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Committee

The Future of UK Development Co- operation: Phase 2: Beyond Aid

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International Development Committee

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Summary

The nature of international development is changing. The number of low income countries is falling. Within that group, most of the poorest countries—and overall, 22 out of DFID’s portfolio of 28 countries—are fragile states, requiring multiple and complex interventions. At the same time, the importance of global issues—conflict, climate, migration, trade, tax, financial stability, youth unemployment, urbanisation economic development, and infectious disease—is rising. These changes will be reflected in the new framework of Sustainable Development Goals to be adopted in 2015.

Aid remains essential for the poorest countries, and for some purposes in middle-income countries (MICs). It is encouraging that the UK has reached the 0.7% target. However, overall, a new approach is required which reflects the changing situation.

First, as aid is no longer provided to some MICs, such as India, new forms of co-operation have to be developed which facilitate links with UK institutions in a wide range of areas, including health, education, culture, law, culture and science. This will be labour-intensive, requiring DFID to put more emphasis on working with small organisations.

Second, policy coherence for development (PCD) is at the heart of a new approach. This means working across Government in the UK, and with global partners in the multilateral system, to maximise the impact on development of all the UK’s actions.

The UK has scored notable successes, for example on some aspects of trade, tax and global health. Its initiatives of women and girls, including FGM, attract widespread praise. At the same time, DFID’s record is patchy. For example, there is more to do on security where we are concerned that DFID lacks influence; as a result too little weight is given to conflict prevention.

The UK faces challenges which will require a cross-Government approach on a large number of issues, including: security, in and originating from fragile states; climate change; and disease threats (illustrated by Ebola). The new SDG framework will require action on these and other issues.

The new approach raises questions about issues such as organisational structures, cross-Government working, competences, and reporting and accountability. We believe DFID’s long-term future as a standalone ministry will be at risk unless stronger mechanisms to support cross-Government working on development are put in place. We recommend that

- The UK maintains a free-standing and Cabinet-level Department for International Development which ensures that international development priorities are at the heart of government, and is appropriate for the UK.
- Cross-Government working be improved. The security sector is a case in point. The National Security Council should take a broader view of threats to UK security, and ensure that development and conflict prevention be given the priority

they deserve. There should be explicit strategies and policies, with clear responsibilities for delivery. Current experience with joint Ministers, joint units, cross-Government funds, and shared offices overseas, should be expanded.

- DFID make policy coherence for development (PCD) a higher priority and make improvements to reporting and accountability. DFID needs to put PCD at the heart of its work, co-operating closely across Whitehall, and not treat it as an add-on. The National Audit Office and the Independent Commission on Aid Impact should give a higher priority to PCD. The National Security Council should be fully accountable to select committees, via the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, and individual select committees.
- Both the International Development Act of 2002 and the International Development (Reporting and Transparency) Act of 2006 be revised and updated to reflect the changes which are taking place. This should be done when the new SDG framework has been agreed.
- DFID ensure that its staff have the right skills for the future. In recent years, as Departmental spending has grown, DFID staff have focused on programme management. In the future, other skills will become increasingly important. The Government must ensure that staff competences cover, in addition to programme management, the ability to influence partners in Whitehall, in international institutions and in developing countries; they must have the ability to facilitate new forms of development co-operation. Both DFID and the FCO will have to invest more in staff working in fragile states, with better language training and longer postings.

1 Introduction

Development in transition

1. The manner and geographic distribution of poverty reduction and international development is changing. Over the course of this Parliament, two particular changes have struck us. First, the number of low-income countries has fallen sharply, to only 34 in the latest World Bank list.¹ The number of middle-income countries is rising. However, many of these countries retain stubborn pockets of poverty. Many are also classed as “fragile”, or conflict-affected, states: 22 of the 28 countries in the UK Department for International Development’s portfolio are fragile.² Second, while long-standing concerns such as gender and the provision of public services remain important, the importance of global issues is rising within the development agenda, as problems in their own right, but specifically affecting the growth prospects and poverty reduction potential of developing countries. These issues include conflict, climate, migration, trade, tax, financial stability, youth unemployment, urbanisation, economic development, infectious disease and governance. They require joined-up action across Government, and also necessarily involve multilateral action.

2. The world will seek to tackle these issues alongside poverty reduction in a new framework of post-2015 sustainable development goals. The UK has taken an important role in the international process of agreeing new goals, with the Prime Minister co-chairing a high-level panel in 2012-13. The UN Secretary General issued a ‘synthesis report’ on 4 December 2014, which sets out the basis for international negotiations in the run-up to their agreement in September 2015.³ In addition, the world will need to find ways of working together with new global players, in particular China. It also requires appropriate thought about how to develop new models of development co-operation with middle income countries like India without using grants. The UK recently reached the UN target of spending 0.7% of GNI on international development. Thus it is a timely moment to think less about how to increase spending, and more about on what, and how, the money is spent and what skills staff will require for a changing world.

What are beyond aid issues, and why do they matter?

3. The Secretary of State has said recently that the UK’s future approach to development will require a focus on the missing issues from the MDGs: economic growth, governance, rule of law, tackling corruption, peace and stability, and putting women and girls first.⁴ DFID’s written submission covered these issues and some others, including international

1 World Bank, [Country and Lending Groups](#) (accessed 21 January 2015)

2 [DFID written evidence](#), para 15

3 United Nations [The Road to Dignity by 2030: Ending Poverty, Transforming All Lives and Protecting the Planet Synthesis Report of the Secretary-General On the Post-2015 Agenda](#) (Advanced unedited version, December 2014)

4 Rt Hon Justine Greening MP, Secretary of State for International Development, [Speech: Beyond Aid - development priorities from 2015](#) (7 July 2014)

taxation, knowledge and technology transfer, and education and children.⁵ Many witnesses agreed with this agenda, adding issues such as climate, trade, tax, migration, infectious diseases, remittances, arms sales, narcotics, peacekeeping deployments, technology, and intellectual property. Figure 1 illustrates the relative frequency with which different issues were mentioned in written submissions.

Figure 1: Frequency of issues in written evidence



4. Why do these issues matter? DFID itself observed in a written submission that “ending global poverty can only be achieved through ensuring the international system works for developing countries.”⁶ Development experts Owen Barder and Theodore Talbot said that policymakers should pay more attention to “beyond aid” policies for development, for three reasons:

- a) The benefits to poor people that can be brought about by even quite modest ‘beyond aid’ policy changes are much larger than can be brought about through aid.
- b) ‘Beyond aid’ policies mainly address the underlying causes of poverty, while aid is most likely to be spent well when it addresses the symptoms of poverty and meets immediate humanitarian needs.
- c) As well as being beneficial for development, most of these ‘beyond aid’ policies would be good for the UK in the short run as well as in the long run. Aid, in contrast, costs the average British household about £430 a year: so the long-run benefits come at a substantial short-term cost.⁷

5. More generally, the Institute of Development Studies emphasised common interests between developed and developing countries:

5 [DFID written submission](#)

6 [DFID written submission](#)

7 [Owen Barder and Theodore Talbot submission](#)

Development needs to be redefined as universal progressive economic, social and political change. Long-established views that associated development primarily with poverty reduction and progress in countries of the ‘global south’ are being contested. The rise of multi-polar politics linked to the BRICS countries and shifts in global geo-alliances has challenged old north-south divisions. Shared global problems, including climate change, environmental and financial system risks, epidemics and conflict are on the rise, with causes and consequences relevant to all people and places, albeit in different ways.⁸

6. At the time of our evidence sessions, the outbreak of Ebola in West Africa featured prominently in public debate. This is a classic example of a global as well as local threat, which requires a coordinated international response at all levels, ranging from aid, co-operation between DFID and other Government departments/institutions, research into vaccines and treatments, to international monitoring and response coordination, as well as deployment of resources on the ground. Investments in global public goods of this kind are of benefit to people in both rich and poor countries.

The inquiry

7. In response to these changes in international development, we decided in 2013 to undertake a two-part inquiry looking at the current UK approach to development, and detailing the Committee’s views on the future UK development approach in 2015 and beyond. Phase 1 of the inquiry focused on Development Finance. We published our report in February 2014. We noted that grants from the UK and other donors to developing countries, while still essential, would be of decreasing importance compared with other sources of finance. We called for new financial mechanisms and looked at the relative roles to be played by multilateral organisations and bilateral programmes.⁹

8. This second phase looks at issues ‘beyond aid’, and how the UK Government increasingly needs to include non-aid policies in its development approach. As Owen Barder and Alex Evans, both former senior Whitehall officials, told us “an effective beyond aid agenda depends on influencing—and hence people—more than on money.”¹⁰ DFID staff, their skills and their use of time, are thus of key relevance to this inquiry.

9. We received a particularly large volume of written evidence, with almost sixty submissions. We held three oral evidence sessions, exploring ‘beyond aid’ issues with experts, academics, an NGO representative, European Union officials, a representative from the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), and the Secretary of State for International Development. The Department of Health sent its Head of International Health Policy as a witness. We invited Sir Kim Darroch, the Government’s National Security Adviser, to give evidence, but he declined to appear, citing concerns about sharing

8 [Institute of Development Studies submission](#)

9 International Development Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2013-14, *The Future of UK Development Co-operation: Phase 1: Development Finance*, HC 334

10 [Global Witness submission](#), para 18

internal policy advice—prepared for the Prime Minister—in public. We would like to thank all those who submitted evidence. We would also like to thank our specialist adviser, Simon Maxwell.

The report

10. As our Chair pointed out at our final evidence session, we have always identified ourselves as the ‘International Development’, not the ‘overseas aid’, committee.¹¹ This, one of our final reports of this Parliament, is a chance to set out why. We see it as our ‘legacy report’, as the end of this Parliament, in April 2015, draws near. The report aims to explore the coverage of issues, the policy processes and the structures needed to implement a wider vision of development. We use as our starting point the fact that development is about more than aid. The report examines whether the Government has an adequate approach to beyond aid issues, and adequate coverage. We explore the policy processes and mechanisms needed to implement a wider vision.

11. Our terms of reference for the inquiry were deliberately challenging, asking whether a stand-alone Department for International Development has a long-term future. We aim to act as a critical friend to DFID, offering a timely prompt about the Department’s strategic priorities and direction of travel as it looks into the next Parliament. We will ask whether DFID has the right skill sets as it adjusts to new modes of development co-operation. We will also look outside the Department to ask whether all Government departments work together to achieve a coherent, comprehensive approach to development, and whether the Government has the right structures to achieve this.

12. In Chapter Two, we reaffirm the case for aid. In Chapter Three, we explore transition strategies in middle-income countries, in particular how to build better partnerships between institutions in these countries and the UK. In Chapter Four, we examine the issue of policy coherence for development. In Chapter Five we look at how the UK’s approach should change. Finally, in Chapter Six, we summarise our conclusions and recommendations.

2 The continuing role for aid

13. The UK can be proud of its commitment to aid, having recently achieved the iconic target of spending 0.7% of its gross national income on official development assistance (ODA). The UK was widely praised by witnesses as a global leader. It ranks highly on comparative measures of aid effectiveness. For example, the most recent measure of the Quality of Official Development Assistance (QuODA), published by the Center for Global Development in July 2014, shows the UK performing in the top third of 31 donors on three out of four composite measures of aid quality (themselves based on 31 separate indicators—see Figure 2).¹² The OECD DAC Peer Review of the UK, published in December 2014, makes many complimentary comments about the aid programme (Box 1), praising cross-party consensus, political leadership and careful management.¹³ It also makes suggestions for further improvement, especially in regard to simplification of accountability procedures.

14. As we stated in Phase 1 of this inquiry, the need for the UK to maintain a significant development budget is still very real, not just on humanitarian grounds—compelling a motivation as this is—but also to tackle the causes of instability in a dangerous world, to reach the very poorest, and so that the UK can play its part in maintaining the UK’s global influence. The UK Aid Network emphasised that “increased awareness of the range and scope of development challenges and tools must not come at the expense of effective aid policy particularly in those countries which need it most (least developed, and low income, countries).¹⁴


15. We do not see it as necessary to explore further in this report the case for aid. Aid absolutely still matters, notably for humanitarian purposes and to support poverty reduction and human development in low-income countries. It also has a limited role helping to build partnerships with emerging powers and other middle income countries. Increased awareness of the range and scope of development challenges must not come at the expense of effective aid policy. In Phase 1 of this inquiry we recorded our full support for the 0.7% aid target. We strongly endorse the continuing need to maintain development spending at 0.7% of GNI.

12 Center for Global Development, [The Quality of Official Development Assistance 2014](#) (December 2014)

13 [OECD DAC Peer Review of the UK](#) (December 2014)

14 [UKAN submission](#)

Figure 2: UK Performance on the Quality of Official Development Assistance (July 2014)



Source:

<http://www.cgdev.org/initiative/commitment-development-index/index>

Box 1: Comments from the OECD/DAC Peer Review of the UK (December 2014)

- **On the vision and policies for development cooperation** (p16)
 - ‘Persistent political will, sustained by broad cross-party consensus, makes it possible to achieve ambitious objectives’.
 - ‘The UK is doing an excellent job of protecting the poverty reduction focus of the development cooperation programme’.
 - DFID is ‘strategically reaching out to emerging powers’.
 - ‘DFID is committed to engaging in fragile and conflict-affected countries’.
- **On allocating the UK’s Official Development Assistance (ODA)** (p17)
 - ‘In a very challenging fiscal climate, the UK has met its commitment to provide 0.7% of its GNI as ODA by 2013’
 - ‘There is a clear focus on low income countries, fragile states, and social infrastructure and services’.
 - ‘DFID contributes to a more effective multilateral system through its multilateral aid review process, its strategic engagement on the boards of multilateral organisations, and its active involvement in the Multilateral Organisations Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN)’.
- **On managing the UK’s development cooperation** (p18):
 - ‘The UK has [...] an effective institutional system, with a clear mandate, a seat in the Cabinet, and a decentralised model backed by a critical mass of development specialists’.
 - ‘UK Departments work well at country level on specific issues of mutual interest’.
 - ‘DFID has planned well how to strengthen capabilities and systems to disburse the scaled-up budget’.
 - ‘DFID has a forward-looking human resources strategy’.
- **On delivery and partnership, DFID:** (p19):
 - ‘Delivers its programme effectively [...] and works closely with partners, often taking a leadership role at country level’
 - ‘The UK systematically and robustly analyses different types of risk’.
- **On results, management and accountability** (p20):
 - ‘There is a clear political drive to achieve results [...] DFID has an impressive results system’.
 - ‘The UK is a top performer on transparency’.
 - ‘DFID is a leader on evaluation internationally [...] and takes steps to produce evidence on what works in development’.
- **On humanitarian assistance** (p21):
 - ‘Globally, the UK has played a significant role, including [...] galvanising international support for humanitarian crises’.
 - ‘DFID’s humanitarian policy recognises international principles and good practices’.
 - ‘The UK maintains a strong focus on proper targeting of its humanitarian funding, with rigorous decision-making processes to support and justify individual funding decisions’.
 - ‘Civil-military coordination appears to function well under civilian command’.

Source: [OECD DAC Peer Review of the UK](#) (December 2014)

3 Transition strategies in middle-income countries

16. UKAN, like other witnesses, also recognised aid “as an important part of the equation in middle income countries (MICs) where a growing majority of the world’s poor and marginalised and excluded communities live.”¹⁵ An estimated 80% of world’s poor live now not in poor countries but in MICs.¹⁶ Ben Jackson, the Director of the BOND coalition of NGOs, told us that “our members are quite clear that the focus of aid should be on poverty and need [...] not defined simply by whether the overall economy is low income.”¹⁷ Adam Smith International commented that

As recent events have shown, problems can flare up in MICs just as easily as poorer countries. Recently DFID has had to open a programme in Libya, and reopen one in Ukraine as well as restarting activities in Iraq. Where the next problems will emerge is not easy to predict. If DFID had been running a substantive, high quality programme in Syria for some years, such that real reform was attempted, would it have been possible to avoid the conflict there? Conflict can be expected to continue to flare up in new countries and regions, with rapid increases in poverty as a result.¹⁸

17. Barder and Evans added that “all five of 2014’s highest fatality conflicts so far are in MICs; many other MICs are affected by violence ranging from rural insurgencies to endemic urban violence that blurs the line between organised crime and conflict.”¹⁹ More generally, others emphasised the importance of not neglecting poverty in MICs. The importance of building new development relationships with previous UK aid recipients, including China and India, was emphasised. For example, Professor Melissa Leach talked about mutual learning between the UK and China on renewable energy: the UK has the opportunity to learn from China, but also to influence China’s internal and external policy in this field.²⁰ ‘South-south co-operation’, whereby emerging powers such as Brazil and China share their expertise with developing countries, was also emphasised.²¹

18. DFID’s Secretary of State, Rt Hon Justine Greening MP, emphasised that DFID recognised the importance of getting transition strategies right: “We are not in a marathon here where a country starts off poor and then we get to the end of the race and it is suddenly developed. It is more like a relay race [...] We need a transition strategy. [...]

15 [UKAN submission](#), p.2

16 Andy Sumner, [written evidence to International Development Committee, Post-2015 Development Goals inquiry](#), October 2012

17 Q 7

18 [Adam Smith International submission](#)

19 The five highest fatality conflicts so far this year are Syria, Iraq, Nigeria, north west Pakistan, and Ukraine. Barder and Evans submission

20 Q 8

21 Q 179 and [Saferworld submission](#)

Even if an economy is rapidly developing, human rights do not always progress along the same path; you get some things surging ahead and other things lagging back.”²²

19. We asked the Secretary of State about India, which is now a MIC, but where one-third of the country still lives in extreme poverty on under \$1.25 a day.²³ She said that the UK’s relationship was changing into one of partnership:

When [India are] spending—I think I am right in saying—around \$50 billion themselves on health and education, the most effective thing we can do is work with them, with our technical expertise, to get the most out of their budget. Alongside that, as their economy grows, we can look at some of the so-called returnable capital investments in the poorer states still—so, targeting it, but rather than simply having grants, we have investments that we have a chance of getting back that we can then recycle. [...] What we have worked hard in DFID to do over the last two years is to develop that transition where we hand the baton over, where it moves gradually from aid to trade.²⁴

20. Witnesses recommended a number of possible actions for DFID in India following the withdrawal of the bilateral aid programme in 2015. World Development Movement said “DFID should make more complex judgements and also consider what expertise and experience the UK has to offer. For example, can we help India build its own version of the NHS?”²⁵ UKCDS recommended UK science and technology research and policy funders focus on opportunities in India.²⁶ The Independent Commission on Aid Impact (ICAI) drew on its ‘DFID’s Livelihoods Work in Western Odisha’ evaluation which looked at a DFID-supported project to reduce poverty by improving very poor communities’ water resources, agriculture and incomes. ICAI told us

The impact of DFID’s support in this environment depends less on the volume of financial support and more on its ability to act as a purveyor of development excellence, helping its partner countries to identify innovative solutions to their economic and social challenges. For example, in our Odisha report, we saw that DFID had developed a very good demonstration project for a development initiative that was subsequently and widely taken up by the Government of India. The project involved quality engagement with the intended beneficiaries, which took time to achieve but proved to be a key success factor. This is an area on which we have consistently recommended that DFID put more emphasis. DFID India was also good at identifying opportunities for policy dialogue and technical assistance to make a real difference. This kind of engagement, based on knowledge

22 Q 181

23 [World Development Movement submission](#)

24 Q 181

25 [World Development Movement submission](#)

26 [UKCDS submission](#)

partnerships rather than on large-scale funding, is likely to become more important in less aid-dependent contexts.²⁷

21. As grants of aid become less appropriate in some countries, so new forms of development co-operation are necessary. *During our recent visits to countries like India, we have noted how the UK could act as a partner in a very wide range of areas, including health, law, education, culture, planning and transport. We recommend that the UK Government increase its efforts to facilitate links between the UK and MICs in these areas, and use a new set of approaches and financial mechanisms, a number of which we explored in Phase 1 of this inquiry.*

22. *We support the UK's principled stance against tied aid, but this should not stand in the way of building links between middle income countries and UK institutions. We recommend that the UK be confident about its decision to continue its 'beyond aid' engagement in middle-income countries. The UK may no longer have a traditional aid relationship with these countries, but it is spending ODA in Brazil, India and China—and is rather diffident about admitting this. We believe the Government should stand up for this course of action, rather than giving its critics opportunities by obfuscating about its—perfectly legitimate—activities in these countries.*

23. *We recommend that DFID think creatively about other ways in which it could develop non-aid forms of co-operation between the UK and MICs such as India, for example by linking up with smaller organisations, and by exporting UK knowledge in a wide range of areas. We remind DFID of ICAI's report on the Department's livelihoods work in Odisha state, which demonstrated how very good demonstration projects can have significant impact, especially when taken up by the Government of India. We support ICAI's recommendations that DFID focus on knowledge partnerships in the poorest states.*

24. *While we should continue to grant aid in some middle-income countries, we believe that—as we have argued in previous reports—the substantial and growing DFID spend in conflict-affected middle-income countries like Pakistan must not divert funds from poorer African countries. We encourage DFID and other Government Departments responsible for aid spending to maintain continuous improvement in management and accountability, so that well-informed, evidence-based decisions can be taken about when and where to use aid.*

Global institutions

25. Professor Ngiare Woods of Oxford University told us that the growing prominence of the BRICs countries means global structures, and global institutions in particular, must adjust. She said

The BRICs Bank is two things: first, a development bank owned and run by the BRICs; and, secondly, a reserve currency fund owned and run by the

BRICs. This is a direct competitor to the IMF. If the IMF and World Bank were functioning well, we would not need these new organisations, but they are emerging fast.²⁸

Professor Woods said that modern, efficient and inclusive global institutions were a crucial route towards dealing with the current set of global problems:

Do we have the capacity multilaterally to respond to Ebola or these new security challenges? Where is it that the world will have discussions on that? Last week the G20 Finance Ministers did discuss Russia and Ukraine to a limited degree, but to me there is a case for thinking about how to ensure the world does not become two parallel systems, but somewhere in the middle there is a multilateral system that works and that China, South Korea, Brazil and India, as much as Britain, feel they can trust [...] What would it mean to make the IMF, World Bank or the World Trade Organization into an organisation where Indians could say, “We trust that organisation as much as the British do”—it might not be a whole lot—and there is a parity of trust and distrust and ownership of those international organisations? We should have been doing it 10 years ago. We did not. The parallel system has now emerged, but it is not too late. We can do it with resolve. I think DFID and Britain have done a pretty good job at trying to push for some of the changes. Britain should [...] use its capacity to present a co-ordinated across-government role and its diplomacy, including aid diplomacy, to push its partners to change these institutions faster. If we do not, they will simply be left by the side of the road.²⁹

26. The growing profile of shared global problems, and global public goods, means we must be sure global institutions are fit for purpose. The international financial institutions must seek to include the needs of the BRICS and other emerging powers, or they will risk irrelevance. *The UK Government must continue to push for reforms to the IMF and World Bank, in particular, to ensure they meet the needs of emerging powers as much as developed countries.*

28 Q3

29 Q3

4 Policy coherence for development

27. Policy coherence for development (PCD) refers to the integration of different aspects of international development within policy-making. PCD is particularly relevant to a beyond aid approach, which necessarily entails working on wider aspects of development, across UK Government departments and with other actors internationally. This chapter will assess the UK's current performance regarding PCD.

Beyond Aid: UK policy and impact

28. While there was universal agreement that beyond aid issues were important, there were different views about how well DFID and HMG more generally performed in their handling of these issues. Some were sceptical. For example, Nilima Gulrajani of LSE said “Currently, there is a palpable sense that DFID’s advisory and advocacy roles at the heart of government have diminished.”³⁰ Similarly, Owen Barder and Alex Evans argued that recently DFID had lost its role as a global thought leader.³¹

29. DFID, naturally, took a different position. Its own evidence submission contained detailed accounts of effective cross-Government working on such topics as trade, tax and transparency (all highlighted at the 2013 G8 Summit at Lough Erne), as well as the major UK Government initiative on female genital mutilation (see Box 2), involving action both domestically and internationally.³² We have witnessed examples of these policies at first hand. We saw efforts to tackle FGM and other harmful practices such as early marriage during our 2013 trip to Ethiopia. In Tanzania last November we saw signs that DFID’s longstanding efforts to boost trade between east African countries are beginning to bear fruit, with ships in Dar es Salaam port being loaded with surplus maize bound for Mogadishu. We met an official representing the new joint DFID-HMRC tax team in Tanzania, and were impressed by efforts to drive domestic resource mobilisation in the country. The Secretary of State was enthusiastic about continuing work on tax and trade:

30 [Nilima Gulrajani submission](#)

31 [Owen Barder and Alex Evans submission](#)

32 [DFID submission](#)

The agenda of trade, tax and transparency was slap bang in the middle of a lot of what DFID has been doing, certainly in recent years. Our ability to be part of that overall HMG team, making sure that the agenda for the G8 was something that would deliver and could work for developing countries as well, worked really effectively. Now we are following up on all of that. We are seeing legislation passing through on things like beneficial ownership. It can really unlock our ability to complement that with the tax capability work we are doing to start to help developing countries really drive this domestic resource-mobilisation agenda, which is going to be another big part of the beyond aid policy approach that we all have.³³

Box 2: Cross-Government working on FGM

- Our 2014 report on *Violence Against Women and Girls* recommended much closer collaboration on FGM—both overseas and in the UK—between Whitehall departments. (para 11)
- DFID has since stepped up its collaboration with the Home Office, the Department for Communities and Local Government, the FCO and other Departments on FGM. £270,000 funding has been awarded by DCLG for UK projects.
- DFID led plans for the *Girl Summit* in July 2014 which brought together over 700 government Ministers, faith leaders, young people and representatives of civil society from the UK and 50 other countries to share best practice and make new commitments to action.
- A new specialised cross-government unit on tackling FGM has been set up that will spearhead efforts to end the practice.
- The Government has launched a consultation asking for views on how best to introduce mandatory reporting of FGM.
- Other Government work to tackle FGM includes new legislation to grant victims of FGM lifelong anonymity from the time an allegation is made; the introduction of new civil orders designed to protect girls identified as being at risk of FGM; and new legislation that will mean parents can be prosecuted if they fail to prevent their daughter being cut.

Source: Gov.uk, 5 December 2014 [‘Government launches consultation into mandatory reporting of FGM’](#)


30. Independent observers also cited successful examples. The OECD DAC, in its five-yearly Peer Review of the UK, published in December 2014, said

The UK has made public statements about the need for coherence between policies to support development. It takes a useful case-by-case approach to policy coherence for development, bringing together different parts of government to work effectively—at home and abroad—on issues of common interest. This has proven an effective approach to anti-corruption, climate

change and trade, areas where the Cabinet has engaged strategically, and where DFID has successfully promoted deeper joint efforts with other departments. Choosing to focus these efforts on a limited number of policy areas where there are win-win opportunities is strategic.³⁴

31. This generally positive assessment is endorsed by the results of the annual ranking exercise of the Center for Global Development, the Commitment to Development Index, published in January 2015. This survey is open to debate but is broadly a useful exercise. The UK ranks fourth out of 27 countries in this Index, which covers performance on aid, trade, finance, migration, environment, security and technology (Figure 3). The UK is the only G7 country to appear among the top five.³⁵

Figure 3: Commitment to Development Index (January 2015)



Source: <http://www.cgdev.org/initiative/commitment-development-index/index>

34 [OECD DAC Peer Review of the UK](#) (December 2014)

35 <http://www.cgdev.org/initiative/commitment-development-index/index>

32. Witnesses informed us of practical examples of joined-up work and collaboration, on such topics as health, science and technology, and gender:

- On health: We note with approval the cross-Government outcomes framework ‘Health is Global’ (although we observe that this is due to expire in 2015).³⁶ The Wellcome Trust told us that “DFID plays a pivotal role in facilitating partnership working and identifying synergies between UK partners to maximise engagement in overseas activities. It is effective in leveraging funding and expertise from other funders and donors.”³⁷ PATH confirmed that the UK has long supported innovations for poverty-related and neglected diseases and conditions through the Medical Research Council and DFID, as well as commercial investment from UK-based companies. In fact, of all EU Member States, the UK is the leading investor in global health research and development, contributing 0.0049 percent of its gross domestic product.³⁸ For the past several years, the UK has consistently been one of the top three funders of global health research in the world.³⁹
- As far as science and technology are concerned, Research Councils UK said: “The total funding committed since 2005 to collaborative programmes including UK Research Councils and DFID is nearly £390m. Taken together, these commitments represent a major co-funding arrangement with a UK government department for the Research Councils.” In addition to collaboration with DFID, the Research Councils are a key delivery partner in the Newton Fund, a £375m investment of UK ODA through international research collaboration.⁴⁰
- With regard to women and girls, Plan UK said: “Recent work on the Girl Summit between the Cabinet Office, Home Office and DFID has shown a cross-departmental drive to protect girls in the UK and globally from violence by ending child marriage and FGM, an approach Plan UK strongly welcomes. Cooperation with the Department for Health includes for example the international emergency trauma register through which the Department of Health is sending NHS experts to provide medical support to the emergency response in Gaza.”⁴¹

33. These positive comments should not be taken as implying that the UK scores a ‘perfect ten’ on all topics where it decides to engage. Indeed, many witnesses focused on areas where performance fell short of expectations. Witnesses argued that there were weaknesses on issues as diverse as global finance, tax, some aspects of trade (TRIPS, TTIP), human rights, drugs, oceans, arms, and corruption. There were also many comments about the links between development, humanitarian and security interventions. NGOs and academics were particularly critical of the private sector.

36 HM Government, [Health is Global](#) (2011-2015)

37 [Wellcome Trust submission](#)

38 [Path written evidence](#). See https://s3.amazonaws.com/one.org/pdfs/Trillion_Dollar_Scandal_report_EN.pdf

39 Q 35

40 [RCUK submission](#)

41 [Plan UK submission](#)

- On global taxation, Action Aid said that, as it stands, global processes on tax are led mostly by the Treasury and BIS, and developing countries' concerns are not largely necessarily addressed. ActionAid said that current wave of international tax rules negotiations, the so-called BEPS (Base Erosion and Profit Shifting) process does not include developing countries as equal negotiation partners and does not address many developing countries' concerns. For example, the BEPS process fails to deal with how the tax base from multinational companies is shared out between countries—residence versus sources taxation—even though this is of vital importance to many developing countries. In fact, the BEPS Action Plan explicitly states that its actions “are not directly aimed at changing the existing international standards on the allocation of taxing rights on cross-border income.”⁴²
- On trade, Stop Aids argued that the ongoing Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is proposed to contain a much broader range of TRIPs-plus terms—data exclusivity, patent term extension and others—that will affect the UK's ability within the EU to access generic medicines, which save the UK around £19 billion annually.^{43, 44} The Fair Trade Foundation gave us another example of UK trade policy impacting negatively upon developing countries. It highlighted that the agreed reform to the Common Agricultural Policy's sugar policy will end limits to EU sugar beet production in 2017. This will make it much harder for the many sugar cane producers reliant on the EU market to offer competitive prices. Further, the UK's groceries and market regulation, overseen by the Competition and Markets Authority, provides good protection for consumers but has little or no mandate to address wider Government policy goals. This lack of coherence, according to the Fair Trade Foundation, is having a detrimental impact on achieving sustainability and fairness in global supply chains.⁴⁵
- On human rights, Amnesty International said that, whilst DFID contributes to the realisation of rights through many elements of its programmes, such as its actions to improve the lives of girls and women and its humanitarian responses to crises, it does not embed human rights consistently across its plans and strategies. It says this makes it difficult for DFID to mainstream human rights across its strategic frameworks, meaning policies neglect human rights, and risk being incoherent with other UK Government work.⁴⁶
- On arms, the UK Aid Network said that since 2008 the UK has approved arms export licences (including both military and dual use) worth £51,133,673,291.⁴⁷ In 2013 the Committees on Arms Export Controls reported that the UK had issued 3,000 export

42 [Research Councils UK submission](#)

43 https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/pcd-report-2013_en.pdf

44 [Stop Aids submission](#)

45 [Fairtrade Foundation submission](#)

46 [Amnesty International submission](#)

47 [UKAN submission](#)

licences for military and intelligence equipment worth £12.3bn to countries which are on its own official list for human rights abuses.^{48, 49}

- On transparency and corruption, CAFOD told us that DFID did not appear to have been at the forefront of discussion on the development and implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, even though there are clearly huge links to the impacts that corporate activities can have on poor and marginalised communities.⁵⁰ The ONE Campaign said that that up to 3.6 million deaths could be prevented each year in the world's poorest countries if action was taken to end “the secrecy that allows corruption and criminality to thrive, and if the recovered revenues were invested in health systems.”⁵¹ It said that specific measures that could have a big impact would include:
 - HMT committing to action to tackle secrecy in trusts.
 - FCO using its influence to press for public registers of company ownership as well as trust transparency in the UK's Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies so that action is co-ordinated and has the biggest impact.
 - BIS ensuring that the regulations to transpose the 4th EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive are fully consistent with the Directive and enable citizens, NGOs and other stakeholders to make complaints about companies who do not comply with the requirements without political interference; and
 - HMT, HMRC, FCO and other departments working together to enable tax collectors from developing countries to access information about off-shore bank accounts.⁵²
- Global Witness made a very strong statement to us on this topic:

Britain is a haven for dirty money and the people it belongs to. Many of the world's most corrupt people are free to park the money they have stolen in London's high-end property and respected banks. They use our lawyers to set up shell companies to hide what they are doing, and send their children to our private schools. They lead extravagant double-lives in one of the world's great cities while the citizens they have stolen from continue to live in dire poverty back home [...] There is also more to do around the concept of 'denial of entry' to deny safe haven to corrupt individuals.⁵³

⁴⁸ http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/1/pdfs/ukpga_20020001_en.pdf

⁴⁹ Committees on Arms Exports Controls, First Joint Report of the Business, Innovation and Skills, Defence, Foreign Affairs, and International Development Committees of Session 2013-14, *Scrutiny of Arms Exports and Arms Control*, HC 205, 1 July 2013

⁵⁰ [CAFOD submission](#)

⁵¹ [ONE submission](#)

⁵² Economic Affairs Select Committee, *The Economic Impact and Effectiveness of Development Aid*, March 2012, Chapter 6, Number 75 <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201012/ldselect/ldeconaf/278/27802.htm>

⁵³ [Global Witness submission](#)

- Finally, private sector development was singled out as a sector subject to particularly weak PCD. The Institute of Development Studies (IDS) noted the large volume of cross-departmental work in this area, for example, DFID work: with BIS on the UN Global Compact and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative; and work on trade with UKTI and the Export Credits Guarantee Department. However, the IDS was sceptical about the degree to which proper co-ordination over private sector work was taking place.⁵⁴

34. While there is some attempt to ensure coherence in these different policy areas, it is not clear how trade-offs between development objectives and other economic or political interests are managed. While DFID is playing a leading role in encouraging “pro-poor” economic development, how coordination happens in those areas of government activity that either seek to create more UK business activity or regulate harmful activities is less apparent. Professor Melissa Leach, IDS Director, told us that “sometimes the emphasis has been on more private sector activity without necessarily asking questions about what kind of private sector activity [...] We need to examine where there are trade-offs.”⁵⁵

35. As these comments illustrate, beyond aid issues are complex. **It is clear that there might be trade-offs between domestic and international priorities, as well as trade-offs between spending on poverty reduction and on global public goods. For this reason, we think it important to be clear about the overall PCD strategy. The UK will be challenged in the coming year to make significant commitments on PCD issues, including: global financial management, including shocks caused by changes in oil prices; security, in and originating from fragile states; climate change; and disease threats (illustrated by Ebola). The new SDG framework will require action on these both externally and in the UK.**

36. Some commentators have been critical not just about aspects of PCD in the UK but its general approach. We were struck by the conclusion of the OECD/DAC Peer Review of the UK that PCD is a weak aspect of HMG’s approach:

The lack of a comprehensive approach to ensuring its development efforts are not undermined by other government policies means potential incoherence in other policy areas can be overlooked. It also means opportunities might be missed for stakeholders to provide evidence on and solutions to problems of incoherence. For instance, little has been done to address potential links between migration policy and development. In addition to managing trade-offs, a more systematic approach would help the UK to tap positive synergies across policy agendas, as it has started to do with trade and development. The UK also does not appear to be investing in building a knowledge base about the impacts of UK policies on developing countries in order to enable more informed decisions. In dialogue with developing country partners, it could do more to increase understanding of the potential effects of different UK policies on key barriers to development,

54 [IDS submission](#)

55 Q35

and to use the evidence acquired to raise awareness of the need for greater coherence.⁵⁶

37. There are many successful examples of policy coherence in the UK. The UK's record is at the high end of international performance. However, we also note witnesses' concerns over the UK's patchy record on some aspects of PCD. We acknowledge that these are difficult issues, with potential trade-offs between national and international priorities, and between spending on poverty reduction and global public goods. We also note the criticism of the OECD DAC Peer Review that the UK lacks an overarching strategy on PCD. *PCD is likely to grow in importance and it is therefore crucial that the UK improves its efforts in this area.*

Reporting policy coherence for development

38. We are struck by the fact that it has not been easy to assemble a coherent account of how Beyond Aid issues are handled in the UK. There is a reporting requirement included within the 2006 International Development (Reporting and Transparency) Act, which requires the Secretary of State to report on policy coherence within the context of MDG Goal 8 (Box 3). For the first time in 2014, DFID included a specific section in its Annual Report setting out its work on PCD (in previous years, sections have taken a more general look at the UK's broader policy work). This was incorporated in a chapter entitled 'Effective Development Cooperation' and covered six topics:

1. Facilitating trade and knowledge transfer (incl WTO)
2. Encouraging transparent and responsible business (incl supply chains)
3. Helping (non-aid) finance flow for development (incl international taxation)
4. Supporting peace-keeping and building resilience (incl Conflict Pool/Conflict, Stability and Security Fund)
5. Producing and consuming sustainably (including climate change)
6. Bringing in talented people and sharing knowledge (incl int'l migration)⁵⁷

39. This list does not map perfectly onto the targets of MDG 8, nor to the wider list of topics covered in this inquiry. Indeed, DFID's own written submission and the Secretary of State's oral evidence covered other issues. For example, human rights, corruption, the arms trade, debt management and international finance are poorly covered in the 2014 Departmental Report.

40. Furthermore, it does not seem to us acceptable that PCD issues should be reported in a free-standing section, without being cross-referenced as major themes in DFID's overall strategy or in sectoral or country-focused sections of the Departmental Report.

⁵⁶ [OECD DAC Peer Review of the UK](#) (December 2014)

⁵⁷ DFID, [Annual Report and Accounts 2013-14](#) pp. 121-124

Legislation

41. Both the International Development Act 2002 and the International Development (Reporting and Transparency Act) 2006 need updating. The 2002 Act has two problems. First, it is principally concerned with ‘development assistance’, meaning aid. Second, and more controversially, it has an exclusive focus on poverty reduction, which is appropriate for traditional aid, but may not be as suitable when it comes to funding global public goods.

42. Only Article 4 of the 2002 Act, headed ‘Supplementary Powers’ provides a somewhat ambiguous opening for non-aid activity (Box 4). The 2006 International Development (Reporting and Transparency Act) does open the door to report on policy coherence issues, but is dated because it is tightly tied to the Millennium Development Goals which expire in 2015 (Box 3).

Box 3: 2006 International Development (Reporting and Transparency) Act Policy coherence and Millennium Development Goal 8

The Act states:

- (1) The Secretary of State shall include in each annual report such general or specific observations as he thinks appropriate on the effects of policies and programmes pursued by Government departments on—
- (a) the promotion of sustainable development in countries outside the United Kingdom,
 - (b) the reduction of poverty in such countries.
- (2) Such observations are to include observations on the pursuit of Millennium Development Goal 8, including in particular progress towards—
- (a) the development of an open trading system that is rule-based and non-discriminatory and expands trading opportunities for low income countries,
 - (b) the development of an open financial system that is rule-based and non-discriminatory,
 - (c) the enhancement of debt relief for low income countries.
- (3) In this section, “Millennium Development Goal 8” means Goal 8 set out in the Annex to the document mentioned in section

Source: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/31/pdfs/ukpga_20060031_en.pdf

Box 4: the International Development Act 2002 - Supplementary powers section

- (1) The Secretary of State may with a view to preparing for or facilitating the exercise of his powers under section 1, 2 or 3—
- (a) enter into arrangements with any person or body (including arrangements to provide assistance), or
 - (b) carry on any other activities
- (2) The Secretary of State may—
- (a) support, by way of subscription or otherwise, any organisation that exists (wholly or partly) for one or more relevant purposes,
 - (b) contribute to any fund that is intended to be used (wholly or partly) for one or more relevant purposes, or
 - (c) promote, or assist any person or body to promote, awareness of global poverty and of the means of reducing such poverty,
- if he is satisfied that to do so is likely to contribute to a reduction in poverty.
- (3) Subsection (2) is without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1).
- (4) For the purposes of subsection (2) “relevant purpose” means—
- (a) a purpose mentioned in section 1(2)(a) or (b) or 3, or
 - (b) a purpose that broadly corresponds to such a purpose.

Source: <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/1/section/4>

43. **The legislative framework provided by the 2002 and 2006 International Development Acts has been extremely important in preserving the purpose and identity of the UK aid programme. We think it important that we have legal protection for the objectives of development assistance. In order to secure this, the aforementioned acts would need to be updated. We conclude that both Acts should be updated to reflect the wider purposes on the UK’s international development efforts.** The poverty focus should not be sacrificed, but the importance of global public goods should be reflected in the legislation. The new framework of Sustainable Development Goals will also need to be used as the foundation of legislation. The whole-of-Government responsibilities should also be reflected in updated legislation.

44. We asked the Secretary of State whether current reporting on PCD is sufficient. She told us that PCD would in future “need to become a bigger part of that annual report [...]”

because it is now a much bigger part of what we do.” *Policy coherence is increasing in importance. We recommend that DFID improve its reporting on PCD, in line with the requirement under the 2006 International Development (Reporting and Transparency) Act. Specifically, we recommend that the current short section within DFID’s Annual Report is expanded.*

45. *We also note that the 2006 Act is based on the MDG framework which will expire in 2015. The Act will need to be amended or replaced once the new post-2015 Sustainable Development framework has been agreed. The new framework will inevitably include a much wider set of Beyond Aid goals and targets. We recommend that the International Development (Reporting and Transparency) Act 2006 be revised or replaced once the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals have been agreed.*

5 How the UK's approach should change

46. We have used the earlier chapters to argue that the way beyond aid issues are tackled is likely to define the success of the UK's future development approach. Having established the importance of a beyond aid approach, we now move to consider how such an approach can best be facilitated. This raises questions about organisational structure, cross-Government working, and accountability in the UK. It also requires careful thought about the competences possessed by DFID staff, and the accountability of agencies responsible for development work. We begin by analysing the experience of other countries, before turning to UK experience and future options.

What have other countries done, why, and how successfully?


47. The UK is not the only country to have been considering how development co-operation is managed. In 2013, for example, there were major reorganisations in both Australia and Canada, both of whom reintegrated their development agencies within their Ministries of Foreign Affairs. We were told in written submissions that the UK was now unusual in having an independent cabinet-level ministry responsible for both policy and implementation. Researchers from the Overseas Development Institute told us that “development cooperation agencies are now closely linked with foreign affairs ministries in most DAC countries” (see Box 5). That approach is illustrated in Models 2 and 3 within Box 4. The (mainstreaming) of development cooperation across policy areas within a Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Model 1) and the existence of a ministry dedicated to development cooperation (as in the UK - Model 4) are less usual.

Box 5: Models of donor governance


Model 1: E.g. Norway, Denmark




Model 2: E.g. Australia, Canada, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Switzerland



Model 3: E.g. Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United States



Model 4: E.g. United Kingdom



Source: OECD (2009) *Managing Aid: DAC Member practices*, Paris, cited in ODI submission

48. Witnesses said it was difficult to assess which of these models is most successful. Erik Lundsgaarde of the German Development Institute told us that “it is becoming increasingly important to consider whether independent development agencies can adequately assume the role of promoting coherent action across government. As the German and US cases suggest, development agencies face clear limitations in coordinating funding managed by other actors or serving as development advocates within the government.” However, he said, “there is limited evidence on the value of different ways of organising cooperation systems, and a dearth of comparative research on the performance of these systems—mainly as they are considered context-specific.”⁵⁸

49. Nilima Gulrajani of LSE went further. She said that

It is widely assumed that the functional task of managing aid and non-aid policies is better achieved within a single organisational unit [...] (However) there are a number of reasons to be sceptical about the narrative of policy coherence requiring and benefitting from a merger of aid and development functions into a ministry of foreign affairs.⁵⁹

The OECD DAC concurred. It said that “looking across our reviews, it is clear that it is not the institutional organisation so much as the inherent capabilities that make the difference in effective development co-operation.” The DAC added that

We have not yet assessed the impact of the Canadian and Australian mergers, but it is clear that national economic and security interests will play a stronger role in defining their policy and programmes. In such circumstances, it is critical that development policy and programmes continue to adhere to internationally agreed standards for development effectiveness, such as untying aid from domestic commercial interests. Experience also shows that in merging development co-operation within the foreign ministry there is a risk of losing technical expertise necessary for the effective delivery of the development co-operation programme. There is also a risk of becoming less flexible and less able to adjust to rapidly evolving situations, such as those that characterise fragile or conflict situations.⁶⁰

50. If the test of how well different models deliver policy coherence, experience also differs widely. The European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) told us that there were five key dilemmas in managing policy coherence:

58 [Eric Lundsgaarde submission](#)

59 [Nilima Gulrajani submission](#)

60 [OECD DAC submission](#)

Key dilemmas
1) Sustaining political interest, will and support for PCD.
2) Making PCD commitments at national level meaningful.
3) Making PCD commitments for EU policies and at EU level meaningful.
4) Ensuring that there is a common understanding and a shared ownership of what is meant by 'development' and a broad knowledge of development policy objectives.
5) Ensuring that there is a common understanding and a shared ownership both of the concept of PCD and the PCD policy commitments in place beyond those mandated to promote it.

Source: [ECDPM submission](#)

ECDPM concluded that

Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) is fundamentally a matter of politics. The key dilemma for PCD is how to develop and sustain the level of political interest in and support for PCD [...] Champions of PCD should be proactive and tactical in focussing on windows of opportunity in specific policy processes with favourable national political and public resonance. For PCD commitments at the national level to be meaningful, strategically selected priority policy areas, specific objectives and measurable progress indicators, as well as clear implementation guidelines can ensure better mainstreaming of responsibilities throughout the concerned line-ministries.⁶¹

In terms of how PCD is organised in different countries, ECDPM assessed experience in five countries, not including the UK, summarising existing institutional mechanisms as follows:

61 [ECDPM submission](#)

Existing institutional mechanisms for promoting PCD

Country	Year instituted	Name	Situated	Mandate for PCD
Finland	2008	Inter-ministerial network on PCD	Inter-ministerial, political level.	Awareness raising and exchange of information on PCD issues.
Germany	2011	Department for Cooperation and Coherence in the Federal Government	Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, technical level.	Mainstream PCD across the Federal Government.
Ireland	2007	Inter-Department Committee on Development (IDCD)	Inter-ministerial, political level.	Strengthen coherence in the government's approach to development.
The Netherlands	2002 (until 2012)	Department for Evaluation and Coherence (DEC)	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorate for Development Cooperation, technical level.	Screen Dutch positions on EU policies; proactively engage with specific policy dossiers.
Sweden	2003	Unit for Development Cooperation Governance (UD-USTYR)	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department for Development Cooperation, technical level.	Coordinating government efforts towards PCD.

Source: [ECDPM submission](#)

51. A more comprehensive review of EU experience was carried out by the European Commission in 2013.⁶² It found inter alia that:

- The EU itself and eight Member States have legislation on PCD. The UK does not.
- Political commitment is expressed in 17 Member States, through 'Guiding Principles' (e.g. Finland, Spain, Portugal, Poland), White Papers (Ireland, Austria, Denmark) or Plans of Action (Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Czech Republic). The UK has no comparable statement.
- The European Parliament has a Standing Rapporteur on PCD.
- The EU has a formal procedure for Impact Assessments, and, in the case of trade, Sustainability Impact Assessments.
- Evaluations are used purposively to examine PCD issues.
- The OCED has a PCD methodology, and regularly reviews Member State performance.
- Different Member States have different reporting requirements. e.g. Belgium (annual stakeholder meeting), Czech Republic (Council on Dev't Cooperation), Denmark (annual report), France (biennial reporting), Ireland (special study on indicators), Luxemburg (inter-ministerial committee), Spain (biennial PCD

62 European Commission, [EU 2013 Report on Policy Coherence for Development](#)

reporting), Sweden (biennial report to parliament), Netherlands (reports to parliament), Croatia (annual report). The entry for the UK reads “No specific national PCD Reporting requirement reported in the national contribution”.⁶³

52. The International HIV/AIDS Alliance said the US International Development Agency (USAID)’s 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review offers a number of lessons from which the UK could draw (see Box 6). It said the UK Government could follow the example of the US Government and give DFID “a more prominent role in international foreign policy deliberations and decisions and be able to shape global development conversations.”⁶⁴

Box 6: The US Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review

The US Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review provides one of the strongest statements available about linking diplomacy and development in pursuit of national interest. The Review says that ‘for the United States, development is a strategic, economic, and moral imperative—as central to our foreign policy as diplomacy and defence. The 2010 National Security Strategy defines our objective: “Through an aggressive and affirmative development agenda and commensurate resources, we can strengthen the regional partners we need to help us stop conflict and counter global criminal networks; build a stable, inclusive global economy with new sources of prosperity; advance democracy and human rights; and ultimately position ourselves to better address key global challenges by growing the ranks of prosperous, capable and democratic states that can be our partners in the decades ahead.”’

Sub-titled ‘Leading Through Civilian Power’, the Review envisages ‘seamless’ teamwork between diplomats and aid workers, under the overall authority of the Secretary of State, and led in-country by the US Ambassador in a role described as ‘Chief Executive Officer of (an) interagency mission’. The Report describes ‘Civilian power (as) the combined force of women and men across the U.S. government who are practicing diplomacy, implementing development projects, strengthening alliances and partnerships, preventing and responding to crises and conflict, and advancing America’s core interests: security, prosperity, universal values—especially democracy and human rights—and a just international order. They are the people who negotiate peace treaties, stand up for human rights, strengthen our economic cooperation and development, and lead interagency delegations to conferences on climate change. It is the civilian side of the government working as one, just as our military services work together as a unified force’.

Source: <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/153108.pdf>

UK experience and options

Organisational structures

53. We asked specifically in the terms of reference for this inquiry ‘whether a stand-alone DFID has a long-term future’. This was regarded by witnesses as an important question. For example, Dr Erik Lundsgaarde told us that “a core dilemma within the UK system relates to whether DFID, as a department with a reputation for managing funding effectively, can assume responsibility for influencing the policy orientations and

63 Q 154

64 USAID, [Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review](#) (2010)

cooperation programmes promoted by other departments beyond its narrow funding role.”⁶⁵

54. The future of DFID was a question addressed by most of those submitting written evidence, with a near-universal response that the answer to our question was ‘yes’. Different reasons were offered: the creation of DFID had sent a strong message internationally; DFID acts as the moral conscience of the UK’s international engagement; having a seat in the Cabinet gives influence at the heart of Government, and DFID’s operational capacity is easier to protect. A selection of comments received is in Box 7.

55. Furthermore, there were risks in making institutional changes. Nilima Gulrajani told us that:

If the goal is to strengthen DFID’s capacity to assist and influence other Whitehall departments and development organisations, it is unclear that a merger with the FCO can be a quick fix for current sources of weakness. Integration will not obviate the need to work across multiple spheres of ministerial responsibility and thus the requirement to navigate, negotiate, coordinate and collaborate across all the domestic spheres of policy that impinge on international development.⁶⁶

65 [Eric Lundsgaarde submission](#)

66 [Nilima Gulrajani submission](#)

Box 7: The future of DFID as a standalone department – views from evidence

- Action Aid said: “DFID has been a world leader in poverty reduction, and its establishment in 1997 has sent a strong message that the UK deeply cares about the world’s prosperity and stability.”
- The Wellcome Trust praised DFID country offices “which inform the approach to international development with local knowledge and expertise.”
- The British Overseas Aid Group said: “DFID should remain a standalone department, with the increased ability to scrutinise other departments’ policies, in relation to poverty reduction, as per the 2002 International Development Act. The loss of DFID would have a real impact on the world’s poorest and most marginalised people.”
- The BOND Disability and Development Group (DDG) said: “DFID acts as the moral conscience of the UK government’s international engagement. This clarity of mandate has been an essential element in building the profile of DFID internationally. In anticipation of new UK government obligations under a universal post-2015 framework, DFID will have more influence with other governments as a stand-alone department than it would have as part of the FCO. As a result, it will be more effective in supporting departments to meet their obligations under the post-2015 SDGs – including any obligations relating to disability inclusion.”
- The Open University said: “It is difficult to imagine what body other than DFID could or would bring their institutional experience to commission a comprehensive review of the development evidence and/or provide a fulcrum for transparent and open discussion to a shared agenda with such high profile international stakeholders. Moreover, an organisation focused on trade over aid would be significantly challenged to prioritise equity within any provision or commissioning of services.”
- Conscience said: “DFID continues as a separate department for the following reasons:
 - the Secretary of State for International Development having a cabinet seat brings real influence to the heart of government, particularly important in a PCD approach
 - a Cabinet seat makes a powerful political statement about the Government prioritising international development alongside other cabinet portfolios
 - working under the Foreign Office would mean that it would be harder for DFID to achieve humanitarian neutrality, and programming based on need rather than other agendas.
 - DFID’s achievements and stature derives from having the freedom of action, and weight within the UK Government that comes from being an independent department.”
- Malaria No More UK and Medicines for Malaria Venture said:

“For the UK to hold a successful future in the arena of international development, DFID should remain a stand-alone department.”
- Marie Stopes told us: “It is unlikely that global attention would have been as focussed on women’s rights, and in particular family planning and FGC, in the way it has been in recent years without a dedicated department. The evidence is clear that with authority and clear purpose, single entities - such as DFID - are more effective and cohesive in achieving their goals than entities with varied and multiple briefs.”

56. Subsuming DFID into another department could be a highly risky approach in that it could risk marginalising development. DFID does not need to be folded into another department to ensure a coherent, comprehensive approach to international development policies. As Lord Jay of Ewelme, a former official of the ODA (now DFID) and former Permanent Secretary of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, stated in 2012 to the

House of Lords Economic Affairs Select Committee inquiry on the economic impact and effectiveness of development aid: "the right structure [for UK international development policy] is to have a separate DFID from the Foreign Office, but working closely together."⁶⁷

57. DFID's own view unsurprisingly favours the continuation of the Department. The Annual Report for 2014 says that

The UK government is currently designed to support being joined up in three specific ways. First, having a separate department with a remit to pursue poverty reduction is important. DFID has a remit to provide analysis and advice about the impact of UK policies on poverty reduction, to complement its spending. Second, the Secretary of State for International Development, as a Cabinet Minister, is consulted on the full range of government policies that might impact on development. Third, the Secretary of State's membership of the National Security Council (NSC) and DFID ministers' membership of other specific Cabinet sub-committees, complemented by cross-departmental groups at official level, such as; NSC (Emerging Powers), NSC (Threats, Hazards, Resilience and Contingencies); Public Expenditure (Efficiency and Reform); NSC (Afghanistan); and Economic Affairs (Trade and Investment), enable the government to take a comprehensive and strategic approach to a series of policy issues that are critical to international development.⁶⁸

58. We asked the Secretary of State about the fact that the UK was now the only OECD DAC donor with a standalone cabinet-level ministry responsible for both policy and implementation.⁶⁹ She said it was "the right approach" for the UK. She said that development was a "strategic agenda for the UK Government", which was why she had a seat at the National Security Council.⁷⁰ We will return to the NSC in the following section.⁷¹

59. We support the continued existence of DFID as a standalone department represented at Cabinet level. Several donors have recently changed the way they structure their development approaches. We heard useful evidence about their new models. The UK is now an outlier in having an independent cabinet-level ministry responsible for both policy and implementation. It is too early to judge the benefits of other donors' new approaches. It may be that greater integration leads to close coordination between diplomacy, defence and development; or it may, conversely, be the case that integration leads to the co-option of development in the service of other national interests. Approaches are likely to be highly context-specific, and, as the OECD DAC says, mergers risk losing technical development expertise, which is more important than ever

67 House of Lords Economic Affairs Select Committee, *The Economic Impact and Effectiveness of Development Aid*, March 2012, Chapter 6, Number 75 <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201012/ldselect/ldconaf/278/27802.htm>

68 DFID, *Annual Report and Accounts 2013-14*, p.121

69 Q53

70 Q154

71 Department for International Development 2012, 'DFID Afghanistan Operational Plan' 2011-2015.

with a Beyond Aid approach. We believe that no one cross-departmental model will guarantee a successful approach, and that other factors are likely to be more important, including political will, and the ability to develop and use the right cross-Government structures.

Cross-Government working

60. A standalone development department continues to be the right approach for the UK. However, we thought it important to consider DFID’s role in working with other Government Departments.

61. ODI emphasised the importance of the UK Government assuming “a more coherent and compelling institutional approach to dealing with future global development challenges.”⁷² A number of witnesses, including DFID itself, noted the importance of cross-Government strategy documents (like the cross-Whitehall ‘Health is Global’ strategy), Cabinet Committees, jointly-owned cross-Government funds (like the International Climate Fund), joint ministerial appointments, and so on. There were many practical suggestions. For example, ODI proposed the “re-introduction of Public Service Agreements (or equivalent) (and) a reporting requirement to Parliament on PCD.”⁷³ The British Overseas Aid Group made a different suggestion: the introduction of a “shared, coherent strategic policy framework to ensure government interventions across the board promote complementary policies.”⁷⁴ UKAN interpreted this putative framework as a “Cross-Whitehall PCD strategy/action plan”, linked to a cross-departmental task force to track and monitor implementation. Like other witnesses, it said that any new such accountability frameworks must be subject to “stringent development and poverty eradication tests.”⁷⁵ Other witnesses recommended systematic ex-ante impact assessments, for example of proposed legislation, or formal ‘spillover analysis’ of domestic policy. We were told about Australia’s decision to set uniform cross-government standards for development co-operation to ensure coherence and effective co-ordination of joint initiatives. The Australian Government has developed eleven formal strategic partnership agreements between the former AusAID and 13 Australian government agencies outlining clearly the nature of their partnerships.⁷⁶

62. It was beyond the reach of this inquiry to consider all the structures used by the UK Government to work collaboratively on development. **We recommend that, in its response to this report, DFID consider the options for better management of cross-Government working set out in this chapter.** We decided to look at one example: how departments work together on security and development.

72 [ODI submission](#)

73 [ODI submission](#)

74 [BOAG submission](#)

75 [UKAN submission](#)

76 [OECD DAC submission](#)

The National Security Council

63. The National Security Council is the UK’s cross-Whitehall forum for discussion of the Government’s objectives for national security, and for making policy about how best to deliver them. The Council meets weekly and is chaired by the Prime Minister.⁷⁷

64. We heard mixed views on the NSC. There was a recognition that the Council helps ensure that “the political and military relationship is functioning”—for example, as it did over the Libya conflict.⁷⁸ However, several witnesses saw the NSC as symptomatic of how development was given a lower priority than defence issues. Sir John Holmes, ex-UN Under-Secretary General, said that development was often “bolted on” to pre-existing military operations. He cited the case of Afghanistan, which he believe had resulted in a “very skewed strategy, badly affected by a lot of happy military talk over many years about how well it was all going.”⁷⁹

65. Holmes told us that Afghanistan demonstrates that the MoD and DFID have not always worked coherently to meet development and humanitarian objectives. For example in Afghanistan in the years running up to 2012 20% of UK aid was directly focused on Helmand province despite Helmand being home to only 3% of the Afghan population and being one of the richer Afghan provinces.⁸⁰ This suggests that political and security objectives have been prioritised over an impartial needs-based approach, contravening Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles.⁸¹

66. Witnesses saw inherent weaknesses in the NSC that contributed to these incoherent military and development strategies. Ben Jackson of BOND said that the NSS and NSC had not amounted “to a driven cross-government strategy.”⁸² Other witnesses said the Council was better suited to crisis management and military issues than “longer-term” issues, including development.⁸³ Sir John Holmes said the NSC was “less focused” on “the broader coherence of policies towards a particular country in terms of trade and regulation and all those other things.” Holmes said that the DFID Secretary of State should have a “powerful voice” in the NSC, because of the Department’s presence on the ground, and the large sums being committed, but that “from the outside” it wasn’t obvious that it did.⁸⁴

77 Other members are: the Deputy Prime Minister, the Chancellor, the Leader of the House of Commons, the Foreign Secretary, the Home Secretary, the Secretary of State for International Development, the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury and the Minister for Government Policy. Other Cabinet Ministers, defence and intelligence representatives attend as necessary.

78 Q 50

79 Q 53

80 According to the World Bank (2010), less than 20% of people in Helmand lived below the poverty line, compared with a national average of 36%. Most other provinces suffered greater rates of poverty. World Bank and Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Economy, [Poverty Status in Afghanistan](#) (2010), p.12

81 ODI, [Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles in Practice](#) (accessed 21 January 2015)

82 Q 18

83 For example, James de Waal Q50, Sir John Holmes Q51

84 Q 51

67. James de Waal of Chatham House told us that the NSC offers the “structure” to HMG but that this does not guarantee a “coherent way of making sure how people use it.” He said that the effectiveness of input into NSC “still depends on a lot of things like personal relationships, presentational skills, and how skilful you are at using the bureaucratic machinery.” He argued for a code of conduct setting out the precise roles of people working on national security and how they use the NSC.⁸⁵ Saferworld wanted an increased role for the NSC in setting whole-of-government objectives for UK engagement in priority countries, including under the new Conflict, Stability and Security Fund which replaces the tri-departmental Conflict Pool in 2015. Saferworld also recommended an enhanced role for DFID, with its in-country expertise and networks.⁸⁶

68. We asked the Secretary of State for her view on how well the NSC worked. She said it worked “extremely effectively [...] not only a very regular meeting of key Ministers in Government” but as a means to look “in the round at what DFID is doing”. She said it gives her “the chance to make sure that this development aspect of tackling security, which is really important, can be a full discussion part of what are often some much more detailed conflict and security-driven discussions.” She stressed that alongside the NSC, the FCO, MOD and DFID work together through the new Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (the CSSF, the 2015 successor to the Conflict Pool). She said

The CSSF is now £1 billion of investment that allows us to combine both ODA spend and non-international-development spend on projects that can really sit alongside NSC priority countries, and it works very effectively. [...] It has a joint secretariat, so it is collectively decided between three Departments, and that means we can ensure that it has the right balance of focus. The challenges are making sure that we effectively combine the international development part of the budget with the non-international-development part of the budget and that that is stacked up in the right proportions. We have seen a significant increase in our budget over recent years [...] But we recognise that for other Departments the resourcing side of it is difficult, and therefore we have to bear that in mind in understanding what the right mix of money in the conflict fund is versus the broader departmental investments that they have in these similar areas.⁸⁷ We asked the Secretary of State whether the NSC put adequate focus on conflict prevention. She said it did, citing evidence showing that every £1 spent on conflict prevention can save £4 on dealing with the conflict itself, and referencing the Syrian conflict, where £700 million has been spent by the UK. She said “[Syria] is extremely expensive when you compare it with what that money could have driven in relation to development outcomes in stable countries.”⁸⁸

85 Q50

86 [Saferworld submission](#), para 21

87 Qq 157 and 116

88 Q 166

69. The current Government published the latest National Security Strategy in October 2010, to stay in place until 2015.⁸⁹ Parliamentary scrutiny of the National Security Strategy and NSC is carried out by the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy (JCNSS), which brings together 22 members of both the House of Commons and the House of Lords (including the chairs of the relevant Commons departmental select committees). As part of its remit the JCNSS scrutinises the structures for Government decision-making on national security, particularly the role of the National Security Council and the National Security Adviser. It has published a series of reports on the various elements of the NSC and NSS.

70. The case for DFID’s continued existence as a standalone department will be made stronger if cross-government structures ensure collaboration with other Departments is as efficient and coherent as possible. Witnesses put forward a range of possible approaches, from creating cross-Government taskforces, to ensuring that Operational Plans harmonise with FCO and other Government department strategies.

71. We are reserving our specific recommendations for security, where improved cross-Government working is crucial given long-held concerns that the development agenda perhaps is downplayed to military priorities.

72. We continue to support the existence of the NSC as a way of improving cross-Government working. However, we received mixed views on its efficacy as a cohering framework for UK policy. At the moment the NSC fails to give adequate priority to DFID’s concerns, and in particular conflict prevention. Any structure is only as good as the efforts invested in it. It is vital that development issues are accorded sufficient priority, and are not “bolted on” to existing military strategies. This will necessitate a broad understanding of security, which encompasses all the issues at stake in conflict-affected countries, including governance, the economy and social investment. Conflict prevention must also be a key priority: not only is it the right thing to do, but it repays the initial investment many times over. *We recommend the NSC to take a broader view of threats to UK security, and ensure that development is given the priority it deserves. We urge the Government to ensure that conflict prevention remains a crucial part of NSC activity.*

One HMG

73. On a slightly wider topic, we looked at the UK Government’s One HMG initiative. In 2013, the UK initiated a One HMG Team Overseas programme to deliver a “shared vision of HMG’s international objectives and value for money.” DFID said “This will enable staff overseas to collaborate closely on policy issues, make the best use of collective expertise and skills; be co-located in the same buildings wherever operationally or practically possible and for each post to have a single corporate services team wherever possible.”⁹⁰ We decided to look at a practical example of UK departments’ collaboration with one another. Briefly consulting publically available material on Ethiopia, it seemed to us that more information

89 [Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy](#) (2010)

90 Para 40, [DFID submission](#)

Box 8: DFID and FCO approaches in Ethiopia

The FCO and DFID seemingly take different approaches to Ethiopia.

The DFID view:

"DFID's vision is to protect the most vulnerable Ethiopians, consolidate development gains, help achieve the MDGs, and seize the opportunity to make our support more transformational, accelerating Ethiopia's graduation from aid dependency.

We will: (i) protect the most vulnerable: by building the resilience of the very poorest by reducing food insecurity and improving livelihoods and security in fragile and/or conflict-affected areas; (ii) consolidate recent gains and help achieve the MDGs: by continuing to support, extend and improve proven programmes to expand access to quality basic services; and (iii) make the impact of the UK's support more transformational by tackling the root causes of poverty and complementing existing programmes." Source: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/208967/Ethiopia.pdf (June 2013)

The FCO view:

"There are concerns in relation to civil and political rights. Ethiopia will hold national elections in May 2015. In this context, we have seen some worrying developments in recent months. These include the terrorism charges brought on 18 July against seven bloggers from the "Zone 9" group, and three journalists; criminal convictions against some publishers; and arrests of opposition party members. The UK will continue to press the Ethiopian government to create the conditions necessary for an inclusive political process.

Two pieces of legislation in particular restrict Ethiopian citizens' ability to exercise some of the civil and political rights guaranteed in the constitution. Civil society organisations' operations continue to be constrained by the Charities and Societies Proclamation (CSP), which introduced limits on foreign sources of funding for Ethiopian charities undertaking certain types of work. Those working on human rights, advocacy, election monitoring, governance, gender equality and security and justice have been particularly affected. The Ethiopian government has made some revisions in implementation of the law, but we are yet to see any amendments on issues such as the regulation of administrative costs.

We have continued to raise concerns about the use of the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation (ATP) with the highest levels of the Ethiopian government [...] In July 2014, the EU issued a joint statement calling for due process and respect for international human rights in relation to the detention under the ATP of the "Zone 9" bloggers, journalists and opposition figures. We will monitor the trials and continue to raise our concerns with the government."

Source: <https://www.gov.uk/government/case-studies/ethiopia-country-case-study-update> (Oct 2014)

would be useful on how the FCO's approach to human rights links up to DFID's approach to development—see Box 8.

74. We asked the Secretary of State for a progress report on One HMG. She said there had been "a lot of progress", and that co-location was now the norm in all but two DFID focus countries. She said efforts went beyond co-location to include a streamlining of back-office processes, and that it was important culturally for "teams to really feel that they are ultimately in one Government team."⁹¹

Joint units

75. Witnesses recommended that the Government make more use of joint country strategies.⁹² We were pleased to hear about joint DFID-DECC units in India and Indonesia

91 Q 175

92 For example, [UKAN submission](#)

working on the International Climate Fund. Andrea Ledward, DFID Head of Climate and Environment Department, told us

In Indonesia [...] we have a joint unit where we work very closely together. It is a great example, actually, of how we are working on integrating the multilateral and the bilateral, and then working with them on the global arena and influencing them politically. India, again, is a great example where it is not huge volumes of finance, but it is very pro-poor focused, and it is a lot of technical assistance to catalyse an enormous amount of change, particularly within the energy sector.⁹³

Nick Dyer, DFID's Director General, Policy and Global Programmes told us that there was "variable geometry" of DFID engagement with other departments, and that while joint units might work in some instances because "we can invest in that scale of governance", in others they made less sense "because you are dealing with smaller sums of money or they are particular issues."⁹⁴

76. The Secretary of State told us that One HMG has been very useful. We welcome the advantages of One HMG on a practical basis, and strongly endorse the concept of co-located offices being more streamlined and efficient. We agree that it is important culturally for FCO and DFID teams to feel they are part of one team. We also endorse the joint units run between DFID and DECC in India and Indonesia. They provide an important way of having long-term influence whether or not an aid programme is in place. We recommend that DFID look at opportunities for introducing joint units in other locations, especially in middle income countries, or where aid is of declining relevance.

Competences

77. A key benefit of a standalone development department is the fact that qualified development specialists deliver the aid programme, and the Department has given great emphasis to programme management to achieve this. Clearly, these competences will continue to be important. However, witnesses told us that, as the 'non-aid' element of the Department's work increases, its staff will need new skills, notably its ability to influence partners across Whitehall and in developing countries. ODI stressed the importance of this task: "While DFID has demonstrated clear success in administering and disbursing a sizeable aid budget [...] without a re-assessment of its organisational structure and ways of working, DFID will be faced with the threat of declining relevance. (Thus) It will also require different capabilities and ways of working to move from disbursement of aid as the primary function towards brokering of global action and the transfer of knowledge."

78. Other witnesses agreed. We were told

93 International Development Committee, Sub-Committee session on the International Climate Fund, 14 Jan 2015, Q 44

94 International Development Committee, Sub-Committee session on the International Climate Fund, 14 Jan, Q 48

What DFID needs most from its staff is the capacity to broker partnerships, understand how to support and promote enabling environments for private sector-led growth, tackle market failures, and bring knowledge of emerging approaches around the world to policy areas ranging from social protection to green growth and climate resilience. Experience of project finance and how to secure it will be especially important.⁹⁵

We were told that DFID will have to continue to employ both aid managers, and people with a different set of skills:

Would you be looking primarily for people with outstanding skills of [...] aid management [...] or would you be looking primarily for people who are able to engage in ideas-based leadership? [...] Of course, the right answer is you want a bit of both [...] I think DFID may well be managing both and doing both, but we need to be careful to make sure that they are developing both kinds of skills.⁹⁶

79. A further issue is that more staff than ever are working in fragile and conflict-affected states. The Institute for Development Studies said that staff working in fragile contexts needed longer rotations in post, and a broader range of skills and expertise around security and diplomacy.⁹⁷ Barder and Evans agreed, saying that the beyond aid agenda would be better-served with longer-term DFID postings that would help DFID staff develop expert knowledge of specific countries and their politics, history, and culture—and that language skills would be important. They suggested that specialisms in specific regions would be sensible, so that staff had skills in specialist areas related, for example, to political transitions; and the ability to operate across disciplinary boundaries (humanitarian, mediation, military, institutional, development).⁹⁸

80. These recommendations chimed with our calls over the course of this Parliament regarding DFID language training, and tour length. Also, if DFID staff are going to play a larger role in influencing and working in co-operation with developing country partners, they will need a great awareness of the cultural context, and for this language is very important. In our report on DFID's 2012-13 Annual Report, we recommended that DFID emphasise that language acquisition is an implicit expectation of all staff posted overseas; and that the Department include language skills in the expected competencies of senior civil servants and in promotion criteria. DFID partially accepted this recommendation pointing to the inclusion of languages in its new international competency framework. However, DFID qualified its commitment to training by saying

For those offices which operate in another language we expect staff posted from the UK to have learned that language, for example Portuguese for staff

95 [Barder and Evans submission](#)

96 Q 95

97 [Institute for Development Studies submission](#)

98 [Barder and Evans submission](#)

working in Mozambique. However we will not instruct staff to undertake language training for each and every post.⁹⁹

81. During our visits, we have been struck by the importance of knowing local languages. When we visited Ethiopia in 2013, a DFID staff member spoke Amharic; in Burma in the same year an FCO official spoke Burmese; and Tanzania in December 2014, one of our own Members—Jeremy Lefroy MP—spoke fluent Kiswahili.¹⁰⁰ These language skills proved to be a genuine asset: it impressed and engaged people we met in the field. When we asked for an update on the training of DFID’s staff, the Secretary of State conceded that the importance of local languages was “a very fair point.”¹⁰¹ She said

Our staff already show a willingness to converse in local languages wherever possible which is widely welcomed and promotes partnership. [...] A survey undertaken in February 2013 identified that 46 different languages are spoken by DFID staff in addition to English. We will continue to highlight the opportunities and benefits of language acquisition and will work with our overseas offices to ensure that learning local languages, as well as developing an understanding of local culture and customs, continues to feature prominently in the induction programme for staff and families moving to a new country location.¹⁰²

82. We have also emphasised the need for DFID staff postings to fragile- and conflict-affected countries to be for longer periods than is currently the case. Often DFID staff only remain in post for 18 months to two years. In our report on DFID’s 2012-13 Annual Report, we recommended that postings to countries other than the six most difficult countries should normally be for a minimum of four years.¹⁰³ DFID disagreed with this, saying that the length of tour should be determined by business need, and might restrict those willing to apply (for example, staff with families).¹⁰⁴

83. Witnesses made a number of practical recommendations about ensuring the right skills mix. Some told us that ensuring this mix was likely to require more secondments into and from DFID.¹⁰⁵ Others said that competence in cross-Government working should be written into all DFID job descriptions, and that good performance in this area should be rewarded.¹⁰⁶ Oxfam agreed that DFID will need to constantly assess that its staff are working cross-departmentally—and, simultaneously, ensure that other departments are required to engage with DFID to develop policies that meet the UK’s overall aims, including reducing poverty.

99 International Development Committee, Eleventh Special Report of Session 2012-13, HC 1098 (18 April 2013) <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmintdev/1098/1098.pdf>

100 [DFID supplementary submission](#)

101 Q 174

102 [DFID supplementary submission](#)

103 International Development Committee, Tenth report of Session 2013-14, [DFID's Performance in 2012-13](#) (5 March 2014)

104 International Development Committee, Eleventh Special Report of Session 2012-13, HC 1098 (18 April 2013) <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmintdev/1098/1098.pdf>

105 [ECDPM submission](#)

106 [Written evidence submitted by Group Capt \(Retd\) M.A. Ashraf and R. Athreya](#)

84. More generally, Erik Lunsgaarde recommended a competence review, covering DFID's internal skill set, but also asking what it could achieve more effectively via multilateral channels. He argued that

DFID should subject itself to a competence review scrutinising both its effectiveness in disbursing funding and its role in influencing the approaches of other government departments [...] policymakers should equally consider the potential for improved efficiency through strengthened efforts to improve the division of labour with actors outside of the United Kingdom. An assessment of opportunities for addressing global development objectives through support for multilateral organizations should therefore accompany the review of the strengths and limitations of UK government departments.¹⁰⁷

We understand that DFID is in the process of putting in place new competency frameworks for staff as a result of the wider Civil Service reform process.¹⁰⁸

85. To confront the new challenges we have described, DFID will need to develop skills that enable it to influence organisations and people in internationally, across Whitehall and in developing countries. These skills will include an enhanced language capacity. Some DFID staff have excellent language skills and are clearly able to exert influence with local interlocutors. It is also important that DFID make the most of locally recruited staff. *In light of the increasing significance of beyond aid issues, we recommend a competence review covering DFID's internal skill set, and also its role in influencing the approaches of other government departments and international actors, including multilaterals. DFID has a lot to learn from the FCO and other departments in terms of competences and vice versa. Ideally we would like to see a combination of the traditional influencing skills of the FCO and the project management skills of DFID.*

Reporting and accountability

86. We have commented earlier that a new approach to international development will require changes to the legislative framework governing the UK Government's development activities, with less emphasis on aid as the main instrument, and clarification of DFID's role as the lead institution across Government. In addition, there will need to be changes in the reporting and accountability arrangements.

87. With regard to DFID, we have made the point that action related to Policy Coherence for Development has not been well-reported in the past. There is a section in the latest Departmental Report which covers PCD, but the key themes are not visible in DFID's overall objectives or in its results frameworks, which focus too much on spending. Furthermore, DFID only offers a partial lens on the UK Government's policy and activities. A number of witnesses made the point to us that better reporting was required. We have demonstrated that many other countries offer comprehensive PCD reporting

¹⁰⁷ [Eric Lunsgaarde submission](#)

¹⁰⁸ ICAI, [How DFID Learns](#) (April 2014), para 1.24

88. **With regard to independent monitoring and evaluation, we note that both the National Audit Office and the Independent Commission on Aid Impact have roles to play.** We are pleased to note that the National Audit Office has assembled its work on foreign policy and development under a single heading of ‘International Affairs’. We note, however, that most of its work is Departmentally-focused, with the exception of a report on the Conflict Pool in 2012. There also seem to have been few reports linking international work to domestic policy. *We encourage the NAO ensure that PCD issues are fully reflected in its work.*

89. *Finally, with regard to Parliament, and specifically our own work as the International Development Select Committee, it goes without saying that we take our responsibilities for PCD extremely seriously. However, we have been constrained in the inquiry by the refusal of the National Security Adviser to appear before us. We recognise that parliamentary scrutiny of the National Security Strategy and NSC is led by the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy (JCNSS). However, we also believe that the NSC should be accountable to other Committees, including ours, so we can test whether it is taking adequate account as such issues as conflict prevention. Select Committees must have access to all relevant branches of Government to complete their work.*

90. *We support close working between other relevant select committees on PCD issues. We trust that our successor committee will continue to take a focus on a wide range of development issues including PCD, and working in partnership with developing countries, rather than a narrow focus on the delivery of aid programmes.*

Conclusions and recommendations

The continuing role for aid

1. We do not see it as necessary to explore further in this report the case for aid. Aid absolutely still matters, notably for humanitarian purposes and to support poverty reduction and human development in low-income countries. It also has a limited role helping to build partnerships with emerging powers and other middle income countries. Increased awareness of the range and scope of development challenges must not come at the expense of effective aid policy. In Phase 1 of this inquiry we recorded our full support for the 0.7% aid target. *We strongly endorse the continuing need to maintain development spending at 0.7% of GNI.* (Paragraph 15)

Transition strategies in middle-income countries

2. As grants of aid become less appropriate in some countries, so new forms of development co-operation are necessary. *During our recent visits to countries like India, we have noted how the UK could act as a partner in a very wide range of areas, including health, law, education, culture, planning and transport. We recommend that the UK Government increase its efforts to facilitate links between the UK and MICs in these areas, and use a new set of approaches and financial mechanisms, a number of which we explored in Phase 1 of this inquiry.* (Paragraph 21)
3. *We support the UK's principled stance against tied aid, but this should not stand in the way of building links between middle income countries and UK institutions. We recommend that the UK be confident about its decision to continue its 'beyond aid' engagement in middle-income countries. The UK may no longer have a traditional aid relationship with these countries, but it is spending ODA in Brazil, India and China—and is rather diffident about admitting this. We believe the Government should stand up for this course of action, rather than giving its critics opportunities by obfuscating about its perfectly legitimate activities in these countries.* (Paragraph 22)
4. *We recommend that DFID think creatively about other ways in which it could develop non-aid forms of co-operation between the UK and MICs such as India, for example by linking up with smaller organisations, and by exporting UK knowledge in a wide range of areas. We remind DFID of ICAI's report on the Department's livelihoods work in Odisha state, which demonstrated how very good demonstration projects can have significant impact, especially when taken up by the Government of India. We support ICAI's recommendations that DFID focus on knowledge partnerships in the poorest states.* (Paragraph 23)
5. *While we should continue to grant aid in some middle-income countries, we believe that as we have argued in previous reports the substantial and growing DFID spend in conflict-affected middle-income countries like Pakistan must not divert funds from poorer African countries. We encourage DFID and other Government Departments responsible for aid spending to maintain continuous improvement in management and accountability, so that well-informed, evidence-based decisions can be taken about when and where to use aid.* (Paragraph 24)

6. The growing profile of shared global problems, and global public goods, means we must be sure global institutions are fit for purpose. The international financial institutions must seek to include the needs of the BRICS and other emerging powers, or they will risk irrelevance. *The UK Government must continue to push for reforms to the IMF and World Bank, in particular, to ensure they meet the needs of emerging powers as much as developed countries.* (Paragraph 26)

Policy coherence for development

7. It is clear that there might be trade-offs between domestic and international priorities, as well as trade-offs between spending on poverty reduction and on global public goods. For this reason, we think it important to be clear about the overall PCD strategy. The UK will be challenged in the coming year to make significant commitments on PCD issues, including: global financial management, including shocks caused by changes in oil prices; security, in and originating from fragile states; climate change; and disease threats (illustrated by Ebola). The new SDG framework will require action on these both externally and in the UK. (Paragraph 35)
8. There are many successful examples of policy coherence in the UK. The UK's record is at the high end of international performance. However, we also note witnesses' concerns over the UK's patchy record on some aspects of PCD. We acknowledge that these are difficult issues, with potential trade-offs between national and international priorities, and between spending on poverty reduction and global public goods. We also note the criticism of the OECD DAC Peer Review that the UK lacks an over-arching strategy on PCD. *PCD is likely to grow in importance and it is therefore crucial that the UK improves its efforts in this area.* (Paragraph 37)
9. The legislative framework provided by the 2002 and 2006 International Development Acts has been extremely important in preserving the purpose and identity of the UK aid programme. We think it important that we have legal protection for the objectives of development assistance. In order to secure this, the aforementioned acts would need to be updated. *We conclude that both Acts should be updated to reflect the wider purposes on the UK's international development efforts.* (Paragraph 43)
10. *Policy coherence is increasing in importance. We recommend that DFID improve its reporting on PCD, in line with the requirement under the 2006 International Development (Reporting and Transparency) Act. Specifically, we recommend that the current short section within DFID's Annual Report is expanded.* (Paragraph 44)
11. *We also note that the 2006 Act is based on the MDG framework which will expire in 2015. The Act will need to be amended or replaced once the new post-2015 Sustainable Development framework has been agreed. The new framework will inevitably include a much wider set of Beyond Aid goals and targets. We recommend that the International Development (Reporting and Transparency) Act 2006 be revised or replaced once the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals have been agreed.* (Paragraph 45)

How the UK's approach should change

12. *We support the continued existence of DFID as a standalone department represented at Cabinet level. Several donors have recently changed the way they structure their development approaches. We heard useful evidence about their new models. The UK is now an outlier in having an independent cabinet-level ministry responsible for both policy and implementation. It is too early to judge the benefits of other donors' new approaches. It may be that greater integration leads to close coordination between diplomacy, defence and development; or it may, conversely, be the case that integration leads to the co-option of development in the service of other national interests. Approaches are likely to be highly context-specific, and, as the OECD DAC says, mergers risk losing technical development expertise, which is more important than ever with a Beyond Aid approach. We believe that no one cross-departmental model will guarantee a successful approach, and that other factors are likely to be more important, including political will, and the ability to develop and use the right cross-Government structures. (Paragraph 59)*
13. *We recommend that, in its response to this report, DFID consider the options for better management of cross-Government working set out in this chapter. (Paragraph 62)*
14. The case for DFID's continued existence as a standalone department will be made stronger if cross-government structures ensure collaboration with other Departments is as efficient and coherent as possible. Witnesses put forward a range of possible approaches, from creating cross-Government taskforces, to ensuring that Operational Plans harmonise with FCO and other Government department strategies. (Paragraph 71)
15. We are reserving our specific recommendations for security, where improved cross-Government working is crucial given long-held concerns that the development agenda perhaps is downplayed to military priorities. (Paragraph 72)
16. We continue to support the existence of the NSC as a way of improving cross-Government working. However, we received mixed views on its efficacy as a cohering framework for UK policy. At the moment the NSC fails to give adequate priority to DFID's concerns, and in particular conflict prevention. Any structure is only as good as the efforts invested in it. It is vital that development issues are accorded sufficient priority, and are not "bolted on" to existing military strategies. This will necessitate a broad understanding of security, which encompasses all the issues at stake in conflict-affected countries, including governance, the economy and social investment. Conflict prevention must also be a key priority: not only is it the right thing to do, but it repays the initial investment many times over. *We recommend the NSC to take a broader view of threats to UK security, and ensure that development is given the priority it deserves. We urge the Government to ensure that conflict prevention remains a crucial part of NSC activity. (Paragraph 73)*
17. The Secretary of State told us that One HMG has been very useful. *We welcome the advantages of One HMG on a practical basis, and strongly endorse the concept of co-located offices being more streamlined and efficient. We agree that it is important culturally for FCO and DFID teams to feel they are part of one team. We also endorse*

the joint units run between DFID and DECC in India and Indonesia. They provide an important way of having long-term influence whether or not an aid programme is in place. We recommend that DFID look at opportunities for introducing joint units in other locations, especially in middle income countries, or where aid is of declining relevance. (Paragraph 77)

18. To confront the new challenges we have described, DFID will need to develop skills that enable it to influence organisations and people in internationally, across Whitehall and in developing countries. These skills will include an enhanced language capacity. Some DFID staff have excellent language skills and are clearly able to exert influence with local interlocutors. It is also important that DFID make the most of locally recruited staff. *In light of the increasing significance of beyond aid issues, we recommend a competence review covering DFID's internal skill set, and also its role in influencing the approaches of other government departments and international actors, including multilaterals. DFID has a lot to learn from the FCO and other departments in terms of competences and vice versa. Ideally we would like to see a combination of the traditional influencing skills of the FCO and the project management skills of DFID. (Paragraph 86)*
19. With regard to independent monitoring and evaluation, we note that both the National Audit Office and the Independent Commission on Aid Impact have roles to play. We encourage the NAO ensure that PCD issues are fully reflected in its work. (Paragraph 89)
20. *Finally, with regard to Parliament, and specifically our own work as the International Development Select Committee, it goes without saying that we take our responsibilities for PCD extremely seriously. However, we have been constrained in the inquiry by the refusal of the National Security Adviser to appear before us. We recognise that parliamentary scrutiny of the National Security Strategy and NSC is led by the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy (JCNSS). However, we also believe that the NSC should be accountable to other Committees, including ours, so we can test whether it is taking adequate account as such issues as conflict prevention. Select Committees must have access to all relevant branches of Government to complete their work. We support close working between other relevant select committees on PCD issues. We trust that our successor committee will continue to take a focus on a wide range of development including PCD, and working in partnership with developing countries, rather than a narrow focus on the delivery of aid programmes. (Paragraph 91)*

Formal Minutes

Monday 26 January 2015

Members present:

Sir Malcolm Bruce, in the Chair

Fiona Bruce

Pauline Latham OBE

Jeremy Lefroy

Sir Peter Luff

Fiona O'Donnell

Draft Report, (*The Future of UK Development Co-operation: Phase 2: Beyond Aid*) proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 89 read and agreed to.

Annex and Summary agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the Tenth Report of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No. 134.

Adjourned till Wednesday 28 January at 2.00 pm

Witnesses

The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the Committee's inquiry page at www.parliament.uk/indcom

Tuesday 14 October 2014

Question number

Professor Ngaire Woods, University of Oxford, **Professor Melissa Leach**, Director, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, **Ben Jackson**, Director, BOND, **Sir John Holmes**, Director, Ditchley Foundation, and **James de Waal**, Senior Fellow, Chatham House

[Q1-74](#)

Tuesday 28 October 2014

Owen Barder, Senior Fellow and Director for Europe, Center for Global Development, **Karen Jorgensen**, Head, Review, Evaluation and Engagement Division, OECD Development Assistance Committee, **Gustavo Martin Prada**, Director, EU Development Policy, Director General for Development and Co-operation, European Commission and **Felix Fernandez-Shaw**, Vice-Director Multilateral Relations & Global Issues, European External Action Service

[Q75-116](#)

Thursday 11 December 2014

Kathryn Tyson, Director of International Health and Public Health Policy and Strategy, Department of Health, **Rt Hon Justine Greening MP**, Secretary of State for International Development, **Liz Ditchburn**, Director General Policy, Department for International, and **Louise Thomas**, Head of Trade for Development, Department for International Development

[Q117-204](#)

Published written evidence

The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the Committee's [inquiry](#) web page. BYD numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.

- 1 Action For Global Health ([BYD0059](#))
- 2 Actionaid ([BYD0052](#))
- 3 Adam Smith International ([BYD0058](#))
- 4 Amnesty International Uk ([BYD0033](#))
- 5 Bernadette O'hare ([BYD0053](#))
- 6 Bingham Centre For The Rule Of Law ([BYD0038](#))
- 7 Boag ([BYD0022](#))
- 8 Bond Disability And Development Group ([BYD0030](#))
- 9 Cafod ([BYD0018](#))
- 10 Chartered Institute Of Arbitrators ([BYD0016](#))
- 11 Conscience ([BYD0045](#))
- 12 Department For International Development Annex A ([BYD0068](#))
- 13 Department Of Health ([BYD0067](#))
- 14 Dfid ([BYD0021](#))
- 15 Erik Lundsgaarde ([BYD0023](#))
- 16 European Centre For Development Policy Management (Ecdpm) ([BYD0025](#))
- 17 Fire Aid ([BYD0051](#))
- 18 Global Witness ([BYD0049](#))
- 19 Group Capt (Retd) M.A.Ashraf and R.Athreya ([BYD0007](#))
- 20 Gsk ([BYD0008](#))
- 21 Health Poverty Action ([BYD0055](#))
- 22 Independent Commission For Aid Impact ([BYD0066](#))
- 23 Institute Of Development Studies ([BYD0035](#))
- 24 International Hiv/Aids Alliance ([BYD0047](#))
- 25 International Partnership For Microbicides ([BYD0015](#))
- 26 International Planned Parenthood Federation ([BYD0037](#))
- 27 Jubilee Debt Campaign ([BYD0012](#))
- 28 Justin Moore ([BYD0039](#))
- 29 Labour Campaign For International Development ([BYD0017](#))
- 30 Malaria No More Uk (Mnm Uk) And Medicines For Malaria Venture (Mmv) ([BYD0009](#))
- 31 Marie Stopes International ([BYD0010](#))
- 32 National Oceanography Centre ([BYD0003](#))
- 33 Nidos ([BYD0065](#))
- 34 Nilima Gulrajani ([BYD0020](#))
- 35 Oecd ([BYD0064](#))
- 36 Open University ([BYD0062](#))
- 37 Overseas Development Institute ([BYD0061](#))
- 38 Owen Barder And Alex Evans ([BYD0056](#))

- 39 Owen Barder And Petra Krylova ([BYD0060](#))
- 40 Owen Barder and Theodore Talbot ([BYD0046](#))
- 41 Oxfam ([BYD0026](#))
- 42 Path ([BYD0029](#))
- 43 Plan Uk ([BYD0028](#))
- 44 Population Matters ([BYD0001](#))
- 45 Progressio ([BYD0024](#))
- 46 Research Councils Uk ([BYD0036](#))
- 47 Results Uk ([BYD0004](#))
- 48 Saferworld ([BYD0048](#))
- 49 Scottish Catholic International Aid Fund (Sciaf) ([BYD0027](#))
- 50 Scottish Government ([BYD0002](#))
- 51 Sightsavers ([BYD0063](#))
- 52 Stopaids ([BYD0040](#))
- 53 The Fairtrade Foundation ([BYD0034](#))
- 54 The One Campaign ([BYD0043](#))
- 55 Uk Aid Network ([BYD0031](#))
- 56 Uk Health Forum ([BYD0019](#))
- 57 Ukcads ([BYD0013](#))
- 58 Wellcome Trust ([BYD0057](#))
- 59 World Development Movement ([BYD0032](#))

List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

All publications from the Committee are available on the Committee's website at www.parliament.uk/indcom.

The reference number of the Government's response to each Report is printed in brackets after the HC printing number.

Session 2014–15

First Report	UK Support for Humanitarian Relief in the Middle East	HC 248 (673)
Second Report	Scrutiny of Government's UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012, the Government's Quarterly Reports from October 2012 to September 2013, and the Government's policies on arms exports and international arms control issues	HC 186
Third Report	The UK's Development Work in the Occupied Palestinian Territories	HC 565 (756)
Fourth Report	The Independent Commission for Aid Impact's Performance and Annual Report 2013-14	HC 523 (812)
Fifth Report	Strengthening Health Systems in Developing Countries	HC 246 (816)
Sixth Report	Recovery and Development in Sierra Leone & Liberia	HC 247 (863)
Seventh Report	Appointment of the Chief Commissioner of the Independent Commission for Aid Impact	HC 741
Eighth Report	Responses to the Ebola Crisis	HC 876
Ninth Report	Parliamentary Strengthening	HC 704

Session 2013–14

First Report	Global Food Security	HC 176 (626)
Second Report	Violence Against Women and Girls	HC 107 (624)
Third Report	Scrutiny of Arms Exports and Arms Control (2013): Scrutiny of the Government's UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2011 published in July 2012, the Government's Quarterly Reports from October 2011 to September 2012, and the government's policies on arms exports and international arms control issues	HC 205 (CM 8707)
Fourth Report	Multilateral Aid Review	HC 349 (694)
Fifth Report	ICAI's Annual Report 2012-13	HC 566 (946)
Sixth Report	Implications for development in the event of Scotland becoming an independent country	HC 692

Seventh Report	The Closure of DFID's Bilateral Aid Programmes: The Case of South Africa	HC 822
Eighth Report	The Future of UK Development Co-operation: Phase 1: Development Finance	HC 334
Ninth Report	Democracy and Development in Burma	HC 821
Tenth Report	Department for International Development's Performance in 2012-13: the Departmental Annual Report 2012-13	HC 693 (522)
Eleventh Report	Disability and Development	HC 947 (336)

Session 2012–13

First Report	DFID's contribution to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria	HC 126 (609)
Second Report	Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, The Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues	HC 419 (CM 8441)
Third Report	The Development Situation in Malawi	HC 118 (641)
Fourth Report	Tax in Developing Countries: Increasing Resources for Development	HC 130 (708)
Fifth Report	DFID's programme in Zambia	HC 119 (759)
Sixth Report	Afghanistan: Development progress and prospects after 2014	HC 403 (862)
Seventh Report	UK Aid to Rwanda	HC 726 (949)
Eighth Report	Post-2015 Development Goals	HC 657 (1065)
Ninth Report	Department for International Development's Annual Report and Accounts 2011–12	HC 751(1098)
Tenth Report	Pakistan	HC 725

Session 2010–12

First Report	Appointment of the Chief Commissioner of the Independent Commission for Aid Impact	HC 551
Second Report	The 2010 Millennium Development Goals Review Summit	HC 534 (HC 959)
Third Report	Department For International Development Annual Report & Resource Accounts 2009–10	HC 605 (1043)
Fourth Report	The World Bank	HC 999 (1044)
Fifth Report	The Future of CDC	HC 607 (1045)
Sixth Report	Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly Reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation	HC 686 (CM 8079)
Seventh Report	The Humanitarian Response to the Pakistan Floods	HC 615 (1435)

Eighth Report	The Future of DFID's Programme in India	HC 616 (1486)
Ninth Report	DFID's Role in Building Infrastructure in Developing Countries	HC 848 (1721)
Tenth Report	The Closure of DFID's Bilateral Aid Programme in Burundi	HC 1134 (1730)
Eleventh Report	Financial Crime and Development	HC 847 (1859)
Twelfth Report	Working Effectively in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States: DRC and Rwanda	HC 1133 (1872)
Thirteenth Report	Private Foundations	HC1557 (1916)
Fourteenth Report	Department for International Development Annual Report and Resource Accounts 2010–11 and Business Plan 2011–15	HC 1569 (107)
Fifteenth Report	South Sudan: Prospects for Peace and Development	HC 1570 (426)
Sixteenth Report	EU Development Assistance	HC 1680 (427)