Counter-terrorism: foreign fighters
Preventing radicalisation
PLACES WHERE INDIVIDUALS ARE RADICALISED
1. Our report on Counter-terrorism, published
in May 2014, highlighted the alarming number of UK citizens and
residents travelling to fight in foreign conflicts, notably in
Syria.[1] The Government
responded to our report in February 2015, stating that it is delivering
targeted projects that address risks arising from the conflict
in Syria and Iraq. More than seventy projects have been approved
for 2014/15 so far, including training for frontline staff who
may come into contact with potential travellers and work to equip
parents with the skills and knowledge to identify risks and vulnerabilities
and the confidence to seek support should they need it. It is
also funding projects for young people, including mentoring and
an interactive workshop that highlight the risks of travel to
Syria.[2]
2. Three British teenagers, two aged 17 and one 19,
were stopped from travelling to Syria from Turkey and were flown
back to the UK and arrested on 14 March. A Turkish official states
that the case was "a good and a clear example of how the
security cooperation between Western intelligence agencies and
Turkey should work."[3]
We agree with this assessment and commend all those involved.
It is vital that there should be more analysis of what motivates
even the very miniscule number wishing to join a murderous and
sadistic band, such as IS.
3. Preventative work with communities must be
a top priority for the Home Office's de-radicalisation work. It
is urgent that new partnerships are developed with mosques and
other community groups and that they play a key role in Prevent
counter-terrorism programmes. We need to reassure them that they
will not be 'toxified' by helping the authorities to identify
those who they suspect of radicalisation and by engaging with
these individuals.
4. The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act imposes
a general duty on a range of authoritiesincluding local
government, prisons, schools and universities, NHS providers and
the policeto have due regard to the need to prevent people
being drawn into terrorism.[4]
The Government conducted a consultation between December
2014 and January 2015 seeking views on the draft guidance from
the authorities concerned.[5]
5. Dr Usama Hasan, Senior Researcher at the Quilliam
Foundation, and Dr Erin Saltman, Senior Researcher at the Institute
for Strategic Dialogue, identified universities and prisons as
two of the most significant places where radicalisation occurs.
The internet, they argued, was a secondary influence. Dr Saltman
argued that it was vital that frontline workers, such as chaplains,
imams, teachers and prison officials, gained anti-radicalisation
expertise.[6]
6. The National Offender Management Service receives
funding from the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism to
enable it to carry out its counter-extremism programme.[7]
With the support of NOMS, Muslim prison chaplains are developing
the 'Ibaana' Programme, designed to target the small number of
prisoners with the most entrenched extremist views. One-to-one
sessions over several hours with a trained chaplain will be used
to challenge the theological arguments used by these prisoners.
The Prime Minister's Task Force on Tackling Radicalisation and
Extremism stated that the Programme would be rolled out in full
by April 2014, and would complement the existing education programme
to develop prisoners' understanding of Islam, already completed
by 1,600 individuals.[8]
However, in February 2015, Andrew Selous MP, the Parliamentary
Under-Secretary of State for Justice said that the Programme would
be rolled out, "where appropriate, in due course".[9]
7. We are concerned at the evidence that some
people who do not previously hold or express any extremist views
become radicalised in prison. It indicates that the programmes
we have are not working effectively enough. Work to prevent radicalisation
in prisons should be a high priority in the Government's counter-radicalisation
agenda. The Prime Minister's Task Force on Tackling Radicalisation
and Extremism stated that the 'Ibaana' prison counter-radicalisation
programme would be rolled out in full across British prisons by
April 2014. The implementation of this programme across the country
must be clearly outlined to specific deadlines. This programme
is of vital importance given this growing threat, and so giving
ambiguous timetables indicating piecemeal application are simply
unacceptable. It is vital that individuals working with prisoners,
particularly those offering counselling, should undergo specific
training to equip them to combat extremist ideologies.
8. The Channel programme provides tailored support
to people identified as being at risk of radicalisation. The Association
of Chief Police Officers has reported a 58% increase in referrals
to Channel in the past year and there have been over 2,000 referrals
since April 2012. In the 2013/14 financial year, local authority
co-ordinators in 30 priority areas worked with over 250 mosques,
50 faith groups and 70 community groups as part of the Prevent
counter-radicalisation programme.[10]
9. It is particularly important that prisoners
who have demonstrated extremist views in prison should receive
support, monitoring and appropriate intervention on their release,
including through the Channel programme. The Channel programme
should be strengthened to provide long-term, effective monitoring
of participants, to ensure proper evaluation of these prevention
programmes. All the evaluations should be sent to our successor
Committee by 31 July 2015.
SOCIAL MEDIA AND RADICALISATION
10. The public can report online content they suspect
may be of a violent, extremist or terrorist nature direct to a
specialist police unit, the Counter Terrorism Internet Referral
Unit (CTIRU). Examples of illegal terrorist or extremist content
include videos of violence with messages of 'glorification' or
praise for terrorists, or postings inciting people to commit acts
of terrorism or violence, which are placed on internet sites,
chat rooms or other web-based forums.[11]
Specialist officers assess the information and, where appropriate,
investigate the website or work with partners to remove it.[12]
The CTIRU has taken down 72,000 individual items since it
was established in 2010.[13]
11. Jamie Bartlett, the Director of the Centre for
the Analysis of Social Media at the think-tank, Demos, argued
that it is already relatively difficult to try to censor all the
types of material that terrorists will post online, especially
as much of what they post online is not directly illegal. He argued
that, as the internet continued to evolve, it was going to be
increasingly difficult to remove content because it was becoming
easier to evade surveillance.[14]
He also suggested that, because large-scale, network-level
analysis of data would in future be easier to evade, partly as
a result of the Snowden revelations, targeted human intelligence
work was likely to be more effective.[15]
12. Dr Saltman did not oppose the removal of extremist
material from the internet, but advocated the promotion of community-led,
counter-extremist online narratives to challenge it. Quilliam
and the Institute for Strategic Dialogue are working to pilot
educational programmes that has already gone live in Canada.[16]
13. On 17 February 2015, Amira Abase, Shamima Begum
and Kadiza Sultana, three teenage girls from East London, flew
to Istanbul with the apparent intention of crossing the border
into Syria to join ISIS. On 24 February, the Metropolitan Police
announced that they had reason to believe that the girls were
no longer in Turkey and had crossed into Syria.[17]
This followed an incident in December, when another girl from
their school appears to have travelled to Syria, after which the
three were interviewed by police. Thought the girls have not been
traced, and information about why they decided to go to Syria
is largely speculative, it seems likely that contact with jihadis
over social media could have played a part.
14. Where social media companies are given evidence
that users of their services are seeking to promote violent extremism,
they should be prepared to take action to suspend their accounts,
as they do where there is abuse or harassment of other users.
15. Sara Khan, the director of Inspire, a non-governmental
advocacy organisation working to counter extremism and gender
inequality, argues that Isis is succeeding where other jihadist
groups had failed, with a "very aggressive" social media
campaign deliberately targeting young girls to help found their
so-called Islamic State:
they are saying to young girls that what is real
empowerment, what is real women's liberation is being part of
Isis - being a mother, a wife, there is no other role in public
life
I think a lot of young girls can't see the deceptive
and sinister meaning that women have no rights, they have no authority,
agency, freedom or opportunity.[18]
FIVE POINT PLAN
16. The evidence given to the Committee demonstrates
that improvements urgently need to be made in responding to the
radicalisation of young people. We suggest, as a starting point,
a five point plan to strengthen the measures already in place.
(1) Improve communication
17. Communication between the police, schools
and parents is in need of vast improvement. The police must engage
in a regular and open dialogue with schools and community groups
to ensure that information is exchanged and new initiatives can
be explored at community level. Schools and the police must inform
parents immediately, and work together when there is even the
smallest hint of radicalisation, or a close association with someone
who is thought to have been radicalised.
(2) Increase police diversity
18. Dal Babu, former Chief Superintendent at the
Metropolitan Police, raised concerns about diversity of officers
involved in the Prevent programme, arguing that "If you are
going to fight terrorism effectively then your key operatives
need to reflect the people that you are dealing with and that
is not happening here."[19]
Assistant Commissioner Mark Rowley said in evidence to the Committee
that he wants the counter-terrorism command to be "reflective
of London", namely "40 percent from different minority
groups" and that they have changed their recruitment criteria
to be more reflective of London."[20]
It is essential that the officers working on the Prevent programme,
as in other areas of the police, are truly reflective and representative
of British society.
(3) Provide advice
19. There needs to be an advice service open to
all, particularly targeted at parents who wish to seek advice
or express concerns about a particular individual. This must be
well publicised, and be a less extreme step than using the Anti-Terrorist
Hotline. There is a fear of stigmatisation among communities and
such a helpline could go some way in changing these attitudes.
This method should be included in the Prevent strategy.
(4) Provide a counter-narrative
20. The universality of the internet has enabled
people to be radicalised in their bedrooms unnoticed by others.
Policing social media sites such as Twitter, a means by which
many IS propaganda has been spread for example, is impossible.
Young people need to be equipped with the skills to become critical
consumers of online content, in order to build a more natural
resistance against radicalisation through online extremist content
and propaganda. This is not just about counter-radicalisation:
an informed, critical and questioning approach to online sources
is a valuable asset in all aspects of a young person's social
and intellectual development.
(5) Improve international co-operation
21. According to the Turkish Ambassador, the British
embassy in Ankara sent details about the girls to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs six days after the girls left the country. This
is an unacceptably slow response which significantly reduced any
chances of intercepting the girls on their journey while there
was still time. International efforts to work in unison to
tackle the growing number of young people travelling to these
conflict zones to join extremist groups must be strengthened urgently.
SUPPORT FOR FAMILIES
22. The Committee took evidence from Sally and Micheal
Evans, the mother and brother of Thomas Evans, who converted to
Islam and travelled to Somalia to fight with Al Shabaab. In February
2011, he was stopped at the airport by the police while attempting
to go to Kenya. The police did not contact his family to inform
them that he had been stopped. Mrs Evans said that the family
had received no support, and she felt that had "fallen between
the cracks", because there were no initiatives to support
families in their situation who were not Muslim.[21]
23. The Metropolitan Police run the anti-terrorism
hotline, which urges people to telephone with information about
unusual or suspicious activity. All information passed to the
police is treated in confidence and is analysed and researched
by experienced officers to determine what, if any, police action
should be taken.[22]
On 10 February 2015, Metropolitan Police commissioner Sir
Bernard Hogan-Howe described the number as "unmemorable."[23]
In April 2014, the French Government set up an anti-terror hotline
for individuals who want to report an alarming situation that
they think is threatening a family member or loved one, offering
information on what to do.[24]
The French Government's Stop-Djihadisme website promotes
the hotline's status as a free number (Numéro Vert),
and highlights the importance of immediately contacting the police
or gendarmerie if there are fears that a minor might leave the
country.[25]
24. We commend all the families which have spoken
to the Committee during the course of this inquiry, namely Sally
and Micheal Evans, Hussen Abase, Fahmida Aziz, and Sahima Begum,
for their courage in speaking up. Not enough support is given
to families by the Home Office. Greater counselling and support
services should be offered to them.
Preventing individuals from travelling
abroad
25. In our 2014 Report, we expressed concern about
the relative ease by which foreign fighters appear to be able
to travel to Syria. It is the responsibility of the international
community to assist transit countries, such as Turkey, and the
UK must offer practical support to those countries in securing
their borders. We recommended that the Government maintain representation
from the UK Counter Terrorism Command to help the Turkish authorities
identify those who are at risk of crossing the border and share
any relevant intelligence with the Turkish authorities. We also
concluded that the Government should work with transit countries
such as Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan to better establish who is
likely to be travelling for genuine humanitarian reasons.[26]
26. The Government stated that the UK is undertaking
a range of activity to support Syria's neighbours to secure their
borders and stop the flow of foreign fighters. The Police and
Security and Intelligence Agencies are co-operating with counterparts
to detect and disrupt individuals suspected of terrorist offences
and they are sharing best practice with a number of countries
on strengthening border security, through protective security
measures and analysis of passenger data.[27]
The Government has regular meetings with international counterparts
on how best to persuade individuals against travel and stop foreign
fighters before they reach Syria. It is working closely with the
Turkish authorities and using their counter-terrorism and extremism
liaison officer network to build capability with key partners
across the region.
27. The Government also states that it has a range
of measures that can disrupt an individual's plans to travelling
abroad. These include exercising the Royal Prerogative to withdraw
or refuse passports. The Home Secretary made a statement in April
2013 setting out the criteria which would govern the "necessary
and proportionate" use of this power in the public interest.[28]
Between April 2013 and October 2014, the total number of passports
removed or refused under the Royal Prerogative was 2,310, though
some of these cases may relate to passports having been fraudulently
obtained, rather than concerns about terrorism.[29]
A Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures notice
can also contain measures restricting foreign travel. Where an
individual going through the criminal justice system, restrictive
licence or bail conditions can be used to prevent the person leaving
the UK. New provisions in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act
2015 will provide the police with a power to seize travel documents
(including tickets and non-UK passports) at the border temporarily,
during which time they will be able to investigate the individual
concerned.[30]
28. It is alarming that people subject to TPIMs
or control orders have been able to abscond. We find it surprising
that the police and security services are not better able to monitor
people who they claim are such a substantial threat. We recommend
that the police and security services review the methods and resources
that they use to monitor these individuals.
29. Not enough emphasis is placed on preventing
people from travelling abroad to join jihadist groups. At the
check-in desk at airports and during exit checks, greater care
should be taken with people travelling to destinations of concern
(DOCs), such as Syria, Somalia, Iraq and Nigeria, as well as neighbouring
countries which might be used as transit points to these destinations.
The Home Office should work with airlines which serve these destinations
to develop stricter controls for passengers travelling there.
Airlines have a duty to work co-operatively with security services.
We welcome the proposals put through on 12 February 2015, they
will make sure that airlines take greater responsibility.
30. Where it becomes clear that individuals might
already have left for Syria, the police need to work faster to
alert overseas partners and airlines about them. Being reactive
is inadequate: once people reach Syria and Iraq, or even Turkey,
it is too late. No-fly lists should be strictly adhered to and
shared internationally.
Combating returning foreign fighters
31. Our 2014 Report concluded that the Government
needs a clear strategy for dealing with foreign fighters on their
return, which may include help to come to terms with the violence
they have witnessed and participated in, as well as counter-radicalisation
interventions. We are concerned that their experiences may well
make them vulnerable to post-traumatic stress, thereby increasing
their vulnerability to further radicalisation. We recommend that
the Government implement a programme, similar to Channel, for
everyone returning to Britain where there is evidence that they
have fought in Syria. The engagement in this strategy should be
linked to any legal penalties imposed on their return. In developing
the strategy the Government must work with mental health practitioners
and academia to ensure that the programme best integrates those
returning from conflict zones such as Syria.[31]
32. The Government states that they can manage the
risk that individuals pose on their return to the UK through a
broad range of disruptions including imposing restrictive TPIMs,
asset freezing, and prosecuting for Terrorism Act or other offences
where appropriate. Dual nationals can also be deprived of their
British citizenship on public interest grounds and non-nationals
may be excluded from the UK. The existing Prevent Case Management
process, including the multi-agency Channel programme, enables
police to work with local partners to manage individuals who are
vulnerable to radicalisation.[32]
33. In Aarhus, Denmark's second-largest city, an
exit programme has created for returning foreign fighters. A vital
component of the Aarhus process is its use of individual mentors,
who engage with would-be or returning fighters over practical
day-to-day issues alongside serious moral and religious debate.
Aarhus model Superintendent Allan Aarslev, who is in charge of
police end of the programme states:
"What's easy is to pass tough new laws.
Harder is to go through a real process with individuals: a panel
of experts, counselling, healthcare, assistance getting back into
education, with employment, maybe accommodation. With returning
to everyday life and society. We don't do this out of political
conviction; we do it because we think it works."[33]
34. We are disappointed that the Home Office has
not implemented a programme for individuals returning to Britain
where there is evidence that they have fought in Syria. It is
vital that the Government works with mental health practitioners
and also assesses the Aarhus process to ensure that the UK's programme
best integrates those returning from conflict zones such as Syria.
35. There are of course people who travel to Syria
and have not been involved in terrorist activity. It is clear
that such people should not face the prospect of criminal sanctions,
and we welcome the fact that Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe accepts this
principle.
1 Home Affairs Committee, Seventeenth Report of Session
2013-14, Counter-terrorism, HC 231 Back
2
HM Government, The Government response to the Seventeenth Report from the Home Affairs Select Committee Session 2013-14,
February 2015, Cm 9011, p. 2 Back
3
BBC, Turkey sends teenagers back to UK after Syria attempt, 15
March 2015 Back
4
Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, s 26 & Schedule
6 Back
5
HM Government, Prevent duty guidance: a consultation Back
6
Q126, Dr Erin Saltman Back
7
Andrew Selous, HC Deb, 3 February 2015, cW Back
8
HM Government, Tackling extremism in the UK: Report from the Prime Minister's Task Force on Tackling Radicalisation and Extremism,
December 2013, p. 6 Back
9
Andrew Selous, HC Deb, 3 February 2015, cW Back
10
Lord Bates, Hansard, 16 December 2014, c35W Back
11
https://www.gov.uk/terrorism-national-emergency/reporting-suspected-terrorism
Back
12
ACPO, The Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit Back
13
James Brokenshire, Hansard, 21 January 2015, col. 332 Back
14
Q160, Jamie Bartlett Back
15
Q162, Jamie Bartlett Back
16
Q143, Dr Erin Saltman Back
17
BBC News, Missing teenagers have crossed into Syria, Met Police say,
24 February 2015 Back
18
Independent, Missing Syria girls: Parents must 'keep passports under lock and key' to stop children joining Isis,
23 February 2015 Back
19
Evening Standard, Police ignorance of Islam 'hindering fight against radicalisation', former top cop says,
9 March 2015 Back
20
Q325, Mark Rowley Back
21
Q53, Q54, Q88, Sally Evans Back
22
Metropolitan Police, Anti-terrorism hotline Back
23
Independent, UK's top police officer Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe forgets anti-terrorism hotline number live on air,
10 February 2015 Back
24
Interieur.gouv.fr, Lancement d'une plateforme d'assistance aux familles et de prévention de la radicalisation violente
[Launching a platform of assistance to families and the prevention
of violent radicalisation], 25 April 2014 Back
25
www.stop-djihadisme.gouv.fr, Besoin d'aide? ["Need help?"] Back
26
Home Affairs Committee, Seventeenth Report of Session 2013-14,
Counter-terrorism, HC 231 Back
27
HM Government, The Government response to the Seventeenth Report from the Home Affairs Select Committee Session 2013-14,
February 2015, Cm 9011, p. 4 Back
28
HC Deb, 25 Apr 2013, col. 68WS Back
29
Passports removed or refused using the Royal Prerogative from April 2013 to October 2014,
Home Office Freedom of Information release published 5 January
2015 Back
30
HM Government, The Government response to the Seventeenth Report from the Home Affairs Select Committee Session 2013-14,
February 2015, Cm 9011, p. 5 Back
31
Home Affairs Committee, Seventeenth Report of Session 2013-14,
Counter-terrorism, HC 231 Back
32
HM Government, The Government response to the Seventeenth Report from the Home Affairs Select Committee Session 2013-14,
February 2015, Cm 9011, p. 5 Back
33
The Guardian, How do you deradicalise returning Isis fighters?,
12 November 2014 Back
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