7 Accountability to Parliament and
the electorate
53. Linked to the issue of checks and balances is
the question of whether the Prime Minister is sufficiently accountable
personally to Parliament and to the electorate.
Accountability to Parliament
54. There are currently two formal mechanisms by
which the House of Commons holds the Prime Minister to account:
Prime Minister's Questions, and the Liaison Committee's oral evidence
sessions with the Prime Minister.Our witnesses had a variety of
views about the ways in which these mechanisms could be improved,
and some suggestions for additional mechanisms.
PRIME MINISTER'S QUESTIONS
55. The Prime Minister answers questions from Members
of Parliament in the House of Commons every Wednesday for half
an hour when the House is sitting.Prime Minister's Questions usually
begin with an open question about the Prime Minister's engagements,
and then the Member of Parliament who has asked this question
follows it up with a supplementary question on any subject.Other
Members of Parliament who have tabled the same questions about
engagements (in practice all or nearly all of the questions are
about engagements) are then called to ask an untabled supplementary
question on any subject.By convention, the Leader of the Opposition
is allowed to ask six questions.
56. A recent report by the Hansard Society, Tuned
in or turned off: Public attitudes to Prime Minister's Questions,stated
of Prime Minister's Questions:
Its main virtue is that the Prime Minister must
attend the House of Commons once a week when the House is sitting
to answer questions for half an hour on any issue that Members
wish to direct at him or her. In theory, this is one of the most
important political mechanisms available to Parliament to hold
the Executive to account. In practice, however, the Prime Minister
is rarely subjected to a searching examination. Too many of the
questions are planted by the party whips, the range of subjects
covered is too broad to be anything but a shallow form of scrutiny,
and the nature of the 'open question' means that the answer from
a Prime Minister who has anything short of a photographic memory
is almost guaranteed to be limited. There are occasions when an
MP who wants a substantive response gives prior warning of their
question in order to facilitate an informed answer but these are
relatively rare.[68]
The Hansard Society suggested extending the length
of Prime Minister's Questions to 45 minutes or an hour once a
month, to facilitate "improved scrutiny and a more informed
discussion".[69]It
also stated: "One option [for reform] could be to introduce
the departmental question time model to PMQs: a proportion of
the questions listed for debate are closed questions (around three
quarters for most departmental question sessions) with the remainder
being open, topical questions."[70]
57. Some of our witnesses made similar points to
the Hansard Society.Professor Theakston and Dr Heppell commented
of Prime Minister's Questions:
The modern media spotlight contributes to the
extremely adversarial and gladiatorial nature of the confrontations.
As a test of nerve, personality-under-pressure, and verbal dexterity
it could hardly be bettered. But the political theatre and knock-about
carries a price in terms of substance and questioning in depth...
Proposals to lengthen PMQs to 45 or 60 minutes, perhaps to return
to two sessions a week, and to make it more of a backbench institution
would be worth serious consideration.
Dr Heffernan described Prime Minister's Questions
as "necessary but not sufficient."[71]He
suggested that "PMQs could be extended to an hour each week
with MPs entitled to ask follow up questions and not confine themselves
to their own particular question".[72]Professor
Richard Toye, of the University of Exeter, suggested that there
should be a return to bi-weekly sessions of Prime Minister's Questions.[73]
LIAISON COMMITTEE
58. The Liaison Committee—a Committee composed
of the 33 Chairs of House of Commons Select Committees—holds
regular oral evidence with the Prime Minister "on matters
of public policy".[74]The
sessions take place two or three times a year. This practice began
in 2002, after the then Prime Minister Rt Hon Tony Blair MP contacted
the then Chair of the Liaison Committee to propose it.
59. On the Liaison Committee's evidence sessions
with the Prime Minister, Professor Theakston and Dr Heppell state:
Some journalists have mocked them as "bore-a-thons"
that do not leave "blood on the carpet", but that is
almost the point and it makes for productive and informative exchanges.
But these are only twice-yearly events and it is arguable that
more frequent sessions would be of value. If the Prime Minister
were also to face questioning by an equivalent Lords select committee,
an extra dimension of accountability and expert scrutiny might
be added.[75]
60. Dan Corry, formerly head of the Policy Unit at
Downing Street, described the Liaison Committee as "potentially
a great innovation."He stated:
Certainly in my experience the PM take it very
seriously, spending some time getting briefed up on a whole range
of issues.
However, usually the PM is well able to handle
the actual meetings as there are too many topics and questioners
to really allow detailed follow-up of particular issues.In one
way or another this needs to be resolved if the Committee is to
be more effective in holding the PM to account.[76]
Dr Heffernan commented:
The Liaison Committee is a good development,
but it is difficult having 25 or so people asking questions of
the Prime Minister.Perhaps you could have a smaller group; perhaps
you could have anonymised questions from Members of Parliament
that are then presented to the Prime Minister in a formal situation
like the Liaison Committee.[77]
61. The Liaison Committee itself has made some attempts
to address what others have pointed to as the defects in its questioning
of the Prime Minister.In its report on Select Committee effectiveness,
resources and powers it listed as one of its draft objectives:
"To increase the effectiveness of our own evidence sessions
with the Prime Minister."[78]Recent
evidence sessions have focused on a narrower range of topics and
have involved a limited number of Members of Parliament asking
the questions, rather than the whole Committee.Its latest oral
evidence session, on 13 May 2014, involved 10 of the 33 members
of the Committee and focused on two themes: migration, and foreign
affairs issues relating to Ukraine and Syria.
62. The Liaison Committee has the potential to
be a very effective mechanism by which Parliament can hold the
Prime Minister to account.We commend the attempts it has made
to narrow the range of topics it discusses at any one session,
and to limit the number of questioners to enable the questioning
to be more thorough and detailed.We hope that these efforts continue.The
fewer the topics, and the questioners, the more in-depth and serious
the scrutiny will become—a welcome balance to the superficial
nature of Prime Minister's Questions.
INVESTITURE VOTE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER
63. The Cabinet Manual states: "The Prime
Minister will normally be the accepted leader of a political party
that commands the majority of the House of Commons…The Prime
Minister accepts office at a private audience with the Sovereign,
at which time the appointment takes effect."[79]Although
Prime Ministersneed the support of the majority of the House of
Commons in order to function effectively, there is no formal process
by which the House of Commons directly endorses the Prime Minister.It
could be argued that the Prime Minister gets his or her democratic
legitimacy from elected MPs—the House of Commons in this
view could be seen as a form of electoral college to legitimise
the Prime Minister, but one which does not officially meet for
this purpose—and that that should be formally recognised
by a proper parliamentary process.Dr Heffernan commented that
it would be "highly desirable for the appointment of the
Prime Minister to be subject to a formal recorded vote of the
House of Commons at the beginning of each parliamentary session
(or, should the party leader be changed in the middle of the parliamentary
session, at that time too)."He stated:
This would impinge on the Sovereign's present
prerogative, but it would empower the House of Commons vis a vis
the Prime Minister by formally demonstrating that he or she only
serves at the behest of the Commons. The Sovereign could then
appoint the Prime Minister once the Commons had nominated him
or her. This could also, following a change of government at an
election, have the agreeable effect of improving our hasty, improvised
means of transition by extending the period of governmental handover
by creating the temporary posts of acting Prime Minister (the
outgoing one) and Prime Minister designate (the incoming one).[80]
64. Professor Theakston and Dr Heppell also suggested
that the House of Commons should have a formal role in the appointment
of Prime Ministers:
It is striking that in the fifteen mid-term successions—changes
of Prime Minister mid-parliament—since 1902 in only one
case (that of Churchill succeeding Chamberlain in 1940) was there
an immediate confidence vote in the House on the formation of
the new government. We would support the introduction of the practice
of a formal Commons investiture vote for Prime Ministers following
a general election and on a mid-term succession in Number 10.
The Monarch's prerogative power to appoint the Prime Minister
would remain, but the House of Commons would nominate or recommend
who should be appointed.[81]
65. Dan Corry described an investiture vote as "a
really interesting idea".He added:
What worries me about it is that while it is
making clear the truth in our unwritten constitution, that the
Prime Minister is elected by the MPs as the person who commands
the House, I don't think that is what the public think.The public
think they vote for the Prime Minister.I know they don't actually,
they vote for their local MP.[82]
He stated:
If the public, having watched leader debates,
seen many posters featuring the party leaders and so on, then
discover that though they have voted for X as PM (even if in fact
voting for their own local MP) they might be faced with a different
character as PM, they would go wild. This may be a shame, but
the media and public reaction to PM Brown not having been voted
in by the public (when in fact he did not have to be), shows where
we stand on this in reality.[83]
It is difficult to imagine circumstances in which,
after a general election, the House of Commons would not vote
to support the leader of the party that had a majority in the
Commons or the leader of the largest party in a coalition government.A
mid-term change of Prime Minister, though, would certainly involve
the Commons voting on a Prime Minister for whom the public did
not feel that they had voted.We address the question of whether
the public should be able directly to elect the Prime Minister
later in our report.
66. The House of Lords Constitution Committee discussed
an investiture vote for the Prime Minister in its recent report
on Constitutional implications of coalition government.It
did not recommend the creation of a vote, stating that it would
be "a step away from the principle that the Government as
a whole should command the confidence of the House of Commons."[84]However,
it noted that a similar vote already takes place in the devolved
Administrations in Scotland and Wales:
Similar processes are already followed in Scotland
and Wales. After an election to the Scottish Parliament or the
National Assembly for Wales the Parliament or the Assembly has
28 days to nominate someone as the First Minister. The person
so nominated is recommended to Her Majesty by the relevant Presiding
Officer. Failure to nominate a First Minister within the 28 days
results in another election.[85]
67. It would be perfectly possible for there be
an investiture vote in the House of Commons following a mid-term
change of Prime Minister.The vote would result in a clearer line
of accountability and would make it explicit that the Prime Minister
commands the confidence of the majority of the House of Commons.
68. Similarly it would be feasible for proposals
be developed for an investiture vote for the Prime Minister within
a specified time period after a general election.This would require
the creation of the post of "Prime Minister Designate".The
Prime Minister Designate would be able to perform all the main
functions of the Prime Minister, including appointing Ministers
and instructing civil servants, but would not take the title of
Prime Minister until he or she had been confirmed in the post
by a vote in the House of Commons and subsequently appointed to
the post by the monarch.
69. We request that the Government consider if
and how Parliament could be involved in the investiture of the
Prime Minister, or the Government, after the general election
of Members of Parliament.
Accountability to the electorate
70. In democracies in which the leading political
figure is directly elected by the people, the office has a separate
legitimacy from the legislature, which is charged with holding
the executive to account.
71. Those witnesses who discussed the Prime Minister's
accountability to the electorate focused on the accountability
provided by general elections.Dr Nicholas Allen stated: "Given
that the Prime Minister leads a team of party politicians that
stand for re-election every four or five years, there is, I think,
sufficient electoral accountability."[86]
72. As Dan Corry noted, some of the public may feel
that they are voting for the Prime Minister in a general election,
but they are in fact voting for their local Member of Parliament,
and although the cumulative choices of all voters will ultimately
play a decisive part in who is the Prime Minister, it is a very
different thing from individual members of the public being able
to vote for the Prime Minister directly.It could be argued that
the post of Prime Minister has no direct electoral legitimacy
of its own and thus legitimacy has to be borrowed from control
of the legislature, which has legitimacy because it is elected.Dr
O'Malley commented:
An argument might be made that if power is personalised
into a single figure then accountability should be personalised
into that figure. The electorate has no way of holding a Prime
Minister directly accountable, but it can hold the government
to account through parliamentary elections.[87]
73. Professor Foley said:
I am thinking that we are in a different kind
of landscape, insofar as you have increasing prime ministerial
pre-eminence but it is based on the notion of national and popular
leadership. How do you bring this in line with the British constitution?
One way you could do that is direct election of the Prime Minister.
That is very radical, of course, but you could make a claim that
that is bringing it into line with the position the Prime Ministers
hold. You could claim that there is insufficient accountability
of prime ministerial power without direct elections.[88]
74. Professor Pryce supported the direct election
of the Prime Minister by the public, stating: "I would like
it to be done here as a way of ensuring a more accountable Prime
Minister."[89]She
added: "most of us are electing MPs in safe seats, so you
don't have a check as an individual voter.But you would if you
were voting for a Prime Minister, wouldn't you?"[90]Having
direct elections for the Prime Minister would mean that the Prime
Minister might not be the leader of the party that commanded a
majority in the House of Commons, but Professor Pryce did not
see this as a difficulty: "Prime Ministers would be, in a
sense, very like an American President.They would be forced to
negotiate with other people within Parliament to build a coalition
of support."[91]
75. Several of those who were opposed to the idea
of a directly elected Prime Minister pointed to the example of
Israel, which, at the end of the last century,briefly introduced
direct elections for its Prime Minister.Dr Bennister commented:
The main reason I would urge some caution is
the example of Israel…From 1996 to 2001 they had direct elections
for the Prime Minister, but it is interesting to note in the case
of Israel that it was mainly to enhance the power of the Prime
Minister, who had become weak. It was not to try to confirm what
already existed. It was also to try to reduce the number of parties
in the Knesset, and it had the opposite effect in both cases.
It made the power of the Prime Minister even weaker by meaning
the Prime Minister had to draw on a Government of a different
political persuasion, which really struggled to get its legislation
through and, rather than reducing the number of parties, it increased
the number of parties because the electorate were happy to split
ticket and vote for different parties. I think there would be
a lot of potential negative effects. Split ticketing, governability—there
could be problems with governability—and negative public
opinion are consequences. If we look at Israel, the public were
very much in favour of direct elections for the Prime Minister
but within a couple of years public opinion had swung the other
way.[92]
76. Professor Paul Webb, of the University of Sussex,
who discussed the Israeli example in detail in his written evidence,
and said that the Prime Minister should "emphatically not"
be directly elected by the British people, stated:
In general terms, the separation of powers tends
to expand the independence, not the compliance of the legislature.When
backbench parliamentarians do not feel fear to bring down the
executive by voting against their leader's wishes, they are more
likely to feel free to rebel.While some might regard such a development
as healthy for democracy, it should be remembered that there is
a price to be paid: governments can find it harder to pilot their
legislative programmes through Parliament, a situation which may
lead to allegations of ungovernability and 'gridlock'.In the long
run, voters are unlikely to be impressed by such developments.Therefore,
while the expectation is that a directly elected premier under
'divided government' should seek to build legislative coalitions
on an issue-by-issue basis, as the US President does, it would
probably be advisable to furnish the head of the executive with
the right to dissolve Parliament and call fresh elections, in
order to avoid the risk of political immobilisation.[93]
77. Currently, the House of Commons is directly
elected by the people but the chief of the executive—the
Prime Minister—is not.Instead, he or she is indirectly accountable
to the public through the mechanism of general elections.Many
would regard this as sufficient, but some have argued that accountability
would be strengthened by the direct election of the Prime Minister
by the public.Such a move would create a very different political
system in the United Kingdom, and could contribute to a clearer
separation of powers. The Prime Minister would still need to command
the support of the majority of Members of Parliament in the legislature
in order to pass legislation.Although the Prime Minister is unlikely
to be directly elected in the near future, we ask the Government
in its response to put on the record its position on allowing
the people to elect directly the UK's senior political figure.
68 Hansard Society, Tuned in or turned off: Public attitudes to Prime Minister's Questions,
2014, p 48 Back
69
Tuned in or turned off, p 51 Back
70
Tuned in or turned off, p 51 Back
71
Q311 Back
72
Dr Richard Heffernan written evidence Back
73
Professor Richard Toye written evidence Back
74
Standing Orders of the House of Commons: Public Business, 2013,
145(2) Back
75
Professor Kevin Theakston and Dr Timothy Heppell written evidence Back
76
Dan Corry written evidence Back
77
Q310 Back
78
Liaison Committee, Second Report of the 2012-13 Session, Select Committee effectiveness, resources and powers,
HC 697, Annex A Back
79
The Cabinet Manual, paras 3.1-3.2 Back
80
Dr Richard Heffernan written evidence Back
81
Professor Kevin Theakston and Dr Timothy Heppell written evidence Back
82
Q153 Back
83
Dan Corry written evidence Back
84
House of Lords Constitution Committee, Fifth Report of Session
2013-14, Constitutional implications of coalition government,
HL Paper 130, para 52 Back
85
Constitutional implications of coalition government, para 46 Back
86
Dr Nicholas Allen written evidence Back
87
Dr Eoin O'Malley written evidence Back
88
Q113 Back
89
Q12 Back
90
Q46 Back
91
Q13 Back
92
Q82 Back
93
Professor Paul Webb written evidence Back
|
