Revisiting the Cabinet Manual - Political and Constitutional Reform Contents



2  PROGRESS SINCE THE COMMITTEE'S EARLIER REPORT

AMBIGUITY AND COMPLEXITY

8. The report of our earlier inquiry criticised the draft Cabinet Manual for failing to acknowledge sufficiently the fact that some conventions listed in the Manual were the subject of disagreement. In that report we recommended that

    Where there is the potential for disagreement or uncertainty, as there so often is on the meaning of unwritten constitutional conventions, it is important that the Cabinet Manual should signal the existence of this uncertainty. [11]

In its response the Government noted that

    where there are different views expressed in relation to a convention, the Cabinet Manual makes this clear or states the Executive's own understanding of the position. The Cabinet Manual is not binding and others are entitled to take a different view on the operation or extent of a particular convention.[12]

9. We heard from a number of witnesses that the first edition of the Cabinet Manual does now acknowledge much more clearly areas where there had been considered to be uncertainty. Professor Ian Cram, of the University of Leeds, noted the improvements made in the first edition:

    The Cabinet Secretary and others took on board the criticism that where there were differences of opinion it was right to say, "Here is an area of disagreement among the scholars and politicians," with a footnote reference to this view and that view. That happens in several places through the manual.[13]

One example he gave of an improvement on the initial draft was in the field of government formation:

    One example was the inclusion in the original of the view […] that in a hung Parliament the party with the most votes and the most seats should have the first go at forming the Administration. That now has been put to rest, after the raising of queries, academic commentaries and other comments.[14]

Although Professor Cram still had reservations about omissions from the document, he considered that in the first edition "we have moved to a better, more accurate document, reflecting, and within the framework of, an executive understanding of the constitution."[15] Professor Hazell shared Professor Cram's view: "I think in the consultation and subsequent revisions the drafters of the Cabinet Manual did their very best, when there was some disagreement or uncertainty, to make that clear."[16]

10. WE NOTE WITH APPROVAL THAT THE FIRST EDITION OF THE CABINET MANUAL APPEARS TO ACKNOWLEDGE MORE CLEARLY INSTANCES WHERE THERE IS DISAGREEMENT OR UNCERTAINTY ABOUT A CONVENTION.

OWNERSHIP

11. We examined who, in practical terms, had ownership of the Cabinet Manual and had responsibility for updating it. In our earlier report we said that we expected to "engage on ongoing dialogue about the Cabinet Manual and its contents."[17] We also concluded that, should the Cabinet Manual become the "basis for a shared understanding beyond the Executive of important parts of the United Kingdom's previously uncodified constitution",[18] Parliamentary intervention in respect of the Manual's contents would be entirely appropriate. In this inquiry we have considered whether this is in fact the case.

12. The Cabinet is said to own the Cabinet Manual. Sir Jeremy Heywood, the Cabinet Secretary, told us that "it is owned by the Cabinet. It is a politically owned document rather than one owned by me."[19] We found one immediate practical difficulty arising from this doctrine of collective ownership: when seeking to invite a Minister to give oral evidence to this inquiry, we experienced great difficulty in confirming a date for any Minister to appear to explain to us the Government's policy on the Manual. We therefore resolved, with some reluctance, to proceed to make this report without the benefit of a Ministerial view on behalf of the Government.

13. GIVEN THAT OWNERSHIP OF THE CABINET MANUAL IS SAID TO BE IN THE COLLECTIVE HANDS OF THE CABINET, AND NOT THE CABINET SECRETARY, IT APPEARS ODD THAT NO MINISTER COULD BE IDENTIFIED TO TAKE ON THE TASK OF EXPLAINING TO US THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY ON OWNERSHIP OF THE MANUAL AND ITS REVISION. WE RECOMMEND THAT THE PRIME MINISTER, ON BEHALF OF THE CABINET, ASSIGN POLICY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONTENT AND CURRENCY OF THE CABINET MANUAL TO A SPECIFIC MINISTERIAL PORTFOLIO.

14. The doctrine of collective Cabinet ownership must be taken to mean that the Cabinet has sole responsibility for updating the Cabinet Manual, an issue which we discuss further below. In considering ownership of the document, we examined its relevance in explaining the role Parliament plays in the UK's constitution.

15. Professor John McEldowney, of the University of Warwick, did not think there should be a significant role for Parliament in updating the Cabinet Manual:

    [T]he role of Parliament is rather limited. It is appropriate that both Houses, through the appropriate Select Committee should be informed and deliberate on the working of the Manual. A clear distinction needs to be maintained between the Cabinet Manual as a guide to the working of government published by the Cabinet Office rather than a parliamentary guide published and drafted by Parliament.[20]

Professor Ian Cram took the contrary view: he considered that a "large number of the sections of the CM relate directly to Parliament"[21] and he has identified all but one chapter (chapter 4) as having content which related to Parliament. He concluded that "given the extent of material that does concern Parliament, it would seem appropriate to seek to reflect joint (Executive & Legislature) understanding of these matters."[22]

16. WHILE THE CURRENT CABINET MANUAL IS SAID TO BE OWNED BY THE CABINET, WE CONSIDER THAT PARLIAMENT HAS A SIGNIFICANT STAKE IN ITS AND SHOULD AT THE VERY LEAST BE CONSULTED ON ANY FUTURE REVISION. SHOULD THE CABINET MANUAL EVOLVE TO BECOME MORE THAN A GUIDE TO THE OPERATION OF THE EXECUTIVE, TO THE EXTENT WHERE IT IS CONSIDERED PART OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE UK, WE RECOMMEND THAT IT SHOULD BE TREATED AS A DOCUMENT IN THE JOINT OWNERSHIP OF THE CABINET AND OF THE RELEVANT PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES.

LEGAL STATUS

17. In our previous report we concluded it was unlikely that the Manual would feature in court proceedings, though we did not rule out the possibility completely. During the course of this inquiry we revisited this issue. In this context it was useful for us to consider what had happened with regard to the New Zealand Cabinet Manual, which is much more developed than the UK manual.

18. Sir Gus O'Donnell, in his preface to the first edition of the Manual, stated that the Manual was "not intended to be legally binding"[23] and that it "records rules and practices, but is not intended to be the source of any rule."[24] This purpose is similar to that of the New Zealand Cabinet Manual, on which the UK version is said to be based.

19. Professor Cram indicated that there were a number of instances in which the New Zealand Cabinet Manual had been cited by the courts in that country.[25] The New Zealand Manual had been used "in a number of circumstances … to confirm the court's understanding of various constitutional arrangements,"[26] and he believed that it was "not far-fetched to suggest that, in time, we might find our Cabinet Manual being prayed in support of a judicial decision that in some way engages constitutional issues."[27] Dr Andrew Blick, of King's College London, suggested to us that given the importance that the Government itself had given the Cabinet Manual, some sort of statutory underpinning might be appropriate: "If the principles contained in the document are as important to the Government as the manual itself claims, then a limited degree of legal enrichment for them might be seen as appropriate."[28]

20. We have considered whether the Manual should therefore have some legal basis, regardless of whether it would be likely to feature in court proceedings. To place the document on a statutory footing could provide greater certainty about the terms on which the courts might engage with the Manual and its contents. Statutory underpinning of the Manual's status would also give Parliament an explicit role in the endorsement of its contents.

21. We have already stated in terms that the Cabinet Manual "is not itself a written constitution: no one has claimed that it is, none of our witnesses has suggested that it is, and many have been explicit that it is not."[29] We did conclude that the Manual has "considerable overlap with what might be expected of a constitution." It has been suggested to us that it would be the most likely starting point for any attempt to produce a written constitution, though that suggestion predated the blueprints for constitutional codification published in our recent report A new Magna Carta?[30]

22. WHILE GIVING THE MANUAL A BASIS IN STATUTE MIGHT APPEAR ATTRACTIVE, NOT LEAST TO THOSE WHO ADVOCATE CONSTITUTIONAL CODIFICATION, WE ARE CONCERNED THAT TO GIVE IT A STATUTORY BASIS MIGHT CREATE AN UNSATISFACTORY HALFWAY HOUSE TO FULL CODIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION. WE DO NOT CONSIDER THAT AT PRESENT THERE IS ANY COMPELLING CASE FOR STATUTORY RECOGNITION OF THE CABINET MANUAL.

23. WHILE IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE CABINET MANUAL, AS PRESENTLY CONCEIVED, WILL FEATURE EXTENSIVELY IN COURT PROCEEDINGS, THE EXPERIENCE IN NEW ZEALAND SHOWS THE CABINET MANUAL COULD IN FUTURE BE REGARDED AS PART OF THE UK'S ACCEPTED CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, MEANING THAT IT COULD ACQUIRE A LEGAL STATUS MORE SIGNIFICANT THAN THAT ORIGINALLY INTENDED. IT WOULD IN OUR VIEW BE UNDESIRABLE FOR THE COURTS TO SEEK TO WRITE THE MANUAL INTO CONSTITUTIONAL LAW WITHOUT THE PROCESS OF PUBLIC DELIBERATION AND DEBATE WHICH WE BELIEVE IS ESSENTIAL TO ANY CODIFICATION EXERCISE. SHOULD THE COURTS SEEK TO INTERPRET THE MANUAL IN CASES OF CONSTITUTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE, THE GOVERNMENT MUST BE PREPARED TO INTERVENE IN SUCH CASES TO SET OUT ITS VIEW OF THE MANUAL'S CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION.

PRECEDENT BOOKS

24. During our earlier inquiry we learned that the Government kept a precedent book in which were recorded the events which were the basis for its operational understandings and its conventions. We recommended publication of this information at the earliest opportunity, acknowledging the necessity of redaction of confidential or sensitive information or personal data: we argued that this would give those outside the Executive a more informed opportunity to judge whether the then draft Manual accurately reflected the conventions on which it claimed to be based.

25. Professor Hazell did not in fact believe that it was particularly important to know what the Precedent Book contained:

    I don't know what is in the Precedent Book but I am not desperately curious to know. I think the Cabinet Manual does contain everything that we need to know. The Precedent Book will be interesting to historians and to my good friend Peter Hennessy but I don't think it is going to tell us anything that might make for more effective government.[31]

26. In its response to our 2011 report the Government indicated that the 1954 version of the Precedent Book had been placed in the National Archives in 2006. Sir Jeremy Heywood told us that a redacted version of the 1978 Precedent Book had since been placed in the National Archives, and that the Cabinet Office was working hard to "try to get the two remaining precedent books published as soon as possible."[32] The National Archives has now sent us a copy of the 1978 book, for which we are grateful.

27. Sir Jeremy also indicated that since 1992 no formal precedent book had been kept, and that the Cabinet Office now relied on a more nebulous concept of unwritten corporate memory:

    How we deal with these issues now is on the basis of experience of how the ministerial code, for example, has been interpreted in the past, what the recent precedents have been, but we don't collect those together into something called the precedent book. In a sense, the corporate memory is there in the Cabinet Office and in my office but we have not gone to the trouble of bringing all of those individual cases together into a new version of the precedent book.[33]

It is not clear to us whether there is any formal mechanism, in the absence of a precedent book, to record the experience of interpretation of constitutional precedents.

28. WE WELCOME THE RELEASE OF THE 1954 AND 1978 PRECEDENT BOOKS, AND WE COMMEND THE WORK BEING UNDERTAKEN TO PLACE THE REMAINING TWO PRECEDENT BOOKS INTO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN. WE NEVERTHELESS NOTE WITH CONCERN THAT THE USE OF A PRECEDENT BOOK AS A MEANS OF RECORDING THE EVENTS WHICH FORM THE BASIS OF PRECEDENTS USED FOR THE CABINET MANUAL HAS LAPSED. THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR RECORDING THE CORPORATE MEMORY OF GOVERNMENT AND THE CABINET OFFICE IN A FORM WHICH CAN INFORM FUTURE EDITIONS OF THE CABINET MANUAL ARE NOW UNCLEAR. WE RECOMMEND THAT IN ITS RESPONSE TO THIS REPORT THE GOVERNMENT SET OUT THE PROCESS WHEREBY THE PRECEDENTS WHICH INFORM ITS UNDERSTANDING OF THE OPERATION OF THE CONSTITUTION ARE CAPTURED AND RETAINED.


11   Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2010-11, Constitutional Implications of the Cabinet Manual, HC 734, para 22 Back

12   Government Response to the House of Lords Constitution Committee, Political and Constitutional Reform Committee and Public Administration Select Committee on the Cabinet Manual Committee Reports of Session 2010-12, Cm 8213, October 2011, p. 18 Back

13   Q13 Back

14   Q13 Back

15   Q13 Back

16   Q57 Back

17   Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2010-11, Constitutional Implications of the Cabinet Manual, HC 734, para 37 Back

18   Ibid., para 41 Back

19   Q89 Back

20   Professor John McEldowney (RCM 006)  Back

21   Professor Ian Cram (RCM 002). Chapter 4 is considered to be the chapter with no explicit Parliamentary relevance. Back

22   Ibid. Back

23   Cabinet Manual, First Edition, October 2011, Preface Back

24   Ibid. Back

25   Q15 Back

26   Ibid. Back

27   Ibid. Back

28   Dr Andrew Blick (RCM 005), para 8 Back

29   Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2010-11, Constitutional Implications of the Cabinet Manual, HC 734 ,para 45 Back

30   Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, Second Report of Session 2014-15, A new Magna Carta?, HC 463 Back

31   Q58 Back

32   Q112 Back

33   Q113 Back


 
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Prepared 2 February 2015