



House of Commons
International Development
Committee

UK Support for Humanitarian Relief in the Middle East

First Report of Session 2014–15



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Summary

The Syrian Civil War has given rise to a grave humanitarian crisis. Since the crisis began, the UK has committed £600 million in humanitarian assistance, making it the second-largest bilateral donor to the relief effort. A number of other European countries including France, Spain and Italy have manifestly failed to pull their weight in this respect. The UK should do everything in its power to encourage other countries to increase their contributions to the humanitarian relief effort. We received strong representations that stressed the case for supporting Syrian refugees in the region, allowing them to remain close to their livelihoods with a possibility of returning to Syria. Clearly there are some people with extreme needs whom the UK should accommodate. Only 24 have come so far, and we hope that the UK will continue this process in a constructive and compassionate way.

The UK's annual spending on its response to the crisis has increased steadily and now stands at approximately £300m per year. This increase has been made possible by the fact that the UK's total Official Development Assistance (ODA) budget has itself been increasing, reaching 0.7% of GNI in 2013. Now that the 0.7% target has been reached, spending will not continue to increase at the same rate. If DFID continues to prioritise humanitarian spending in the Middle East, this will have implications for DFID's spending in other parts of the world. DFID tells us that it has a contingency for responding to humanitarian crises, but it has not been willing to tell us how big this contingency is. We urge it to be more transparent.

The UK's response to the Syria crisis covers not only Syria itself, but also neighbouring countries such as Lebanon and Jordan to which many Syrians have fled. In these countries, most Syrian refugees are residing in towns and villages rather than in formal refugee camps, yet there is a tendency for donors to focus disproportionately on the camps; DFID must avoid falling into this trap. We also recommend that DFID use national plans as the basis for its assistance to Lebanon and Jordan, and that it prioritise education for Syrian refugee children.

With reference to Jordan in particular, it is imperative to ensure that stability is maintained: we therefore recommend that the UK launch a medium-term development programme in addition to its humanitarian work. The UK should also encourage the Government of Jordan to allow Syrian refugees to work: whilst we fully understand their present reluctance, we believe that allowing refugees to work, and hence generate tax revenues, would be of great benefit to Jordan.

1 Introduction

1. The UK's development assistance programmes have traditionally prioritised sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia rather than the Middle East.¹ In recent years, the Syrian Civil War and consequent humanitarian crisis have led to a significant increase in DFID activity in the region.² The UK has committed £600 million in humanitarian assistance since the crisis began.³ Scrutinising the UK's work on the Syria crisis was in our view imperative, on account of the scale of the humanitarian needs.

Our inquiry

2. We launched our inquiry in December 2013. We set out to examine both the UK's humanitarian response to the Syria crisis, and DFID's bilateral programme in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs.) This report deals with the Syria crisis; we will publish a separate report on DFID's work in the OPTs.

3. In Chapter 2 we examine the humanitarian situation inside Syria and the UK's response; in Chapter 3 we do the same for neighbouring countries such as Lebanon and Jordan. Chapter 4 then compares the UK's response with that of other international donors.

4. We received 61 pieces of written evidence from a wide range of individuals and organisations including academics, UN organisations and NGOs. We also held three oral evidence sessions. Those giving evidence on the Syria crisis included Rt Hon Alan Duncan MP, the Minister of State for International Development; and representatives of the World Food Programme (WFP), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the UN Development Programme (UNDP). A full list of witnesses is included at the back of this report. We also visited the region during March 2014, gathering evidence both for this report and for our forthcoming report on the OPTs. We visited projects throughout the region and met a range of Ministers, NGOs and DFID staff: this was invaluable to our understanding of the region. Finally, we are grateful to Eva Svoboda of the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) for serving as our Specialist Adviser in this inquiry.

¹ DFID, [Annual Report and Accounts 2011–12](#) (June 2012), pp. 199–201

² DFID, [Annual Report and Accounts 2012–13](#) (June 2013), p 224

³ DFID, [UK Aid Syria Response](#) (June 2014), p 1

2 Humanitarian situation in Syria

5. According to UN estimates there are presently 9.3 million people within Syria in need of humanitarian assistance, including 6.5 million who are internally displaced.

Humanitarian access

6. Of the 9.3 million people in Syria in need of humanitarian assistance, approximately 3.5 million are in “hard-to-reach” areas.⁴ Between 22 April and 19 May this year, 12.6% of all hard-to-reach locations received aid, including food aid from WFP, UNRWA and UNICEF as well as some non-food items.⁵

7. Some areas of Syria are currently under siege: the Minister of State told us that Syrian Government forces were using “siege, starvation and surrender tactics”.⁶ At present 196,000 people are besieged by Government forces in Madamiyet Elsham, eastern Ghouta, Darayya and Yarmouk;⁷ the siege of the Old City of Homs ended in May.⁸ In addition, 45,000 are besieged by opposition forces in Zahra and Nubul.⁹ Between 22 April and 19 May, only a very small proportion of the besieged population received aid: 6.9% received food and nutrition support, 4.1% received water and sanitation assistance, and 6% received medicines.¹⁰

8. WFP reports that many drivers are unwilling to travel to the most insecure areas,¹¹ whilst the International Rescue Committee (IRC) highlights the risk of humanitarian workers being detained or kidnapped or of goods being confiscated.¹² The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) reports that in opposition-controlled areas, foreign aid workers are threatened and kidnappings are common.¹³

9. Denial of humanitarian access may represent a breach of international law.¹⁴ In his evidence to us, Amir Abdulla, Deputy Executive Director of WFP, summarised the challenges his organisation is facing in respect of access:

⁴ UN Security Council, [Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2139 \(2014\)](#) (May 2014), para 17

⁵ Ibid., para 19

⁶ Q 134

⁷ UN Security Council, [Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2139 \(2014\)](#) (May 2014), para 21

⁸ Q 134

⁹ UN Security Council, [Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2139 \(2014\)](#) (May 2014), para 21

¹⁰ Ibid., para 22

¹¹ World Food Programme ([MID0060](#)) para 14

¹² International Rescue Committee ([MID0061](#)) para 11

¹³ Norwegian Refugee Council ([MID0059](#)) para 3

¹⁴ DFID ([MID0053](#)) para 20

I would say that we basically operate in four areas. The first is clear regime control, where access is possibly easier, for somebody from the Damascus side. Then, there are areas that are clearly under control of a party with whom we can negotiate and get permission to go; those we are reaching. Then, there are areas where the control is not clear, and we try to operate in those areas. There are, unfortunately, areas that are controlled by groups such as al-Nusra, ISIS, ISIL and others, who very clearly have said they do not want anything like the United Nations or international humanitarian relief.¹⁵

10. In addition to the difficulties in accessing opposition-controlled areas, many organisations are prevented from operating in Government-controlled areas. The Syrian Government has given just fifteen NGOs permission to operate in the country.¹⁶ Even once permission is obtained, many obstacles remain: the Norwegian Refugee Council reports that whilst it was given permission in February 2013, it took until December 2013 to obtain visas for its staff.¹⁷ HelpAge International reports that whilst the Government of Syria recently issued 50 visas to humanitarian workers, these were valid only for a short period of time and for a limited number of entries.¹⁸

11. On 22 February 2014, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2139 (2014), which addresses the question of humanitarian access in Syria. The resolution demands that “all parties, in particular the Syrian authorities, promptly allow rapid, safe and unhindered humanitarian access for United Nations humanitarian agencies and their implementing partners, including across conflict lines and across borders, in order to ensure that humanitarian assistance reaches people in need through the most direct routes.” In the Resolution the Security Council also requests the Secretary-General to “report to the Council on the implementation of this resolution [...] in 30 days of its adoption and every 30 days thereafter”, and expresses its intention to “take further steps in the case of non-compliance with this resolution.”¹⁹

12. The Security Council had previously issued a Presidential Statement addressing the same issues, but this made little difference in practice.²⁰ In his evidence Nigel Pont, Mercy Corps’ Regional Director for the Middle East, drew a comparison between humanitarian workers and weapons inspectors, and pointed out that whilst the former faced innumerable access restrictions, the latter had faced no such constraints.²¹

13. Some witnesses were cautiously optimistic that the Resolution might lead to substantial improvements. Amir Abdulla said:

“I think there is, to be very clear, a huge legal and binding difference between a presidential statement and a Security Council resolution. We have to take the fact

¹⁵ Q 5

¹⁶ International Rescue Committee ([MID0061](#)) para 12

¹⁷ Norwegian Refugee Council ([MID0059](#)) para 3

¹⁸ HelpAge International ([MID0056](#)) para 2.2

¹⁹ UN Security Council, [Resolution 2139 \(2014\)](#) (Feb 2014)

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Q 11

that a resolution has been passed as a significant step forward. A resolution is binding.”²²

Maria Calivis, UNICEF’s Regional Director for the Middle East and North Africa, was also strongly supportive of the resolution, and stressed the need to ensure it was implemented consistently.²³

14. However, Amir Abdulla went on to sound a more cautious note:

One of the concerns we do have, though, is that the resolution itself does recognise the territorial integrity of Syria. It is in the preamble and opening. If Syria chooses to take that to mean, “Any border that we do not control contravenes our territorial integrity,” we may still be in a difficult situation. As if it is not complicated enough, there is a further complication. Several of the border crossings that one would need to use are now controlled by al-Nusra and ISIS, who do not recognise the United Nations or the Security Council resolution.²⁴

Similarly, the Minister of State told us that the resolution had made little difference, with the Syrian regime continuing to obstruct the delivery of aid.²⁵ In his most recent monthly report, the Secretary General reports that the situation in respect of humanitarian access has in fact deteriorated further.²⁶

15. On 15 May 2014 the Secretary of State for International Development, Rt Hon Justine Greening MP, said:

The Syrian regime’s refusal to allow humanitarian agencies to deliver aid is clearly a breach of international humanitarian law and it is vital that further steps are taken to address this. We will strongly support a new UN Security Council Resolution referring the Syrian regime to the International Criminal Court.²⁷

DFID’s spending

16. Since the crisis began, DFID has allocated £249.1 million for humanitarian assistance within Syria.²⁸ The table below indicates how this money is being spent.

²² Q 7

²³ Q 66

²⁴ Q 7

²⁵ Q 134

²⁶ UN Security Council, [Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2139 \(2014\)](#) (May 2014), para 18

²⁷ [“Greening: access to humanitarian aid needed in Syria”](#), DFID press notice, 15 May 2014

²⁸ DFID, [UK Aid Syria Response](#) (June 2014), p 4

Organisation	Funding allocation (£m)
UN World Food Programme (WFP)	72.2
UN Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF)	15.8
UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)	15.6
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	10.7
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)	9.0
World Health Organisation (WHO)	8.0
UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)	7.0
International Organisation for Migration (IOM)	4.7
UN Population Fund (UNFPA)	3.0
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)	2.3
UN Department for Safety and Security (UNDSS)	0.5
Undisclosed humanitarian agencies, not named for security reasons (operating outside of the UN led response)	98.6
In kind contributions	1.7
Total	249.1

Source: adapted from DFID, [UK Aid Syria Response](#) (June 2014), p 4

Amir Abdulla told us that:

this operation costs on the order of \$42 million per week. However, that reaches about 6 million people. Rounded up, that translates to \$1 a day – 65p per day – which is a lot less than you would spend on a cup of coffee – to deliver food in what is basically a war zone.²⁹

17. DFID intends to deliver around 50% of its aid to Syria from across international borders. The Minister of State told us that whilst he held UN organisations in high-regard, their cross-border aid work had left something to be desired; DFID therefore planned to deliver more of its assistance through NGOs than it had done previously.³⁰ The Minister of State also said:

Let me highlight one thing that is important above all: all of the people who are delivering aid inside Syria are in serious danger and over 40 have been killed. These are the heroes of the hour, who go on to the front line and across it in order to deliver aid.³¹

18. The scale of humanitarian need in Syria is vast. A wide range of organisations—UN organisations and others—are working in Syria in extremely dangerous circumstances. Organisations such as WFP, which is able to deliver food assistance for around 65p per person per day, are providing exceptional value for money. We commend the brave men and women working on the ground in Syria to provide humanitarian assistance. We were interested to hear that DFID was considering delivering more of its assistance through NGOs.

²⁹ Q 22

³⁰ Q 129

³¹ Ibid.

19. We warmly welcome the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2139 (2014). In view of the manifest failure of last October's UN Security Council Presidential Statement, a Resolution was the only option. We are nevertheless concerned that certain parties may not abide by the resolution: groups such as al-Nusra and ISIS do not recognise the UN. We are also concerned about the bureaucratic restrictions which prevent NGOs from delivering humanitarian assistance in Syria. *Where NGOs are ready, willing and able to provide much-needed humanitarian assistance, the Government should use every means possible to help them to obtain permission to operate in Syria, and to help their staff to obtain visas.*

3 Humanitarian situation in neighbouring countries

20. Over 2.3 million refugees have fled Syria since the conflict began, mostly to Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq and Egypt.³² The Norwegian Refugee Council states: “Thousands of displaced Syrians are prevented from seeking protection and assistance in the neighbouring countries due to various degrees of border control and regulations, Palestine refugees from Syria are a group of particular concern, as the lack of citizenship is used as a pretext to treat them differently from their Syrian compatriots.”³³ The table below shows the number of refugees by country:

Country	Registered refugees (date of last update)	Refugees awaiting registration (date of last update)
Lebanon	1,061,355 (23/06/2014)	48,926 (23/06/2014)
Turkey	789,219 (23/06/2014)	n/a
Jordan	597,328 (08/06/2014)	n/a
Iraq	217,795 (15/06/2014)	7,680 (15/06/2014)
Egypt	137,994 (23/06/2014)	n/a

Source: adapted from UNHCR, *'Syria Regional Refugee Response: Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal,'* accessed 24 June 2014

DFID's spending

21. Since the crisis began, DFID has allocated £292.6 million for humanitarian assistance in the neighbouring countries. This is to address a number of challenges across various sectors, including health, education and food security.³⁴ The table below indicates how DFID's money is being spent.

Organisation	Funding allocation (£m)						Total
	Jordan	Lebanon	Turkey	Iraq	Egypt	Regional	
UN World Food Programme (WFP)	38.8	37.8	9.8	2.2	0.2		88.8
UN Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF)	22.5	15.9	4.8	7.2		1.2	51.6
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	25.8	16.5	1.4	5.5	1.7		50.9
International Rescue Committee (IRC)	4.3	5.3		1.8			11.4
Doctors of the World (MdM)	5	4.7				0.8	10.5

³² DFID (MID0053) para 8

³³ Norwegian Refugee Council (MID0059) para 3

³⁴ DFID, *UK Aid Syria Response* (June 2014), p 4

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UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)	2.2	7.7					9.9
Danish Refugee Council (DRC)	4.5		5				9.5
Handicap International	3.4	3.6					7
Save the Children International		6.3		0.2	0.4		6.9
Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)	1	5.6					6.6
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)	1.9	3.5					5.4
UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)		4					4
Government of Lebanon		3.7					3.7
Oxfam		3.6					3.6
World Health Organisation (WHO)	1.8					0.8	2.6
CARE International	2						2
Islamic Relief	2						2
International Organisation for Migration (IOM)	2						2
World Vision International		1.9					1.9
Turkish Red Crescent (TRC)			1				1
Undisclosed humanitarian agencies, not named for security reasons (operating outside of the UN led response)	1.8	4	2.1	1.2			9.1
Technical assistance to humanitarian partners and DFID in the region		0.2	0.1	0.1		1.8	2.2
Total	119.0	124.3	24.2	18.2	2.3	4.6	292.6

Source: adapted from DFID, [UK Aid Syria Response](#) (June 2014)

This table shows DFID's spending in the neighbouring countries expressed in pounds per refugee:

Country	DFID funding allocation since beginning of crisis (£m)	DFID funding allocation since beginning of crisis (pounds per refugee)
Lebanon	124.3	£117.10
Turkey	24.2	£30.66
Jordan	119.0	£199.22
Iraq	18.2	£83.56
Egypt	2.3	£16.67

22. The countries bordering Syria have taken in an extraordinary number of refugees. In countries such as Lebanon and Jordan, organisations working to provide assistance face a very challenging situation. We fully support the efforts of such organisations.

23. Syria and its neighbours are all middle-income countries; DFID would ordinarily be expected to stop operating in these countries once the humanitarian crisis is over. In the case of Jordan, however, the Minister of State told us that:

Given the severity and the longevity of the Syrian crisis, and the fact that, although we would like to see people go back to Syria, there is not much of a country to go back to, what we need to plan for in Jordan is a medium-term stability programme. I would shy away from calling it a bilateral programme, because it would not be a classic bilateral programme, but some kind of DFID involvement to underpin the stability of the country would be sensible and responsible. Quite what degree of funding it might require is as yet un-designed. It may be that it is not an enormous amount, but a smaller amount focused in the right way – public financial management, designing an education system or whatever it might be.³⁵

In addition, DFID is already providing support to local municipalities in Jordan.³⁶

24. As the Minister of State rightly highlighted, maintaining the stability of Jordan is critical. DFID should launch a development programme in Jordan for the medium-term, in addition to its existing humanitarian work and support to municipalities. We look at how to implement this programme below.

Impact on host communities

25. The countries bordering Syria have granted refugees access to public services: in this respect, these countries' contribution to the humanitarian effort far outstrips any of the conventional "donors".³⁷ However, this is placing great strain on the host communities.³⁸ Nigel Pont told us:

³⁵ Q 138

³⁶ DFID ([MID0053](#)) para 5

³⁷ UNHCR country pages for [Lebanon](#), [Turkey](#), [Jordan](#), [Iraq](#), [Egypt](#) (accessed 24 June 2014)

³⁸ International Rescue Committee ([MID0061](#)) para 19

The situation in Lebanon is of greatest concern to us, with a quarter of the population now being refugees [...] I think Lebanon is where we have most concern but Jordan is also of great concern to us. The subject of water in Jordan is particularly interesting in this context. [...] Before the conflict started, Jordan was the fourth-most water scarce country in the world. It is now the third.³⁹

He went on to say

“we need to invest more in host communities. That is the bottom line. It has to be done, or we will see the tensions rise in the future. Despite the resource constraints, resources need to be prioritised for those activities. There are a lot of incredibly poor, local families who are seeing high levels of assistance, unmatched by local social security services, going to target refugee families. This is exacerbating the situation.”⁴⁰

In Lebanon, there is an additional risk of tensions between confessional groups. The Lebanese population includes a number of different religious groups; the influx of (mostly Sunni) Syrian refugees could lead to tensions between and within these groups.⁴¹

26. In countries bordering Syria, it would be a mistake for donors to provide assistance to refugees without also providing assistance to host communities. Doing so would almost inevitably lead to an increase in tensions between the two groups: if their own needs were neglected, poor families in host communities would understandably feel resentful towards refugees receiving international assistance. In Lebanon and Jordan, DFID should ensure that its humanitarian assistance benefits needy host communities as well as refugees.

Shelter

27. In Jordan a number of large-scale refugee camps have been constructed. The Zaatari camp, which we visited, now houses around 100,000 refugees; another large camp has recently opened at Azraq.⁴² Yet 80% of refugees in Jordan are living in host communities (towns and villages) rather than camps.⁴³ In Lebanon there are no large-scale refugee camps at all. The Minister of State said: “we are talking to the Government [of Lebanon] about trying to find places where you might have quasi-camps, but there is a lot of local resistance to such things [...] you have to get community support.”⁴⁴ Jehangir Malik, UK Director of Islamic Relief, told us: “I do not think Jordan and Lebanon want camps, with the risk of them becoming permanent settlements. We have seen that in other conflicts, where in protracted crises these camps turn into longer-term cities, towns and dwellings;

³⁹ Q 14

⁴⁰ Q 20

⁴¹ Q 14

⁴² “[Jordan opens a new desert camp for Syrian refugees at Azraq](#)”, UNHCR, 30 April 2014

⁴³ Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, [Final Draft National Resilience Plan 2014–2016](#) (May 2014), p 52

⁴⁴ Q 140

there is that political factor.”⁴⁵ Across the region as a whole, 85% of refugees are living in host communities.⁴⁶

28. The Minister of State argued that refugees in host communities often received support from members of those communities, or from members of their own extended families.⁴⁷ Nevertheless, life for such refugees is undeniably difficult. Jehangir Malik said:

I have seen some horrific dwellings in monitoring and evaluation visits in Jordan and in Lebanon. It is primarily because people have left their homes with no money at all, and the cost of living inside Lebanon and Jordan is extremely high. It is \$300 minimum for a room in some of these locations.⁴⁸

Refugees in host communities face difficulties in registering with UNHCR, understanding their rights and possible sources of support, and accessing services.⁴⁹ We visited a family living in a host community in southern Lebanon: the mother and her children never went outside as they did not feel safe. Nigel Pont told us that the amount of aid given to support refugees in camps (and particularly in the Zaatari camp) vis-à-vis those in host communities was “disproportionate”; he argued that providing aid in camps was “easier”.⁵⁰ The Minister of State echoed this latter point, saying: “you know where they are when they are in camps. They are more difficult to disentangle from the communities if they are in the community.”⁵¹ However, he told us that despite this DFID was focusing increasingly on host communities.⁵² Matthew Wyatt, Head of DFID’s Syria Crisis Unit, added:

Through the agencies that we are working with in providing humanitarian support, much of that support is going to host communities as well as to the refugees [...] we provided £4 million for text books in Lebanon. That very explicitly was for all those people going to state schools in Lebanon, who by definition tend to be the poorest, because only a third of Lebanese children go to state schools. The others are in private education. All the children in school will benefit from that – both the refugees and the host communities. [...] we are trying to shape the programme to make sure that we are reaching people on the basis of need, rather than on the basis of their status as a refugee or not.⁵³

29. We are concerned that refugees in host communities receive disproportionately little international assistance by comparison with those in refugee camps, possibly because aid in refugee camps is easier to provide. *In countries bordering Syria, DFID must ensure that an appropriate share of its humanitarian aid reaches refugees in host*

⁴⁵ Q 19

⁴⁶ International Rescue Committee ([MID0061](#)) para 22

⁴⁷ Q 140

⁴⁸ Q 18

⁴⁹ International Rescue Committee ([MID0061](#)) para 22

⁵⁰ Q 18

⁵¹ Q 140

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Q 141

communities, who make up 85% of the total Syrian refugee population. DFID should also monitor levels of child marriage and domestic violence in these communities.

Education

30. A quarter of all children in Lebanon, together with almost 10% of children in Jordan, are Syrian refugees. Providing these children with an adequate education is a huge challenge. Save the Children argues that donors should provide additional funding to enable schools to operate two “shifts” (one in the morning and one in the afternoon);⁵⁴ during our visit to Jordan we were told that the total number of Jordanian primary schools doing this was just 350 – a relatively small proportion. Across the region there are a range of informal learning programmes, which seek to provide some basic education to children who are unable to attend school: examples include the “family-friendly spaces” run by Intersos with support from UNICEF and DFID, two of which we visited.

31. Refugee children who are fortunate enough to enrol in school still face a number of challenges, including social isolation and the difficulty of adapting to a different curriculum.⁵⁵ In countries such as Lebanon, language is a major problem: during our visit we were told that whilst the Syrian curriculum is taught entirely in Arabic, the Lebanese curriculum is taught jointly in Arabic, French and English.⁵⁶ Lindy Cameron, DFID’s Director for the Middle East, Conflict and Humanitarian, said:

younger primary school children are still at a stage where, much like Arabic-speaking Lebanese children, they can learn a second language of English or French in order to assimilate into that system. For older children, who have gone through their whole education in Arabic, it is much harder to integrate.⁵⁷

32. In her evidence Maria Calivis stressed that in order to learn effectively, many refugee children also require psychosocial support:

one of the barriers to learning, even when kids have access, is the fact that they have unresolved trauma and big emotional blockages. Therefore, the investment in psychosocial support and emotional recovery is so important for these kids to succeed. Just one year ago, in every three families that used to cross, there would be one or two kids that were affected psychologically by the war. Now, no kids come across the borders that are not affected.⁵⁸

She went on to say that:

there is now a very good local capacity of Jordanians and Lebanese NGOs that can impart psychosocial support. The one thing is that the demand is far greater, and therefore the quality suffers.⁵⁹

⁵⁴ Save the Children ([MID0043](#)) para 2.10

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, para 2.8

⁵⁶ Q 81

⁵⁷ Q 149

⁵⁸ Q 79

⁵⁹ Q 82

The Minister of State told us that DFID was already providing funds for trauma care for refugee children.⁶⁰

33. As a consequence of all these challenges, two-thirds of refugee children (over 500,000) are now out of school,⁶¹ together with over 2.5 million children who remain in Syria.⁶² In both cases the numbers continue to rise, and research indicates that the longer a child is out of school, the less likely he or she is ever to return.⁶³ Maria Calivis argued that donors should give greater priority to education, with a particular focus on ensuring that the youngest – whose chances of completing their education should be much greater – are able to attend pre-school.⁶⁴

34. The astonishingly high number of Syrian children who are out of school is cause for grave concern. If an entire generation of children is unable to complete its education, the long-term implications for the stability of Syria and the wider region will be very serious indeed. Ensuring that Syrian refugee children receive an adequate education should remain a top priority for DFID. DFID should allocate additional funds to support the operation of “double shifts” in schools. To support children who are unable to enrol in school, DFID should scale up its support for informal learning mechanisms such as “family-friendly spaces.” DFID should also allocate additional funds for the provision of psychosocial support, to enable traumatised children to re-engage with education.

Employment

35. During our visit we discussed the position of Syrian refugees in the labour market. We were told that Syrian refugees were allowed to work in Lebanon provided they had entered the country legally, but that in Jordan this was not generally the case. There are some exceptions – we were told, for example, that Syrian refugees have found employment in a supermarket in the Zaatari refugee camp. However, when the Norwegian Refugee Council sought to support the provision of vocational training to young Syrian refugees, the Government of Jordan prevented such activity.⁶⁵

36. The Jordanian position is perfectly understandable, especially given possible concerns about unemployment. However, if Jordan changed its stance and allowed Syrian refugees to work, they would be able to contribute to the economy and pay taxes. Skilled members of the refugee population, such as doctors and teachers, could make a particularly valuable contribution. When we asked him about this Amin Awad, Director of UNHCR’s Middle East and North Africa Office, said: “I think the Ministry of Planning and the Government of Jordan at the highest levels are changing their narrative. [...] Instead of having them sitting idle, the question is how best they can use professionals, technical, casual or skilled labour in their national plan to sustain the country.”⁶⁶ However, the Minister of State said:

⁶⁰ Q 145

⁶¹ Save the Children ([MID0043](#)) para 2.7

⁶² Q 145

⁶³ Save the Children ([MID0043](#)) para 2.9

⁶⁴ Q 79

⁶⁵ Norwegian Refugee Council ([MID0059](#)) para 2

⁶⁶ Q 77

“The Jordanian Government is looking at this but I think they are reluctant. [...] This is primarily a matter for the Jordanians.”⁶⁷

37. The Jordanian Government’s reluctance to allow Syrian refugees to work is entirely understandable, especially given the risk of rising unemployment amongst the native Jordanian population. However, allowing Syrian refugees to work would have many potential benefits, especially in the case of skilled professionals such as doctors and teachers. Whilst recognising the inherent political sensitivities of the issue, we recommend that the UK encourage the Government of Jordan to allow Syrian refugees to work.

National plans

38. In January 2014, the Jordanian Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation published a draft National Resilience Plan (NRP): a table summarising its contents is included as an Annex to this report. The document covers the period from 2014 to 2016, and sets out precisely what support the Government of Jordan needs from international donors: needs are especially great in the four governorates with the highest refugee populations (Irbid, Mafraq, Amman and Zarqa). The NRP encourages donors to deliver their assistance through the Government of Jordan’s own channels.⁶⁸

39. Similarly, the Government of Lebanon requested that the World Bank, together with the EU, UN and IMF, conduct an “Economic and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) of the Syrian Conflict.” In a similar way to the Jordanian NRP, this document sets out precisely what support the Government of Lebanon needs from international donors.⁶⁹ Again, a table summarising its contents is included as an Annex to this report.

40. In their evidence to us, both Amin Awad and Maria Calivis said that donors such as DFID should use the NRP and the ESIA as the basis of its assistance to Jordan and Lebanon respectively.⁷⁰ In the case of Lebanon, Maria Calivis argued that donors should also refer to the Lebanese Government’s three-year education plan.⁷¹ The Minister of State was less emphatic, describing the NRP as merely “a very good starting point for assessing needs in Jordan.”⁷² *DFID should use the National Resilience Plan and the Economic and Social Impact Assessment as the basis of its assistance to Jordan and Lebanon respectively.*

⁶⁷ Q 143

⁶⁸ Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, [Final Draft National Resilience Plan 2014–2016](#) (May 2014)

⁶⁹ World Bank, [Lebanon: Economic and Social Impact Assessment of the Syrian Conflict](#), September 2013

⁷⁰ Q 70, Q 71

⁷¹ Q 71

⁷² Q 136

4 Donor funding

41. The UK has made a sizeable financial contribution to the humanitarian effort in Syria and the surrounding countries. Since the crisis began, the UK has committed £600 million, including funding for Syria itself (see Chapter 2), funding for the neighbouring countries (see Chapter 3), and funding whose allocation is still to be finalised.⁷³ The UK's annual spending on its response to the crisis has increased steadily and now stands at approximately £300m per year.⁷⁴ This increase has been made possible by the fact that the UK's total Official Development Assistance (ODA) budget has itself been increasing, reaching 0.7% of GNI in 2013.⁷⁵

42. The Minister of State told us that he expected DFID's annual spending on the Syria crisis to remain broadly stable for "the next year or two."⁷⁶ He went on to say that whilst DFID's spending on the Syria crisis had not yet affected its spending on bilateral programmes, there may be some effect in the future:

As our budget has plateaued and other lumps of money have been put into things such as the [new Conflict, Stability and Security Fund], we are not as flush as we have been over the last two or three years. Whereas I am not saying that the Syrian crisis is necessarily going to have a detrimental impact on bilateral agreements – maybe you can take some from the multilateral alternatives – there are going to be some difficult choices anyway, even if there were not a Syrian humanitarian problem.⁷⁷

43. We asked the Minister of State to clarify DFID's overall budget for responding to humanitarian crises, but he was reluctant to provide a figure:

Whereas it is logical to perhaps ring-fence or commit a percentage to what are predictable continuous programme objectives, humanitarian spending is less susceptible to that certainty. We are already of course asked to commit 30% of our budget towards fragility and stability. We are in danger of ending up with a lot of overlapping, slightly illogical, incoherent percentages all bumping into each other [...] we have a contingency for the unexpected earthquake or cyclone. I am pretty confident that, by and large, particularly if the Syrian problem remains—and heaven knows there is enough going on in Africa—we will probably end up spending something like 10% on humanitarian. However, to plan for it and demand it is a slightly different way of approaching the issue.⁷⁸

44. In its written evidence, DFID highlights the UK Government's attempts to lobby other donor countries to match its commitment. In practice, however, many have failed to do so.

⁷³ DFID, [UK Aid Syria Response](#) (June 2014), p 4

⁷⁴ DFID ([MID0053](#)) para 23

⁷⁵ DFID, [Statistical Release: Provisional UK Official Development Assistance as a proportion of Gross National Income, 2013](#) (April 2014), p 1

⁷⁶ Q 118

⁷⁷ Q 121

⁷⁸ Q 128

The table below shows the commitments/contributions and pledges made by other EU member states since the crisis began.

Donor representative country	USD committed/contributed	USD pledged
United Kingdom	778,373,624	74,374,561
Germany	548,502,927	18,328,074
Sweden	108,841,232	8,889,064
Denmark	104,968,268	1,648,467
Netherlands	93,797,729	2,043,062
France	59,311,534	16,075,228
Italy	45,841,864	45,547,373
Finland	39,123,709	0
Belgium	31,738,407	0
Ireland	29,295,255	7,496,879
Spain	16,566,339	5,748,138
Luxembourg	15,260,700	1,979,973
Austria	11,373,474	0
Poland	3,800,494	800,000
Czech Republic	3,460,719	385,529
Estonia	1,715,415	73,267
Croatia	847,141	206,897
Hungary	735,151	0
Bulgaria	618,870	0
Romania	450,000	50,000
Portugal	433,702	0
Greece	394,223	0
Slovakia	199,331	97,225
Slovenia	196,634	0
Latvia	124,715	0
Lithuania	110,037	0
Malta	100,427	0
Cyprus	45,597	13,793

Source: adapted from UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service, '[Syrian Arab Republic— Civil Unrest](#),' accessed 24 June 2014

45. The Minister of State told us:

I have to say, I am seriously worried about the rise of donor fatigue. At the last meeting I was at, which was an officials' meeting about donor co-ordination, I sensed that this is going to be the real challenge of the next year or so, which is that the willingness of people to contribute is likely to peter out a bit. That makes it essential to argue that those who have not stepped up to the plate so far should do so now.⁷⁹

46. With its humanitarian response to the Syria crisis, the UK has led the world: we commend the Government for its exemplary contribution. The UK has been able to increase its annual spending because its Official Development Assistance (ODA) budget has been increasing; now that the 0.7% target has been reached, spending will

⁷⁹ Q 122

not continue to increase at the same rate. As the Minister of State highlighted, there are difficult choices ahead: if DFID continues to prioritise humanitarian spending in the Middle East, this will have implications for DFID's spending in other parts of the world. Whilst we accept that humanitarian crises are unpredictable, we recommend that DFID set a clear budget for its humanitarian spending. With the ODA budget capped at 0.7% of GNI transparency as to the apportionment of humanitarian and development spending is essential. *DFID should tell us what the budget for humanitarian spending is in its response to this report. It should tell us how it sets about planning for humanitarian work; what contingencies it has; and at what point it would be unable to commit further resources to humanitarian work. Rather than simply telling us that it has a contingency, it should explicitly provide us with an annual figure as to what the contingency is.*

47. In this context, it is ever more crucial that other donors fulfil their responsibilities. The contributions made by many other donor countries fall far short of that made by the UK. *The Government should use every means possible to put pressure on other donor countries and encourage them to match the UK's commitment.*

48. UNHCR is appealing to countries around the world to accept up to 30,000 Syrian refugees by the end of 2014, either on humanitarian admission, resettlement or other programmes. Currently twenty countries have agreed to do so: Germany, for example, has accepted 10,000 refugees on humanitarian admission.⁸⁰

49. The UK has been criticised in some quarters for not taking part.⁸¹ However, the UK has launched its own Vulnerable Persons Relocation (VPR) scheme. The Government expects to accept several hundred refugees under this scheme, with a focus on the most vulnerable.⁸² As at 13 May, 24 Syrians had arrived in the UK.⁸³ The Minister of State said: "We have tried [...] to pick some of the most [...] vulnerable and design a specialist approach to their acute needs. [...] In my view, that is one up on the UNHCR scheme, rather than just an easy "Thank you very much; we will go along with it.""⁸⁴ He went on to say that "transplanting someone from a completely different cultural context, particularly when they are the most acute victims, is not necessarily always the very best and easiest way of putting them into a happy setting."⁸⁵

50. **We received strong representations that stressed the case for supporting Syrian refugees in the region, allowing them to remain close to their livelihoods with a possibility of returning to Syria. Clearly there are some people with extreme needs whom the UK should accommodate. As at 13 May 24 had come, and we hope that the UK will continue this process in a constructive and compassionate way.**

⁸⁰ UNHCR, [Resettlement, Humanitarian Admission, and Other Forms of Admission for Syrian Refugees: 2013/2014 Pledges](#) (February 2014)

⁸¹ Christian Aid ([MID0049](#)) para 2.5.2

⁸² "[Syria: UK helps vulnerable refugees](#)", Home Office press notice, 25 March 2014

⁸³ HC Deb, 13 May 2014, [col 450W](#)

⁸⁴ Qq 153–4

⁸⁵ Q 155

Annex 1–summary of Jordan’s “National Resilience Plan”

Sector	2014 (USD, millions)	2015 (USD, millions)	2016 (USD, millions)	All Years (USD, millions)
Education	157.2	175.0	206.2	538.5
Energy	35.8	45.3	36.6	117.7
Health	138.6	177.8	152.5	469.0
Housing	1.4	2.6	1.6	5.3
Livelihoods & Employment	43.5	49.8	43.4	136.6
Municipal Services	79.1	72.8	54.0	205.9
Protection & Social Protection	111.9	116.1	114.0	341.9
WASH	137.6	345.0	188.2	670.8
Subsidies for Syrian Refugees	208	250.0	300.0	758.0
Security Support	291.7	320.8	352.9	965.3
Aviation and Transport Support	62.5	62.5	62.5	187.5
Grand Total	1266.8	1617.7	1511.8	4396.3

Source: adapted from Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, [Final Draft National Resilience Plan 2014–2016](#) (May 2014)

Annex 2—summary of the World Bank’s “Economic and Social Impact Assessment of the Syrian Conflict” for Lebanon

	2012	2013	2014 (baseline refugee influx)	2014 (high refugee influx)	Cumulative 2012-14 (baseline refugee influx)	Cumulative 2012-14 (high refugee influx)
Health	38	177	216	306	431	521
Education	97	183	348	434	628	714
Employment and Livelihoods	n/a ⁸⁶	n/a ⁸⁷	166	242	166	242
Poverty and Social Safety Nets	23	67	85	n/a ⁸⁸	175	90
Electricity	39	214	57	187	310	440
Water and Sanitation	5	89	246	281	340	375
Solid Waste Management & Municipal Services	4	48	141	154	193	206
Transportation infrastructure	0	43	203	482	246	525

Source: adapted from World Bank, [Lebanon: Economic and Social Impact Assessment of the Syrian Conflict](#), September 2013

⁸⁶ Costs for 2014 baseline and high scenarios include the needs for 2013.

⁸⁷ Costs for 2014 baseline and high scenarios include the needs for 2013.

⁸⁸ No high scenario has been calculated for Poverty and SSNs in 2014.

Conclusions and recommendations

Humanitarian situation in Syria

1. The scale of humanitarian need in Syria is vast. A wide range of organisations—UN organisations and others—are working in Syria in extremely dangerous circumstances. Organisations such as WFP, which is able to deliver food assistance for around 65p per person per day, are providing exceptional value for money. We commend the brave men and women working on the ground in Syria to provide humanitarian assistance. We were interested to hear that DFID was considering delivering more of its assistance through NGOs. (Paragraph 18)
2. We warmly welcome the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2139 (2014). In view of the manifest failure of last October's UN Security Council Presidential Statement, a Resolution was the only option. We are nevertheless concerned that certain parties may not abide by the resolution: groups such as al-Nusra and ISIS do not recognise the UN. We are also concerned about the bureaucratic restrictions which prevent NGOs from delivering humanitarian assistance in Syria. *Where NGOs are ready, willing and able to provide much-needed humanitarian assistance, the Government should use every means possible to help them to obtain permission to operate in Syria, and to help their staff to obtain visas.* (Paragraph 19)

Humanitarian situation in neighbouring countries

3. The countries bordering Syria have taken in an extraordinary number of refugees. In countries such as Lebanon and Jordan, organisations working to provide assistance face a very challenging situation. We fully support the efforts of such organisations. (Paragraph 22)
4. As the Minister of State rightly highlighted, maintaining the stability of Jordan is critical. *DFID should launch a development programme in Jordan for the medium-term, in addition to its existing humanitarian work and support to municipalities. We look at how to implement this programme below.* (Paragraph 24)
5. In countries bordering Syria, it would be a mistake for donors to provide assistance to refugees without also providing assistance to host communities. Doing so would almost inevitably lead to an increase in tensions between the two groups: if their own needs were neglected, poor families in host communities would understandably feel resentful towards refugees receiving international assistance. *In Lebanon and Jordan, DFID should ensure that its humanitarian assistance benefits needy host communities as well as refugees.* (Paragraph 26)
6. We are concerned that refugees in host communities receive disproportionately little international assistance by comparison with those in refugee camps, possibly because aid in refugee camps is easier to provide. *In countries bordering Syria, DFID must ensure that an appropriate share of its humanitarian aid reaches refugees in host communities, who make up 85% of the total Syrian refugee population. DFID should*

also monitor levels of child marriage and domestic violence in these communities. (Paragraph 29)

7. The astonishingly high number of Syrian children who are out of school is cause for grave concern. If an entire generation of children is unable to complete its education, the long-term implications for the stability of Syria and the wider region will be very serious indeed. *Ensuring that Syrian refugee children receive an adequate education should remain a top priority for DFID. DFID should allocate additional funds to support the operation of “double shifts” in schools. To support children who are unable to enrol in school, DFID should scale up its support for informal learning mechanisms such as “family-friendly spaces.” DFID should also allocate additional funds for the provision of psychosocial support, to enable traumatised children to re-engage with education. (Paragraph 34)*
8. The Jordanian Government’s reluctance to allow Syrian refugees to work is entirely understandable, especially given the risk of rising unemployment amongst the native Jordanian population. However, allowing Syrian refugees to work would have many potential benefits, especially in the case of skilled professionals such as doctors and teachers. *Whilst recognising the inherent political sensitivities of the issue, we recommend that the UK encourage the Government of Jordan to allow Syrian refugees to work. (Paragraph 37)*
9. *DFID should use the National Resilience Plan and the Economic and Social Impact Assessment as the basis of its assistance to Jordan and Lebanon respectively. (Paragraph 40)*

Donor funding

10. With its humanitarian response to the Syria crisis, the UK has led the world: we commend the Government for its exemplary contribution. The UK has been able to increase its annual spending because its Official Development Assistance (ODA) budget has been increasing; now that the 0.7% target has been reached, spending will not continue to increase at the same rate. As the Minister of State highlighted, there are difficult choices ahead: if DFID continues to prioritise humanitarian spending in the Middle East, this will have implications for DFID’s spending in other parts of the world. Whilst we accept that humanitarian crises are unpredictable, we recommend that DFID set a clear budget for its humanitarian spending. With the ODA budget capped at 0.7% of GNI transparency as to the apportionment of humanitarian and development spending is essential. *DFID should tell us what the budget for humanitarian spending is in its response to this report. It should tell us how it sets about planning for humanitarian work; what contingencies it has; and at what point it would be unable to commit further resources to humanitarian work. Rather than simply telling us that it has a contingency, it should explicitly provide us with an annual figure as to what the contingency is. (Paragraph 46)*
11. In this context, it is ever more crucial that other donors fulfil their responsibilities. The contributions made by many other donor countries fall far short of that made by the UK. *The Government should use every means possible to put pressure on other donor countries and encourage them to match the UK’s commitment. (Paragraph 47)*

12. We received strong representations that stressed the case for supporting Syrian refugees in the region, allowing them to remain close to their livelihoods with a possibility of returning to Syria. Clearly there are some people with extreme needs whom the UK should accommodate. As at 13 May 24 had come, and we hope that the UK will continue this process in a constructive and compassionate way. (Paragraph 50)

Formal Minutes

Tuesday 24 June 2014

Members present:

Sir Malcolm Bruce, in the Chair

Fiona Bruce
Sir Tony Cunningham
Fabian Hamilton
Pauline Latham
Jeremy Lefroy

Sir Peter Luff
Mr Michael McCann
Fiona O'Donnell
Chris White

Draft Report (*UK Support for Humanitarian Relief in the Middle East*), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 50 read and agreed to.

Annexes and Summary agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the First Report of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No. 134.

[Adjourned till Tuesday 1 July 2014 at 9.30 am

Witnesses

The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the Committee's inquiry page at [UK support for humanitarian relief in the Middle East](#).

Tuesday 25 February 2014

Question number

Amir Abdulla, Deputy Executive Director, UN World Food Programme, **Nigel Pont**, Regional Director for the Syrian Response, Mercy Corps, **Jehangir Malik**, UK Director, Islamic Relief, **John Ging**, Director of Coordination Response Division, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), **Margot Ellis**, Deputy Commissioner General, UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), and **Daniel Levy**, Director of Middle East and North Africa Programme, European Council on Foreign Relations.

[Q1-61](#)

Tuesday 8 April 2014

Maria Calivis, Regional Director for the Middle East and North Africa, UNICEF, **Amin Awad**, Director of Middle East and North Africa Office, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and **Mourad Wahba**, Deputy Regional Director, Division for Arab States, UN Development Programme (UNDP), **Yossi Mekelberg**, Associate Fellow, Chatham House, **Tony Laurance**, Chief Executive Officer, Medical Aid for Palestinians, and **Nicola Cobbold**, Chief Executive Officer, Portland Trust

[Q62-116](#)

Thursday 8 May 2014

Rt Hon Alan Duncan MP, Minister of State, Department for International Development, **Matthew Wyatt**, Head of Syria Crisis Unit, DFID, **Lindy Cameron**, Director, Middle East, Humanitarian and Conflict, DFID, **Jonathan Hargreaves**, Head of Palestinian Programme, DFID, and **Cathy Ward**, Deputy Head of Near East Department, Foreign & Commonwealth Office

[Q117-207](#)

List of printed written evidence

The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the Committee's inquiry web page at [UK support for humanitarian relief in the Middle East](#). MID numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.

- 1 [The Parents Circle-Families Forum \(MID0001\)](#)
- 2 [Center for Near East Policy Research \(MID0003\)](#)
- 3 [Onevoice Europe \(MID0004\)](#)
- 4 [Middle East Forum \(MID0005\)](#)
- 5 [Moon Valley Enterprises Limited \(MID0006\)](#)
- 6 [Trade Union Friends of Israel \(MID0007\)](#)
- 7 [Alexander H Joffe \(MID0008\)](#)
- 8 [Premiere Urgence – Aide Medicale Internationale \(MID0009\)](#)

- 9 [Einat Wilf \(MID0010\)](#)
- 10 [Givat Haviva \(MID0013\)](#)
- 11 [NGO Monitor \(MID0014\)](#)
- 12 [Kids Creating Peace \(MID0015\)](#)
- 13 [Mifalot Education and Society Enterprises \(MID0016\)](#)
- 14 [Arava Institute for Environmental Studies \(MID0017\)](#)
- 15 [The Jerusalem Intercultural Centre \(MID0019\)](#)
- 16 [Tearfund \(MID0020\)](#)
- 17 [Gisha-Legal Center for Freedom of Movement \(MID0021\)](#)
- 18 [Meet \(Middle East Education Through Technology \(MID 0022\)](#)
- 19 [Rabbis for Human Rights \(MID0023\)](#)
- 20 [The Jerusalem Foundation \(MID0024\)](#)
- 21 [Hand in Hand: Center for Jewish-Arab Education in Israel \(MID0025\)](#)
- 22 [International Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists \(MID0026\)](#)
- 23 [World Vision UK \(MID0028\)](#)
- 24 [Heartbeat Inc \(MID0029\)](#)
- 25 [Shaare Zedek UK \(MID0030\)](#)
- 26 [Palestine Solidarity Campaign \(MID0031\)](#)
- 27 [Alliance for Middle East Peace \(MID0032\)](#)
- 28 [Hadassah Medical Organization \(MID0033\)](#)
- 29 [Bicom \(MID0034\)](#)
- 30 [Embassy of Israel in London \(MID0035\)](#)
- 31 [The Abraham Fund Initiatives \(MID0036\)](#)
- 32 [Save a Child's Heart \(MID0037\)](#)
- 33 [Palestinian Media Watch \(MID0038\)](#)
- 34 [Dr Asaf Romirowsky \(MID0039\)](#)
- 35 [Peaceplayers International \(MID0040\)](#)
- 36 [Friends of Al-Aqsa \(MID0041\)](#)
- 37 [BBC Media Action \(MID0042\)](#)
- 38 [Save the Children \(MID0043\)](#)
- 39 [Project Cherish \(MID0045\)](#)
- 40 [The Portland Trust \(MID0046\)](#)
- 41 [Christian Aid \(MID0049\)](#)
- 42 [Oxfam GB \(MID0050\)](#)
- 43 [The Israeli-Palestinian Chamber of Commerce \(MID0052\)](#)
- 44 [Department for International Development \(MID0053\)](#)
- 45 [Helpage International \(MID0056\)](#)
- 46 [Doctors of the World \(MID0057\)](#)
- 47 [Medical Aid for Palestinians \(MID0058\)](#)
- 48 [Norwegian Refugee Council \(MID0059\)](#)
- 49 [World Food Programme \(MID0060\)](#)
- 50 [International Rescue Committee UK \(MID0061\)](#)
- 51 [Glen Rangwala \(MID0064\)](#)
- 52 [Care International UK \(MID0068\)](#)
- 53 [Handicap International \(MID0069\)](#)

- 54 [UNICEF \(MID0070\)](#)
- 55 [Professor Rosemary Hollis \(MID0071\)](#)
- 56 [Embrace the Middle East \(MID0072\)](#)
- 57 [Centre for Syrian Studies, University of St Andrews \(MID0073\)](#)
- 58 [Department for International Development Annex A \(MID0074\)](#)
- 59 [Embassy of Israel Annex A \(MID0075\)](#)

List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

All publications from the Committee are available on the Committee's website at www.parliament.uk/indcom.

The reference number of the Government's response to each Report is printed in brackets after the HC printing number.

Session 2013–14

First Report	Global Food Security	HC 176 (626)
Second Report	Violence Against Women and Girls	HC 107 (624)
Third Report	Scrutiny of Arms Exports and Arms Control (2013): Scrutiny of the Government's UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2011 published in July 2012, the Government's Quarterly Reports from October 2011 to September 2012, and the government's policies on arms exports and international arms control issues	HC 205 (CM 8707)
Fourth Report	Multilateral Aid Review	HC 349 (694)
Fifth Report	ICAI's Annual Report 2012-13	HC 566 (946)
Sixth Report	Implications for development in the event of Scotland becoming an independent country	HC 692 (1107)
Ninth Report	Democracy and Development in Burma	HC 821 (1290)
Tenth Report	Department for International Development's Performance in 2012–13: the Departmental Annual Report 2012–13	HC 693 (CM 8441)
Eleventh Report	Disability and Development	HC 947 (336)

Session 2012–13

First Report	DFID's contribution to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria	HC 126 (609)
Second Report	Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, The Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues	HC 419 (CM 8441)
Third Report	The Development Situation in Malawi	HC 118 (641)
Fourth Report	Tax in Developing Countries: Increasing Resources for Development	HC 130 (708)
Fifth Report	DFID's programme in Zambia	HC 119 (759)
Sixth Report	Afghanistan: Development progress and prospects after 2014	HC 403 (862)

Seventh Report	UK Aid to Rwanda	HC 726 (949)
Eighth Report	Post-2015 Development Goals	HC 657 (1065)
Ninth Report	Department for International Development's Annual Report and Accounts 2011–12	HC 751(1098)
Tenth Report	Pakistan	HC 725 (325)

Session 2010–12

First Report	Appointment of the Chief Commissioner of the Independent Commission for Aid Impact	HC 551
Second Report	The 2010 Millennium Development Goals Review Summit	HC 534 (HC 959)
Third Report	Department For International Development Annual Report & Resource Accounts 2009–10	HC 605 (1043)
Fourth Report	The World Bank	HC 999 (1044)
Fifth Report	The Future of CDC	HC 607 (1045)
Sixth Report	Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly Reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation	HC 686 (CM 8079)
Seventh Report	The Humanitarian Response to the Pakistan Floods	HC 615 (1435)
Eighth Report	The Future of DFID's Programme in India	HC 616 (1486)
Ninth Report	DFID's Role in Building Infrastructure in Developing Countries	HC 848 (1721)
Tenth Report	The Closure of DFID's Bilateral Aid Programme in Burundi	HC 1134 (1730)
Eleventh Report	Financial Crime and Development	HC 847 (1859)
Twelfth Report	Working Effectively in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States: DRC and Rwanda	HC 1133 (1872)
Thirteenth Report	Private Foundations	HC1557 (1916)
Fourteenth Report	Department for International Development Annual Report and Resource Accounts 2010–11 and Business Plan 2011–15	HC 1569 (107)
Fifteenth Report	South Sudan: Prospects for Peace and Development	HC 1570 (426)
Sixteenth Report	EU Development Assistance	HC 1680 (427)