Conclusions and recommendations
1. Section
94 of the Telecommunications Act 1984 gives extensive powers to
the Secretary of State to take actions 'in the interests of national
security or relations with the government of a country or territory
outside the United Kingdom'. There is no public disclosure of
how this is used, and none of our witnesses has been aware of
anyone who considers it their role to scrutinise it or have any
oversight powers. We believe this should be reviewed, and one
of the Commissioners specifically tasked with oversight of this
power, and for them to be given the information and access needed
to fulfil this role. We also recommend that the government publish
on an annual basis the number of times this power is used. We
further suggest that the Intelligence and Security Committee conduct
an inquiry into the use of this power. (Paragraph 15)
2. We urge forces
to communicate openly and efficiently with the Commissioner regarding
the information they give him about their work. IOCCO should be
given further resources to carry out its job in an effective and
timely manner, most notably their inquiry into the use of RIPA
powers regarding journalistic sources. (Paragraph 22)
3. We note Sir Paul's
recommendation to the Home Office concerning the need for improvements
to the statistical requirements in the RIPA Code of Practice.
It is vital that the statistical requirements are enhanced, so
that the public can be better informed about the use which public
authorities make of communications data. (Paragraph 26)
4. The Home Office
should hold a full public consultation on an amended RIPA Code
of Practice, and any updated advice should contain special provisions
for dealing with privileged information, such as journalistic
material and material subject to legal privilege. (Paragraph
28)
5. RIPA is not fit
for purpose, with law enforcement agencies failing to routinely
record the professions of individuals who have had their communications
data accessed under the RIPA. The recording of information under
RIPA is totally insufficient, and the whole process appears secretive
and disorganised with information being destroyed afterwards.
Whereas we acknowledge the operational need for secrecy both during
investigations and afterwards (so that investigative techniques
more broadly are not disclosed), we are concerned that the level
of secrecy surrounding the use of RIPA allows investigating authorities
to engage in acts which would be unacceptable in a democracy,
with inadequate oversight. We recommend that the Home Office use
the current review of the RIPA Code to ensure that law enforcement
agencies use their RIPA powers properly. (Paragraph 33)
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