2 CONSTITUTIONAL CONSOLIDATION ACT
An illustrative blueprint (second of three)
A consolidation of existing laws of a constitutional
nature in statute, the common law and parliamentary practice,
together with a codification of essential constitutional conventions.[8]
__________________________________________________________
A
BILL
TO
Consolidate in one Act of Parliament the existing
statutory provisions of a constitutional nature, together with
a codification of common law principles, parliamentary practice
and constitutional conventions, essential to the working of the
government of the United Kingdom and its relationship with its
citizens.
Be it enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty,
by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and
Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and
by the authority of the same, as follows:-
PART
I
THE CROWN AND POLITICAL EXECUTIVE
Chapter 1: THE HEAD OF STATE
1 The Sovereign
(1) The UK is a Constitutional Monarchy.[9]
(2) The Sovereign is the Head of State, the Head
of the Armed Forces, the Supreme Governor of the Church of England,
and the fount of honours.
2 Title to the Crown
(1) The Princess Sophia, Electress and Duchess Dowager
of Hanover, Daughter of the late Queen of Bohemia, Daughter of
King James the First, to inherit after the King and the Princess
Anne, in Default of Issue of the said Princess and His Majesty,
respectively and the Heirs of her Body, being Protestants. [10]
(2) Whereas in the First Year of the Reign of Your
Majesty and of our late most gracious Sovereign Lady Queen Mary
(of blessed Memory) An Act of Parliament was made intituled [An
Act for declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and
for settling the Succession of the Crown] wherein it was (amongst
other things) enacted established and declared That the Crown
and Regall Government of the Kingdoms of England France and Ireland
and the Dominions thereunto belonging should be and continue to
Your Majestie and the said late Queen during the joynt Lives of
Your Majesty and the said Queen and to the Survivor And that after
the Decease of Your Majesty and of the said Queen the said Crown
and Regall Government should be and remain to the Heirs of the
Body of the said late Queen And for Default of such Issue to Her
Royall Highness the Princess Ann of Denmark and the Heirs of Her
Body And for Default of such Issue to the Heirs of the Body of
Your Majesty. [11]
(3) And it was thereby further enacted That all and
every Person and Persons that then were or afterwards should be
reconciled to or shall hold Communion with the See or Church of
Rome or should professe the Popish Religion or marry a Papist
should be excluded and are by that Act made for ever incapable
to inherit possess or enjoy the Crown and Government of this Realm
and Ireland and the Dominions thereunto belonging or any part
of the same or to have use or exercise any regall Power Authority
or Jurisdiction within the same And in all and every such Case
and Cases the People of these Realms shall be and are thereby
absolved of their Allegiance And that the said Crown and Government
shall from time to time descend to and be enjoyed by such Person
or Persons being Protestants as should have inherited and enjoyed
the same in case the said Person or Persons so reconciled holding
Communion professing or marrying as aforesaid were naturally dead.
[12]
(4) To grant to Your Majesty or to Her Royall Highness
such Issue as may be inheritable to the Crown and Regall Government
aforesaid by the respective Limitations in the said recited Act
contained doe constantly implore the Divine Mercy for those Blessings
And Your Majesties said Subjects having Daily Experience of Your
Royall Care and Concern for the present and future Wellfare of
these Kingdoms and particularly recommending from Your Throne
a further Provision to be made for the Succession of the Crown
in the Protestant Line for the Happiness of the Nation and the
Security of our Religion And it being absolutely necessary for
the Safety Peace and Quiet of this Realm to obviate all Doubts
and Contentions in the same by reason of any pretended Titles
to the Crown and to maintain a Certainty in the Succession thereof
to which Your Subjects may safely have Recourse for their Protection
in case the Limitations in the said recited Act should determine.
[13]
(5) Therefore for a further Provision of the Succession
of the Crown in the Protestant Line We Your Majesties most dutifull
and Loyall Subjects the Lords Spirituall and Temporall and Commons
in this present Parliament assembled do beseech Your Majesty that
it may be enacted and declared and be it enacted and declared
by the Kings most Excellent Majesty by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Lords Spirituall and Temporall and Comons in this
present Parliament assembled and by the Authority of the same
That the most Excellent Princess Sophia Electress and Dutchess
Dowager of Hannover Daughter of the most Excellent Princess Elizabeth
late Queen of Bohemia Daughter of our late Sovereign Lord King
James the First of happy Memory be and is hereby declared to be
the next in Succession in the Protestant Line to the Imperiall
Crown and Dignity of the said Realms of England France and Ireland
with the Dominions and Territories thereunto belonging after His
Majesty and the Princess Ann of Denmark and in Default of Issue
of the said Princess Ann and of His Majesty respectively and that
from and after the Deceases of His said Majesty our now Sovereign
Lord and of Her Royall Highness the Princess Ann of Denmark and
for Default of Issue of the said Princess Ann and of His Majesty
respectively the Crown and Regall Government of the said Kingdoms
of England France and Ireland and of the Dominions thereunto belonging
with the Royall State and Dignity of the said Realms and all Honours
Stiles Titles Regalities Prerogatives Powers Jurisdictions and
Authorities to the same belonging and appertaining shall be remain
and continue to the said most Excellent Princess Sophia and the
Heirs of Her Body being Protestants And thereunto the said Lords
Spirituall and Temporall and Commons shall and will in the Name
of all the People of this Realm most humbly and faithfully submit
themselves their Heirs and Posterities and do faithfully promise.
[14]
(6) That after the Deceases of His Majesty and Her
Royall Highness and the failure of the Heirs of their respective
Bodies to stand to maintain and defend the said Princess Sophia
and the Heirs of Her Body being Protestants according to the Limitation
and Succession of the Crown in this Act specified and contained
to the utmost of their Powers with their Lives and Estates against
all Persons whatsoever that shall attempt anything to the contrary.
[15]
3 Duties and functions of the Sovereign
(1) The Sovereign appoints the Prime Minister as
Head of Government and, on his or her advice, other ministers
of the Crown.[16]
(2) The Sovereign appoints the First Minister of
Scotland and the First Minister for Wales, and has a role in relation
to the Devolved Administrations, as set out in legislation.[17]
(3) The Sovereign opens each new session of Parliament,
and brings the session to an end, proroguing Parliament if necessary
by Order in Council. [18]
(4) A Bill which has completed all of its prior Parliamentary
stages becomes law when Royal Assent is given.[19]
4 Regency of the Sovereign
(1) If the Sovereign is, at His Accession, under
the age of eighteen years, then, until He attains that age, the
royal functions shall be performed in the name and on behalf of
the Sovereign by a Regent. [20]
(2) For the purpose of any enactment requiring any
oath or declaration to be taken, made, or subscribed, by the Sovereign
on or after His Accession, the date on which the Sovereign attains
the age of eighteen years shall be deemed to be the date of His
Accession. [21]
(3) If the following persons or any three or more
of them, that is to say, the wife or husband of the Sovereign,
the Lord Chancellor, the Speaker of the House of Commons, the
Lord Chief Justice of England, and the Master of the Rolls, declare
in writing that they are satisfied by evidence which shall include
the evidence of physicians that the Sovereign is by reason of
infirmity of mind or body incapable for the time being of performing
the royal functions or that they are satisfied by evidence that
the Sovereign is for some definite cause not available for the
performance of those functions, then, until it is declared in
like manner that His Majesty has so far recovered His health as
to warrant His resumption of the royal functions or has become
available for the performance thereof, as the case may be, those
functions shall be performed in the name and on behalf of the
Sovereign by a Regent. [22]
(4) A declaration under this section shall be made
to the Privy Council and communicated to the Governments of His
Majesty's Dominions. [23]
(5) If a Regency becomes necessary under this Act,
the Regent shall be that person who, excluding any persons disqualified
under this section, is next in the line of succession to the Crown.
[24]
(6) A person shall be disqualified from becoming
or being Regent, if he is not a British subject of full age and
domiciled in some part of the United Kingdom, or is a person who
would, under section 2 of the Act of Settlement 1700, be incapable
of inheriting, possessing, and enjoying the Crown; and section
3 of the Act of Settlement 1700 shall apply in the case of a Regent
as it applies in the case of a Sovereign. [25]
(7) If any person who would at the commencement of
a Regency have become Regent but for the fact that he was not
then of full age becomes of full age during the Regency, he shall,
if he is not otherwise disqualified under this section, thereupon
become Regent instead of the person who has theretofore been Regent.
[26]
(8) If the Regent dies or becomes disqualified under
this section, that person shall become Regent in his stead who
would have become Regent if the events necessitating the Regency
had occurred immediately after the death or disqualification.
[27]
(9) Subsections (3) and (4), above, shall apply in
relation to a Regent with the substitution for references to the
Sovereign of references to the Regent, and for the words "those
functions shall be performed in the name and on behalf of the
Sovereign by a Regent" of the words "that person shall
be Regent who would have become Regent if the Regent had died."
[28]
(10) The Regent shall, before he acts in or enters
upon his office, take and subscribe before the Privy Council the
oaths set out in the Schedule to the Regency Act 1937 (c.16),
and the Privy Council are empowered and required to administer
those oaths and to enter them in the Council Books. [29]
(11) The Regent shall not have power to assent to
any Bill for changing the order of succession to the Crown or
for repealing or altering an Act of the fifth year of the reign
of Queen Anne made in Scotland entitled "An Act for Securing
the Protestant Religion and Presbyterian Church Government."
[30]
5 Guardianship of the Sovereign during Regency
(1) During a Regency, unless Parliament otherwise
determines,
(a) if the Sovereign is under the age of eighteen
years, and unmarried, His mother, if she is living, shall have
the guardianship of His person; [31]
(b) if the Sovereign, being married, is under the
age of eighteen years or has been declared under this Constitution
to be incapable for the time being of performing the royal functions,
the wife or husband of the Sovereign, if of full age, shall have
the guardianship of the person of the Sovereign; [32]
(c) the Regent shall, save in the cases aforesaid,
have the guardianship of the person of the Sovereign; and the
property of the Sovereign, except any private property which in
accordance with the terms of any trust affecting it to be administered
by some other person, shall be administered by the Regent. [33]
Chapter 2: THE PRIME MINISTER
6 The Prime Minister
(1) The Prime Minister is head of the Government.
[34]
(2) The Prime Minister is appointed by the Monarch,
on the basis of his or her ability to command the confidence of
the House of Commons. [35]
(3) The Prime Minister is a member of the House of
Commons. [36]
(4) The Prime Minister advises the Monarch on the
exercise of the Royal Prerogative powers in relation to government,
and the exercise of statutory powers including the calling of
elections where there is an early election or a deferred election
under the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011. [37]
(5) The Prime Minister advises the Monarch on the
appointment, dismissal and acceptance of resignation of other
ministers. [38]
(6) The Prime Minister recommends other public appointments
formally made by the Monarch, including archbishops and bishops
of the Church of England, senior judges and certain civil appointments.
He or she also recommends appointments to several public boards
and institutions, as well as to various Royal and statutory commissions.[39]
(7) The Prime Minister informs the Monarch of the
general business of the government at regular meetings. [40]
(8) The Prime Minister is First Lord of the Treasury[41]
and in that capacity takes the oath of office.[42]
(9) The Prime Minister is the minister for the Civil
Service and is also the minister responsible for National Security
and matters affecting the Secret Intelligence Service, Security
Service and GCHQ collectively. [43]
(10) The Prime Minister is responsible for the overall
organisation of the executive and the allocation of functions
between Ministers in charge of departments. [44]
(11) The Prime Minister is the ultimate judge of
the standards of behaviour expected of a Minister and the appropriate
consequences of a breach of those standards. [45]
Chapter 3: MINISTERS AND MINISTERIAL
CONDUCT
7 Ministers
(1) In general, the ministers in the government comprise
the categories of senior ministers, junior ministers, the Law
Officers, and whips. The Prime Minister may agree that a minister
in any of the categories can be known by a 'courtesy title' reflecting
the job the minister has been asked to do, for example 'Minister
for Europe'. A courtesy title has no legal or constitutional significance.
[46]
(2) The most senior ministers in the Government are
the members of Cabinet. The Prime Minister determines who forms
Cabinet, but this will always include the Chancellor of the Exchequer,
the Lord Chancellor and the secretaries of state. There are no
formal limits on the size of Cabinet, but there are limits on
the number of ministerial salaries that can be paid, and particularly
who can be paid first-tier Cabinet-level salaries. [47]
(3) Other ministers who are often invited by the
Prime Minister to be a member of, or attend, Cabinet include the
Lord President of the Council, the Lord Privy Seal, the Chancellor
of the Duchy of Lancaster, the Paymaster General, the Chief Secretary
to the Treasury and the Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury
(the Commons Chief Whip). A minister of state may also sometimes
be invited to be a member of, or attend, Cabinet. [48]
(4) A minister may be appointed Deputy Prime Minister.
The responsibilities of a Deputy Prime Minister vary according
to the circumstances. The fact that a person has the title of
Deputy Prime Minister does not constrain the Sovereign's power
to appoint a successor to a Prime Minister. [49]
(5) A minister may be appointed First Secretary of
State to indicate seniority. The appointment may be held with
another office. The responsibilities of the First Secretary of
State will vary according to the circumstances. [50]
(6) Junior ministers are generally ministers of state,
Parliamentary under secretaries of state and Parliamentary secretaries.
Typically they are ministers within a government department and
their function is to support and assist the senior minister in
charge of the department. [51]
8 Ministerial propriety and behaviour [52]
(1) The principle of collective responsibility, save
where it is explicitly set aside, applies to all Government Ministers;
(2) Ministers have a duty to Parliament to account,
and be held to account, for the policies, decisions and actions
of their departments and agencies;
(3) It is of paramount importance that Ministers
give accurate and truthful information to Parliament, correcting
any inadvertent error at the earliest opportunity. Ministers who
knowingly mislead Parliament will be expected to offer their resignation
to the Prime Minister;
(4) Ministers should be as open as possible with
Parliament and the public, refusing to provide information only
when disclosure would not be in the public interest which should
be decided in accordance with the relevant statutes and the Freedom
of Information Act 2000;
(5) Ministers should similarly require civil servants
who give evidence before Parliamentary Committees on their behalf
and under their direction to be as helpful as possible in providing
accurate, truthful and full information in accordance with the
duties and responsibilities of civil servants as set out in the
Civil Service Code;
(6) Ministers must ensure that no conflict arises,
or appears to arise, between their public duties and their private
interests;
(7) Ministers should not accept any gift or hospitality
which might, or might reasonably appear to, compromise their judgement
or place them under an improper obligation;
(8) Ministers in the House of Commons must keep separate
their roles as Minister and constituency Member;
(9) Ministers must not use government resources for
Party political purposes;
(10) Ministers must uphold the political impartiality
of the civil service and not ask civil servants to act in any
way which would conflict with the Civil Service Code as set out
in the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010.
(11) Ministers must also comply at all times with
the requirements which Parliament itself has laid down in relation
to the accountability and responsibility of Ministers. [53]
9 Ministers and Parliament
(1) When Parliament is in session, the most important
announcements of Government policy should be made in the first
instance, in Parliament. [54]
(2) Even when Government announcements are not of
major importance their timing may require careful consideration
in order to avoid clashes with other Government publications,
statements or announcements or with planned Parliamentary business.
The Offices of the Leader of the Commons, the Chief Whip, the
Deputy Prime Minister and the Prime Minister should be given as
long an opportunity as possible to comment on all important announcements.
[55]
(3) Every effort should be made to avoid leaving
significant announcements to the last day before a recess. [56]
(4) Ministers should not give undertakings, either
in or outside the House of Commons, that an oral statement will
be made to the House until the agreement has been given by the
private secretaries to the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister,
the Leader of the House of Commons and the Chief Whip. The Leader
of the House of Lords and Lords Chief Whip should be consulted
where a statement is to be made in the House of Lords in the first
instance. [57]
(5) A copy of the text of an oral statement should
usually be shown to the Opposition shortly before it is made.
For this purpose, 15 copies of the statement and associated documents
should be sent to the Chief Whip's Office at least 45 minutes
before the statement is to be made. At the same time, a copy of
the final text of an oral statement should in all cases be sent
in advance to the Speaker. [58]
(6) Every effort must be made to ensure that where
a former Minister or a Ministerial colleague and/or a fellow MP/Peer
is mentioned in a statement or report which prompts a Ministerial
statement, he or she is given as much notice as is reasonably
possible. [59]
(7) Any Minister or Parliamentary Private Secretary
who receives a copy of a Select Committee report in advance of
publication excluding copies sent to departments at the Confidential
Final Revise stage should make no use of them and should return
them without delay to the Clerk of the relevant Committee. Civil
servants, including special advisers, are also covered by this
ruling. [60]
10 Ministerial powers
(1) Ministers' powers derive from: Parliament, which
grants powers through legislation; ministers' common law powers
to act; and prerogative powers of the Crown that are exercised
by, or on the advice of, ministers. Each form of power is subject
to limits and constraints, and its use may be challenged in the
courts. Ministers can also only spend public money for the purposes
authorised by Parliament. Powers may be exercised by civil servants
on behalf of ministers. [61]
(2) Acts of Parliament grant powers to ministers
or place statutory duties on ministers. Normal practice
is that the powers and duties involved in exercising continuing
functions of ministers (particularly those involving financial
liabilities extending beyond a given year) should be identified
in legislation. Statute also provides ministers with
emergency powers, in particular that emergency regulations could
be made by Order in Council or by ministers as a last resort where
existing legislation is insufficient to respond in the most effective
way. [62]
(3) Most statutory powers and duties are conferred
on the Secretary of State; these may be exercised or complied
with by any one of the secretaries of state, unless a statute
confers powers on a specific minister.[63]
This reflects the doctrine that there is only one office of Secretary
of State, even though it is the well-established practice to appoint
more than one person to carry out the functions of the office.
[64]
(4) It is also the well-established practice for
each secretary of state to be allocated responsibility by the
Prime Minister for a particular department (for example health,
foreign affairs, defence, transport, education etc.) and, accordingly,
for each Secretary of State, in practice, to exercise only those
functions that are within that department. It is for the Prime
Minister to determine the various departments. [65]
(5) Most secretaries of state are incorporated as
'corporations sole'. This gives the minister a separate legal
personality. This is administratively convenient, for example
as regards the ownership of property, because it facilitates continuity
when the officeholder changes. [66]
(6) Statutory powers conferred on the Treasury are
exercisable by the Commissioners of the Treasury, and may not
be exercised by other ministers. The First Lord of the Treasury,
along with the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Junior Lords
of the Treasury, make up the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury.
However, the Treasury Commissioners do not meet in that capacity.
In practice, the Treasury is headed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer
supported by the Chief Secretary to the Treasury and other junior
Treasury ministers. [67]
(7) Ministers' functions are not limited to those
authorised by statute. A minister may, as an agent of the Crown,
exercise any powers which the Crown may exercise, except insofar
as ministers are precluded from doing so by statute and subject
to the fact that a minister will only be able to pay for what
he or she does if Parliament votes him or her the money. This
is a summary of what is known as the Ram doctrine. [68]
(8) The powers that a minister may exercise include
any of the legal powers of an individual, for example to enter
into contracts, convey property or make extra-statutory payments.
As more of ministers' powers have been codified in legislation,
the extent of inherent powers has been correspondingly reduced.
[69]
(9) Prerogative powers are generally exercised by
ministers or by the Sovereign on the advice of ministers, particularly
the Prime Minister. However, the Sovereign continues to exercise
personally some prerogative powers of the Crown (the award of
certain honours, such as the Order of Merit) and reserves the
right to exercise others in unusual circumstances. [70]
(10) Prerogative powers may be divided into the following
broad categories:[71]
(a) Constitutional or personal prerogatives: these
are the powers that the Sovereign continues to exercise either
personally or on the advice of the Government. They include the
powers to: appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister and other ministers;
grant assent to legislation; and prorogue Parliament.
(b) Prerogative executive powers: these are the powers
that are exercised on the Sovereign's behalf by ministers. Most
prerogative powers fall into this category. They include powers
in relation to foreign affairs, to deploy the armed forces, and
to grant mercy. The limited prerogative powers that are relevant
to devolved functions are exercised by ministers in the Devolved
Administrations.
(11) Before the armed forces are committed to
significant military action under the royal prerogative, the House
of Commons should have an opportunity to debate the matter except
when there was an emergency and such action would not ?be
appropriate.[72]
(12) The scope of the prerogative is affected both
by the common law (as developed by the courts) and by statutes
(as enacted by Parliament) and accordingly has changed over time.
[73]
(13) The role of the courts in determining the existence
and extent of the prerogative from time to time can be a significant
control on the prerogative. In particular, the control is strengthened
by the common law doctrine that courts cannot create new prerogatives.
Equally, however, the courts can recognise prerogatives
that were previously of doubtful provenance, or adapt old prerogatives
to modern circumstances. [74]
(14) Over time, legislation has also clarified and
limited the extent of the prerogative, including in some cases
abolishing it. Acts of Parliament which are not primarily aimed
at reforming the prerogative may nevertheless bring about significant
reform to it. Departmental civil servants provide advice to ministers
on the extent of their powers. In the most complex cases, reference
can be made to the Law Officers. [75]
(15) The Minister in charge of a department is solely
accountable to Parliament for the exercise of the powers on which
the administration of that department depends. The Minister's
authority may, however, be delegated to a Minister of State, a
Parliamentary Secretary, or to an official. It is desirable that
Ministers in charge should devolve to their junior Ministers responsibility
for a defined range of departmental work, particularly in connection
with Parliament. A Minister's proposal for the assignment of duties
to junior Ministers, together with any proposed "courtesy
titles" descriptive of their duties should be agreed in writing
with the Prime Minister, copied to the Cabinet Secretary. [76]
(16) Ministers of State and Parliamentary Secretaries
will be authorised to supervise the day-to-day administration
of a defined range of subjects. This arrangement does not relieve
the Permanent Secretary of general responsibility for the organisation
and discipline of the department or of the duty to advise on matters
of policy. The Permanent Secretary is not subject to the directions
of junior Ministers. Equally, junior Ministers are not subject
to the directions of the Permanent Secretary. Any conflict of
view between the two can be resolved only by reference to the
Minister in charge of the department. [77]
(17) Departments should ensure appropriate arrangements
are made for Ministerial cover when Ministers are absent from
London. [78]
(18) The Prime Minister's prior approval should be
sought for the arrangements for superintending the work of a department
when the Minister in charge will be absent. Special care must
be taken over the exercise of statutory powers. Ministers should
seek legal advice in cases of doubt. [79]
(19) The Prime Minister must be consulted in good
time about any proposal to set up:
(a) Royal Commissions: these can only be set up with
the sanction of the Cabinet and after The Queen's approval has
been sought by the Prime Minister;
(b) Major public inquiries under the Inquiries Act
2005 (c.12). [80]
(20) The Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for
Justice should also be consulted where there is a proposal to
appoint a judge or legal officer to the above. [81]
11 Party and constituency interests of Ministers
(1) Facilities provided to Ministers at Government
expense to enable them to carry out their official duties should
not be used for Party or constituency work. [82]
(2) Government property should not generally be used
for constituency work or party activities. A particular exception
is recognised in the case of official residences. Where Ministers
host Party or personal events in these residences it should be
at their own or Party expense with no cost falling to the public
purse. [83]
(3) Official facilities and resources may not be
used for the dissemination of material which is essentially party
political. The conventions governing the work of the Government
Communication Network are set out in the Government Communication
Network's Propriety Guidance - Guidance on Government Communications.
[84]
(4) Where Ministers have to take decisions within
their departments which might have an impact on their own constituencies,
they must take particular care to avoid any possible conflict
of interest. Within departments, the Minister should advise their
Permanent Secretary and, in the case of junior Ministers, their
Secretary of State of the interest and responsibilities should
be arranged to avoid any conflict of interest. [85]
(5) Ministers are free to make their views about
constituency matters known to the responsible Minister by correspondence,
leading deputations or by personal interview provided they make
clear that they are acting as their constituents' representative
and not as a Minister. [86]
(6) Ministers are advised to take particular care
in cases relating to planning applications in their constituencies
or other similar issues. In all such cases, it is important that
they make clear that they are representing the views of their
constituents, avoid criticism of Government policies and confine
themselves to comments which could reasonably be made by those
who are not Ministers. Once a decision has been announced, it
should be accepted without question or criticism.[87]
(7) Particular care also needs to be taken over cases
in which a Minister may have a personal interest or connection,
for example because they concern family, friends or employees.
If, exceptionally, a Minister wishes to raise questions about
the handling of such a case they should advise their Permanent
Secretary and write to the Minister responsible, as with constituency
cases, but they should make clear their personal connection or
interest. The responsible Minister should ensure that any enquiry
is handled without special treatment. [88]
12 Private interests of Ministers
(1) Ministers must ensure that no conflict arises,
or could reasonably be perceived to arise, between their public
duties and their private interests, financial or otherwise. [89]
(2) It is the personal responsibility of each Minister
to decide whether and what action is needed to avoid a conflict
or the perception of a conflict, taking account of advice received
from their Permanent Secretary and the independent adviser on
Ministers' interests. [90]
(3) On appointment to each new office, Ministers
must provide their Permanent Secretary with a full list in writing
of all interests which might be thought to give rise to a conflict.
The list should also cover interests of the Minister's spouse
or partner and close family which might be thought to give rise
to a conflict. [91]
(4) Where appropriate, the Minister will meet the
Permanent Secretary and the independent adviser on Ministers'
interests to agree action on the handling of interests. Ministers
must record in writing what action has been taken, and provide
the Permanent Secretary and the independent adviser on Ministers'
interests with a copy of that record. [92]
(5) The personal information which Ministers disclose
to those who advise them is treated in confidence. However, a
statement covering relevant Ministers' interests will be published
twice yearly. [93]
(6) Where it is proper for a Minister to retain a
private interest, he or she should declare that interest to Ministerial
colleagues if they have to discuss public business which in any
way affects it and the Minister should remain entirely detached
from the consideration of that business. Similar steps may be
necessary in relation to a Minister's previous interests. [94]
(7) Ministers must scrupulously avoid any danger
of an actual or perceived conflict of interest between their Ministerial
position and their private financial interests. They should be
guided by the general principle that they should either dispose
of the interest giving rise to the conflict or take alternative
steps to prevent it. In reaching their decision they should be
guided by the advice given to them by their Permanent Secretary
and the independent adviser on Ministers' interests. Ministers'
decisions should not be influenced by the hope or expectation
of future employment with a particular firm or organisation. [95]
(8) Where exceptionally it is decided that a Minister
can retain an interest, the Minister and the department must put
processes in place to prohibit access to certain papers and ensure
that the Minister is not involved in certain decisions and discussions
relating to that interest. [96]
(9) In some cases, it may not be possible to devise
a mechanism to avoid a conflict of interest. In any such case,
the Prime Minister must be consulted and it may be necessary for
the Minister to cease to hold the office in question. [97]
(10) Where a Minister is allocated an official residence,
they must ensure that all personal tax liabilities, including
council tax, are properly discharged, and that they personally
pay such liabilities. Ministers who occupy an official residence
will not be able to claim Accommodation Expenses from the Independent
Parliamentary Standards Authority. [98]
(11) When they take up office, Ministers should give
up any other public appointment they may hold. Where exceptionally
it is proposed that such an appointment should be retained, the
Minister should seek the advice of their Permanent Secretary and
the independent adviser on Ministers' interests. [99]
(12) Ministers should take care to ensure that they
do not become associated with non-public organisations whose objectives
may in any degree conflict with Government policy and thus give
rise to a conflict of interest. [100]
(13) Ministers should not therefore normally accept
invitations to act as patrons of, or otherwise offer support to,
pressure groups, or organisations dependent in whole or in part
on Government funding. There is normally less objection to a Minister
associating him or herself with a charity, subject to the points
above, but Ministers should take care to ensure that in participating
in any fund-raising activity, they do not place, or appear to
place, themselves under an obligation as Ministers to those to
whom appeals are directed and for this reason they should not
approach individuals or companies personally for this purpose.
In all such cases, the Minister should consult their Permanent
Secretary and where appropriate the independent adviser on Ministers'
interests. [101]
(14) In order to avoid any conflict of interest,
Ministers on taking up office should give up membership or chairmanship
of a Select Committee or All Party Parliamentary Group. This is
to avoid any risk of criticism that a Minister is seeking to influence
the Parliamentary process. Ministers must also avoid being drawn
into a situation whereby their membership of a Committee could
result in the belief that ministerial support is being given to
a particular policy or funding proposal. [102]
(15) Where Ministers become involved in legal proceedings
in a personal capacity, there may be implications for them in
their official position. Defamation is an example of an area where
proceedings will invariably raise issues for the Minister's official
as well as his or her private position. In all such cases, Ministers
should consult the Law Officers in good time and before legal
proceedings are initiated so that they may offer guidance on the
potential implications and handling of the proceedings. [103]
(16) Similarly, when a Minister is a defendant or
a witness in an action, he or she should notify the Law Officers
as soon as possible. Preferably, this should be before he or she
has instructed his or her own solicitors in the matter. [104]
(17) From time to time, the personal support of Ministers
is requested for nominations being made for international prizes
and awards, for example, the annual Nobel prizes. Ministers should
not sponsor individual nominations for any awards, since it would
be inevitable that some people would assume that the Government
was itself thereby giving its sponsorship. [105]
(18) Ministers should not normally, while holding
office, accept decorations from foreign countries. [106]
13 Private Secretaries
(1) Cabinet ministers and ministers of state may
appoint Parliamentary private secretaries. All appointments require
the prior written approval of the Prime Minister. The Chief Whip
should also be consulted and no commitments to make such appointments
should be entered into until such approval is received. [107]
(2) Parliamentary private secretaries are not members
of the Government, although by convention they are bound by collective
agreement. Their role is to support ministers in conducting Parliamentary
business. [108]
14 Law Officers of the Crown
(1) The term 'the Law Officers' refers to the UK
Law Officers, who are the Attorney General, the Solicitor General
and the Advocate General for Scotland. The Attorney General for
England and Wales is also the ex-officio Advocate General for
Northern Ireland. [109]
(2) The Attorney General is the Chief Law Officer
for England and Wales and is the Chief Legal Adviser to the Crown.
The Solicitor General is in practice the Attorney General's deputy
and may exercise any function of the Attorney General. [110]
(3) The Advocate General for Scotland is the principal
legal adviser to the Government on Scots law. Jointly with the
Attorney General, the Advocate General for Scotland also advises
the Government on legal issues, including human rights and EU
law. [111]
(4) The core function of the Law Officers is to advise
on legal matters, helping ministers to act lawfully and in accordance
with the rule of law. The Attorney General is also the minister
with responsibility for superintending the Crown Prosecution Service
and the Serious Fraud Office. [112]
(5) In addition to these roles, the Law Officers
have a number of public interest functions. Acting in the public
interest, independently of government, and in accordance with
the relevant statutes, they may:
· refer
unduly lenient sentences to the Court of Appeal;
· bring
contempt of court proceedings;
· grant
consent for some specific prosecutions;
· intervene
in certain charity and family law cases;
· bring
proceedings to restrain vexatious litigants;
· appoint
advocates to the Court; and
· refer
points of law to the Court of Appeal after acquittals in criminal
cases. [113]
(6) The Law Officers must be consulted by ministers
or their officials in good time before the Government is committed
to critical decisions involving legal considerations. It
has normally been considered appropriate to consult the Law Officers
in cases where:
· the
legal consequences of action by the Government might have important
repercussions in the foreign, EU or domestic fields;
· a departmental
legal adviser is in doubt concerning:
· the
legality or constitutional propriety of proposed primary or subordinate
legislation which the Government proposes to introduce;
· the
powers necessary to make proposed subordinate legislation; or
· the
legality of proposed administrative action, particularly where
that action might be subject to challenge in the courts;
· ministers,
or their officials, wish to have the advice of the Law Officers
on questions involving legal considerations that are likely to
come before Cabinet or a Cabinet committee;
· there
is a particular legal difficulty (including one that arises in
the context of litigation) that may raise sensitive policy issues;
or
· two
or more government departments disagree on legal questions and
wish to seek the view of the Law Officers. [114]
(7) The Law Officers have a role in ensuring the
lawfulness and constitutional propriety of legislation. In particular,
the Law Officers' consent is required for legislative provisions
that have a retrospective effect or where it is proposed that
legislation is commenced within two months of Royal Assent. [115]
(8) Where advice from the Law Officers is included
in correspondence between ministers, or in papers for Cabinet
or ministerial committees, the conclusions of the advice may be
summarised, if necessary. But if this is done, the complete text
of the advice should be attached. [116]
(9) The fact that the Law Officers have advised,
or have not advised, and the content of their advice may not be
disclosed outside government without their authority. The Law
Officers' advice to government is subject to legal professional
privilege (LPP) and is confidential. [117]
15 Government Whips
(1) Government whips are appointed for both the House
of Commons and the House of Lords. The government chief whips
in the House of Commons and the House of Lords arrange the scheduling
of government business, often in consultation with their opposition
counterparts. Collectively, the government and opposition whips
are often referred to as 'the usual channels' when the question
of finding time for a particular item of business is being discussed.
[118]
(2) The chief whips and their assistants manage their
Parliamentary parties. Their duties include keeping members informed
of forthcoming Parliamentary business, maintaining the party's
voting strength by ensuring that members attend important votes,
and passing on to the party leadership the opinions of backbench
members. Whips in the House of Commons do not generally speak
during Parliamentary debates. However, Lords whips may speak in
Parliament on behalf of departments. [119]
Chapter 4: THE CABINET
16 The Cabinet
(1) Cabinet is chaired by the Prime Minister, who
also determines its membership. It will usually comprise
senior ministers. The Prime Minister may arrange for other ministers
to attend Cabinet, either on a regular basis or for particular
business (for example, the Attorney General to give legal advice).
All members of Cabinet as Privy Counsellors are bound by the Privy
Council Oath. [120]
17 Cabinet business
(1) The business of the Cabinet and Ministerial Committees
consists in the main of:
(a) questions which significantly engage the collective
responsibility of the Government because they raise major issues
of policy or because they are of critical importance to the public;
(b) questions on which there is an unresolved argument
between departments. [121]
(2) Collective agreement can be sought at a Cabinet
or Cabinet committee meeting or through ministerial correspondence.
[122]
(3) There are no set rules about the issues that
should be considered by Cabinet itself and it is ultimately for
the Prime Minister to decide the agenda, on the advice of the
Cabinet Secretary. Cabinet and Cabinet committees can all take
collective decisions and the level of committee at which a decision
is taken should not be disclosed. [123]
(4) With the agreement of the Prime Minister, consideration
of significant domestic or international policy issues may be
taken by Cabinet at an early stage by way of a general discussion
to inform the development of detailed policy by the relevant Secretary
of State, or as a final step prior to announcement. Where an issue
is brought to Cabinet at the end of the process, it would normally
have been discussed and agreed by the relevant Cabinet committee.
[124]
(5) All legislative proposals relating to primary
legislation require clearance from the Cabinet committee that
is responsible for Parliamentary business and legislation, in
addition to clearance through the relevant policy committee.
Legislative proposals include public commitments to legislate
within certain timescales, clearance of bills before introduction,
amendments to bills during their passage through Parliament and
the Government's position on Private Members' Bills. [125]
(6) The Chancellor of the Exchequer's Budget and
any other Budget statement are disclosed to Cabinet at a meeting
on the morning of the day on which they are presented to the House
of Commons, although the content of the proposal will often have
been discussed with relevant ministers in advance of the meeting.
The expectation is that the proposals will be accepted by Cabinet
without amendment, although the Chancellor may, if necessary,
make amendments. [126]
(7) An agenda is set for each Cabinet and Cabinet
committee meeting. In the case of Cabinet, items for the agenda
are agreed by the Prime Minister. For other Cabinet committees,
the agenda is agreed by the relevant chair. [127]
(8) Any proposals where other departments have an
interest should be discussed with them before collective agreement
is sought. Where proposals have public expenditure implications,
the Treasury should be consulted before they are submitted for
collective agreement. Where the department proposing
the policy and the Treasury cannot agree in advance, any proposal
for collective ministerial consideration should record the Treasury's
position in terms which are acceptable to them. Policy proposals
with public expenditure implications will not be agreed unless
Treasury ministers are content. If necessary, issues can be referred
to the Prime Minister or, if he or she so decides, to Cabinet
for a decision. [128]
(9) Minutes are taken for each Cabinet and Cabinet
committee meeting, forming part of the historic record of government.
They record the main points made in discussion and the Cabinet
or Cabinet committee conclusions as summed up by the chair. To
help preserve the principle of collective responsibility, most
contributions by ministers are unattributed. However, points made
by the minister introducing the item and the chair's summing-up
are generally attributed. [129]
(10) It is the responsibility of the Cabinet Secretariat
to write and circulate the minutes to members of Cabinet or the
relevant Cabinet committee. This should be done within 24 hours
of the meeting. Minutes are not cleared with the chair of Cabinet
or the Cabinet committee in advance of circulation. If a minister
has a factual correction to make, the Cabinet Secretariat should
be informed within 24 hours of circulation of the minutes. [130]
18 Cabinet Committees
(1) Cabinet committees help to ensure that government
business is processed more effectively by relieving pressure on
Cabinet. The committee structure also supports the principle of
collective responsibility, ensuring that policy proposals receive
thorough consideration without an issue having to be referred
to the whole Cabinet. Cabinet committee decisions have the same
authority as Cabinet decisions. [131]
(2) The Prime Minister decides - with the advice
of the Cabinet Secretary - the overall structure of the Cabinet
committee system, including the chair, deputy chair (if any),
membership and the terms of reference of each Cabinet committee.
[132]
(3) Committees are usually established to consider
a particular area of government business, such as home or domestic
affairs, or national security. Where appropriate, sub-committees
may be established to consider detailed issues and report as necessary
to the full committee. Ad hoc or miscellaneous committees may
also be established by the Prime Minister to carry out a particular
task, usually over a limited timescale. [133]
(4) The committee structure varies depending on the
requirements of the incumbent government. A list of the current
committees, their terms of reference and the ministers who sit
on them will normally be available from the Cabinet Office website.
[134]
(5) The Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) is the
mechanism for agreeing the central government response to major
emergencies which have international, national or multi-regional
impact. Meetings at COBR are in effect Cabinet committee
meetings, although there is no fixed membership, and they can
meet at ministerial or official level depending on the issue under
consideration. In general the chair will be taken by the secretary
of state of the government department with lead responsibility
for the particular issue being considered. [135]
(6) Official committees can be established to support
Cabinet committees. Official committees are chaired by the Cabinet
Secretariat. There is no fixed membership, but senior officials
will be invited from each department with a minister who is a
member of the relevant Cabinet committee. [136]
(7) Official committees may be convened for a variety
of purposes, but would normally meet in advance of a Cabinet committee.
This would enable them to consider the issues that would need
to be covered in Cabinet committee papers and to help the Cabinet
Secretariat identify points that are likely to be raised so that
it can brief the chair of the Cabinet committee effectively. [137]
(8) The role of the Cabinet committee responsible
for primary legislation differs from that of a policy Cabinet
committee: it is concerned with the preparation and management
of the legislative programme, rather than with agreeing government
policy. The committee aims to ensure that the content of the legislative
programme as a whole implements the Government's priorities, and
that the passage of bills through Parliament can be successfully
managed. [138]
19 Collective Responsibility
(1) The principle of collective responsibility, save
where it is explicitly set aside, requires that Ministers should
be able to express their views frankly in the expectation that
they can argue freely in private while maintaining a united front
when decisions have been reached. This in turn requires that the
privacy of opinions expressed in Cabinet and Ministerial Committees,
including in correspondence, should be maintained. [139]
(2) Matters wholly within the responsibility of a
single Minister and which do not significantly engage collective
responsibility need not be brought to the Cabinet or to a Ministerial
Committee unless the Minister wishes to inform his colleagues
or to have their advice. No definitive criteria can be given for
issues which engage collective responsibility. The Cabinet Secretariats
can advise where departments are unsure. When there is a difference
between departments, it should not be referred to the Cabinet
until other means of resolving it have been exhausted. It is the
responsibility of the initiating department to ensure that proposals
have been discussed with other interested departments and the
outcome of these discussions should be reflected in the memorandum
or letter submitted to Cabinet or a Cabinet Committee. [140]
20 The Cabinet Secretary and Cabinet
Secretariat
(1) The Cabinet Secretary is the head
of the Cabinet Secretariat. The Cabinet Secretary is
appointed by the Prime Minister on the advice of the retiring
Cabinet Secretary and the First Civil Service Commissioner. [141]
(2) The Cabinet Secretary, unless unavoidably absent,
attends all meetings of Cabinet and is responsible for the smooth
running of Cabinet meetings and for preparing records of its discussions
and decisions. This includes responsibility for advising the Prime
Minister on all questions connected with the appointment and organisation
of Cabinet committees, including membership and terms of reference.
[142]
(3) The Cabinet Secretariat exists
to support the Prime Minister, and the Deputy Prime Minister where
a minister has been appointed to that office, and the chairs of
Cabinet committees in ensuring that government business is conducted
in an effective and timely way and that proper collective consideration
takes place. The Cabinet Secretariat is therefore non-departmental
in function and consists of officials who are based in the Cabinet
Office but drawn from across government. [143]
(4) The Cabinet Secretariat reports
to the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister and other ministers
who chair Cabinet committees. The Cabinet Secretariat
prepares the agenda of Cabinet committee meetings, with the agreement
of the chair; it also provides them with advice and support in
their functions as chair; and it issues the minutes of the committees.
[144]
8 The approach taken by the author to codifying in
writing the existing conventions of the constitution for the purpose
of this Constitutional Consolidation Act has been to adopt the
opinion of the Cabinet office as to what the conventions are,
as set in its official publication endorsed by the Cabinet, The
Cabinet Manual: A Guide to Laws, Conventions and Rules on the
Operation of Government (2011) Ed.1 (hereafter 'Cabinet Manual').
This should not be taken as meaning that the Cabinet Manual is
a source of the constitution itself, but simply that it is a peculiarly
authoritative secondary source, not only because it sets out the
restrictions which the government fully accept upon itself, but
also because it is the public document most frequently relied
upon by the media to inform the public in its reporting of political
events. A more precise and realistic interpretation of some of
the conventions, such on prime ministerial appointment and war
powers, is given by the author in the Constitutional Code (Part
II, 1). Back
9
Common law; Act of Supremacy 1558; see Cabinet Manual Ch.1 Back
10
Act of Settlement 1700 Part 1 Back
11
Act of Settlement 1700 Part 1 Back
12
Act of Settlement 1700 Part 1 Back
13
Act of Settlement 1700 Part 1 Back
14
Act of Settlement 1700 Part 1 Back
15
Act of Settlement 1700 Part 1 Back
16
Common law; convention; Cabinet Manual Ch.1 para 1.1 Back
17
Common law; Scotland Act 1998 c.46, s.45; Government of Wales
Act 2006 c.32, s.46; Cabinet Manual Ch.1 para 1.1 Back
18
Common law; Cabinet Manual Ch.1 para 1.1 Back
19
Common law; Prorogation Act 1867; Cabinet Manual Ch.1 para
1.1 Back
20
Regency Act 1937 c.16 s1(1) (as amended) Back
21
Regency Act 1937 c.16 s1(2) (as amended) Back
22
Regency Act 1937 c.16 s2(1) (as amended) Back
23
Regency Act 1937 c.16 s2(2) (as amended) Back
24
Regency Act 1937 c.16 s3(1) Back
25
Regency Act 1937 c.16 s3(2) Back
26
Regency Act 1937 c.16 s3(3) Back
27
Regency Act 1937 c.16 s3(4) Back
28
Regency Act 1937 c.16 s3(5) Back
29
Regency Act 1937 c.16 s4(1) Back
30
Regency Act 1937 c.16 s4(2) Back
31
Regency Act 1937 c.16 s5(1)(a) Back
32
Regency Act 1937 c.16 s5(1)(b) Back
33
Regency Act 1937 c.16 s5(1)(c) Back
34
Convention; existence cited in various statutes eg Chequers Estate
Act 1917, Ministerial and other Pensions and Salaries Act 1991,
and Constitutional Reform Act 2005; Cabinet Manual Ch.3
para 3.1 Back
35
Convention; Cabinet Manual Ch.3, paras 3.1, 3.2. This section
is a distillation of the principle described in the Cabinet Manual.
A more accurate or precise statement of the convention, drafted
by the author, is given as article 46 of the Constitutional Code
(Part II, 1). See also Robert Blackburn, " Monarchy and the
Personal Prerogatives", Public Law (2004) 546; and
Robert Blackburn, "The 2010 General Election Outcome and
Formation of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government",
Public Law (2011) 30. Back
36
Convention; Cabinet Manual Ch.3 para 3.1 Back
37
Cabinet Manual Ch.3 para 3.4 Back
38
Cabinet Manual Ch.3 para 3.4 Back
39
Cabinet Manual Ch.3 para 3.5 Back
40
Cabinet Manual Ch.3 para 3.5 Back
41
Convention; Cabinet Manual Ch.3 para 3.2 Back
42
Promissory Oaths Act 1868 c.72 Back
43
Convention; Cabinet Manual Ch.3 para 3.6 Back
44
Ministerial Code (2010) para 4.1 Back
45
Ministerial Code (2010) para 1.5 Back
46
Cabinet Manual Ch.3 para 3.7 Back
47
Cabinet Manual Ch.3 para 3.9; Ministerial Salaries Act
1975 c.27 Back
48
Cabinet Manual Ch.3 para 3.10 Back
49
Cabinet Manual Ch.3 para 3.11 Back
50
Cabinet Manual Ch.3 para 3.12 Back
51
Cabinet Manual Ch.3 para 3.13 Back
52
Ministerial Code (Cabinet Office, May 2010) (hereafter 'Ministerial
Code') s1.2 Back
53
Ministerial Code para 1.6 Back
54
Ministerial Code para 9.1 Back
55
Ministerial Code para 9.2 Back
56
Ministerial Code para 9.3 Back
57
Ministerial Code para 9.4 Back
58
Ministerial Code para 9.5 Back
59
Ministerial Code para 9.6 Back
60
Ministerial Code para 9.7 Back
61
Cabinet Manual Ch.3 para 3.24 Back
62
Cabinet Manual Ch.3 para 3.25; Civil Contingencies Act
2004 c.36 ss19-31 Back
63
Cabinet Manual Ch.3 para 3.30 Back
64
Cabinet Manual Ch.3 para 3.26 Back
65
Cabinet Manual Ch.3 para 3.27 Back
66
Cabinet Manual Ch.3 para 3.28ddf Back
67
Cabinet Manual Ch.3 para 3.29 Back
68
Cabinet Manual Ch.3 para 3.31 Back
69
Cabinet Manual Ch.3 para 3.32 Back
70
Cabinet Manual Ch.3 para 3.33 Back
71
Cabinet Manual Ch.3 para 3.34 Back
72
Cabinet Manual Ch.5 paras 5.36 to 5.38, which sets out
the Cabinet Office's interpretation of the existing convention.
However see also the Constitutional Code (Part 2, I) para 43(ii)
for the author's interpretation based on recent precedents, especially
the parliamentary against military action in Syria on 29 August
2013 (Commons Hansard, 29 August 2013, cols.1425f), the
acceptance of the government of Parliament's negation of its proposed
action, and the greater political emphasis in recent times generally
upon parliamentary control over the prerogative powers Back
73
Cabinet Manual Ch.3 para 3.35 Back
74
Cabinet Manual Ch.3 para 3.36 Back
75
Cabinet Manual Ch.3 para 3.37 Back
76
Ministerial Code para 4.6 Back
77
Ministerial Code para 4.7 Back
78
Ministerial Code para 4.8 Back
79
Ministerial Code para 4.9 Back
80
Ministerial Code para 4.10 Back
81
Ministerial Code para 4.11 Back
82
Ministerial Code para 6.1 Back
83
Ministerial Code para 6.2 Back
84
Ministerial Code para 6.3 Back
85
Ministerial Code para 6.4 Back
86
Ministerial Code para 6.5 Back
87
Ministerial Code para 6.6 Back
88
Ministerial Code para 6.7 Back
89
Ministerial Code para 7.1 Back
90
Ministerial Code para 7.2 Back
91
Ministerial Code para 7.3 Back
92
Ministerial Code para 7.4 Back
93
Ministerial Code para 7.5 Back
94
Ministerial Code para 7.6 Back
95
Ministerial Code para 7.7 Back
96
Ministerial Code para 7.8 Back
97
Ministerial Code para 7.9 Back
98
Ministerial Code para 7.10 Back
99
Ministerial Code para 7.11 Back
100
Ministerial Code para 7.12 Back
101
Ministerial Code para 7.13 Back
102
Ministerial Code para 7.14 Back
103
Ministerial Code para 7.16 Back
104
Ministerial Code para 7.17 Back
105
Ministerial Code para 7.18 Back
106
Ministerial Code para 7.19 Back
107
Cabinet Manual Ch.3 para 3.21; Ministerial Code para 3.6 Back
108
Cabinet Manual Ch.3 para 3.22; Ministerial Code para 3.9 Back
109
Cabinet Manual Ch.6 para 6.1 Back
110
Cabinet Manual Ch.6 para 6.2 Back
111
Cabinet Manual Ch.6 para 6.3 Back
112
Cabinet Manual Ch.6 para
6.4 Back
113
Cabinet Manual Ch.6 para 6.5 Back
114
Cabinet Manual Ch.6 para 6.6; Ministerial Code para 2.10 Back
115
Cabinet Manual Ch.6 para 6.7 Back
116
Cabinet Manual Ch.6 para 6.8; Ministerial Code para 2.12 Back
117
Cabinet Manual Ch.6 para 6.9; Ministerial Code para 2.13 Back
118
Cabinet Manual Ch.3 para 3.16 Back
119
Cabinet Manual Ch.3 para 3.17 Back
120
Cabinet Manual Ch.4 para 4.5 Back
121
Ministerial Code para 2.2 Back
122
Cabinet Manual Ch.4 para 4.16 Back
123
Cabinet Manual Ch.4 para 4.18 Back
124
Cabinet Manual Ch.4 para 4.19 Back
125
Cabinet Manual Ch.4 para 4.20 Back
126
Cabinet Manual Ch.4 para 4.23 Back
127
Cabinet Manual Ch.4 para 4.26 Back
128
Cabinet Manual Ch.4 para 4.32 Back
129
Cabinet Manual Ch.4 para 4.34 Back
130
Cabinet Manual Ch.4 para 4.35 Back
131
Cabinet Manual Ch.4 para 4.9 Back
132
Cabinet Manual Ch.4 para 4.10 Back
133
Cabinet Manual Ch.4 para 4.11 Back
134
Cabinet Manual Ch.4 para 4.12 Back
135
Cabinet Manual Ch.4 para 4.13 Back
136
Cabinet Manual Ch.4 para 4.14 Back
137
Cabinet Manual Ch.4 para 4.15 Back
138
Cabinet Manual Ch.4 para 4.21 Back
139
Ministerial Code para 2.1 Back
140
Ministerial Code para 2.4 Back
141
Cabinet Manual Ch.4 para 4.53 Back
142
Cabinet Manual Ch.4 para 4.54 Back
143
Cabinet Manual Ch. 4 para 4.51 Back
144
Cabinet Manual Ch.4 para 4.52 Back
|