Conclusions and recommendations
Clarity about role and powers
1. The office of Prime
Minister has evolved over nearly three centuries.It is both a
cause and a consequence of that evolution that there is no single
authoritative source of information on the Prime Minister's role
and powers.The Cabinet Manual, published in October 2011, contains
arguably the most comprehensive official account to date of the
Prime Minister's role and powers, but it is aimed at Ministers
and civil servants, rather than the public, and it has no statutory
force.
(Paragraph 14)
2. We request that
the Government explore in a Green Paper the arguments for and
against placing the Prime Minister's role as outlined in the Cabinet
Manual on a statutory footing, so that the next Parliament can
decide the issue. (Paragraph 15)
3. Many of the Prime
Minister's powers are exercised under the prerogative.These powers
in particular are difficult to define and are therefore hard to
scrutinise effectively, and confusing to many people.We welcome
the recent moves to place some prerogative powers on a statutory
footing, and we also accept that there is a need for the Prime
Minister to retain some reserve powers that are not codified in
statute for use in an emergency.However, the process of transferring
prerogative powers to statute, and making them subject to greater
parliamentary oversight, must continue. (Paragraph 16)
Codification
4. There are a variety
of views on whether it would be desirable to codify the role and
powers of the Prime Minister in statute.Opponents of codification
argue that it would reduce flexibility; proponents that it would
bring clarity.While it would be difficult, if not impossible,
to codify all the Prime Minister's powers in statute, international
examples, and the examples of the First Ministers in the devolved
Administrations, demonstrate that setting out the basic architecture
of how the Prime Minister is appointed and, in broad terms,his
or her executive functions, is an achievable goal.We have included
as an Appendix to this report an example Bill.We believe this
and future Governments should consider consolidating the existing
Prime Ministerial powers in one place. (Paragraph 24)
Changes to the role
5. There is widespread
agreement that the number of functions performed by the Prime
Minister has increased in recent decades—including, in particular,
an increased role in policy making—and some agreement that
Prime Ministers have become progressively less collegiate and
more "presidential", although the extent of this change
is disputed.Three factors emerged as driving these changes to
the role of the Prime Minister: the development of 24-hour mass
media, the increased importance of international bodies, and the
lack of clear statutory constraints on executive power.As the
concentration of Prime Ministerial power over the decades intensifies
the need for Parliament and the people to be clear about the extent
and legitimacy of that power, it will make an open, transparent
statement of those powers in law more necessary, not less. (Paragraph
35)
Impact of coalition government
6. Coalition government
has to some extent constrained the powers of the Prime Minister
and made a more collegiate style of government necessary.This
does not mean that this more collegiate style would persist under
a single-party government. (Paragraph 41)
Checks and balances
7. The need to keep
the support of the majority of Members of Parliament and the support
of the Cabinet acts as a check and balance on the powers of the
Prime Minister.In extremis, Members of Parliament can, as history
demonstrates, remove a Prime Minister from office by withdrawing
their support.However, these political mechanisms are not effective
as a day-to-day check and balance on Prime Ministerial power.Members
of Parliament—be they Cabinet Ministers or Backbenchers—can
technically say "no" to the Prime Minister, but the
Prime Ministerial powers of patronage mean they very rarely do.A
more assertive Cabinet, and a more assertive House of Commons,
would require a change in political structure.Defining Prime Ministerial
powers could be the start of that change. (Paragraph 52)
Accountability to Parliament and the electorate
8. The Liaison Committee
has the potential to be a very effective mechanism by which Parliament
can hold the Prime Minister to account. We commend the attempts
it has made to narrow the range of topics it discusses at any
one session, and to limit the number of questioners to enable
the questioning to be more thorough and detailed.We hope that
these efforts continue.The fewer the topics, and the questioners,
the more in-depth and serious the scrutiny will become—a
welcome balance to the superficial nature of Prime Minister's
Questions. (Paragraph 62)
9. We request that
the Government consider if and how Parliament could be involved
in the investiture of the Prime Minister, or the Government, after
the general election of Members of Parliament. (Paragraph 69)
10. Currently, the
House of Commons is directly elected by the people but the chief
of the executive—the Prime Minister—is not.Instead,
he or she is indirectly accountable to the public through the
mechanism of general elections.Many would regard this as sufficient,
but some have argued that accountability would be strengthened
by the direct election of the Prime Minister by the public.Such
a move would create a very different political system in the United
Kingdom, and could contribute to a clearer separation of powers.
The Prime Minister would still need to command the support of
the majority of Members of Parliament in the legislature in order
to pass legislation.Although the Prime Minister is unlikely to
be directly elected in the near future, we ask the Government
in its response to put on the record its position on allowing
the people to elect directly the UK's senior political figure.
(Paragraph 77)
Structures of power
11. The current confusion
about the nature of the relationship between the Prime Minister's
Office and the Cabinet Office is unhelpful.The Government should
address this by considering the creation of a combined Department
for the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, with a departmental Select
Committee specifically to scrutinise that Department. (Paragraph
85)
Conclusion
12. Effective checks
and balances, and strong accountability mechanisms, ultimately
lead to better decisions.This is good for Parliament, for the
Government, for the Prime Minister, and, most importantly, for
the public.We have suggested several practical reforms to improve
accountability mechanisms, such as placing more prerogative powers
on a statutory footing.During the course of our inquiry, we have
also discussed some much more contentious and radical reforms.Our
intention has been to provoke debate about the role and powers
of the Prime Minister, and how they should change in the years
to come. (Paragraph 88)
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