3 Information and accountability
Expenditure and performance indicators
DFID
27. We heard conflicting evidence on whether DFID
should dedicate a specific proportion of health expenditure to
HSS. While this could provide clarity of focus, there was also
a danger it could act to isolate HSS, whereas ideally it should
be integrated with other programmes such as infectious disease
control and reproductive health.[71]
28. DFID acknowledged that it can estimate only roughly
how much it spends on HSS.[72]
This means that HSS expenditure cannot be assessed for impact
and value for money in the same way as that targeted on specific
diseases.[73] Action
for Global Health told us that DFID could be held more accountable
for its health work if it published more detailed data on HSS
expenditure, disaggregated by the area of the health system targeted.[74]
29. A lack of DFID performance indicators for HSS
was also identified as a problem. Their absence is partly because
system strengthening, particularly in areas such as corporate
governance, is difficult to measure.[75]
Yet, HSS indicators are potentially important as both a management
tool, in helping to ensure that resources are allocated and used
effectively, and a means of measurement, enabling DFID to be held
accountable for its HSS work.[76]
System measures could also be useful for assessing the efficacy
of interventions in the short run as impacts on health outcomes
may not register within the timeframe of projects.[77]
For example, vaccination rates are more readily recorded than
disease prevalence.
30. DFID uses system measures for monitoring some
individual projects, but the Minister acknowledged that it was
unsatisfactory that DFID does not have HSS indicators to assess
its broader performance.[78]
However, she expressed concern that targeting system measures
could divert focus from health outcomes.[79]
Professor Kara Hanson added that indicators can cease to be good
measures once they become targets.[80]
Results UK told us that DFID should publish proxies for system
functionality, such as immunisation coverage and the proportion
of children who are undernourished.[81]
Others thought a narrowing of focus could be overcome by using
broad indicators relating to universal health coverage,[82]
stating that measures of service coverage were effective measures
of system performance,[83]
and that effective HSS indicators already exist.[84]
Jane Edmondson, Head of Human Development, DFID, told us that
the Department was working with the WHO and World Bank to develop
internationally-recognised system measures that could be used
to monitor performance against post-2015 development goals.[85]
31. It is impossible to know how well DFID is
delivering its health systems strengthening strategy without knowing
how much it spends or having indicators of its performance. Nor
can DFID allocate its resources efficiently in the dark. These
deficiencies are best addressed through the publication of data
to internationally-agreed standards. This would ensure comparability
and enable DFID to exert influence on its partners to improve
their system strengthening work. We recommend that DFID prioritise
international agreement on measures of system strengthening expenditure
and efficacy as part of discussions about the post-2015 development
goals. We further recommend that, once agreed, these measures
form part of DFID's regular reporting.
INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS
32. The difficulties in assessing expenditure and
performance in HSS are exacerbated by DFID channelling an increased
proportion of its health expenditure through multilaterals.[86]
Witnesses told us that these multilaterals are "less accountable
for expenditure and results than providers of technical assistance
contracted through a competitive process"[87]
and that multilateralism takes DFID "one step away from accountability"
for ensuring HSS is afforded appropriate attention.[88]
DFID is unable to estimate what proportion of its core funding
of multilaterals is spent on HSS.[89]
This is a particular problem given our concerns, set out in the
last chapter, that some major multilaterals do not share DFID's
commitment to broad system strengthening.
33. The Minister told us that the Global Fund had
been "a phenomenon" in driving down the price of important
health commodities, such as antiretroviral drugs for HIV, and
noted that the Multilateral Aid Review had found it and GAVI to
be good value for money.[90]
However, NICE International, though noting that a multilateral
approach can bring economies of scale, said that there were "significant
opportunities for efficiencies" in the expenditure of the
Global Fund, which showed insufficient regard for the relative
clinical effectiveness and value for money of different treatments.[91]
The Malaria Consortium recommended that DFID conducts further
analysis to understand how its money is being spent by the Global
Fund.[92]
34. Dr Julian Lob-Levyt told us that DFID could do
better in assessing the HSS work of multilaterals by using more
sophisticated indicators of their performance.[93]
The Minister expressed concern that detailed value for money assessment
of the work of multilaterals could be very resource-intensive.[94]
Dr Kalipso Chalkidou, Director of NICE International, suggested
that DFID would not have to do all such analysis itself and that
the most effective means of holding multilaterals such as the
Global Fund accountable for their expenditure would be for much
more information to be published freely online.[95]
Dr Michael Johnson said that the Global Fund would be happy to
publish more data when possible, and the Minister said that DFID
would seek to use its influence on the Global Fund's board to
encourage them to be more transparent.[96]
35. The Global Fund and GAVI have been highly
successful in improving health outcomes in some of the poorest
parts of the world. The multilateral model has advantages in economies
of scale. However, it is unacceptably difficult to assess whether
these organisations have genuinely and sufficiently switched focus
to system strengthening. The multilaterals and their donors have
a responsibility ensure that their assistance has the greatest
possible impact. DFID has a responsibility to UK taxpayers to
ensure that their money can be followed and is spent wisely. We
recommend that DFID insist that the Global Fund and GAVI publish
better measures of system strengthening expenditure and performance.
If DFID is not satisfied that system strengthening is being given
sufficient priority by an organisation, and that organisation
does not change, DFID should be prepared to withhold funds. We
further recommend that DFID press the Global Fund and GAVI for
programme data to be published online. Freely accessible data
will facilitate more accountability and scrutiny, and should also
be of benefit to systems strengthening research.
36. Other donors do not share DFID's responsibilities
to UK taxpayers. Private donors such as the Gates Foundation are
rightly free to set their own priorities. However, health development
is invariably a complex team effort. Transparency about expenditure
and performance is imperative for these arrangements to work well.
We recommend that DFID work harder to encourage its partners
to make more data on their health systems strengthening work freely
available. Accepting our recommendation that it publish more
disaggregated statistics of the expenditure and performance of
its own programmes would set a good example and make this task
easier.
Research
37. DFID has long been a world leader in health systems
research, and we heard praise for its evidence-based decision-making.[97]
However, we were told that "knowledge on how best to strengthen
health systems is limited" and that research in areas such
as universal health coverage, system financing and non-communicable
diseases was struggling to keep up with a growth in interest.[98]
DFID aimed to "develop better ways of demonstrating the association
between systems strengthening and health outcomes" as isolating
such effects was more complex than for targeted interventions.[99]
Nevertheless, health systems research accounts for less than one
per cent of DFID expenditure on health, excluding core contributions
to multilateral agencies, and is equivalent to only three per
cent of the its total research and evidence division budget.[100]
Over the five years to 2012-13, just 15 per cent of DFID's expenditure
on health research was on systems.[101]
Professor Kara Hanson told us that insufficient resources were
being devoted to HSS research.[102]
38. The London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine
described DFID's long-term approach to health systems research
funding as a "key strength", though in oral evidence
Professor Hanson, of the School, expressed concern that in recent
years there has been "increased focus on quick results, and
quickly getting research into policy and practice" which
could limit the ambition of research.[103]
Successful HSS research often took many years to come to fruition;
for example, decades-old DFID-funded research on health contracting
in South Africa had informed recent initiatives in post-conflict
settings including Afghanistan.[104]
We also heard concerns that the lessons of successful programmes
in one country are not always spread effectively to others.[105]
39. Understanding what works is an important part
of effective and efficient intervention in health systems. At
the moment, too little is known. DFID has a large research budget
and allocating more of it to health systems is likely to be good
value for money. We recommend that DFID increase funding for
health system strengthening research.
71 Q9 [Dr David Evans and
Dr Andrew Cassels] Back
72
HSS19 [DFID] Back
73
HSS44 [Dr Julian Lob-Levyt] Back
74
HSS22 [Action for Global Health] Back
75
Q61 [Dr Kalipso Chalkidou] Back
76
HSS22 [Action for Global Health] Back
77
Q39 [Simon Wright] Back
78
Q118 [Jane Edmondson] Back
79
Q117 [Lynne Featherstone MP] Back
80
Q8 [Prof Kara Hanson] Back
81
HSS25 [Results UK] Back
82
Q8 [Prof Kara Hanson and Dr David Evans] Back
83
Q34 [Dr David Evans] Back
84
Q33 [Dr Andrew Cassels] Back
85
Q118 [Jane Edmondson] Back
86
HSS19B [DFID] Back
87
HSS5 [Options Consultancy Ltd] Back
88
Q41 [Simon Wright] Back
89
HSS19B [DFID] Back
90
Q105 and Q120 [Lynne Featherstone MP] Back
91
Q60 and Q67 [Dr Kalipso Chalkidou] and HSS2 [NICE International] Back
92
HSS15 [Malaria Consortium] Back
93
Q38 [Dr Julian Lob-Levyt] Back
94
Q120 [Lynne Featherstone MP] Back
95
Q87 [Dr Kalipso Chalkidou] Back
96
Q94 [Dr Michael Johnson] and Q121 [Lynne Featherstone MP] Back
97
HSS7 [London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine], HSS27 [GRM Futures Group]
and HSS36 [Wellcome Trust] Back
98
Q12 [Prof Kara Hanson] and HSS7 [London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine] Back
99
HSS19 [DFID] and DFID, Health position paper: delivering healthy results,
July 2013, p16 Back
100
HSS19 and HSS19B [DFID] and DFID, Annual Report and Accounts 2013-14,
p188 Back
101
HSS19B [DFID] Back
102
Q12 [Prof Kara Hanson] Back
103
HSS7 [London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine] and Q2
[Prof Kara Hanson] Back
104
HSS7 [London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine] Back
105
HSS6 [Overseas Development Institute] Back
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