Conclusions and recommendations
Progress since the Committee's earlier report
1. We note with approval that the first edition
of the Cabinet Manual appears to acknowledge more clearly instances
where there is disagreement or uncertainty about a convention.
(Paragraph 10)
2. Given that ownership of the Cabinet Manual
is said to be in the collective hands of the Cabinet, and not
the Cabinet Secretary, it appears odd that no Minister could be
identified to take on the task of explaining to us the Government's
policy on ownership of the Manual and its revision. We recommend
that the Prime Minister, on behalf of the Cabinet, assign policy
responsibility for the content and currency of the Cabinet Manual
to a specific Ministerial portfolio. (Paragraph 13)
3. While the current Cabinet Manual is said to
be owned by the Cabinet, we consider that Parliament has a significant
stake in its contents and should at the very least be consulted
on any future revision. Should the Cabinet Manual evolve to
become more than a guide to the operation of the Executive, to
the extent where it is considered part of the constitutional arrangements
for the UK, we recommend that it should be treated as a document
in the joint ownership of the Cabinet and of the relevant Parliamentary
committees. (Paragraph 16)
4. While giving the Manual a basis in statute
might appear attractive, not least to those who advocate constitutional
codification, we are concerned that to give it a statutory basis
might create an unsatisfactory halfway house to full codification
of the constitution. We do not consider that at present there
is any compelling case for statutory recognition of the Cabinet
Manual. (Paragraph 22)
5. While it is unlikely that the Cabinet Manual,
as presently conceived, will feature extensively in court proceedings,
the experience in New Zealand shows the Cabinet Manual could in
future be regarded as part of the UK's accepted constitutional
arrangements, meaning that it could acquire a legal status more
significant than that originally intended. It would in our view
be undesirable for the courts to seek to write the Manual into
constitutional law without the process of public deliberation
and debate which we believe is essential to any codification exercise.
Should the courts seek to interpret the Manual in cases of constitutional
significance, the Government must be prepared to intervene in
such cases to set out its view of the Manual's constitutional
position. (Paragraph 23)
6. We welcome the release of the 1954 and 1978
Precedent Books, and we commend the work being undertaken to place
the remaining two precedent books into the public domain. We nevertheless
note with concern that the use of a precedent book as a means
of recording the events which form the basis of precedents used
for the Cabinet Manual has lapsed. The arrangements for recording
the corporate memory of Government and the Cabinet Office in a
form which can inform future editions of the Cabinet Manual are
now unclear. We recommend that in its response to this report
the Government set out the process whereby the precedents which
inform its understanding of the operation of the constitution
are captured and retained. (Paragraph 28)
Use of the Cabinet Manual
7. We do not recommend that a separate version
of the Cabinet Manual be produced for use by the general public
(Paragraph 36)
8. Insofar as the Cabinet Manual describes 'the
rules of the game', its contents must be made more accessible
to all. It is surely vital to a properly-functioning democracy
that the public has access to clear, objective and unambiguous
information about the process whereby administrations are formed
and the roles of the key players. In the run-up to the dissolution
of Parliament and the 2015 general election, there is now clearly
no time to undertake an effective programme of public engagement
on this process. We recommend that the Cabinet Office plan
for an enhanced programme of public engagement on the contents
of the Cabinet Manual following the 2015 General Election.
(Paragraph 38)
9. We recommend that the Government commission
an internal assessment of the usefulness of the Cabinet Manual
to Ministers and Departments to inform its next revision.
(Paragraph 39)
Future revision
10. Users of the Cabinet Manual must bear in
mind its stated purpose, which is as a guide to the current practice
of government. The precedents the Manual cites may be helpful
in guiding a response to future political circumstances, but it
should not be seen as a rulebook full of out-of-date prescriptions
which are inadequate to address fresh challenges. Regular updating
of the Manual to reflect the current agreed practice of Government
is therefore vital. (Paragraph 42)
11. We consider that it is important that the
Cabinet Manual is kept up to date. We believe the Manual should
be revised every Parliament as a bare minimum, especially on the
arrival of a new administration, to ensure that it accurately
reflects the current Government's understanding. We endorse the
proposal from the Cabinet Secretary that the Cabinet Office should
produce a running list of matters which will require attention
at the Manual's next revision. We recommend that the Cabinet
Office publish, as soon as possible, a list of matters in the
Cabinet Manual which will require amendment at its next revision.
At the same time the current online edition of the Manual, which
is accessible to the public, should be marked up at each point
where future revision is envisaged. (Paragraph 50)
12. Undoubtedly the Cabinet Manual is a significant
document. In the absence of widespread public engagement with
its contents, its main use hitherto has been as a guide for the
Executive on the operation of government. Given the fact that
most chapters relate to, and have a direct impact on, the work
of Parliament and the relationship between Parliament and the
Executive, we consider that Parliament, through the relevant select
committees of each House, should be consulted on all proposed
revisions to the Manual which relate to Parliament and its relationship
with the Executive. (Paragraph 55)
13. While the Cabinet Manual reflects current
uncertainty over the constitutional obligations on a sitting Prime
Minister who does not expect to be able to form an administration
after a general election, the principle that there must always
be a government, and that the Sovereign must always have an adviser
in the form of a Prime Minister, is unambiguous. We recommend
that, for the benefit of the media and the general public, the
Cabinet Secretary should set out clearly, and well in advance
of the forthcoming general election, the Government's view of
the constitutional principles which underpin the continuance in
office or otherwise of administrations following a general election.
(Paragraph 60)
14. We maintain that the advent of fixed-term
Parliaments, and the certainty they bring to the political process,
should be reflected more widely in those elements of the political
cycle which remain within the power of the Prime Minister to determine.
We do not believe that there is a compelling case for the Prime
Minister alone to determine when it is appropriate for pre-election
contact to be authorised. It is manifestly in the interests of
good government for pre-election contacts between the Civil Service
and Opposition parties to be authorised as a matter of course
12 months before each general election held in accordance with
section 1 of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011. We recommend
that the Directory of Civil Service Guidance be amended to provide
for a standard 12-month pre-election contact period, and that
at its next revision the Cabinet Manual be amended accordingly.
(Paragraph 66)
15. While we welcome the commitment to update
the Cabinet Manual to reflect recent instances where the convention
on consulting Parliament before deciding to commit armed forces
overseas has operated, such a commitment is meaningless without
a clear and published plan for revision of the Manual. Since the
Manual is acknowledged to be a 'guide to the rules', and not the
source of any rule, any update to the Manual should fully and
unambiguously reflect the scope of uncertainty over the use of
the convention, and take into account the issues on the use of
the convention raised by this Committee on behalf of the House.
(Paragraph 70)
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