The administrative scheme for "on-the-runs" - Northern Ireland Affairs Contents


5  Operation Rapid

Introduction

159. According to the Downey judgment, the work on the administrative scheme came to a halt in 2004. From the documents we have available to us, we can see that very little was done between 2004 and 2006, although 12 letters were sent out during that period. According to the Report of the Hallett review, the last list of Sinn Féin names was provided on 18 August 2006.[106]

160. In February 2007, following the letter promising acceleration sent by Tony Blair to Sinn Féin in later 2006, the PSNI began 'Operation Rapid', the operational name for a review of people regarded as "wanted" in connection with terrorist-related offences committed after the Belfast Agreement of 10 April 1998. Its Terms of Reference were drawn up internally by the PSNI.

161. It appears that in Operation Rapid, after files had been assessed, they were effectively closed and new evidence no longer sought. Drew Harris told us that, "In respect of the Operation Rapid files, what you describe, in effect, of them being closed is probably what happened."

Speeding up the process

162. We heard from many people, including Tony Blair, that Operation Rapid was an attempt to accelerate the OTR administrative process. He explained:

    at the end of December [2006], the commitment that I gave to Gerry Adams to speed this process up, did it have an impact on Sinn Féin's decision on policing? Probably. I don't recall for sure whether I was told that at the time, but I should think so, because it was an important issue for them.[107]

163. The Terms of Reference resulted in OTR cases being reviewed far more quickly than had previously been the case. In 2007, the first year of Operation Rapid, 58 OTRs received a letter stating they were not wanted. During the previous administrative scheme, the greatest number of names cleared in a single year was 31.

164. Kevin McGinty, of the AGO, when asked whether the process changed, told us:

    I do not think it did change. There were always questions about whether this process could be speeded up, and I provided you with some correspondence, which perhaps suggested a way of speeding the process up by taking the prosecution process out of it and simply asking the police whether or not these individuals were wanted. The Director said, "I do not think that is going to speed the process up and I would not be happy doing it", so it continued on in the same way as before—that is, with a rigorous check made by both the police and the prosecutors as to whether or not the evidential test was met[108]

165. The Northern Ireland Police Ombudsman's report, and other sources, explained that all of the names previously submitted to the scheme were looked at again and 36 of those who had previously been listed as "wanted" had their status changed to "not wanted". The Police Ombudsman's report stated that Operation Rapid:

    carried out a review of all names again, not merely a continuation of outstanding checks or a processing of additional names. Furthermore the reviews conducted through Operation Rapid resulted in a change of status in a considerable number of those who had already been reviewed in recent years. In comparing the recorded status of the individuals, 36 of those who were assessed prior to January 2007 as 'wanted', for arrest and interview in relation to serious terrorist offences, were subsequently re-assessed in 2007 and 2008 as 'not wanted' by Operation Rapid.[109]

166. We consider that speeding up the process in 2007 made it more difficult for thorough and competent reviews to be carried out and, therefore, may well have made it more likely that someone would get a letter who was not supposed to.

Terms of Reference

167. The Terms of Reference for Operation Rapid were written by DCS Norman Baxter and signed off by Assistant Chief Constable Peter Sheridan in the PSNI. The team involved was summarised in the Downey judgment as follows:

    responsibility for the expeditious completion of the review rested with the Head of Branch C2 of the PSNI (who would ensure that a proper detailed record auditing the review and decision making process would be made and retained); that there would be a small team of investigators (a Detective Chief Inspector, 2 Detective Sergeants and 3 assistant civilian investigators); that the review would be conducted on terms of conditional reporting in order to prevent a misinterpretation of its purpose; that the Assistant Chief Constable, Crime Operations would supply a list of those individuals identified to the PSNI as having requested information as to their status with the PSNI as a "wanted person"; that each offence would be reviewed on an individual basis; and that recommendations would be made in accordance with particular forms of words set out in the Terms (although the forms of words in relation to a person wanted for arrest did not include one for someone who was wanted by another police force in the UK).[110]

168. It is clear from the Terms of Reference for Operation Rapid that, strictly speaking, the Operation Rapid team was only looking at whether someone was wanted by the PSNI, not by any other UK force.

169. The Terms of Reference suggest that they did not consider Downey to be 'on-the-run' as he was born in the Republic of Ireland, and that was where he was currently residing. In his assessment of Downey's case, DCS Baxter stated:

    The above person is a native of the Republic of Ireland and is a citizen of the Irish Republic. He has not resided in Northern Ireland and remains resident in his native district. He is not currently 'on the run' from his home

This shows DCS Baxter did not see Downey as an OTR, under the Terms of Reference for Operation Rapid.

170. According to the Police Ombudsman's Report, the PSNI had shared these Terms of Reference with the NIO. The Police Ombudsman's statement said:

    It has been established that the Operation Rapid Terms of Reference were shared with an NIO Official in a letter dated 15 February 2007, and when explored with the Assistant Chief Constable he explained the rationale for this was to ensure the NIO understood what the PSNI Operation Rapid involved.[111]

171. The NIO should have, therefore, been aware of what the PSNI were investigating and raised any concerns they had with the Terms of Reference directly with the PSNI.

172. Sir Matt Baggott told us that the Terms of Reference for Operation Rapid were, "very detailed" and "very thorough".[112] However the Report of the Hallett Review disagreed with this assessment, pointing to the Terms of Reference for the original scheme in 2002 as a much more comprehensive document.

WAS IT THE ROLE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE TO CHECK CASES IN ENGLAND AND WALES?

173. In the summer of 2006, several meetings took place resulting in the establishment of Operation Rapid. One of the most important of these was on 9 June 2006. A note of the meeting was shared with us by the AGO. In the meeting, one individual was discussed who was not wanted by the PSNI, but may have been wanted by the MPS. The note states:

    Mr McGinty accepted it would probably fall to the Attorney General's office to make these enquiries, he accepted the Met would have to be persuaded of the necessity of responding to these enquiries.

    (ACTION 2-Kevin McGinty to confirm with the Metropolitan Police if individuals are wanted, why they are wanted and what evidence exists in relation to the incidents.)[113]

174. Whist he did not attend the meeting, DCS Norman Baxter, who was in charge of Operation Rapid in 2007-8, told us that at that meeting it was decided that the Attorney General would confirm whether an individual was wanted by the MPS. In oral evidence he told us, "Mr McGinty said that the duty to check in England would fall to the AGO.[114]

175. Mr McGinty told us that, whilst his office was able to pass on England and Wales cases to the relevant authorities, he would have to have been made aware they were wanted before he could do that. He stated:

    I had to be told that they were wanted by the Met before I could start that process. I cannot check the PNC, and it would be absurd, for the reasons I have set out in my statement, that I would write to the Met in relation to every single name and ask them, "Please check the PNC to see not only if you want them, but if any other force in the United Kingdom wants them" when the PSNI were already doing that.[115]

176. We note the difference between the two views and believe that whilst it may not have been the responsibility of the PSNI to check with the MPS as to whether someone was wanted, they should have alerted the DPP(NI) or the AGO that there was a possibility they could have been wanted by the MPS. We also note that, on occasion, the PSNI did make enquiries with the MPS with regard to individuals' statuses.

177. ACC Peter Sheridan told us that, in hindsight, he understood why the PSNI were worried about releasing information about somebody wanted by another police force to the NIO, and that he would have felt more comfortable if the request for information had come through the proper channels, i.e. from the Attorney General, the DPP(NI), and to the PSNI. He told us:

    I can see now that what the Operation Rapid team was doing was not telling my staff officer that John Downey was wanted on the PNC, because that was going to go to the Northern Ireland Office. The proper procedure would have been for the Northern Ireland Office to write back to the Attorney General, to the DPP, to ask the question then of the police, and we would have had no difficulty in telling the DPP.[116]

WAS IT ILLEGAL TO PASS THE INFORMATION ON TO ANOTHER POLICE FORCE

178. DCS Norman Baxter did not see it as his job to pass on that someone was wanted by the MPS. Indeed, he told us that he thought it would actually be illegal to pass on such information:

    [I]t was not a "catastrophic mistake", but it was a legal requirement. I had no jurisdiction to pass information about a person wanted in another jurisdiction to that individual. Indeed, to do so would be prejudicing the investigation; it would be perverting the course of justice.[117]

179. However, the MPS in their written evidence stated, "The MPS does not consider that it would be illegal (or unlawful) for it to provide advice as to whether a person was wanted, or was not wanted, by a police service in another jurisdiction."[118] In any case, DCS Baxter was not being asked to pass on to the individual whether he was wanted or not.

180. ACC Peter Sheridan also told us he did not know that Downey was wanted by the MPS, as this information was not passed on to him. He stated, "I did not know that and was not aware of it. The review team—Mr Baxter's team—knew he was wanted but they did not pass that information to me."[119] He also told us that "If I had have been told, then I would have alerted the DPP(NI) of it".[120]

DID EVERYONE KNEW THEIR ROLE IN THE SCHEME?

181. Another argument Mr McGinty used as to why the AGO would not check for names is that his understanding was that everyone involved in the scheme already knew their place and knew their role due to the fact that the process had "been going on for about six years".[121]

182. Unfortunately, by the time Operation Rapid began, there was almost an entirely new PSNI team. The Police Ombudsman Statement explained:

    The Detective Chief Superintendent stated that he understood from his briefing that the work required by the PSNI was a relatively new issue arising after the legislation drafted to address 'On the Runs' had failed in Westminster in 2006. […] He described the revelation through the judgment of an 'administrative scheme' dating back to 1999 as 'quite shocking'.[122]

183. Both DCS Norman Baxter and ACC Peter Sheridan told us that they did not know about the work done on OTRs before Operation Rapid commenced. ACC Sheridan said, "The first time I heard of the administrative scheme was in recent weeks and months, when the press talked about the administrative scheme. I was unaware of an administrative scheme."[123]

EVIDENTIAL THRESHOLD

184. In both the Report of the Hallett Review and in the statement by the Police Ombudsman, criticisms were made of DCS Norman Baxter's leadership of Operation Rapid, specifically in the approach he took to dealing with evidence. The Hallett Report stated:

    Mr Baxter acknowledged in interview that he took a far more robust attitude to 'intelligence'. If there were doubts as to the reliability of intelligence/evidence then it was ignored. During the course of the earlier reviews the approach in general terms had been much more cautious and individuals were only informed that they were 'not wanted' if there was no or very limited evidence or intelligence.[124]

185. It is not clear why such a robust approach was taken. However, in his written evidence to us, Barra McGrory suggested the following:

    [F]ollowing the judgement in the prosecution of Sean Hoey for involvement in the Omagh bombing in which there was trenchant criticism of the police handling and storage of exhibits it was agreed that a further review should be undertaken of those cases in which the evidential test had previously been found to be met.[125]

186. The Police Ombudsman's statement also criticised the PSNI for the assumption that there had been a change in powers of arrest from "reasonable suspicion" to "reasonable grounds". The report stated:

    The most serious flaw is the wrongly articulated threshold for arrest creating the potential to impose a different standard when considering the grounds for arrest than that which is normally applied.[126]

The Police Ombudsman argued that this was a mistake, and there had been no change in the circumstances in which someone could have been arrested.

187. ACC Sheridan contended, however, that this was not the threshold for arrest used by the Operation Rapid team. He stated:

    In Lady Justice Hallett's report, [...] she says, "until the PSNI has concluded its lengthy review of all of the decisions previously made, it is too early to say whether an incorrect threshold was applied at any time, including in 2007­08" […] 6a(1) was about police intelligence and reasonable suspicion. To say that it is not articulated in the terms of reference is not right; it is in the terms of reference.

    Furthermore, until we know what the quality of the work done was, it is unfair to say that the threshold was wrong.[127]

188. Under different leadership by DCS Williamson from October/November 2008 onwards, a different approach was taken in dealing with intelligence evidence.

189. Downey was born and resided in Donegal, so was not considered an OTR by DCS Norman Baxter, under the Terms of Reference for Operation Rapid.

190. There was undoubtedly confusion over who was supposed to check whether someone was wanted by the police in England and Wales. The Terms of Reference of Operation Rapid made it clear that the PSNI were only looking at whether someone was wanted by the PSNI.

191. We accept that DCS Norman Baxter and ACC Sheridan did not know about the previous scheme so, unlike Mr McGinty, they were not aware of the normal processes and the normal roles everyone played. For example, they were not aware that they should pass on information as to whether someone was wanted by the MPS. This, however, begs the question as to why the PSNI felt they had to check with the MPS whether Downey was wanted, and, in hearing that he was wanted, did not pass this information on. DCS Norman Baxter should have, at the very least, passed this information to ACC Sheridan.

192. It is not illegal to pass the information on to another police force, so DCS Baxter was mistaken; he should have passed the information that John Downey was wanted by the MPS on to the DPP(NI).

193. The approach to evidence during Operation Rapid is concerning, especially in light of the very large number of cases which had their status changed during DCS Baxter's time in charge.[128] We endorse Dame Heather Hallett's recommendation that "The PSNI give priority in this new review of OTR cases to the 36 individuals whose status changed under Operation Rapid in 2007-08."[129]

Role of the Northern Ireland Office

194. After the withdrawal of the Northern Ireland (Offences) Bill in January 2006, pressure continued to be exerted by Sinn Féin on HM Government to resolve the remaining OTR cases. Tony Blair wrote to Gerry Adams in December 2006 regarding the issue of OTRs, promising to expedite the remaining cases. As we have previously stated, speeding up the process was also something that was promised in order for Sinn Féin to join the Policing Board. The letter stated:

    The Government remains committed to resolving the issue of OTRs.

    The Government has already announced that it would no longer pursue the extradition of individuals convicted of pre-1998 offences who had escaped from prison and who would, if they returned to Northern Ireland and successfully applied for the early release scheme, have little if any of their time left to serve.

    We remain committed also to addressing the anomalous position of all other OTRs, including those suspected but not convicted of qualifying offences before the Belfast Agreement.

    Had these individuals been convicted for these offences they would have benefited from the early release scheme which was part of the provisions of the Agreement.

    We are now working with a renewed focus on putting in place mechanisms to resolve these cases. This includes expediting the existing administrative procedures and putting in place measures to deal with the cases of those who would, were they to return to Northern Ireland, be brought before the courts.

    I have always believed that the position of these OTRs is an anomaly which needs to be addressed. Before I leave office I am committed to finding a scheme which will resolve all the remaining cases.[130]

195. The Police Ombudsman Review also highlighted an email sent from a Senior Police Officer to the Operation Rapid team, stating:

    Due to the renewed progress on the political front the NIO are pushing strongly to:

    Have the outstanding reviews completed as soon as possible.

    To resolve the instances of approx. 54 OTR's who, following review, are listed as wanted by PSNI for arrest and question in relation to serious terrorist offences.[131]

196. These statements show clearly that the beginning of Operation Rapid was a government initiative and only because of pressure from the NIO did the Police begin Operation Rapid.

KNOWLEDGE OF THE END TO END SCHEME

197. Officials in the NIO were clearly aware of the processes in the Operation Rapid; however, not everyone else was. The full extent of the scheme was not shared with the PSNI, who did not know that OTRs were being informed by letter whether they were "wanted" or "not wanted".

198. What is even more concerning is that the NIO did not liaise with the PSNI when drafting the letters, and ensuring they were aware of the precise terms of the letters before they were released. This was a failure on behalf of the NIO.

199. It is very clear that several Chief Constables of the PSNI and the Operation Rapid team did not know about the letters until 2011.

FAILURE TO LIAISE WITH THE METROPOLITAN POLICE SERVICE

200. The MPS told us the circumstances in which they found out about the scheme, which was only upon Downey's arrest in 2013. They said Mr Downey made them aware that:

    there had been some discussions and there was a potential for a letter indicating that the matter had been resolved. We were then immediately able to speak to both the PSNI and the Northern Ireland Office in order to identify the circumstances behind the letter, because this was the first knowledge we had around any potential letter or the whole process of on­the­runs scheme.[132]

201. By the time of his arrest, the MPS had already used significant police time and resources to ensure the arrest of Mr Downey. They told us:

    It is frustrating that colleagues and the Metropolitan Police over 30 years have done an immense amount of work to build the case—and these sorts of cases, where four people have died and many people were injured, are particularly awful—and even 30 years on have managed to build a case that is sustainable and potentially prosecutable. It is very disappointing that the problems with the execution of an administrative scheme have holed that prosecution below the waterline.

202. We share the MPS's frustration; if the NIO had informed them about the scheme, so much time and resources would not have been wasted. We agree with the Report of the Hallett Review that:

    MPS officers should have been told-and were entitled to know-of the existence of the administrative scheme and of the letters of assurance. Quite apart from the fact that their expertise and intelligence sources could have informed PSNI considerations, the scheme potentially impacted upon their own investigations (as with Mr Downey's case). Failure to inform the MPS of the scheme meant that it was unable to alert the PSNI to the fact that the details of all 'wanted' individuals would not necessarily have been registered on the PNC.[133]

203. It is clear that Operation Rapid was put in place as Tony Blair was leaving office and it was absolutely critical that Sinn Féin signed up to the Policing Board before he left.

204. When assessing the role of the NIO, it is important to note that Operation Rapid was completely separate to the previous administrative scheme. It had different PSNI staff, and those people in charge did not have any knowledge of the previous scheme in place. The NIO were the only party in a position to assume overall control of the scheme and ensure everyone understood what it involved.

205. There was no overall policy and procedural control of the specific role the different bodies involved had. Most importantly, there was also no procedure in place which dealt with how to correct a mistake, and this was a serious failing of the scheme. A process should have been in place for dealing with errors. If there had been such a process when the PSNI were alerted to the Downey error in 2008 and 2009, the error could have been rectified and the letter withdrawn.

206. We are also surprised that the wording of the letters-"the PSNI are not aware of interest in you by any other police force"-was allowed to stand. Surely, the writers of the letters should have realised that this was an incomplete assessment of a person's status.

207. If the PSNI had known about the entire scheme and had been involved in checking the letters sent to OTRs, it is almost certain that the Downey judgment could have been prevented. Matt Baggott, former Chief Constable of the PSNI, told us that, "with the benefit of hindsight, had we known there were letters, could there have been a bigger conversation about the implications if a mistake had been made"[134]. We agree with this comment.

208. In particular, the NIO should have ensured the MPS were aware of Operation Rapid and understood what it involved. The NIO were the only party in a position to do this. The mistake could also have been prevented if the MPS had been directly involved in the scheme and had been working alongside the PSNI to ensure that those on the OTR lists were not wanted by the MPS Counter Terrorism Unit.

Operation Redfield

209. As a result of the Downey judgment the PSNI is now reviewing all of the OTR cases to ensure that no further mistakes have been made. Former Chief Constable Matt Baggott told us that:

    We have established a team of experienced detectives to work our way through the 228 cases to ensure that no mistakes have been made and that any new evidence can be pursued. We have given this a name, as you would expect. It is called Operation Redfield. If I can say, the Downey case does appear to be somewhat unique, as far as we are aware from the ongoing work of the review at the moment, in that the fact that he was wanted was not passed on. It is the only case of this nature that we know of. In the only case that was wanted elsewhere, the individual remains wanted. As far as we are aware at the moment, that review is showing that this is in fact a unique matter.[135]

210. On the second occasion giving evidence to the Committee, Deputy Chief Constable Drew Harris told us:

    28 [cases] are open, but that is not to say that that is 28 concluded. That is 28 open and presently under examination and investigation. What I could point to, though, is the priority by which we are doing these. Thirty­six were specifically referred to in Lady Justice Hallett's report, so those 36 are a priority for our work in terms of examination. […] Given that in various reports both Lady Hallett and the Police Ombudsman have complimented the depth and quality of the work between 2000 and 2006, we believe that is, as has been pointed out to us, a good starting place in terms of our work and those will receive priority. I think those 36 cases are an appropriate place to begin our efforts and to concentrate our efforts for the moment.[136]

211. Clearly we welcome the PSNI's review of all OTR cases. We are, nevertheless, extremely concerned that, because of reductions in the PSNI's budget, it could take up to a decade to complete the task.

212. The work around OTRs was commissioned specifically by the NIO for reasons other than policing. The checks being undertaken initially by the PSNI, in relation to OTRs, were not as a result of its normal policing role; they were being carried out at the request of the NIO for political reasons. What has followed, specifically Operation Redfield, was a direct result of that piece of work being commissioned by the NIO. We believe this needs to be separated out from the wider work around historic investigations and we recommend that the NIO should commit the funds to ensure the review of the names of all those who received letters is undertaken swiftly.

Historical Enquiries Team

213. The HET is a unit of the PSNI set up in September 2005 to investigate the unsolved murders committed during the Troubles[137] in Northern Ireland. It should be noted the team did not consider murders carried out in England. The aims of the project were defined by the PSNI as follows:

    We envisage a re-examination process for all deaths attributable to the security situation with case reviews leading to re-investigation in appropriate circumstances where there are evidential opportunities.

    Families will sit at the very heart of our investigations. The primary objective will be to work with them to achieve a measure of resolution in these difficult cases. […]The second objective will be to enable a sense of confidence among those directly affected and the wider public that all these cases will be comprehensively examined to current professional standards, to the extent that as an organisation we can be satisfied that all evidential opportunities have been explored.[138]

When this unit was set up, little thought was given to how the HET's work would operate alongside the investigations into OTRs.

214. This has caused us much concern, as it is clear that there was a significant overlap between the work of the two teams. When we questioned the former Director of the HET, Dave Cox, about the his knowledge of the OTR scheme and how his team interacted with the PSNI, he stated:

    I certainly knew that a scheme was being worked up, and I knew Norman Baxter was running it, but it did not really impact on us because we were going to do our job anyway. We felt that if we came across anything relevant, we would be in touch with them.[139]

He also went on to say there was "no formal interaction"[140] between the HET and Operation Rapid.

215. Whilst we are concerned that there was little crossover between the two teams, we do not think Operation Rapid impacted on the work being carried out by the HET. We agree with Dave Cox that if the HET had found new evidence, they "would not have stopped referring it to the PSNI because there was an OTR letter"[141].

216. With regard to Mr Downey's case in particular, the fact that he had received an OTR letter did not prevent the HET from investigating his case and, in fact, the HET were able to highlight the result to the PSNI team. As expressed in the conclusions regarding the Downey case, this was an opportunity missed to correct the impression that Mr Downey was not wanted by the MPS and pass this information onto ACC Sheridan.

217. We support fully the principle of revisiting murders from that period and pursuing prosecutions where the evidence allows, and it is a great pity that the parallel process to consider the cases of OTRs was incompatible with HET's investigations.

Lawfulness of the scheme

218. The Report of the Hallett Review concluded that the scheme was "not unlawful in principle"[142], which is a heavily qualified comment and far from saying that this was in practise a lawful scheme.

219. Dame Heather Hallett takes a narrow view, that no specific criminal justice offence had been committed in carrying out the scheme. However, we regard the scheme as a significant departure from what would be considered the normal/ordinary criminal process. On the contrary, it involved the police looking at cases out of sequence, and exclusively on behalf of Sinn Féin, on the instruction of the then Prime Minister. We share Lord Williams' concern, as referred to in paragraph 51 above, that the issue of "comfort-letters" could result in individuals gaining immunity from prosecution in a manner inconsistent with the normal criminal justice processes in Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK. We are concerned that, especially during the initial phase of Operation Rapid, where the speed of review was accelerated considerably and the threshold may have been mistakenly set too high, that the operation of the scheme had crossed the line from being an extraordinary method of carrying out normal policing work into an unjustifiably reckless exercise of executive authority.

220. Whilst there is no suggestion that the scheme was actually illegal, it would be difficult to say that the scheme is unquestionably lawful in every case and this might have given an aggrieved person an opportunity to have a decision made by a Minister quashed in judicial review proceedings. Secrecy denied this opportunity. However, we are pleased that cases for judicial review have now been brought given the wider public understanding of the scheme. We are also concerned that the availability of this scheme to only one section of the community, and even then only effectively at the whim of one political party, raises questions about equality rules in Northern Ireland.

221. What is also curious is the continuation of the OTR scheme by the Coalition Government in May 2010, even though justice and policing had been devolved to the Northern Ireland Assembly in the spring of 2010. Not all OTRs were wanted for terrorist-related crimes and so it was not a matter of national security, as Dominic Grieve confirmed, when he told us, "National security could come into it but I certainly would not want to mislead this Committee. Whilst national security could arise in these cases, in some cases it would not."[143]


106   The Hallett Review, The Report of the Hallett Review, July 2014, para 4.157 Back

107   Q3700 Back

108   Q543 Back

109   Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, 'Public Statement on PSNI Operation Rapid, matters arising from the ruling in R v John Anthony Downey', October 2014, para 4.21 Back

110   Judiciary of England and Wales, 'The Queen- v-John Anthony Downey', 21 February 2014, para 75 Back

111   Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, 'Public Statement on PSNI Operation Rapid, matters arising from the ruling in R v John Anthony Downey', October 2014, para 4.75 Back

112   Q739 Back

113   Downey Disclosure Documents, Flag 17, Minutes of the OTR meeting, 9 June 2006 Back

114   Q17 Back

115   Q647 Back

116   Q3170 Back

117   Q17 Back

118   Metropolitan Police Service (OTR0023) Back

119   Q143 Back

120   Q149 Back

121   Q581 Back

122   Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, 'Public Statement on PSNI Operation Rapid, matters arising from the ruling in R v John Anthony Downey', October 2014, REFERENCE Back

123   Q118 Back

124   The Hallett Review, The Report of the Hallett Review, July 2014, para 5.50 Back

125   Barra McGrory (OTR0018) para 29 Back

126   Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, 'Public Statement on PSNI Operation Rapid, matters arising from the ruling in R v John Anthony Downey', October 2014, para 6.17 Back

127   Q3150 Back

128   See Annex 1 Back

129   The Hallett Review, The Report of the Hallett Review, July 2014, para 11.3 Back

130   The Hallett Review, The Report of the Hallett Review, July 2014, para 5.11 Back

131   Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, 'Public Statement on PSNI Operation Rapid, matters arising from the ruling in R v John Anthony Downey', October 2014, para 4.53 Back

132   Q2819 Back

133   The Hallett Review, The Report of the Hallett Review, July 2014, para 7.61 Back

134   Q688 Back

135   Q678 Back

136   Q3041 Back

137   Between 1968 and 1998 Back

138   Police Service of Northern Ireland, 'Policing the Past. Introducing the work of the Historical Enquiries Team' Back

139   Q890 Back

140   Q892 Back

141   Q927 Back

142   The Hallett Review, The Report of the Hallett Review, July 2014, para 10.66 Back

143   Q2228 Back


 
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