3 Economic development in the OPTs
The
Portland Trust and DFID's Palestinian Market Development Programme
(PMDP)
19. In her evidence Nicola Cobbold, CEO of the Portland
Trust, underlined the importance of economic development in the
OPTs: "If the [Israeli-Palestinian talks] now collapse, I
do not think we can afford to allow the […] economy to collapse
as well; therefore, it is […] important to try to maintain
[the economy] in order to bring back the political process."[ 17]
DFID informed us that according to a recent study, Israeli restrictions
on the OPTs (discussed below) cost the Palestinian economy at
least 85% of its GDP (2010 figures).[ 18]
The Quartet Representative, Tony Blair, has recently spoken of
"the enormous potential of the Palestinian economy."[ 19]
20. DFID's main initiative in this field is its newly-established
Palestinian Market Development Programme (PMDP). This £15.3
million programme provides matching grants plus technical assistance,
and is expected to support at least 480 companies.[ 20]
Nicola Cobbold described the programme as "very important
and very focused".[ 21]
21. The Portland Trust makes a number of recommendations
as to how the UK might best support the Palestinian private sector,
including by launching a Private Sector Grant Facility (PSGF).[ 22]
The Dutch Government's "PSOM" programme operates along
similar lines, providing financing to Dutch organisations to encourage
them to invest in Palestinian companies: during our visit we met
representatives of the Chamber of Commerce in Hebron, who were
most appreciative of PSOM. Further details of the Portland Trust's
suggestions are provided in Box 1 below.
Box 1
| Recommendations made by the Portland Trust
|
| · Private Sector Grant Facility (PSGF). The facility would pool together aid money to be used as grants, which would in turn enable critical large scale private sector investment projects to proceed. The PSGF would finance up to 15% of private sector investment in projects that would otherwise not be able to materialise, including in much needed infrastructure, housing and energy generation (including solar) projects. With DFID's extensive experience around the world in developing and operating similar funds (including Challenge Funds) they seem well placed to be the lead donor to a PSGF. If £75 million of aid was used in this way it could attract over £500 million in private sector investment.
· Development Impact Bonds (DIBs). Based on the model of a Social Impact Bond, DIBs aim to provide upfront funding for development programmes by private investors. Investors will then be remunerated by donors or host-country governments - with a return - if evidence shows that programmes achieve their pre-agreed outcomes. The UK's Social Finance and the US Center for Global Development are leading the development of DIBs, with DFID having been a key member of the Working Group. Work is currently underway to consider where DIBs could be used in the Palestinian context. A number of areas are being explored including lowering the incidence of type 2 diabetes.
· Public-Private-Partnerships (PPP). Many private sector projects in the Beyond Aid initiative are likely to require PPPs (especially in infrastructure and energy). However there is currently little local experience of such structures and mechanisms. The British Government, with its own extensive experience of PPPs would be well placed to provide such assistance, for example through the training and capacity building programme in PPPs under development by Infrastructure UK. Further down the line the actual construction of many infrastructure and energy projects (including waste-water treatment plants), will be largely dependent on donor and government support.
· Training / Human Capital Development: The Portland Trust launched a project in 2012 to address the skills gap in different economic sectors in Palestine. It partnered with Palestinian business leaders and international companies to place mid-level executives from the most established companies in Palestine with world class companies in the UK for fellowship positions lasting between two weeks and two months. The participants developed specific skills relevant to the management of their own companies in the West Bank. As of March 2013, The Portland Trust had placed ten fellows in the UK, but the programme had to stop because of difficulties in obtaining visas for participants. A specific intervention by the UK authorities to ease the visa process and allow this and other similar programmes to continue could create real impact.
|
Source: adapted from Portland Trust written evidence http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Host.aspx?Content=Indicators/OfficialList.htm
Nicola Cobbold told us that the Portland Trust was discussing
these suggestions with DFID:
We are exploring the Palestinian grant leveraging facility
carefully with them, and the public-private partnership as well.
The development impact bond has a bit further to go; there is
no expertise on the ground in the Jerusalem office there, but
we are in discussion with them. On the visa, as an interim basis,
the British Council have agreed to sponsor the programme and create
a tier 5 sponsorship bond for us to enable the programme to go,
but it remains expensive, so we would still welcome some cross-Government
support in trying to resolve this issue.[ 23]
22. If the OPTs are to enjoy a better future, promoting economic
development will be of the utmost importance. We strongly support
DFID's recently-launched Palestinian Market Development Programme
(PMDP), but we also believe that it could do more in this area.
We recommend that DFID launch a Private Sector Grant Facility
(PSGF) and Development Impact Bonds (DIBs) in the OPTs, as the
Portland Trust recommended.
THE WEST BANK
23. As part of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, an Interim
Agreement was reached in 1995 on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,
known as the Oslo II Accords. The West Bank was split into
Areas A, B and C. This was a temporary measure, seen as a stepping
stone to a peace agreement, initially planned to last for a five-year
period, but has endured until today. The PA currently has full
control in Area A, and full control of civil matters in Area B
(it shares control of security matters with the Government of
Israel). In Area C, however, the Government of Israel has full
control. Area C constitutes the majority of the West Bank: in
1998-99 some land was transferred from Area C to Areas A and B,
but as shown by the map below over 60% of the West Bank still
falls within Area C,[ 24]
including much privately owned Palestinian land.[ 25]
 Source:
OCHA
The World Bank's Report
24. Area C is the most fertile area of the West Bank,
with greater water resources than Areas A and B: it includes the
Jordan Valley, which has been described as the "bread basket"
of the OPTs.[ 26] In a
report in October 2013 the World Bank stated that
'access to this area for most kinds of economic
activity has been severely limited. Yet, the potential contribution
of Area C to the Palestinian economy is large. Area C is richly
endowed with natural resources and it is contiguous, whereas Areas
A and B are smaller territorial islands. The manner in which Area
C is currently administered virtually precludes Palestinian businesses
from investing there.
It added that
'Neglecting indirect positive effects, we estimate
that the potential additional output from the sectors evaluated
in this report alone would amount to at least USD 2.2 billion
per annum in valued added terms-a sum equivalent to 23 percent
of 2011 Palestinian GDP...The bulk of this would come from agriculture
and Dead Sea minerals exploitation.[ 27]
25. We note the huge benefits which greater access
to Area C would bring to the Palestinian economy.
Demolitions and their effect on development
26. In Area C, Palestinian individuals or organisations
wishing to erect any new structures are required to obtain a permit
from the Israeli authorities. These permits are very difficult
to obtain, with applications often subject to indefinite delay.[ 28]
Oxfam informed us that between 2009 and 2012, 1,640 applications
were submitted but only 37 were approved.[ 29]
On the other hand the Embassy of Israel informed us:
In recent years, Israel has approved over 300
development plans for Palestinians in Area C. These include medical
facilities, water and electricity lines, roads, wastewater treatment
plants, garbage disposal, among others.[ 30]
27. On our visit we met a factory owner in Hebron
who wished to expand his business by building a new factory with
new equipment. He told us that the best place to do this in terms
of cost and space would be in Area C, but it was uncertain whether
he would get permission.
28. Many Palestinians erect structures without permits,
but we were informed that these structures are frequently demolished
by the Israeli authorities; and in almost all circumstances these
demolitions are contrary to international humanitarian law.[ 31]
According to DFID during 2013, 663 structures were demolished
(an increase of 59 on the previous year), with over 1,100 Palestinian
residents displaced.[ 32]
Bedouin communities are badly affected by demolitions. Save the
Children informed us that it provided assistance to communities
affected by demolitions, but this assistance was sometimes blocked
or confiscated. Moreover, some of the affected groups (5,000 people
in 38 communities) lived in areas designated by the Israeli authorities
as firing zones: it was difficult for Save the Children to gain
access to these areas.[ 33]
29. In its written evidence, the Israeli Embassy
stated: "When an unauthorized building is constructed, the
authorities issue an order either to halt construction or to demolish
the building. On receipt of such an order, interested parties
may […] appeal the decision. […] If the interested parties
do not exercise their right to appeal or if the appeal is declined,
a demolition order will be sent to those in charge instructing
them to dismantle the unauthorised structure. If this order is
not carried out, and no appeal has been submitted, then the authorities
will send a demolition crew.[ 34]
30. In a similar way to buildings, crops planted
by Palestinian are often subject to destruction. During our visit
we saw a group of Israeli settlers destroying Palestinian-planted
crops, with Israeli forces watching on; a Palestinian farmer told
us that he was 73 and had started picking his uncle's olives when
he was ten. In its written evidence, the Israeli Embassy stated
that the land in question was public land.
31. Some of the structures subject to demolition
are in fact donor-funded (though not funded through DFID's bilateral
programme). We were informed by Save the Children that during
2013, 122 donor-funded structures were demolished in Area C and
East Jerusalem.[ 35] These
included water and sanitation facilities, and livestock support
structures.[ 36] The European
Union, which receives funding from the UK taxpayer, was amongst
the donors affected: it lodged a complaint with the Israeli authorities,
but made no attempt to obtain compensation.[ 37]
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), used to construct
temporary shelters for those affected by demolitions, but in some
cases these too have been demolished.
32. In 2009, in an attempt to ease the blockage,
the UK began funding the International Peace Cooperation Centre
to submit community planning applications known as master-plans.[ 38]
33. DFID's work on master-plans appears to have helped
the situation: according to the IPCC, there have been no demolitions
in the 32 areas where UK-funded master-plans have been prepared.[ 39]
DFID has also helped a number of Palestinians to fight such demolitions
through the courts, with some success,[ 40]
but it is clear that more needs to be done. We received a number
of suggestions from NGOs as to how the UK might best respond to
the situation: for example, Save the Children encourages the UK
to "ensure systematic and intensified high-level communications
with the Israeli authorities as soon as demolition or other threats
arise."[ 41] The
Embassy of Israel told us
Israel is also in the process of approving 19
master plans for the construction of Palestinian communities in
Area C, through coordination with the local population. Three
of these master plans have already been approved. A further five
of these master plans are currently in the process of being published
for consultation.
However, the Embassy noted:
The remainder are currently on hold as a result
of the Palestinian Authority's unilateral decisions to seek recognition
by UN bodies and establish a unity government with Hamas, in violation
of the terms of the peace negotiations with Israel.[ 42]
34. While there are disagreements about the extent
of the difficulties faced by Palestinians in obtaining construction
permits, it is clear that the difficulties have a major negative
impact on the Palestinian economy, for example on businesses seeking
to expand. We recommend that the UK press the Israeli authorities
to grant significantly more construction permits than they have
thus far been willing to do.
35. The demolition of many Palestinian structures
is contrary to international law. We recommend that the
UK seek to persuade the Israeli authorities to refrain from such
demolitions where the UK believes such structures are justified.
UK representatives should engage with Israeli officials as soon
as demolition orders are issued where the UK believes these structures
are justified. We also recommend that DFID scale up the important
work it is already doing to help Palestinians to contest demolition
orders in the courts.
36. Israelis have justifiable concerns about the
nature and objectives of Hamas and its role in the PA government,
but this should not prevent the Government of Israel from taking
forward actions that remove obstacles to the development of Palestinian
communities in Area C; specifically the process of developing
"Master Plans" for communities in Area C should not
be frozen as part of the suspension of Israel's peace negotiations
with the Palestinians.
SETTLEMENTS
37. Since 1967 the Government of Israel has authorised
the construction of 150 settlements for Israelis in the West Bank
and East Jerusalem. The settlements are entire towns and conurbations:
they are not flimsy structures such as cabins, tents or huts.
A further 100 "outpost" settlements have been constructed
without official Israeli authorisation.[ 43]
Of the total surface area of the West Bank, 42.81% has been allocated
to regional settlement councils for construction.[ 44]
As a consequence there are now 300,000 Israelis living in Area
C, and only 150,000 Palestinians.[ 45]
The total number of Israeli settlers in the West Bank as a whole
is 530,000.[ 46]
38. Settlement construction, whether authorised by
the Israeli authorities or not, is illegal under international
law. Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states that: "The
occupying power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own
population into the territories it occupies." Israel has
argued that this does not apply to the OPTs, since the territories
were not under any legitimate sovereignty before the Israeli occupation.[ 47]
However, the international community (including UN bodies, the
International Court of Justice and the International Committee
of the Red Cross) maintains that the Fourth Geneva Convention
does apply.[ 48]
39. In addition, the settlements are a source of
continuing violence from both sides. On the one hand, Palestinians
are subjected to violence by Israeli settlers, including attacks
carried out by the notorious 'price tag' organisation'. On the
other hand, Israelis are also victims of violence; for example,
the kidnapping and murder of the 3 Israeli teenagers, which sparked
the recent escalation of violence, took place near Hebron on the
West Bank.[ 49]
40. Expansion of settlements continues. Of particular
concern at present is the proposed expansion of the large Ma'ale
Adumim settlement close to Jerusalem: if the expansion goes ahead,
a Bedouin herding community will be displaced and will see its
livelihood destroyed. This very community was previously displaced
from the Negev.[ 50] On
our visit we met Danny Sidemann, who informed us that the expansion
of settlements to the east of Jerusalem (in the area known as
E1 which lies between Jerusalem and the Ma'ale Adumim settlement)
would threaten the very possibility of a two state solution. The
Israeli Embassy stressed that 'no significant demolitions [had]
been carried out in E1, beyond the seizure of illegal mobile homes—some
of which were recently supplied by international organizations.
There is no Israeli construction in E1'.[ 51]
41. According to UN OCHA the settlements' "regional
councils" cover 70% of the surface area of Area C; across
the whole of this area, Palestinian individuals and organisations
are prohibited from erecting structures.[ 52]
42. During our visit, we were told that much of the
land in the OPTs is unregistered; this facilitates the expansion
of settlements. The Israeli Embassy informed us that the Military
Commander published a Military Order immediately after the Area
came under Israel's control, stating that the law in place on
the eve of the Six Day War would remain in force unless amended
or abolished by a military order. All amendments that have been
adopted since 1967 have been enacted in accordance with the security
legislation published by the Military Commander.' The law in force
in 1967 was often Ottoman Law or Jordanian Military Law.
43. We asked the Minister of State whether DFID would
consider helping the Palestinian Authority with land registration;
he said: "This is complicated by occupation, but in principle
you are absolutely right. We go around the world preaching the
virtues of land ownership and its proper registration, because
it is a fundamental foundation block of the rule of law."[ 53]
Jonathan Hargreaves, Head of DFID's Palestinian Programme, added:
There is an existing World Bank programme supporting
land registration, and we are having some very active conversations
with them about whether we can support them and also with the
Office of the Quartet Representative. It is something that we
will look at extremely carefully when we come to our new programming
from next year onwards.[ 54]
44. In 2009 the UK introduced labelling guidelines
calling for products made in Israeli settlements to be labelled
as such, thus enabling UK consumers to make an individual choice
as to whether they wish to purchase such products.[ 55]
Daniel Levy told us that he considered such labelling "absolutely
legitimate."[ 56]
Cathy Ward, Deputy Head of the Near East Department at the Foreign
& Commonwealth Office (FCO) said:
We were one of the key movers behind the introduction
of EU guidelines on the territorial application of EU funding,
which came out in July 2013. In December of last year, the UK
introduced guidance for businesses on human rights. It includes
guidance, which is published online in the UK now, about the activity
of businesses in settlements.[ 57]
The EU guidelines of 2013 which stated that Jewish
institutions in the OPTs would not be considered part of agreements
between Israel and the EU were seen by some of the organisations
we met as effective in highlighting to ordinary Israelis, European
countries' opposition to the settlements. Organisations such as
Christian Aid and the Palestine Solidarity Campaign argue that
the UK should go further by banning the import of products made
in Israeli settlements.[ 58]
45. Israeli settlements in the OPTs are illegal
under international law, and we consider them to be unacceptable.
The presence of the settlements, and the consequent inability
of Palestinians in Area C to control their own resources, severely
restrict the Palestinian economy. We are extremely concerned about
the potential for further settlement expansion, especially around
Jerusalem. Palestinians and some Israelis and Israeli organisations
we met believe that the international community could exert its
influence to restrict the expansion of settlements if it were
to take firmer measures to show its condemnation of the settlements.
The UK should in concert with other European countries stress
to the Israeli authorities the unacceptability of the present
situation. DFID should also support the World Bank programme which
is helping the Palestinian Authority with land registration.
46. We welcome the UK's decision to introduce
labelling guidelines calling for products made in Israeli settlements
to be labelled as such: this allows consumers to make an informed
decision as to whether they wish to purchase such products. We
continue to support strong economic ties between the UK and Israel.
However, we consider that it is very important to find out whether
the introduction of labelling guidelines for products made in
Israeli settlements has been effective, including whether they
have been implemented by major retailers and what effect they
have had on the sales of products from the settlements in the
UK. We strongly recommend that the UK Government undertake a review
of the implementation and impact of the introduction of labelling
guidelines. We also recommend a review of the initial impact of
the introduction of the 2013 EU guidelines on the territorial
application of EU funding.
HEBRON
47. We visited the city of Hebron, where life is
particularly difficult for Palestinians. In 1994, during the Oslo
peace process, the settler, Baruch Goldstein, opened fire on praying
Muslims in the Ibrahimi Mosque/Cave of Machpela in Hebron, killing
29 and injuring many more. Israelis were then killed in revenge
suicide attacks. The Oslo process continued and in February 1997
an agreement on the partial redeployment of the IDF in Hebron
was signed and the city was divided in two areas: Area H1, controlled
by the PA, and area H2, which continued to be under Israeli military
control. Violence escalated in the city after the outbreak of
the Second Intifada in 2000, with daily clashes and attacks from
both the Palestinian and the Israeli sides. In April 2002, the
IDF took full control of the entire city. Permanent watchtowers
were erected in the H1-area in 2003. Our tour of H2 was facilitated
by Breaking the Silence, an Israeli NGO which aims to raise
awareness among Israelis about the situation in the West Bank.
H2 is under full Israeli control, yet its population includes
just several hundred Israeli settlers living alongside 40,000
Palestinians. Despite Palestinians constituting the vast majority
of the population, H2 contains a number of "restricted areas"
where the activities of Palestinians are heavily constrained.
On many streets in these areas, Palestinian vehicles are prohibited;
some streets are off limits to all Palestinians, including pedestrians.[ 59]
During our visit we were told that a number of Palestinians live
on these streets: their front doors have been welded shut and
they are forced to exit their houses via the back door. Whilst
walking down one such street we were told that prior to the imposition
of restrictions, it used to be the main street of the town. We
saw offensive signs, one attached to a Muslim cemetery. An OCHA
survey found that in the restricted areas, over 1,000 Palestinian
homes (over two-fifths of the total number of homes in the area)
had been abandoned.[ 60]
We saw ecumenical observers who walk with Palestinian children
to and from school. We also saw Breaking the Silence footage
of Palestinian children being verbally and physically abused with
almost no protection from Israeli forces.
48. We were shocked by what we saw during our
visit to Hebron especially the impact of settlements, which are
illegal under international law, on the daily lives of Palestinians.
The restrictions on Palestinians have an entirely unacceptable
impact on their livelihoods, economic development and security.
We recommend that the Government put pressure on the Israeli
authorities to lift these restrictions as a matter of urgency.
49. We are concerned that Breaking the Silence
no longer receives Conflict Pool funding. It is a unique and credible
voice which speaks to Israelis about what is done in their name.
We recommend that the Government reinstate funding for Breaking
the Silence.
ACCESS TO SERVICES
50. During our visit, Palestinians we met complained
about their lack of access to water. The Israeli Embassy emphasised
that Israel was exceeding the amount of fresh water it was mandated
to provide to the Palestinians and that it subsidised the
price.[ 61] The problem
seems to be that the Oslo II water regime heavily restricts Palestinians'
access to water. This measure, which was meant to be of temporary
nature has never been amended, and thus the water from the Mountain
Aquifer continues to be largely extracted by Israel. While
we note the comments of the Israeli Embassy, we are deeply concerned
about the continuing validity of the restrictions on Palestinians'
access to water in Area C under the interim Oslo II agreement.
The UK should use its influence to encourage Israel and Palestine
to reach a more satisfactory agreement about water resources,
allowing Palestinians equitable access to the water resources
in the West Bank.
51. We were also told that 3G services were only
available in the West Bank to those with an Israeli SIM card-most
likely Israeli settlers. In its written evidence, the Embassy
of Israel states that following the Fatah-Hamas reconciliation,
discussions about 3G in the Israeli-Palestinian Joint Technical
Committee (JTC) have been placed on hold.[ 62]
Despite the Fatah-Hamas reconciliation, we recommend that the
UK encourage both sides to resume discussions in the Joint Technology
Committee (JTC), with a view to enabling users with Palestinian
SIM cards to access 3G services and to undertake to reach rapid
agreement on 4G services when they are technically available.
Gaza
52. Since 2007 the Government of Israel has imposed
severe restrictions on Gaza. Residents of Gaza are subject to
travel restrictions; exports to Israel and the West Bank are banned;
and imports of "dual-use" items (items which could be
used for terrorist activities) and basic private sector construction
materials are banned. Moreover, there are significant restrictions
on access to 35% of Gaza's agricultural land and 85% of its fishable
waters.[ 63]
53. The travel restrictions on Gaza residents are
extremely severe: Gazans are not generally allowed to leave the
territory. During our visit we were told that residents of Gaza
were allowed to leave to visit "first degree relatives"
in special circumstances (e.g. illness or a wedding), but this
did not extend to "second degree relatives" (e.g. grandparents).
We were also told that whilst Gazans were allowed to travel to
Israel for medical treatment, they had to be accompanied, and
often had to transfer to an Israeli ambulance at the crossing.
Palestinian ambulances require permits to cross the border.[ 64]
54. Since 2010, we were told, a very small number
of people have been allowed to leave Gaza for business- or training-related
reasons. The only vehicles allowed across the border were UN and
diplomatic vehicles: ordinary Gazans, if allowed to cross at all,
had to do so on foot. Between January and June 2013, the average
number of people allowed to leave Gaza was less than 200 per day;
during the equivalent period in 2000, the average was 26,000.[ 65]
55. The trade restrictions are equally severe. Between
January and June 2013, the average number of truckloads leaving
Gaza was less than one per day; during the equivalent period in
2007, the average was 38.[ 66]
The impact on Gaza's economy has been hugely damaging: almost
60% of Gaza's businesses have closed down since the blockade began,
whilst another 25% have reduced their staffing levels by 80%.
Exports from Gaza have fallen by 97%.[ 67]
The consequence was the development of an illegal "tunnel
economy", with goods being smuggled between Gaza and Egypt
through a number of illegal tunnels. Whilst illegal, these tunnels
at least provided some opportunity for trade.[ 68]
It should also be noted that the tunnels were used for weapons
and rockets being smuggled in from Iran and elsewhere. Recently,
following the fall of the Hamas-supporting Muslim Brotherhood
in Egypt, most of the tunnels have been destroyed.[ 69]
56. Supply of essential utilities in Gaza is heavily
disrupted. Gaza has an aquifer, but it is extremely saline: less
than 10% of the water extracted is safe to drink and the aquifer
may become unusable by 2016.
Only 25% of Gazan households have running water, and then only
for a few hours each day. The electricity supply is equally disrupted.
Gaza imports 63% of its electricity from Israel, but its capacity
to generate its own electricity is constrained by shortages of
fuel for the power plant. In its written evidence, the Israeli
Embassy attributes these shortages to a dispute between Hamas
and the PA about who is responsible for paying for and taxing
the fuel.[ 70] During
our visit we were told that power blackouts occur for between
8 and 16 hours each day. A group of young Gazan entrepreneurs
told us that they had had to adjust their working hours as a consequence,
including working at night when power was unavailable during the
day.
57. The Minister of State told us:
I spoke […] to the head of the Gaza supply
plant, and essentially they have half the generating capacity
they need at the best of times and half the feedstock they need
for half the capacity. What you end up with is constant power
cuts […] Just before I was there, the electricity went off
and all the sewage pumping stations ground to a halt, so the streets
were running with sewage, which is not a pretty sight […]
there is a tentative plan to have pylons coming in from the southern
corner, from Israel, but the planning for that is essentially
blocked. We are trying to champion, where we can, the BG project-a
longstanding licence they have held, as yet inoperative-to produce
gas just offshore Gaza, but they are not in control of course,
without Israeli permission, of their own resource. There is a
long-term prospect of a really good energy source from Gaza Marine,
which will be of broader economic benefit, because it would produce
more gas than Gaza needs, so they would have an export potential.
[…] Tony Blair and the Quartet are doing their best to advance
it, and it would be a very good solution to their energy problems
and to much of their economic plight.[ 71]
The Minister of State also said:
When I was last there, I became seriously concerned
by the prospect that UNRWA, which underpins so much that happens
in Gaza, will run out of money in the autumn, and we are left
with a Gaza with no water, no power and no food. The prospects
for Gaza, towards the end of this calendar year, are very grim
indeed.[ 72]
58. In her evidence to us Margot Ellis, Deputy Commissioner-General
of UNRWA, said: "I think the best thing that Israel could
do for its own security is to allow exports [...] Having an impoverished,
marginalised population in Gaza is the worst thing to have at
Israel's doorstep in terms of promoting insecurity."[ 73]
Yossi Mekelberg, Lecturer in Politics and International Relations
at Regent's University, London, said: "The reasons for [the
blockade] are political-to weaken Hamas-rather than real security.
[…] The fact that the Government of Gaza, or Hamas, is regarded
[…] as a terrorist entity does not mean that all the people
that live in Gaza are terrorists and have to be punished for it."[ 74]
59. In its written evidence, Oxfam argues that:
a) "DFID
should continue to focus on development of economic opportunities
and enabling exports of goods from Gaza. In order to be effective,
however, all such initiatives need to be accompanied by strong
political engagement from the UK and other states.
b) DFID should
consider bolder initiatives aimed at promoting implementation
Israel's existing international agreements to enable Palestinians
to travel between Gaza and the West Bank and to enable movement
of goods. This could include launching existing plans to open
the port or similarly develop plans for a corridor for travel
between Gaza and the West Bank."[ 75]
60. We fully appreciate Israel's legitimate security
concerns in respect of the Gaza strip, especially in the light
of recent events, including rocket attacks on Israel from Gaza.
However, we do not believe that all the present arrangements,
notably those which affect travel and trade are proportionate.
Some are contrary to Israel's obligations under international
law and also run the risk of making the security situation worse.
Given the current situation in the Gaza Strip, it is understandable
that the Government of Israel is unwilling to engage in discussions,
but, nevertheless, we recommend that the UK encourage the Israeli
authorities to lift those restrictions which are not justified
by security needs. The UK should also seek to persuade Israel
to consider what steps it might take to improve the availability
of water and electricity in Gaza.
61. We recommend that DFID scale up its work supporting
exports from Gaza. DFID should also support the implementation
of existing plans to open Gaza's port, and work to facilitate
travel between Gaza and the West Bank, possibly by developing
plans for a travel corridor.
OPTs: conclusions
62. Israel is a democracy with a strong entrepreneurial
culture. We saw in the OPTs similar dynamism and enterprise, which
we wish to see encouraged. So much could be achieved if Palestinians
and Israelis could work together to foster economic development.
We fully understand and appreciate Israeli security concerns,
especially in view of the recent murder of three Israeli teenagers
outside Hebron and the continuing rockets attacks on Israel from
the Gaza Strip. Some of the evidence we were given on our visit
is difficult to reconcile with that subsequently provided by the
Israeli Embassy, but we were shocked by what we saw in the OPTs.
We saw a country whose people have known immense suffering now
imposing conditions on their Palestinian neighbours which cause
a different but very real suffering and often without real security
justification. We saw Israel taking a range of actions that hinder
Palestinian economic development and must, at the very least,
cause deep resentment on the Palestinian side, even amongst the
most moderate and pragmatic people, and so will actually worsen
Israel's own security.
17 Q91 Back
18 DFID, written evidence Back
19 http://nsnbc.me/2014/03/10/prague-conference-palestinian-economy-highlights-potentials-omissions/.
The Quartet comprises the UN, the US and Russia; its role is to
help mediate Israeli-Palestinian talks. Back
20 DFID, written evidence Back
21 Q88 Back
22 Portland Trust, written evidence Back
23 Q97 Back
24 DFID, written evidence Back
25 UNOCHA OPT: The humanitarian impact of Israeli settlement policies; January 2012 Back
26 Oxfam, written evidence Back
27 World Bank: Area C and the Future of the Palestinian Economy,
October 2013 Back
28 Save the Children, written evidence Back
29 Oxfam, written evidence Back
30 Israeli Embassy, written evidence Back
31 DFID, written evidence Back
32 DFID, written evidence Back
33 Save the Children, written evidence Back
34 Israeli Embassy, written evidence Back
35 Save the Children, written evidence; Q181 Back
36 Q46 Back
37 Palestine Solidarity Campaign, written evidence Back
38 Oxfam, written evidence Back
39 Q183 Back
40 Oxfam, written evidence Back
41 Save the Children, written evidence Back
42 Israeli Embassy, written evidence Back
43 Christian Aid, written evidence Back
44 Christian Aid, written evidence Back
45 DFID, written evidence Back
46 Christian Aid, written evidence Back
47 http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/issues/pages/faq_peace_process_with_palestinians_dec_2009.aspx#Settlements4 Back
48 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/1682640.stm
Back
49 As the occupying power, Israel is obliged to prevent attacks on
civilians, but, we were informed, Israel often fails to abide
by this. The Israeli Embassy informed us that 'price tag' 'had
been defined as an illegal organization and, accordingly, administrative
restraining orders were being used.' It listed a series of 'actions
that had been taken to combat "price tag" attacks. Back
50 Q45 Back
51 Israeli Embassy, written evidence Back
52 UNOCHA OPT: Area C of the West Bank: key humanitarian concerns; January 2013 Back
53 Q195 Back
54 Q195 Back
55 Q187 Back
56 Q41 Back
57 Q187 Back
58 Christian Aid, written evidence; Palestine Solidarity Campaign, written evidence Back
59 UNOCHA OPT, The humanitarian impact of Israeli settlements in Hebron city; November 2013 Back
60 UNOCHA OPT, The humanitarian impact of Israeli settlements in Hebron city; November 2013 Back
61 Israeli Embassy, written evidence Back
62 Israeli Embassy, written evidence Back
63 DFID, written evidence Back
64 Israel Embassy, written evidence Back
65 UNOCHA OPT: The Gaza Strip: the humanitarian impact of movement restrictions on people and goods; July 2013 Back
66 UNOCHA OPT: The Gaza Strip: the humanitarian impact of movement restrictions on people and goods; July 2013 Back
67 Oxfam, written evidence Back
68 Oxfam, written evidence Back
69 http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/14/us-egypt-gaza-idUSBREA0D09D20140114;
Israeli Embassy, written evidence Back
70 Israeli Embassy, written evidence Back
71 Q197 Back
72 Q196 Back
73 Q35 Back
74 Q103-5 Back
75 Oxfam, written evidence Back
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