The UK's Development Work in the Occupied Palestinian Territories - International Development Committee Contents


Conclusions and recommendations


The OPTs: the background

1.  We regret the recent suspension of peace talks between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority. We note with sadness the terrible crimes recently committed by both Palestinian and Israeli extremists. We understand the revulsion which many Israelis feel for Hamas, whose charter calls for the destruction of the Israeli state. We condemn the continuous rocket attacks on Israel from the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip, which show the seriousness of Israel's security concerns. Nevertheless, in the long run there has to be agreement between Fatah and Hamas which should result in peace talks between such a unified Palestinian government and Israel. All parties to these peace talks, including Hamas, must accept the Quartet's principles if there is to be a two-state solution. Moreover, we believe that the reconciliation increases the likelihood that Hamas will one day accept Israel's right to exist. US Secretary of State John Kerry had shown extraordinary leadership in bringing the parties to the table, and despite the murders of late June and July we remain hopeful that the current suspension will be temporary rather than permanent. (Paragraph 17)

2.  The suspension of the peace process should not lead to the suspension of discussions to lift restrictions on economic development in the OPTs. These cannot await a peace agreement; there has not been a final peace settlement in over 40 years and there may not be one for many years. The stalling of the peace process should not prevent the UK from encouraging economic development in the OPTs and encouraging the removal of those restrictions which are not justified on security grounds. Indeed, we see it as in everyone's interest to increase prosperity in the OPTs. (Paragraph 18)

Economic development in the OPTs

3.  If the OPTs are to enjoy a better future, promoting economic development will be of the utmost importance. We strongly support DFID's recently-launched Palestinian Market Development Programme (PMDP), but we also believe that it could do more in this area. (Paragraph 22)

4.  We recommend that DFID launch a Private Sector Grant Facility (PSGF) and Development Impact Bonds (DIBs) in the OPTs, as the Portland Trust recommended. (Paragraph 22)

5.  We note the huge benefits which greater access to Area C would bring to the Palestinian economy. (Paragraph 25)

6.  While there are disagreements about the extent of the difficulties faced by Palestinians in obtaining construction permits, it is clear that the difficulties have a major negative impact on the Palestinian economy, for example on businesses seeking to expand. (Paragraph 34)

7.  We recommend that the UK press the Israeli authorities to grant significantly more construction permits than they have thus far been willing to do. (Paragraph 34)

8.  The demolition of many Palestinian structures is contrary to international law. (Paragraph 35)

9.  We recommend that the UK seek to persuade the Israeli authorities to refrain from such demolitions where the UK believes such structures are justified. UK representatives should engage with Israeli officials as soon as demolition orders are issued where the UK believes these structures are justified. We also recommend that DFID scale up the important work it is already doing to help Palestinians to contest demolition orders in the courts. (Paragraph 35)

10.  Israelis have justifiable concerns about the nature and objectives of Hamas and its role in the PA government, but this should not prevent the Government of Israel from taking forward actions that remove obstacles to the development of Palestinian communities in Area C; specifically the process of developing "Master Plans" for communities in Area C should not be frozen as part of the suspension of Israel's peace negotiations with the Palestinians. (Paragraph 36)

11.  Israeli settlements in the OPTs are illegal under international law, and we consider them to be unacceptable. The presence of the settlements, and the consequent inability of Palestinians in Area C to control their own resources, severely restrict the Palestinian economy. We are extremely concerned about the potential for further settlement expansion, especially around Jerusalem. Palestinians and some Israelis and Israeli organisations we met believe that the international community could exert its influence to restrict the expansion of settlements if it were to take firmer measures to show its condemnation of the settlements. (Paragraph 45)

12.  The UK should in concert with other European countries stress to the Israeli authorities the unacceptability of the present situation. DFID should also support the World Bank programme which is helping the Palestinian Authority with land registration. (Paragraph 45)

13.  We welcome the UK's decision to introduce labelling guidelines calling for products made in Israeli settlements to be labelled as such: this allows consumers to make an informed decision as to whether they wish to purchase such products. We continue to support strong economic ties between the UK and Israel. However, we consider that it is very important to find out whether the introduction of labelling guidelines for products made in Israeli settlements has been effective, including whether they have been implemented by major retailers and what effect they have had on the sales of products from the settlements in the UK. We strongly recommend that the UK Government undertake a review of the implementation and impact of the introduction of labelling guidelines. We also recommend a review of the initial impact of the introduction of the 2013 EU guidelines on the territorial application of EU funding. (Paragraph 46)

14.  We were shocked by what we saw during our visit to Hebron especially the impact of settlements, which are illegal under international law, on the daily lives of Palestinians. The restrictions on Palestinians have an entirely unacceptable impact on their livelihoods, economic development and security. (Paragraph 48)

15.  We recommend that the Government put pressure on the Israeli authorities to lift these restrictions as a matter of urgency. (Paragraph 48)

16.  We are concerned that Breaking the Silence no longer receives Conflict Pool funding. It is a unique and credible voice which speaks to Israelis about what is done in their name. (Paragraph 49)

17.  We recommend that the Government reinstate funding for Breaking the Silence. (Paragraph 49)

18.  While we note the comments of the Israeli Embassy, we are deeply concerned about the continuing validity of the restrictions on Palestinians' access to water in Area C under the interim Oslo II agreement. (Paragraph 50)

19.  The UK should use its influence to encourage Israel and Palestine to reach a more satisfactory agreement about water resources, allowing Palestinians equitable access to the water resources in the West Bank. (Paragraph 50)

20.  Despite the Fatah-Hamas reconciliation, we recommend that the UK encourage both sides to resume discussions in the Joint Technology Committee (JTC), with a view to enabling users with Palestinian SIM cards to access 3G services and to undertake to reach rapid agreement on 4G services when they are technically available. (Paragraph 51)

21.  We fully appreciate Israel's legitimate security concerns in respect of the Gaza strip, especially in the light of recent events, including rocket attacks on Israel from Gaza. However, we do not believe that all the present arrangements, notably those which affect travel and trade are proportionate. Some are contrary to Israel's obligations under international law and also run the risk of making the security situation worse. (Paragraph 60)

22.  Given the current situation in the Gaza Strip, it is understandable that the Government of Israel is unwilling engage in discussions, but, nevertheless, we recommend that the UK encourage the Israeli authorities to lift those restrictions which are not justified by security needs. The UK should also seek to persuade Israel to consider what steps it might take to improve the availability of water and electricity in Gaza. (Paragraph 60)

23.  We recommend that DFID scale up its work supporting exports from Gaza. DFID should also support the implementation of existing plans to open Gaza's port, and work to facilitate travel between Gaza and the West Bank, possibly by developing plans for a travel corridor. (Paragraph 61)

24.  Israel is a democracy with a strong entrepreneurial culture. We saw in the OPTs similar dynamism and enterprise, which we wish to see encouraged. So much could be achieved if Palestinians and Israelis could work together to foster economic development. We fully understand and appreciate Israeli security concerns, especially in view of the recent murder of three Israeli teenagers outside Hebron and the continuing rockets attacks on Israel from the Gaza Strip. Some of the evidence we were given on our visit are difficult to reconcile with that subsequently provided by the Israeli Embassy, but we were shocked by what we saw in the OPTs. We saw a country whose people have known immense suffering now imposing conditions on their Palestinian neighbours which cause a different but very real suffering and often without real security justification. We saw Israel taking a range of actions that hinder Palestinian economic development and must, at the very least, cause deep resentment on the Palestinian side, even amongst the most moderate and pragmatic people, and so will actually worsen Israel's own security. (Paragraph 62)

OPTs: DFID's programme

25.  DFID's support is helping to prepare the PA for the assumption of governmental functions in a future Palestinian state. DFID's financial support is critical to the PA's operation, especially giving its ongoing financial crisis. (Paragraph 67)

26.  UK policy remains to support a two-state solution and DFID should continue to provide funding to the Palestinian Authority. (Paragraph 67)

27.  We are nevertheless concerned that DFID is not taking adequate measures to prevent its funds from being misused. Given the scale of the operation, with 85,000 civil servants being paid with UK money, there is a serious risk of abuse. We do not regard a six-monthly audit as an adequate protection to secure the integrity of UK aid funds. (Paragraph 68)

28.  We recommend that DFID impose more stringent checks to ensure that the money it provides to the PA is not being misused while pursuing a constructive dialogue with the PA on the end-use of funds. (Paragraph 68)

29.  We are also extremely concerned about the PA's policy of paying salaries to the families of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails. While appreciating it is a sensitive issue, issuing payments to families based on the length of jail terms, rather than need, is a political and not a welfare decision and thus unacceptable. In addition, while the British Government maintains that no UK money supports this activity, UK aid payments fund the payment of PA civil servants. It could therefore be said with some justification that this payment of UK funds enables the PA to release alternative funds which allow these payments to continue and which might alternatively be used more effectively to cover other needs. The Palestinian Finance Minister confirmed that the payments were a serious burden on the PA's finances. (Paragraph 69)

30.  We urge the UK to help the Palestinian Authority stop these payments and to replace them with welfare payments to prisoners' families based on poverty levels and need. (Paragraph 69)

31.  UNRWA is a key provider of public services in the Palestinian territories, and it is only able to fulfil this role thanks to the contributions made by donors such as DFID. Donor funding to UNRWA plays a crucial role in preventing great hardship in the OPTs. (Paragraph 73)

32.  We recommend that DFID continue to provide funding to UNRWA. While there are weaknesses in UNWRA s work, it has made improvements, but DFID must maintain pressure on the organisation to make further efficiencies. (Paragraph 73)

33.  The health sector in Gaza is in a situation of grave crisis. Failure to address this crisis as a matter of urgency will have severe consequences. (Paragraph 77)

34.  Together with other donors, DFID should provide funding for urgent medical supplies in Gaza. DFID should also reinstate the health sector as a key priority within its Palestinian programme, as it is clear that the circumstances which led to its de-prioritisation no longer apply. (Paragraph 77)

35.  If a two-state solution is to be achieved, it will require genuine support and buy-in from ordinary people on both sides. This cannot and should not be taken for granted. On the contrary, concrete steps should be taken to strengthen the appetite for peace on both sides of the divide. (Paragraph 85)

36.  We recommend that the UK fund a significant number of people-to-people projects in Israel and the OPTs, either through DFID, the Conflict Pool or the new Conflict, Stability and Security Fund. As part of this, it should fund organisations, which can bring together people of all faiths. As part of this, it should fund organisations, which can bring together people of all faiths. We met a number of individuals from organisations which appeared well equipped to do this, including Cherish, the Bethlehem Bible College and other Palestinian Christian organisations, which we met at the college. (Paragraph 85)

37.  The progress on peace talks has been frustrating and difficult, but failure to reach an agreement eventually would have devastating consequences on both Israelis and Palestinians. In view of this, we believe that it is essential that the UK continues to support the talks, keep hopes of peace and the two state solution alive and to provide funding to support the Palestinians, especially in view of the UK's role in the history of the area. (Paragraph 87)


 
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Prepared 6 August 2014