5 Operation Rapid
Introduction
159. According to the Downey judgment, the work on
the administrative scheme came to a halt in 2004. From the documents
we have available to us, we can see that very little was done
between 2004 and 2006, although 12 letters were sent out during
that period. According to the Report of the Hallett review, the
last list of Sinn Féin names was provided on 18 August
2006.[106]
160. In February 2007, following the letter promising
acceleration sent by Tony Blair to Sinn Féin in later 2006,
the PSNI began 'Operation Rapid', the operational name for a review
of people regarded as "wanted" in connection with terrorist-related
offences committed after the Belfast Agreement of 10 April 1998.
Its Terms of Reference were drawn up internally by the PSNI.
161. It appears that in Operation Rapid, after files
had been assessed, they were effectively closed and new evidence
no longer sought. Drew Harris told us that, "In respect of
the Operation Rapid files, what you describe, in effect, of them
being closed is probably what happened."
Speeding up the process
162. We heard from many people, including Tony Blair,
that Operation Rapid was an attempt to accelerate the OTR administrative
process. He explained:
at the end of December [2006], the commitment
that I gave to Gerry Adams to speed this process up, did it have
an impact on Sinn Féin's decision on policing? Probably.
I don't recall for sure whether I was told that at the time, but
I should think so, because it was an important issue for them.[107]
163. The Terms of Reference resulted in OTR cases
being reviewed far more quickly than had previously been the case.
In 2007, the first year of Operation Rapid, 58 OTRs received a
letter stating they were not wanted. During the previous administrative
scheme, the greatest number of names cleared in a single year
was 31.
164. Kevin McGinty, of the AGO, when asked whether
the process changed, told us:
I do not think it did change. There were always
questions about whether this process could be speeded up, and
I provided you with some correspondence, which perhaps suggested
a way of speeding the process up by taking the prosecution process
out of it and simply asking the police whether or not these individuals
were wanted. The Director said, "I do not think that is going
to speed the process up and I would not be happy doing it",
so it continued on in the same way as before—that is, with
a rigorous check made by both the police and the prosecutors as
to whether or not the evidential test was met[108]
165. The Northern Ireland Police Ombudsman's report,
and other sources, explained that all of the names previously
submitted to the scheme were looked at again and 36 of those who
had previously been listed as "wanted" had their status
changed to "not wanted". The Police Ombudsman's report
stated that Operation Rapid:
carried out a review of all names again, not
merely a continuation of outstanding checks or a processing of
additional names. Furthermore the reviews conducted through Operation
Rapid resulted in a change of status in a considerable number
of those who had already been reviewed in recent years. In comparing
the recorded status of the individuals, 36 of those who were assessed
prior to January 2007 as 'wanted', for arrest and interview in
relation to serious terrorist offences, were subsequently re-assessed
in 2007 and 2008 as 'not wanted' by Operation Rapid.[109]
166. We
consider that speeding up the process in 2007 made it more difficult
for thorough and competent reviews to be carried out and, therefore,
may well have made it more likely that someone would get a letter
who was not supposed to.
Terms of Reference
167. The Terms of Reference for Operation Rapid were
written by DCS Norman Baxter and signed off by Assistant Chief
Constable Peter Sheridan in the PSNI. The team involved was summarised
in the Downey judgment as follows:
responsibility for the expeditious completion
of the review rested with the Head of Branch C2 of the PSNI (who
would ensure that a proper detailed record auditing the review
and decision making process would be made and retained); that
there would be a small team of investigators (a Detective Chief
Inspector, 2 Detective Sergeants and 3 assistant civilian investigators);
that the review would be conducted on terms of conditional reporting
in order to prevent a misinterpretation of its purpose; that the
Assistant Chief Constable, Crime Operations would supply a list
of those individuals identified to the PSNI as having requested
information as to their status with the PSNI as a "wanted
person"; that each offence would be reviewed on an individual
basis; and that recommendations would be made in accordance with
particular forms of words set out in the Terms (although the forms
of words in relation to a person wanted for arrest did not include
one for someone who was wanted by another police force in the
UK).[110]
168. It is clear from the Terms of Reference for
Operation Rapid that, strictly speaking, the Operation Rapid team
was only looking at whether someone was wanted by the PSNI, not
by any other UK force.
169. The Terms of Reference suggest that they did
not consider Downey to be 'on-the-run' as he was born in the Republic
of Ireland, and that was where he was currently residing. In his
assessment of Downey's case, DCS Baxter stated:
The above person is a native of the Republic
of Ireland and is a citizen of the Irish Republic. He has not
resided in Northern Ireland and remains resident in his native
district. He is not currently 'on the run' from his home
This shows DCS Baxter did not see Downey as an OTR,
under the Terms of Reference for Operation Rapid.
170. According to the Police Ombudsman's Report,
the PSNI had shared these Terms of Reference with the NIO. The
Police Ombudsman's statement said:
It has been established that the Operation Rapid
Terms of Reference were shared with an NIO Official in a letter
dated 15 February 2007, and when explored with the Assistant Chief
Constable he explained the rationale for this was to ensure the
NIO understood what the PSNI Operation Rapid involved.[111]
171. The NIO should have, therefore, been aware of
what the PSNI were investigating and raised any concerns they
had with the Terms of Reference directly with the PSNI.
172. Sir Matt Baggott told us that the Terms of Reference
for Operation Rapid were, "very detailed" and "very
thorough".[112]
However the Report of the Hallett Review disagreed with this assessment,
pointing to the Terms of Reference for the original scheme in
2002 as a much more comprehensive document.
WAS IT THE ROLE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S OFFICE TO CHECK CASES IN ENGLAND AND WALES?
173. In the summer of 2006, several meetings took
place resulting in the establishment of Operation Rapid. One of
the most important of these was on 9 June 2006. A note of the
meeting was shared with us by the AGO. In the meeting, one individual
was discussed who was not wanted by the PSNI, but may have been
wanted by the MPS. The note states:
Mr McGinty accepted it would probably fall to
the Attorney General's office to make these enquiries, he accepted
the Met would have to be persuaded of the necessity of responding
to these enquiries.
(ACTION 2-Kevin McGinty to confirm with
the Metropolitan Police if individuals are wanted, why they are
wanted and what evidence exists in relation to the incidents.)[113]
174. Whist he did not attend the meeting, DCS Norman
Baxter, who was in charge of Operation Rapid in 2007-8, told us
that at that meeting it was decided that the Attorney General
would confirm whether an individual was wanted by the MPS. In
oral evidence he told us, "Mr McGinty said that the duty
to check in England would fall to the AGO.[114]
175. Mr McGinty told us that, whilst his office was
able to pass on England and Wales cases to the relevant authorities,
he would have to have been made aware they were wanted before
he could do that. He stated:
I had to be told that they were wanted by the
Met before I could start that process. I cannot check the PNC,
and it would be absurd, for the reasons I have set out in my statement,
that I would write to the Met in relation to every single name
and ask them, "Please check the PNC to see not only if you
want them, but if any other force in the United Kingdom wants
them" when the PSNI were already doing that.[115]
176. We note the difference between the two views
and believe that whilst it may not have been the responsibility
of the PSNI to check with the MPS as to whether someone was wanted,
they should have alerted the DPP(NI) or the AGO that there was
a possibility they could have been wanted by the MPS. We also
note that, on occasion, the PSNI did make enquiries with the MPS
with regard to individuals' statuses.
177. ACC Peter Sheridan told us that, in hindsight,
he understood why the PSNI were worried about releasing information
about somebody wanted by another police force to the NIO, and
that he would have felt more comfortable if the request for information
had come through the proper channels, i.e. from the Attorney General,
the DPP(NI), and to the PSNI. He told us:
I can see now that what the Operation Rapid team
was doing was not telling my staff officer that John Downey was
wanted on the PNC, because that was going to go to the Northern
Ireland Office. The proper procedure would have been for the Northern
Ireland Office to write back to the Attorney General, to the DPP,
to ask the question then of the police, and we would have had
no difficulty in telling the DPP.[116]
WAS IT ILLEGAL TO PASS THE INFORMATION
ON TO ANOTHER POLICE FORCE
178. DCS Norman Baxter did not see it as his job
to pass on that someone was wanted by the MPS. Indeed, he told
us that he thought it would actually be illegal to pass on such
information:
[I]t was not a "catastrophic mistake",
but it was a legal requirement. I had no jurisdiction to pass
information about a person wanted in another jurisdiction to that
individual. Indeed, to do so would be prejudicing the investigation;
it would be perverting the course of justice.[117]
179. However, the MPS in their written evidence stated,
"The MPS does not consider that it would be illegal (or unlawful)
for it to provide advice as to whether a person was wanted, or
was not wanted, by a police service in another jurisdiction."[118]
In any case, DCS Baxter was not being asked to pass on to the
individual whether he was wanted or not.
180. ACC Peter Sheridan also told us he did not know
that Downey was wanted by the MPS, as this information was not
passed on to him. He stated, "I did not know that and was
not aware of it. The review team—Mr Baxter's team—knew
he was wanted but they did not pass that information to me."[119]
He also told us that "If I had have been told, then I would
have alerted the DPP(NI) of it".[120]
DID EVERYONE KNEW THEIR ROLE IN
THE SCHEME?
181. Another argument Mr McGinty used as to why the
AGO would not check for names is that his understanding was that
everyone involved in the scheme already knew their place and knew
their role due to the fact that the process had "been going
on for about six years".[121]
182. Unfortunately, by the time Operation Rapid began,
there was almost an entirely new PSNI team. The Police Ombudsman
Statement explained:
The Detective Chief Superintendent stated that
he understood from his briefing that the work required by the
PSNI was a relatively new issue arising after the legislation
drafted to address 'On the Runs' had failed in Westminster in
2006. […] He described the revelation through the judgment
of an 'administrative scheme' dating back to 1999 as 'quite
shocking'.[122]
183. Both DCS Norman Baxter and ACC Peter Sheridan
told us that they did not know about the work done on OTRs before
Operation Rapid commenced. ACC Sheridan said, "The first
time I heard of the administrative scheme was in recent weeks
and months, when the press talked about the administrative scheme.
I was unaware of an administrative scheme."[123]
EVIDENTIAL THRESHOLD
184. In both the Report of the Hallett Review and
in the statement by the Police Ombudsman, criticisms were made
of DCS Norman Baxter's leadership of Operation Rapid, specifically
in the approach he took to dealing with evidence. The Hallett
Report stated:
Mr Baxter acknowledged in interview that he took
a far more robust attitude to 'intelligence'. If there were doubts
as to the reliability of intelligence/evidence then it was ignored.
During the course of the earlier reviews the approach in general
terms had been much more cautious and individuals were only informed
that they were 'not wanted' if there was no or very limited evidence
or intelligence.[124]
185. It is not clear why such a robust approach was
taken. However, in his written evidence to us, Barra McGrory suggested
the following:
[F]ollowing the judgement in the prosecution
of Sean Hoey for involvement in the Omagh bombing in which there
was trenchant criticism of the police handling and storage of
exhibits it was agreed that a further review should be undertaken
of those cases in which the evidential test had previously been
found to be met.[125]
186. The Police Ombudsman's statement also criticised
the PSNI for the assumption that there had been a change in powers
of arrest from "reasonable suspicion" to "reasonable
grounds". The report stated:
The most serious flaw is the wrongly articulated
threshold for arrest creating the potential to impose a different
standard when considering the grounds for arrest than that which
is normally applied.[126]
The Police Ombudsman argued that this was a mistake,
and there had been no change in the circumstances in which someone
could have been arrested.
187. ACC Sheridan contended, however, that this was
not the threshold for arrest used by the Operation Rapid team.
He stated:
In Lady Justice Hallett's report, [...] she says,
"until the PSNI has concluded its lengthy review of all of
the decisions previously made, it is too early to say whether
an incorrect threshold was applied at any time, including in 200708"
[…] 6a(1) was about police intelligence and reasonable suspicion.
To say that it is not articulated in the terms of reference is
not right; it is in the terms of reference.
Furthermore, until we know what the quality of
the work done was, it is unfair to say that the threshold was
wrong.[127]
188. Under different leadership by DCS Williamson
from October/November 2008 onwards, a different approach was taken
in dealing with intelligence evidence.
189. Downey
was born and resided in Donegal, so was not considered an OTR
by DCS Norman Baxter, under the Terms of Reference for Operation
Rapid.
190. There was
undoubtedly confusion over who was supposed to check whether someone
was wanted by the police in England and Wales. The Terms of Reference
of Operation Rapid made it clear that the PSNI were only looking
at whether someone was wanted by the PSNI.
191. We accept
that DCS Norman Baxter and ACC Sheridan did not know about the
previous scheme so, unlike Mr McGinty, they were not aware of
the normal processes and the normal roles everyone played. For
example, they were not aware that they should pass on information
as to whether someone was wanted by the MPS. This, however, begs
the question as to why the PSNI felt they had to check with the
MPS whether Downey was wanted, and, in hearing that he was wanted,
did not pass this information on. DCS Norman Baxter should have,
at the very least, passed this information to ACC Sheridan.
192. It is not
illegal to pass the information on to another police force, so
DCS Baxter was mistaken; he should have passed the information
that John Downey was wanted by the MPS on to the DPP(NI).
193. The approach
to evidence during Operation Rapid is concerning, especially in
light of the very large number of cases which had their status
changed during DCS Baxter's time in charge.[128]
We endorse Dame Heather Hallett's
recommendation that "The PSNI give priority in this new review
of OTR cases to the 36 individuals whose status changed under
Operation Rapid in 2007-08."[129]
Role of the Northern Ireland
Office
194. After the withdrawal of the Northern Ireland
(Offences) Bill in January 2006, pressure continued to be exerted
by Sinn Féin on HM Government to resolve the remaining
OTR cases. Tony Blair wrote to Gerry Adams in December 2006 regarding
the issue of OTRs, promising to expedite the remaining cases.
As we have previously stated, speeding up the process was also
something that was promised in order for Sinn Féin to join
the Policing Board. The letter stated:
The Government remains committed to resolving
the issue of OTRs.
The Government has already announced that it
would no longer pursue the extradition of individuals convicted
of pre-1998 offences who had escaped from prison and who would,
if they returned to Northern Ireland and successfully applied
for the early release scheme, have little if any of their time
left to serve.
We remain committed also to addressing the anomalous
position of all other OTRs, including those suspected but not
convicted of qualifying offences before the Belfast Agreement.
Had these individuals been convicted for these
offences they would have benefited from the early release scheme
which was part of the provisions of the Agreement.
We are now working with a renewed focus on putting
in place mechanisms to resolve these cases. This includes expediting
the existing administrative procedures and putting in place measures
to deal with the cases of those who would, were they to return
to Northern Ireland, be brought before the courts.
I have always believed that the position of these
OTRs is an anomaly which needs to be addressed. Before I leave
office I am committed to finding a scheme which will resolve all
the remaining cases.[130]
195. The Police Ombudsman Review also highlighted
an email sent from a Senior Police Officer to the Operation Rapid
team, stating:
Due to the renewed progress on the political
front the NIO are pushing strongly to:
Have the outstanding reviews completed as soon
as possible.
To resolve the instances of approx. 54 OTR's
who, following review, are listed as wanted by PSNI for arrest
and question in relation to serious terrorist offences.[131]
196. These statements show clearly that the beginning
of Operation Rapid was a government initiative and only because
of pressure from the NIO did the Police begin Operation Rapid.
KNOWLEDGE OF THE END TO END SCHEME
197. Officials in the NIO were clearly aware of the
processes in the Operation Rapid; however, not everyone else was.
The full extent of the scheme was not shared with the PSNI, who
did not know that OTRs were being informed by letter whether they
were "wanted" or "not wanted".
198. What is even more concerning is that the NIO
did not liaise with the PSNI when drafting the letters, and ensuring
they were aware of the precise terms of the letters before they
were released. This was a failure on behalf of the NIO.
199. It is very clear that several Chief Constables
of the PSNI and the Operation Rapid team did not know about the
letters until 2011.
FAILURE TO LIAISE WITH THE METROPOLITAN
POLICE SERVICE
200. The MPS told us the circumstances in which they
found out about the scheme, which was only upon Downey's arrest
in 2013. They said Mr Downey made them aware that:
there had been some discussions and there was
a potential for a letter indicating that the matter had been resolved.
We were then immediately able to speak to both the PSNI and the
Northern Ireland Office in order to identify the circumstances
behind the letter, because this was the first knowledge we had
around any potential letter or the whole process of ontheruns
scheme.[132]
201. By the time of his arrest, the MPS had already
used significant police time and resources to ensure the arrest
of Mr Downey. They told us:
It is frustrating that colleagues and the Metropolitan
Police over 30 years have done an immense amount of work to build
the case—and these sorts of cases, where four people have
died and many people were injured, are particularly awful—and
even 30 years on have managed to build a case that is sustainable
and potentially prosecutable. It is very disappointing that the
problems with the execution of an administrative scheme have holed
that prosecution below the waterline.
202. We share the MPS's frustration; if the NIO had
informed them about the scheme, so much time and resources would
not have been wasted. We agree with the Report of the Hallett
Review that:
MPS officers should have been told-and were entitled
to know-of the existence of the administrative scheme and of the
letters of assurance. Quite apart from the fact that their expertise
and intelligence sources could have informed PSNI considerations,
the scheme potentially impacted upon their own investigations
(as with Mr Downey's case). Failure to inform the MPS of the scheme
meant that it was unable to alert the PSNI to the fact that the
details of all 'wanted' individuals would not necessarily have
been registered on the PNC.[133]
203. It
is clear that Operation Rapid was put in place as Tony Blair was
leaving office and it was absolutely critical that Sinn Féin
signed up to the Policing Board before he left.
204. When assessing
the role of the NIO, it is important to note that Operation Rapid
was completely separate to the previous administrative scheme.
It had different PSNI staff, and those people in charge did not
have any knowledge of the previous scheme in place. The NIO were
the only party in a position to assume overall control of the
scheme and ensure everyone understood what it involved.
205. There was
no overall policy and procedural control of the specific role
the different bodies involved had. Most importantly, there was
also no procedure in place which dealt with how to correct a mistake,
and this was a serious failing of the scheme. A process should
have been in place for dealing with errors. If there had been
such a process when the PSNI were alerted to the Downey error
in 2008 and 2009, the error could have been rectified and the
letter withdrawn.
206. We are
also surprised that the wording of the letters-"the PSNI
are not aware of interest in you by any other police force"-was
allowed to stand. Surely, the writers of the letters should have
realised that this was an incomplete assessment of a person's
status.
207. If the
PSNI had known about the entire scheme and had been involved in
checking the letters sent to OTRs, it is almost certain that the
Downey judgment could have been prevented. Matt Baggott, former
Chief Constable of the PSNI, told us that, "with the benefit
of hindsight, had we known there were letters, could there have
been a bigger conversation about the implications if a mistake
had been made"[134].
We agree with this comment.
208. In particular, the
NIO should have ensured the MPS were aware of Operation Rapid
and understood what it involved. The NIO were the only party in
a position to do this. The mistake could also have been prevented
if the MPS had been directly involved in the scheme and had been
working alongside the PSNI to ensure that those on the OTR lists
were not wanted by the MPS Counter Terrorism Unit.
Operation Redfield
209. As a result of the Downey judgment the PSNI
is now reviewing all of the OTR cases to ensure that no further
mistakes have been made. Former Chief Constable Matt Baggott told
us that:
We have established a team of experienced detectives
to work our way through the 228 cases to ensure that no mistakes
have been made and that any new evidence can be pursued. We have
given this a name, as you would expect. It is called Operation
Redfield. If I can say, the Downey case does appear to be somewhat
unique, as far as we are aware from the ongoing work of the review
at the moment, in that the fact that he was wanted was not passed
on. It is the only case of this nature that we know of. In the
only case that was wanted elsewhere, the individual remains wanted.
As far as we are aware at the moment, that review is showing that
this is in fact a unique matter.[135]
210. On the second occasion giving evidence to the
Committee, Deputy Chief Constable Drew Harris told us:
28 [cases] are open, but that is not to say that
that is 28 concluded. That is 28 open and presently under examination
and investigation. What I could point to, though, is the priority
by which we are doing these. Thirtysix were specifically
referred to in Lady Justice Hallett's report, so those 36 are
a priority for our work in terms of examination. […] Given
that in various reports both Lady Hallett and the Police Ombudsman
have complimented the depth and quality of the work between 2000
and 2006, we believe that is, as has been pointed out to us, a
good starting place in terms of our work and those will receive
priority. I think those 36 cases are an appropriate place to begin
our efforts and to concentrate our efforts for the moment.[136]
211. Clearly we welcome the PSNI's review of all
OTR cases. We are, nevertheless, extremely concerned that, because
of reductions in the PSNI's budget, it could take up to a decade
to complete the task.
212. The work
around OTRs was commissioned specifically by the NIO for reasons
other than policing. The checks being undertaken initially by
the PSNI, in relation to OTRs, were not as a result of its normal
policing role; they were being carried out at the request of the
NIO for political reasons. What has followed, specifically Operation
Redfield, was a direct result of that piece of work being commissioned
by the NIO. We believe this needs to be separated out from the
wider work around historic investigations and we recommend that
the NIO should commit the funds to ensure the review of the names
of all those who received letters is undertaken swiftly.
Historical Enquiries Team
213. The HET is a unit of the PSNI set up in September
2005 to investigate the unsolved murders committed during the
Troubles[137] in Northern
Ireland. It should be noted the team did not consider murders
carried out in England. The aims of the project were defined by
the PSNI as follows:
We envisage a re-examination process for all
deaths attributable to the security situation with case reviews
leading to re-investigation in appropriate circumstances where
there are evidential opportunities.
Families will sit at the very heart of our investigations.
The primary objective will be to work with them to achieve a measure
of resolution in these difficult cases. […]The second objective
will be to enable a sense of confidence among those directly affected
and the wider public that all these cases will be comprehensively
examined to current professional standards, to the extent that
as an organisation we can be satisfied that all evidential opportunities
have been explored.[138]
When this unit was set up, little thought was given
to how the HET's work would operate alongside the investigations
into OTRs.
214. This has caused us much concern, as it is clear
that there was a significant overlap between the work of the two
teams. When we questioned the former Director of the HET, Dave
Cox, about the his knowledge of the OTR scheme and how his team
interacted with the PSNI, he stated:
I certainly knew that a scheme was being worked
up, and I knew Norman Baxter was running it, but it did not really
impact on us because we were going to do our job anyway. We felt
that if we came across anything relevant, we would be in touch
with them.[139]
He also went on to say there was "no formal
interaction"[140]
between the HET and Operation Rapid.
215. Whilst
we are concerned that there was little crossover between the two
teams, we do not think Operation Rapid impacted on the work being
carried out by the HET. We agree with Dave Cox that if the HET
had found new evidence, they "would not have stopped referring
it to the PSNI because there was an OTR letter"[141].
216. With regard
to Mr Downey's case in particular, the fact that he had received
an OTR letter did not prevent the HET from investigating his case
and, in fact, the HET were able to highlight the result to the
PSNI team. As expressed in the conclusions regarding the Downey
case, this was an opportunity missed to correct the impression
that Mr Downey was not wanted by the MPS and pass this information
onto ACC Sheridan.
217. We support
fully the principle of revisiting murders from that period and
pursuing prosecutions where the evidence allows, and it is a great
pity that the parallel process to consider the cases of OTRs was
incompatible with HET's investigations.
Lawfulness of the scheme
218. The Report of the Hallett Review concluded that
the scheme was "not unlawful in principle"[142],
which is a heavily qualified comment and far from saying that
this was in practise a lawful scheme.
219. Dame Heather Hallett takes a narrow view, that
no specific criminal justice offence had been committed in carrying
out the scheme. However, we regard the scheme as a significant
departure from what would be considered the normal/ordinary criminal
process. On the contrary, it involved the police looking at cases
out of sequence, and exclusively on behalf of Sinn Féin,
on the instruction of the then Prime Minister. We share Lord Williams'
concern, as referred to in paragraph 51 above, that the issue
of "comfort-letters" could result in individuals gaining
immunity from prosecution in a manner inconsistent with the normal
criminal justice processes in Northern Ireland and the rest of
the UK. We are concerned that, especially during the initial phase
of Operation Rapid, where the speed of review was accelerated
considerably and the threshold may have been mistakenly set too
high, that the operation of the scheme had crossed the line from
being an extraordinary method of carrying out normal policing
work into an unjustifiably reckless exercise of executive authority.
220. Whilst
there is no suggestion that the scheme was actually illegal, it
would be difficult to say that the scheme is unquestionably lawful
in every case and this might have given an aggrieved person an
opportunity to have a decision made by a Minister quashed in judicial
review proceedings. Secrecy denied this opportunity. However,
we are pleased that cases for judicial review have now been brought
given the wider public understanding of the scheme. We are also
concerned that the availability of this scheme to only one section
of the community, and even then only effectively at the whim of
one political party, raises questions about equality rules in
Northern Ireland.
221. What is also curious is the continuation of
the OTR scheme by the Coalition Government in May 2010, even though
justice and policing had been devolved to the Northern Ireland
Assembly in the spring of 2010. Not all OTRs were wanted for terrorist-related
crimes and so it was not a matter of national security, as Dominic
Grieve confirmed, when he told us, "National security could
come into it but I certainly would not want to mislead this Committee.
Whilst national security could arise in these cases, in some cases
it would not."[143]
106 The Hallett Review, The Report of the Hallett Review,
July 2014, para 4.157 Back
107
Q3700 Back
108
Q543 Back
109
Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, 'Public Statement on PSNI Operation Rapid, matters arising from the ruling in R v John Anthony Downey',
October 2014, para 4.21 Back
110
Judiciary of England and Wales, 'The Queen- v-John Anthony Downey',
21 February 2014, para 75 Back
111
Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, 'Public Statement on PSNI Operation Rapid, matters arising from the ruling in R v John Anthony Downey',
October 2014, para 4.75 Back
112
Q739 Back
113
Downey Disclosure Documents, Flag 17, Minutes of the OTR meeting,
9 June 2006 Back
114
Q17 Back
115
Q647 Back
116
Q3170 Back
117
Q17 Back
118
Metropolitan Police Service (OTR0023) Back
119
Q143 Back
120
Q149 Back
121
Q581 Back
122
Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, 'Public Statement on PSNI Operation Rapid, matters arising from the ruling in R v John Anthony Downey',
October 2014, REFERENCE Back
123
Q118 Back
124
The Hallett Review, The Report of the Hallett Review, July 2014,
para 5.50 Back
125
Barra McGrory (OTR0018) para 29 Back
126
Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, 'Public Statement on PSNI Operation Rapid, matters arising from the ruling in R v John Anthony Downey',
October 2014, para 6.17 Back
127
Q3150 Back
128
See Annex 1 Back
129
The Hallett Review, The Report of the Hallett Review, July 2014,
para 11.3 Back
130
The Hallett Review, The Report of the Hallett Review, July 2014,
para 5.11 Back
131
Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, 'Public Statement on PSNI Operation Rapid, matters arising from the ruling in R v John Anthony Downey',
October 2014, para 4.53 Back
132
Q2819 Back
133
The Hallett Review, The Report of the Hallett Review, July 2014,
para 7.61 Back
134
Q688 Back
135
Q678 Back
136
Q3041 Back
137
Between 1968 and 1998 Back
138
Police Service of Northern Ireland, 'Policing the Past. Introducing
the work of the Historical Enquiries Team' Back
139
Q890 Back
140
Q892 Back
141
Q927 Back
142
The Hallett Review, The Report of the Hallett Review, July 2014,
para 10.66 Back
143
Q2228 Back
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