Conclusions and recommendations
Changes from the 2010 election
1. The
public should expect that the negotiation period for the formation
of a potential coalition Government or confidence and supply arrangement
will be longer in 2015 than in 2010. (Paragraph 9)
2. While we recognise
that, in a number of scenarios, after a general election there
may not be uncertainty over the nature of the continuing or incoming
administration, opinion polling in the last months of this Parliament
has consistently indicated the likelihood of an election result
with no overall majority. We are therefore disappointed that the
opportunity provided by the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 has
not been used by the Government and the Civil Service to plan
better for the potential of a period of negotiations immediately
following the General Election. An opportunity to ensure that
as far as possible key decisions do not have to be taken by a
caretaker administration during a period of government formation
appears to have been missed. We recommend that in future the
Civil Service seeks as far as possible to schedule key decisions
for Ministers until after the end of any likely period of Government
formation after an election. (Paragraph 13)
3. We welcome the
fact that parties involved in negotiations in 2010 have made formal
changes to their internal processes so that there can be greater
consultation with Members of Parliament and, perhaps equally importantly,
all three parties seem to acknowledge the need for consultation
on any agreement to which their party wishes to commit them.
(Paragraph 19)
Operation of the 'caretaker convention'
4. It
is clear to us that there are significantly different rationales
for restrictions on the normal government activity during a 'purdah'
period before an election and a 'caretaker' period afterwards.
This is not made clear in the Cabinet Manual. During the former,
which is in place for any election, the Government may still command
a majority in the outgoing House of Commons but is expected to
observe discretion in initiating any new action of a continuing
or long-term character which might aid an election campaign. (Paragraph
26)
5. During a caretaker
period, the incumbent government can no longer command the confidence
of Parliament and a new administration will eventually be formed.
The rationale for the incumbent Government remaining in place
during the caretaker period is that it can continue with the management
of the country, carrying out administrative tasks and dealing
with any urgent matters which arise, and ensuring that there is
a continuous source of constitutional advice to the Queen. (Paragraph
27)
6. We
recommend that in the next Parliament the Cabinet Manual should
be updated to differentiate more clearly the reasons behind the
periods of restriction. This will give greater clarity to Ministers,
Members of Parliaments, civil servants and the public about what
should and what should
not happen during these periods.
(Paragraph 28)
7. Should the outcome
of the 2015 election result in a House of Commons with no overall
majority, the public and media should expect to see the incumbent
Prime Minister remain as Prime Minister, in 10 Downing Street,
even if there is little prospect that he will be able to form
an administration. The incumbent Prime Minister should remain
in office until it is clear that a new administration is in a
position to form a Government which will command the confidence
of the House of Commons. Indeed we consider that there is a duty
on him to stay in place until such a time. (Paragraph 33)
8. Following the 2015
election, in the event of a House of Commons with no overall majority
and an extended negotiating period, the public should expect to
see Ministers who have lost their seats in the House continuing
in their ministerial roles until a new government has been formed.
(Paragraph 37)
9. We believe that
any caretaker administration required to take significant decisions
during a period of Government formation should consult each of
the parties taking part in negotiations relating to the formation
of the next Government; however, we recognise that if a decision
needs to be made urgently and agreement with other parties cannot
be met, the caretaker administration has a right to take a decision,
bearing in mind the public interest. (Paragraph 44)
10. We recommend
that, for the avoidance of doubt, a caretaker administration should
continue in office until it can be demonstrated that a prospective
new administration will have the confidence of the House of Commons.
A single party majority or a formal majority coalition agreement
have been taken as tantamount to a formal vote of confidence.
Where there is any doubt, the caretaker administration should
continue until that doubt has been removed.
(Paragraph 50)
The first meeting of a new Parliament
11. We
think it is wrong in principle that the decision on the date of
Parliament's return should be in the hands of the Prime Minister.
Control over the date of general elections was put on a statutory
basis to prevent the Prime Minister from choosing the most favourable
time. We recommend that the date of Parliament's first sitting
following a General Election should similarly be put on a statutory
basis.(Paragraph 53)
12. We
recommend that, in the event that no single party has a majority
in the House of Commons to be elected on 7 May 2015, Parliament
should return as soon as possible. Transparency is paramount,
and a newly elected Parliament should be as informed and involved
as possible in any negotiations surrounding the formation of the
new government. It is important that the House of Commons should
be able to publicly debate important issues surrounding the formation
of government at the earliest opportunity.(Paragraph
54)
13. We recommend
that the Prime Minister sets the date for Parliament's return
following the General Election for Monday 11 May 2015. In the
event that there is a decisive result and a single party has a
majority, Parliament's return could be postponed.
(Paragraph 55)
14. The introduction
of the 12 day period before Parliament's return in 2010 was for
reasons relating to the induction of new members but was done
without regard to issues of government formation. We believe that
induction could proceed in parallel with sittings of the House.
Indeed, debating the formation of the new government would prove
a valuable part of any induction for a new Member. (Paragraph
56)
15. An investiture
vote of some form would give a clear signal that the person appointed
as Prime Minister by the Queen would indeed have the confidence
of the House and would be able to govern. Without that, the new
appointment may be made on the balance of probability. Such a
vote would also give a clear and decisive indication that a caretaker
period has ended and a new government has begun. (Paragraph
61)
16. We recommend
that, in the next Parliament, the necessary steps are taken to
introduce investiture votes for incoming governments in the future.(Paragraph
62)
17. The process for
individual swearing of the oath in the Chamber could be expedited,
and other reforms considered. The legislation governing
this should be revisited with a view to considering some form
of collective swearing of the oath or individual swearing outside
the chamber. Pending that change, we recommend that the swearing-in
process should be carried out using two streams. (Paragraph
65)
18. We recommend
that, in the event of an indecisive election, Parliament should
return on Monday 11 May and, using an expedited process, should
enter on business as soon as is practicable that day. The necessary
measures to enable this should be put in place ahead of the General
Election, including by a further proclamation if necessary.
(Paragraph 67)
Civil Service support to political parties in post-election
discussions
19. If
there is no conclusive result to the election, we do not believe
that Prime Ministerial approval should be required for civil service
support to post-election discussions. If there is agreement among
parties involved in the negotiations that they require support
it should be given. The next version of the Cabinet Manual should
be updated to reflect this view. (Paragraph 74)
20. From the outset
the civil service should be ready to provide factual information
to all parties involved in Government formation negotiations.
(Paragraph 75)
21. To avoid any impression
that the civil service might favour one party's policy over another,
any advice to the individual parties should be given on a confidential
basis. (Paragraph 76)
22. Should more than
one party in negotiations require exactly the same information
from the civil service, then exactly the same response should
be issued to all of the parties who asked for it. Any information
requested by one party should only be sent to other parties involved
in the negotiations if all parties agree to this practice at the
outset of the negotiation period. (Paragraph 80)
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