Conclusions and recommendations
Preventing radicalisation
1. Preventative work
with communities must be a top priority for the Home Office's
de-radicalisation work. It is urgent that new partnerships are
developed with mosques and other community groups and that they
play a key role in Prevent counter-terrorism programmes. We need
to reassure them that they will not be 'toxified' by helping the
authorities to identify those who they suspect of radicalisation
and by engaging with these individuals. (Paragraph 3)
2. We are concerned
at the evidence that some people who do not previously hold or
express any extremist views become radicalised in prison. It indicates
that the programmes we have are not working effectively enough.
Work to prevent radicalisation in prisons should be a high priority
in the Government's counter-radicalisation agenda. The Prime Minister's
Task Force on Tackling Radicalisation and Extremism stated that
the 'Ibaana' prison counter-radicalisation programme would be
rolled out in full across British prisons by April 2014. The implementation
of this programme across the country must be clearly outlined
to specific deadlines. This programme is of vital importance given
this growing threat, and so giving ambiguous timetables indicating
piecemeal application are simply unacceptable. It is vital that
individuals working with prisoners, particularly those offering
counselling, should undergo specific training to equip them to
combat extremist ideologies. (Paragraph 7)
3. It is particularly
important that prisoners who have demonstrated extremist views
in prison should receive support, monitoring and appropriate intervention
on their release, including through the Channel programme. The
Channel programme should be strengthened to provide long-term,
effective monitoring of participants, to ensure proper evaluation
of these prevention programmes. All the evaluations should be
sent to our successor Committee by 31 July 2015. (Paragraph 9)
4. Where social media
companies are given evidence that users of their services are
seeking to promote violent extremism, they should be prepared
to take action to suspend their accounts, as they do where there
is abuse or harassment of other users. (Paragraph 14)
5. Communication between
the police, schools and parents is in need of vast improvement.
The police must engage in a regular and open dialogue with schools
and community groups to ensure that information is exchanged and
new initiatives can be explored at community level. Schools and
the police must inform parents immediately, and work together
when there is even the smallest hint of radicalisation, or a close
association with someone who is thought to have been radicalised.
(Paragraph 17)
6. It is essential
that the officers working on the Prevent programme, as in other
areas of the police, are truly reflective and representative of
British society. (Paragraph 18)
7. There needs to
be an advice service open to all, particularly targeted at parents
who wish to seek advice or express concerns about a particular
individual. This must be well publicised, and be a less extreme
step than using the Anti-Terrorist Hotline. There is a fear of
stigmatisation among communities and such a helpline could go
some way in changing these attitudes. This method should be included
in the Prevent strategy. (Paragraph 19)
8. The universality
of the internet has enabled people to be radicalised in their
bedrooms unnoticed by others. Policing social media sites such
as Twitter, a means by which many IS propaganda has been spread
for example, is impossible. Young people need to be equipped with
the skills to become critical consumers of online content, in
order to build a more natural resistance against radicalisation
through online extremist content and propaganda. This is not just
about counter-radicalisation: an informed, critical and questioning
approach to online sources is a valuable asset in all aspects
of a young person's social and intellectual development. (Paragraph
20)
9. International efforts
to work in unison to tackle the growing number of young people
travelling to these conflict zones to join extremist groups must
be strengthened urgently. (Paragraph 21)
10. We commend all
the families which have spoken to the Committee during the course
of this inquiry, namely Sally and Micheal Evans, Hussen Abase,
Fahmida Aziz, and Sahima Begum, for their courage in speaking
up. Not enough support is given to families by the Home Office.
Greater counselling and support services should be offered to
them. (Paragraph 24)
Preventing individuals from travelling abroad
11. It is alarming
that people subject to TPIMs or control orders have been able
to abscond. We find it surprising that the police and security
services are not better able to monitor people who they claim
are such a substantial threat. We recommend that the police and
security services review the methods and resources that they use
to monitor these individuals. (Paragraph 28)
12. Not enough emphasis
is placed on preventing people from travelling abroad to join
jihadist groups. At the check-in desk at airports and during exit
checks, greater care should be taken with people travelling to
destinations of concern (DOCs), such as Syria, Somalia, Iraq and
Nigeria, as well as neighbouring countries which might be used
as transit points to these destinations. The Home Office should
work with airlines which serve these destinations to develop stricter
controls for passengers travelling there. Airlines have a duty
to work co-operatively with security services. We welcome the
proposals put through on 12 February 2015, they will make sure
that airlines take greater responsibility. (Paragraph 29)
13. Where it becomes
clear that individuals might already have left for Syria, the
police need to work faster to alert overseas partners and airlines
about them. Being reactive is inadequate: once people reach Syria
and Iraq, or even Turkey, it is too late. No-fly lists should
be strictly adhered to and shared internationally. (Paragraph
30)
Combating returning foreign fighters
14. We are disappointed
that the Home Office has not implemented a programme for individuals
returning to Britain where there is evidence that they have fought
in Syria. It is vital that the Government works with mental health
practitioners and also assesses the Aarhus process to ensure that
the UK's programme best integrates those returning from conflict
zones such as Syria. (Paragraph 34)
15. There are of course
people who travel to Syria and have not been involved in terrorist
activity. It is clear that such people should not face the prospect
of criminal sanctions, and we welcome the fact that Sir Bernard
Hogan-Howe accepts this principle. (Paragraph 35)
16.
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