initial
decisions served compared with 2012. Some cases take longer than
6 months for reasons outside of our control, such as when waiting
for medical reports or elsewhere there are issues relating to
national security.
However, we recognise we need to do more and accept
that we should be taking over 90% of initial decisions within
6 months. To achieve this, the Asylum Casework Directorate (ACD)
has introduced new stretching productivity targets for decision-makers
and recruited over 250 new staff, including 160 decision-makers,
to increase capacity. In 2014-15, ACD plans to ensure all pre-April
2014 cases have an initial decision, and all straightforward claims
received from 1 April 2014 receive an initial decision within
6 months. That would see 90% of cases receiving initial decisions
by the end of March 2015.
Offering protection to those most in need is of course
our primary aim, but an obstacle to this lies in the fact that
the majority of asylum claims are unfounded. In 2013 63% of cases
were refused at initial decision stage. Of those who appealed
this decision, around 75% were dismissed by the Immigration Tribunal.
Much casework resource then goes into dealing with further submissions,
after all appeal rights are exhausted and other barriers to removal;
that wastes time and effort. The Department would welcome the
Committee's clear support in saying that unfounded claims get
in the way of offering protection to those in need, and waste
public money.
Appeals Success Rate
Conclusion/Recommendation 21
In its response to our Report on Asylum, the Government
said that UK Visas and Immigration approach to asylum should include
taking steps to improve consistency of decision making. We have
yet to see much evidence of this. There are ongoing questions
about the quality of decision making across UK Visas and Immigration,
as shown by the number of successful appeals.
Government response
The percentage of asylum decisions being overturned
at appeal has decreased year-on-year since 2010, from almost 29%
to around 24% in 2013. This suggests that the quality of decision
making is improving. But we are not complacent. Our Next Generation
Quality Framework is now up and running and audits 5% of all asylum
decisions nationally. Local senior caseworkers also review decisions
under the same framework. Both of these factors ensure decision-makers
are now reviewed roughly every month for decision quality.
Conclusion/Recommendation 22
The Committee expresses serious concerns about
the removal of appeal rights whilst the quality of decision making
continues to be so poor. We hope that the passage of the Immigration
Bill through the House of Lords will allow for further scrutiny
of the decision to remove these rights.
Government response
The Immigration Act received Royal Assent on 14 May.
Its provisions were scrutinised by Parliament in the usual way.
MP's Correspondence
Conclusion/Recommendation 23
We welcome the development of the valuable document
bank and the centralised system for tracing documentation. We
hope the document bank is appropriately resourced and able to
respond to inquiries in a prompt and efficient way. We are however
concerned that progress to improve the percentage of responses
to MPs' correspondence remain slow. We expect there to be significant
improvement in response rates to avoid creating extra work. We
will revisit this subject.
Government response
The latest data now published on the gov.uk website,
shows improved performance. This performance improvement has been
the result of the work that we have done to restructure the teams
that deal with MPs' enquiries, moving to a model of regionally
based teams who work closely with their local MPs and building
on our successful MP Account Manager approach. As part of this
we will shortly be moving all work from the MPs' Enquiry Line
to these, local teams, and anticipate that this will ensure better
and more consistent performance in the future.
Immigration Detention
Conclusion/Recommendation 24
We are concerned that the number of Rule 35 reports
has consistently increased over the past four quarters and note
that these reports often involve extremely vulnerable individuals.
The Committee seeks clarification from the Home Office on this
increase and the actions taken in response to it. We will explore
the subject in further detail in future evidence.
Government response
The purpose of Rule 35 of the Detention Centre Rules
2001 is to ensure that any detainee considered to be potentially
vulnerable is brought to the attention of Home Office staff responsible
for authorising, maintaining or reviewing their detention. The
information contained in such reports needs to be considered in
deciding whether the individual's continued detention is appropriate
in each case.
The Home Office is unable to attribute the recent
increase in the number of Rule 35 reports issued to any particular
cause. However, towards the end of 2012 the Home Office published
a revised Detention Services Order (DSO) to provide improved guidance
to staff working in Immigration Removal Centres (IRCs) about the
operation of the Rule 35 process. This was accompanied by training
sessions for doctors working in IRCs to improve their awareness
and handling of Rule 35 reports.
It is possible therefore that the increase in the
number of Rule 35 reports is reflective of these measures.
Detainees' access to health care staff is facilitated
in all immigration removal centres, all of which provide primary
healthcare services equivalent to those available in the community.
The only, short term restrictions on detainees' access to IRC
medical staff would be during particularly busy periods in healthcare.
Conclusion/Recommendation 25
The Committee welcomes the fact that many fewer
children are now detained than at the beginning of 2012, but is
concerned that the numbers have increased in the last two quarters.
The Committee notes that pre-departure accommodation in Cedars
is different from immigration detention in Yarl's Wood and calls
for the government to clearly distinguish between (a) pre-departure
accommodation, (b) short-term facilities at ports, and (c) other
immigration detention.
Government response
There will always inevitably be some degree of fluctuation
in the number of children entering detention from quarter to quarter.
The increase in the number of children entering detention in Q3
2013, as compared with Q2 2013, cannot be attributed to any single
cause. However, it will in part have been the result of the establishment
of the dedicated Family Removals Team in Removals Casework, with
the majority of Family Engagement Managers coming on line from
June 2013 onwards.
Section 6 of the Immigration Act will provide a separate
legal basis for the Cedars pre-departure accommodation, which
is used only for holding families with children as part of the
family returns process. The provision in the Act will also give
effect to the existing maximum time limits for holding families
there.
In addition, pre-departure accommodation will be
the subject of new statutory rules governing its operation and
management, which will be separate to new statutory rules covering
short-term holding facilities more generally. In line with the
commitment given by Lord Taylor during Committee Stage of the
Immigration Bill, both sets of rules will be laid by summer recess.
Foreign National Offenders and
Ex-Foreign National Offenders (FNOs)
Conclusion/Recommendation 26
We welcome the fact that the Home Office has managed
to reduce the average length of time taken to deport an ex-FNO
from 118 days in Q3 2012 to 99 days in Q3 2013. However, we are
concerned that failed removals have risen over the past two quarters.
The Home Office must clarify exactly how much these failed removals
cost the taxpayer and what steps they are taking to limit their
frequency.
Government response
The reporting mechanism for failed removals changed
in early 2013. We had previously used manual records to capture
removals which had been cancelled within the month of the planned
removal itself, which did not record all cancelled removals. Our
new reporting process captures all failed removals, including
those which have removal directions cancelled in any period ahead
of the removal date. The Committee were notified of this change
in quarter one of 2013.
We now also provide a breakdown of the number of
individuals whose removal has failed, as well as the total number
of failed removal attempts (some FNOs have more than one failed
removal attempt).
We do not hold records on the cost of failed removals.
The cost of each failure would vary significantly, dependant on
a number of factors, such as whether contractors were involved
and whether the removal was a scheduled or charter flight. We
continue to monitor our failed removals closely and work with
our removal contractors to maximise the effectiveness of the delivery
chain and reduce logistical issues that affect a small number
of removals. There will always be failed removals because of last
minute attempts to frustrate removal action, such as late applications,
asylum claims and legal challenges, but we seek constantly to
reduce those which are within our control.
We have ongoing cross Government work to overcome
issues affecting FNO removals. We are focusing on improving performance,
removing barriers to documentation and addressing legal issues
through the Immigration Act.
The Immigration Act will have a significant impact
on the ability of FNOs to delay removal by mounting legal challenges
whilst in the UK. The current appeals system means that 17 different
types of decision can be appealed. The Immigration Act will simplify
the appeals system and mean that appeals can only be brought where
the Home Office has refused a protection (asylum or humanitarian
protection) claim, a human rights claim or a claim based on EU
free movement rights. We will also have the power to certify that
where deportation will not cause serious irreversible harm, the
appeal will be heard after the FNO has left the country.
Border Agency Backlogs
Conclusion/Recommendation 27
The Committee welcomes the reduction of 49,003
in the number of cases in the backlogs. We note that the largest
backlog, the Migration Refusal Pool has barely shifted throughout
2013, yet this is the backlog which the Home Office specifically
contracted Capita to address. We remain unconvinced that the Home
Office is getting to grips with this issue. The backlog is still
at an astonishing 364, 235, about the same size as the city of
Cardiff, and will take over 5 years to clear at the current rate
of action. This assumes there are no new backlogs discovered.
The Committee reiterates its previous recommendation made on numerous
occasions that the backlogs must be cleared as a matter of priority.
Government response
The Temporary and Permanent Migration pool represents
our current 'work in progress' (WIP). It is not accurate to describe
it as a 'backlog' because a significant proportion of the cases
included within it are still in service standard or are blocked
from decision for reasons beyond our control (e.g. where we are
awaiting the result of checks; where we are awaiting further evidence;
or where we are awaiting the result of a legal judgement). We
have provided full details of work in progress in our regular
data release, which was published on 30 May.
Regarding the MRP, people flow into this as their
applications receive a negative decision. On average, approximately
3,000 cases enter the MRP each week. Capita was contracted to
contact manage and cleanse records in this pool, and closes cases
where checks show the individual has departed or where enforcement
action is not required (for example, if they are granted leave,
lodge an appeal, submit a new application). This proactive management
of the pool has stabilised its overall number, which would have
been substantially higher without the implementation of the Capita
contract.
James Brokenshire MP
Minister for Immigration and Security
July 2014
1 http://niesr.ac.uk/sites/default/files/publications/NIESR%20EU2%20MIGRATION%20REPORT.pdf
Back
| 
