Conclusions and recommendations
Humanitarian situation in Syria
1. The
scale of humanitarian need in Syria is vast. A wide range of organisations—UN
organisations and others—are working in Syria in extremely
dangerous circumstances. Organisations such as WFP, which is able
to deliver food assistance for around 65p per person per day,
are providing exceptional value for money. We commend the brave
men and women working on the ground in Syria to provide humanitarian
assistance. We were interested to hear that DFID was considering
delivering more of its assistance through NGOs. (Paragraph 18)
2. We
warmly welcome the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution
2139 (2014). In view of the manifest failure of last October's
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, a Resolution was the
only option. We are nevertheless concerned that certain parties
may not abide by the resolution: groups such as al-Nusra and ISIS
do not recognise the UN. We are also concerned about the bureaucratic
restrictions which prevent NGOs from delivering humanitarian assistance
in Syria. Where NGOs are ready, willing and able to provide
much-needed humanitarian assistance, the Government should use
every means possible to help them to obtain permission to operate
in Syria, and to help their staff to obtain visas. (Paragraph
19)
Humanitarian situation in neighbouring
countries
3. The
countries bordering Syria have taken in an extraordinary number
of refugees. In countries such as Lebanon and Jordan, organisations
working to provide assistance face a very challenging situation.
We fully support the efforts of such organisations. (Paragraph
22)
4. As
the Minister of State rightly highlighted, maintaining the stability
of Jordan is critical. DFID should launch a development programme
in Jordan for the medium-term, in addition to its existing humanitarian
work and support to municipalities. We look at how to implement
this programme below. (Paragraph 24)
5. In
countries bordering Syria, it would be a mistake for donors to
provide assistance to refugees without also providing assistance
to host communities. Doing so would almost inevitably lead to
an increase in tensions between the two groups: if their own needs
were neglected, poor families in host communities would understandably
feel resentful towards refugees receiving international assistance.
In Lebanon and Jordan, DFID should ensure that its humanitarian
assistance benefits needy host communities as well as refugees.
(Paragraph 26)
6. We
are concerned that refugees in host communities receive disproportionately
little international assistance by comparison with those in refugee
camps, possibly because aid in refugee camps is easier to provide.
In countries bordering Syria, DFID must ensure that an appropriate
share of its humanitarian aid reaches refugees in host communities,
who make up 85% of the total Syrian refugee population. DFID should
also monitor levels of child marriage and domestic violence in
these communities. (Paragraph 29)
7. The
astonishingly high number of Syrian children who are out of school
is cause for grave concern. If an entire generation of children
is unable to complete its education, the long-term implications
for the stability of Syria and the wider region will be very serious
indeed. Ensuring that Syrian refugee children receive an adequate
education should remain a top priority for DFID. DFID should allocate
additional funds to support the operation of "double shifts"
in schools. To support children who are unable to enrol in school,
DFID should scale up its support for informal learning mechanisms
such as "family-friendly spaces." DFID should also allocate
additional funds for the provision of psychosocial support, to
enable traumatised children to re-engage with education. (Paragraph
34)
8. The
Jordanian Government's reluctance to allow Syrian refugees to
work is entirely understandable, especially given the risk of
rising unemployment amongst the native Jordanian population. However,
allowing Syrian refugees to work would have many potential benefits,
especially in the case of skilled professionals such as doctors
and teachers. Whilst recognising the inherent political sensitivities
of the issue, we recommend that the UK encourage the Government
of Jordan to allow Syrian refugees to work. (Paragraph 37)
9. DFID
should use the National Resilience Plan and the Economic and Social
Impact Assessment as the basis of its assistance to Jordan and
Lebanon respectively. (Paragraph
40)
Donor funding
10. With
its humanitarian response to the Syria crisis, the UK has led
the world: we commend the Government for its exemplary contribution.
The UK has been able to increase its annual spending because its
Official Development Assistance (ODA) budget has been increasing;
now that the 0.7% target has been reached, spending will not continue
to increase at the same rate. As the Minister of State highlighted,
there are difficult choices ahead: if DFID continues to prioritise
humanitarian spending in the Middle East, this will have implications
for DFID's spending in other parts of the world. Whilst we accept
that humanitarian crises are unpredictable, we recommend that
DFID set a clear budget for its humanitarian spending. With the
ODA budget capped at 0.7% of GNI transparency as to the apportionment
of humanitarian and development spending is essential. DFID
should tell us what the budget for humanitarian spending is in
its response to this report. It should tell us how it sets about
planning for humanitarian work; what contingencies it has; and
at what point it would be unable to commit further resources to
humanitarian work. Rather than simply telling us that it has a
contingency, it should explicitly provide us with an annual figure
as to what the contingency is. (Paragraph 46)
11. In
this context, it is ever more crucial that other donors fulfil
their responsibilities. The contributions made by many other donor
countries fall far short of that made by the UK. The Government
should use every means possible to put pressure on other donor
countries and encourage them to match the UK's commitment.
(Paragraph 47)
12. We
received strong representations that stressed the case for supporting
Syrian refugees in the region, allowing them to remain close to
their livelihoods with a possibility of returning to Syria. Clearly
there are some people with extreme needs whom the UK should accommodate.
As at 13 May 24 had come, and we hope that the UK will continue
this process in a constructive and compassionate way. (Paragraph
50)
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