3 The body entrusted with drafting the
30 Once a future Cabinet might agree to start
a process by which the constitution was to be codified, some important
preliminary decisions would need to be reached almost immediately.
One of these would be to settle the nature and scope of the document
(which it might be, as suggested above, a non-legal Constitutional
Code, a Constitutional Consolidation Act, or a Written Constitution).
Only in the light of this decision, could it be decided what type
of public body was best suited to be entrusted with the delicate
task of preparing the document.
31 There are a wide number of public bodies that
have been appointed by past governments for inquiries into constitutional
affairs, designed to consult and bring forward recommendations.
They include Royal Commissions, Independent Commissions, and Speaker's
Conferences. A parliamentary select committee has also been used
The Law Commissions, in England and in Scotland, work on law projects
referred to them by the Justice Secretary.
Operating independent of government a cross-party Constitutional
Convention including representatives of civil society worked on
Scottish devolution issues prior to the Scotland Bill being framed
The House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee
has suggested a government-initiated Constitutional Convention
with a strong element of public participation be established to
review and recommend a new and more lasting settlement for regional
government across the UK.
Abroad, a number of public bodies have been entrusted with constitution-building
projects, including specially established Constitutional Assemblies
and Constitutional Commissions.
The Cabinet Office
32 Initial consideration, however, should be
given to the role of the Cabinet Office. In terms of government
responsibility for political and constitutional reform, in the
present Parliament it is the Deputy Prime Minister and a Minister
of State who are the lead ministers, both of whom are based in
the Cabinet Office. One of the key functions of the Cabinet Office,
as set out in its Departmental Business Plan for 2011-15 is to
'Reform our political and constitutional system'. The Deputy Prime
Minister chairs the Cabinet Home Affairs Committee whose terms
of reference include consideration of issues relating to constitutional
and political reform.
33 Within the Cabinet Office, these two ministers
receive support from the Constitutional Group, transferred from
the Ministry of Justice in 2010-11, comprising a Constitution
Office and four units beneath it (Elections and Democracy, Parliament
and Constitution, Electoral Registration Transformation, and Devolution
Strategy). In the next Parliament, following the expected 2015
general election, ministerial and civil service responsibility
for constitutional affairs is likely to revert to the Ministry
of Justice if there is a change of party or parties in government.
34 While the Cabinet Office remains the lead
body for constitutional reform, this can also at different times
fall within the remit of various other departments, depending
on the issue involved. For example, if a matter of European Union
law is involved, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office will be involved.
The Ministry of Justice has responsibility for constitutional
affairs not covered by the Deputy Prime Minister, under the Lord
Chancellor and Secretary of State supported by a Minister of State
who currently is also Leader of the House of Lords.
35 Even if responsibility for constitutional
reform moves back to the Ministry of Justice in the future, the
Cabinet Office would still have an important role to play in codifying
the constitution, whether of a central, supporting or coordinating
nature. This would be particularly so with respect to the drawing
up of a non-legal constitutional code, given the preparatory work
it undertook during 2010-11 in the production of the Cabinet Manual.
36 The background and significance of the Cabinet
Manual is as follows. In February 2010 the then Prime Minister
Gordon Brown announced in a speech to the Institute of Public
Policy Research that he has asked the Cabinet Secretary, then
Sir Gus O'Donnell, to have the Cabinet Office produce a consolidation
of the existing unwritten constitutional conventions (non-legal
rules) affecting government into one single written document.
In his speech, he said,
"I can announce today that I have asked the
Cabinet Secretary to lead work to consolidate the existing unwritten,
piecemeal conventions that govern much of the way central government
operates under our existing constitution into a single written
This initiative formed part of Mr Brown's broader
project of working towards a written constitution, support for
which he had informed the House of Commons earlier in a statement
on constitutional renewal.
37 The Cabinet Office then proceeded to produce
the current Cabinet Manual, with support from colleagues across
government, intended to be "a source of information on the
laws, conventions and rules that affect the operation and procedures
of government". A draft chapter covering the rules on government
formation under a hung Parliament was published in February 2010,
and submitted for comment to the House of Commons Justice Committee.
To some extent it formed the basis for inter-party negotiations
on constructing the coalition at the May general election. Work
continued on the rest of the Manual after the election with the
approval of the new Prime Minister David Cameron and Deputy Prime
Nick Clegg. Following a full draft being published for consultation
in December 2010, the final revised version was released in October
2011, with a foreword by the Prime Minister stating that it had
been endorsed by the Cabinet as an "authoritative" guide
for everyone working in government.
38 There is a debate to be had about the precise
nature and status of the Manual. Thus in the view of the House
of Lords Constitution Committee, "the Manual is not the first
step towards a written constitution".
Indeed, that Committee believes it should be re-titled "The
Cabinet Office Manual", clearly indicating that it is a unilateral
declaration of constitutional principles that others might not
necessarily agree with. The House of Commons Political and Constitutional
Committee, however differs in some degree, whilst accepting the
Manual is certainly not a written constitution in itself. The
"It has, however, considerable overlap in content
with what might be expected of a constitution. The Cabinet Secretary
has suggested to us that it would be likely to be a starting point
for any attempt to produce such a constitution. By bringing together
and publishing the Government's interpretation of existing constitutional
rules and conventions, the Government has already begun to spark
debate about both the nature of these rules and conventions and
if and how they should be written down. This is a debate in which
Parliament needs to play a full part."
39 It is submitted that the very process of a
Cabinet endorsed statement setting out the rules and conventions
of the UK system of government in a single authoritative written
document is of considerable significance to the general idea of
codifying the constitution; and indeed, it was with this in mind
that the then Prime Minister in February 2010 initiated the work
on the Manual and required it to be drawn up by the Cabinet Office.
40 Having already undertaken a great deal of
preparatory work on what is essentially a codification of internal
practice, the Cabinet Office is well-situated, and has the necessary
resources, to oversee the drafting of a non-legal constitutional
code (model A above), covering all aspects of the constitution,
extending to some areas it does not cover such as matters of citizenship,
to be submitted to Parliament for formal scrutiny and approval.
A Royal Commission
41 The classic method of examining some major
constitutional question in the United Kingdom has been to establish
a Royal Commission.
This has the highest formal status in terms of a public inquiry,
with members of the Commission being formally appointed by royal
warrant on the advice of the Prime Minister or a Secretary of
State. Constitutional matters on which a Royal Commission has
been set up in modern times include Systems of Election (1908-1910),
the Civil Service (1912-15,
the Local Government of Greater London (1921-23,
Local Government (1923-29,
the Police (1960-62),
the Constitution (in practice, dealing with devolution, 1969-73),
and Reform of the House of Lords (1999-2000).
42 In substance, there is little difference between
a Royal Commission and a departmental committee of inquiry that
is more simply appointed by one or more government ministers.
Such inquiries on constitutional matters have included Ministers'
and Administrative Tribunals and Inquiries (1955-57).
More recently, bodies of a similar nature termed Independent Commissions
have been set up to consider some particularly controversial proposal,
including on the Voting System (1997-98)
and a Bill of Rights (2011-12).
43 The membership of Royal Commissions and departmental
committees is hand picked by the government, often taking nominees
of opposition parties into consideration. Their working practices
have varied considerably, and to a large extent are dictated by
the government in setting the period of time in which the Commission
or committee is required to report, and the human and financial
resources assigned to them. A Royal Commission is more likely
to hold extensive public hearings, but neither it nor a departmental
committee of inquiry has the power to compel the attendance of
witnesses, which bodies established under the Inquiries Act 2005
may do, such as the recent inquiry into the Culture, Practice
and Ethics of the Press (2011-12),
or (in theory) a parliamentary select committee.
44 All these public bodies are advisory in nature,
leaving it to the government to accept or reject their recommendations,
or cherry-pick which of their recommendations to adopt. Depending
on the nature of the composition of the Royal Commission or committee/commission,
it may perform a role in fostering a degree of cross-party agreement.
To the extent that it holds evidence-taking sessions, it will
involve and gather useful information guiding its recommendations
from experts, civil society, and the public generally.
45 In terms of prestige and tradition, a Royal
Commission might appear the natural choice for designing or supervising
a codification of the constitution. However, in practice there
may be considerable drawbacks. The method of government appointment
is opaque, often giving rise to suspicions that the membership
is biased towards a particular conclusion. There has been little
attempt in the past to make such a body representative of society.
Its inquisitorial style of public hearing in the past has not
been successful in terms of encouraging public participation and
deliberation. The success rate of Royal Commissions in terms of
outcome has been poor.
46 Insofar as the requirements for drawing up
the different models of codification under consideration are both
to engage the public and stimulate greater interest and clarity
in the constitution on the one hand, and to complete a largely
technical exercise in consolidating existing constitutional law
and practice into one document on the other hand, a Royal Commission
fits awkwardly as a means of delivering either outcome, unless
it is to act as a supervisory body sponsoring one or two sub-units
specially commissioned for the purposes of public deliberation
and documentary drafting.
A parliamentary inquiry
47 A parliamentary inquiry into codifying the
constitution could play a positive and important role in terms
of political involvement, cross-party discussion, and selective
evidence taking from constitutional experts, interest groups and,
to some extent, popular opinion. Since, as discussed earlier,
the government would effectively retain the initiative over any
particular course of action, its report would be advisory in effect,
but add fresh pressure and influence on ministers to respond and
give an account of its policy and intentions with regard to the
issues raised. In other words, such an inquiry could play an important
preparatory and contributory role in the wider process of working
towards a codified constitution.
48 The setting up of a Select Committee inquiry
could be on a government or parliamentary initiative, presented
in a motion to the House of Parliament concerned, with a specific
remit to draft a codified constitution with commentary and analysis
for further consideration. A time limited Select Committee could
be set up in the House of Commons with a special remit to bring
forward recommendations on constitutional codification, in similar
manner to the Select Committee on Reform of the House of Commons
chaired by Tony Wright in 2009; or a similar Committee could be
established in the House of Lords or a Joint Committee of both
49 An alternative procedure would be for two
or more existing Select Committees with a common or overlapping
interest in constitutional affairs (notably the House of Commons
Political and Constitutional Reform Committee and House of Lords
Constitution Committee, possibly with the House of Commons Justice
Committee, the Joint Committee on Human Rights, and the House
of Lords European Union Committee) to establish a special sub-committee
on constitutional codification, as has been done in the case of
the present Arms Export Controls Committee. There is considerably
more flexibility in the select committee system generally today,
both in the selection of its inquiries and in their operational
methods for public consultation. In the House of Commons, they
are also now more genuinely independent of government and representative
of the House as a whole, following the introduction of elections
for members and chairmen since 2010.
50 An alternative approach would be to adopt
the mechanism of a Speaker's Conference, in other words a cross-party
conference chaired by the Speaker of the House of Commons, with
a view to recommendations being put forward for the government
to consider acting upon. As things have evolved over the past
100 years, there is now a tradition that a Speaker's Conference
is limited to the consideration of difficult issues of parliamentary
election law, particularly if they have a broad scope in terms
of representation and are a matter of cross-party concern.
51 However, there is no good reason why a Speaker's
Conference should be limited in this way. Indeed, the first such
Conference in 1916-17, established to consider universal voting,
the female franchise, and the voting system, was simply an ad
hoc response to the need to find a method of promoting cross-party
agreement on matters of a highly controversial nature, but which
all were agreed had to be resolved as a matter of urgency for
the post-War reconstruction of civil society. Most of the recommendations
of the Conference successfully found their way into the Representation
of the People Act 1918.
52 There is one precedent for a Speaker's Conference
on a subject other than electoral matters, being on regional devolution
in 1919-20 initiated at the request of some Conservative MPs.
Two reports were produced, but the conference failed to reach
agreement on whether there should be devolution to England as
a whole or to the regions of England and on whether devolved bodies
should be directly elected or not.
53 The great advantage of a Speaker's Conference
would lie in the authority afforded it by virtue of the Speaker's
chairmanship, with him being seen as politically neutral as it
is possible for any parliamentarian to be in his capacity as Chair.
In addition, it would be an effective device for promoting cross-party
discussions, though this would need to be supported by genuine
efforts at agreement in private meetings held elsewhere. It might
have limitations in terms of engaging the public, though evidence-taking
sessions could certainly take place, together with a specially
commissioned programme of public deliberation on a range of constitutional
54 As the servant of the House of Commons, the
initiative for a Conference could not realistically come from
the Speaker himself. A backbench or opposition motion in the Commons
could propose the creation of a Speaker's Conference on the constitution,
but without the governing party's support it is almost certain
to be rejected. If the Prime Minister were to instigate this procedure,
however, this would signify a high level of commitment to act
on its recommendations.
A constitutional Convention
or Assembly with popular representation
55 The Committee on Political and Constitutional
Reform has considered the case for a "constitutional convention"
for the UK, focusing on the Union and future structure of devolution
and regional governance in the United Kingdom.
A deliberative body of this kind could play a significant role
in preparing the ground for a future government initiative, particularly
if any changes of substance were being considered (as in model
C). It could usefully clarify the areas of common agreement and
particular problems to be addressed.
56 An essential element of such a convention
would be its highly inclusive nature and strong element of public
participation. Delegates should be drawn widely from across society,
including representatives from business and the trade unions,
local and regional government, faith groups, and former holders
of public office including the judiciary. The convention might
contain a proportion of ordinary members of the public willing
to serve as delegates selected at random from the electoral register
or through a scheme of election. Various methods might be adopted
for otherwise involving the public. 
57 It would be most effective for such a convention
to be established by the government, following cross-party talks
and agreement on the precise remit and composition of the convention.
However, a body of this kind could come into existence on the
independent initiative of influential public or academic figures,
as did the Scottish Constitutional Convention in 1989 that proved
influential in preparing the ground for the Labour government's
legislation on Scottish devolution in 1998.
58 There would be a range of civil society groups
able to participate or offer assistance. Some permanent policy
institutes or ad hoc commissions have worked on the idea of codifying
the constitution or related issues, such as Unlock Democracy (the
successor to Charter 88), the Power Commission (whose membership
included Ferdinand Mount and Helena Kennedy QC) which reported
in 2006, the Institute of Public Policy Research ('The Constitution
of the United Kingdom') in 1991, the Institute of Economic Affairs
('Britain's Constitutional Future') in 1991, the Smith Institute
in 2007 ('Towards a New Constitutional Settlement'), and the law
reform body Justice ('Towards a Codified Constitution') in 2010.
Critical to the convention's success would be the participation
of those political parties who wished to move forward the debate
on codifying the constitution.
The Law Commissions
59 If codifying the constitution in legal form
were seen as essentially a technical exercise, re-enacting and
codifying pre-existing rules - as would be most of the work involved
in preparing a document in the nature of model B, while modernising
some of the language used in earlier Acts of Parliament - the
Law Commissions could be regarded as well situated to take on
this task. The Law Commission of England and Wales was created
specifically for the purpose of achieving greater simplification,
coherence and modernisation in the structure of the law.
The Commission is required "to take and keep under review
all the law including in particular the codification of such law".
60 There are three Law Commissions in the UK,
dealing with the respective legal systems in England and Wales,
Scotland and Northern Ireland. The Law Commission for England
and Wales could be the lead body in codifying the constitution,
acting in close association with the other two Commissions. The
English Commission consists of a Chairman and four Commissioners,
all of who are appointed by the Lord Chancellor and Secretary
of State for Justice. The Chair is a person who holds office as
a judge of the High Court or Court of Appeal, and the other Commissioners
are qualified by the holding of judicial office or by experience
as a legal practitioner or as a University professor of law.
61 The Commission adopts project proposals on
the basis of government departmental submissions or at the suggestion
of others, with the support of the department. These it considers
taking into account factors such as whether it agrees the law
is unsatisfactory, there are benefits of reform, the suitability
of the Commission to undertake the work, and the Commission has
the relevant expertise. Commissioners then submit their proposed
programmes of work to the Lord Chancellor for his formal approval.
After their work is completed, their reports (which include draft
Bills and detailed legislative proposals) are submitted to the
Lord Chancellor to consider, and he will present them to Parliament
if and when he and the Cabinet agree to do so.
62 Since the Commission is under a statutory
duty to review "all of the law", this includes the law
of the constitution. It has earlier conducted reviews of particular
public law subjects, including on Administrative Redress and currently
on Electoral Law. It has extensive experience of both consolidation
work, producing over 200 consolidation Bills that have become
Acts since 1965, and codification exercises, including in the
law of divorce, family, crime, landlord and tenant relations,
though only a few of these were in the event completed, largely
for reasons of resource and shifting priorities. In the case of
one project, on codifying the criminal law, it established a dedicated
group of distinguished academics known as the "Code Team"
under terms of reference set by the Commission to which it reported.
The team's report, including a draft bill, was published with
an introduction by the Commission, and presented to the Lord Chancellor
as a "document for discussion".
63 In the opinion of the Commission and the Lord
Chancellor, any proposed project for its work must be "suitable",
which has been described in its latest programme of law reform
in the following way: "Whether the reform would be suitable
to be put forward by a body of lawyers after legal research and
consultation (this would tend to exclude subjects were the considerations
are shaped primarily by 'political judgements'".
This means that if the government requested that the Law Commission
undertake this work of codifying the constitution, it must come
with the agreement of the main political parties and without any
significant degree of political contentiousness.
64 The advantage of using the Commission for
codifying the constitution would be that its report and draft
document would be conducted in a politically neutral and independent
way, treated as a technical exercise, and it would follow the
professional working practices of the Commission which are well
suited for such a task in matters such as consultation and Commissioner
peer-review. However, there would need to be a broad consensus
not only on the desirability of codification, but also on what
the content of codified constitution should be. The government's
brief to the Commission on content would need to be established
in advance through a prior process of public and parliamentary
consultation and all-party agreement.
65 In correspondence with the author, the Chairman
of the Law Commission, Sir David Lloyd Jones, agrees that the
Law Commission is suitably equipped to take on this task. In his
letter of 19 June 2014, he has said,
"On a technical level, the task of bringing
together in one statute, and modernising the language of, various
provisions of existing statute law relating to constitutional
matters is one for which, in principle, the Commission would be
well suited. I can equally see how a similar process could be
applied to constitutional conventions. I would only add two caveats.
First, it would only be appropriate for the Commission to undertake
such a task if there was a clear political consensus in favour
of engaging in it as a technical exercise. Secondly, such a task,
particularly if there were to be a requirement to conduct it speedily,
would require appropriate additional resources for the Commission.
The United Kingdom-wide nature of such a project would make involvement
of the Scottish and Northern Irish Law Commissions desirable."
A Commission for Democracy
66 Beyond the UK's experience of the various
commissions, inquiries, committees and conferences that have been
involved in aspects of constitutional change in the past lie a
number of other institutions or procedures that have either been
used abroad for the purposes of constitution change and innovation,
and/or might be constructed as a bespoke solution to the challenging
task of codifying the UK constitution.
67 One option would be to establish a permanent
constitutional commission, either under the royal prerogative
or under an Act of Parliament, with its first task to be that
of preparing a codified constitution for the UK. This would be
an advisory body to the government, operating similarly to that
of a Royal Commission but on a standing and permanent basis like
the Committee on Standards in Public Life. Longer term responsibilities
might include policy and impact reviews on issues of prospective
reform, and undertaking initiatives of public engagement and deliberation
on political and constitutional issues.
68 Proposals for a constitution commission for
the UK have been made before,
and have been influenced by the Australian experience of such
Its composition might be a mixture of nominees from the main political
parties, together with representatives from relevant professional
groups including law and business, as well as civil society and
local and regional bodies.
69 Far more ambitious would be the creation of
a Constitutional Assembly or Convention with an elected element,
established by Act of Parliament for the specific purpose of enacting
a new constitution. This would involve a specially composed representative
body, with at least half being chosen through a democratic process
of nomination and election, for the task of creating a new constitution
or constitutional settlement. In recent times bodies of this nature
have been used in Geneva, Iceland and Ireland, which are discussed
in the ancillary paper Case Studies on Constitutional Building.
70 If substantive changes to the political system
or citizens' rights were being proposed by the government at the
same time as preparing the codified constitution, it would provide
an institutional framework for both cross-party discussions and
popular deliberation in which to take place. It would be a sensational
event, arousing considerable media and popular discussion, particularly
if the issues were perceived as directly affected ordinary people's
social and political rights and everyday lives. However an Assembly
of this nature is unlikely to be thought suitable for an exercise
in codifying the constitution as it exists at present, and so
is likely to be ruled out as unnecessary if a non-legal code or
consolidation statute was being considered.
71 The most suitable option for supervising the
preparation of any of the three models for codification, especially
if the process of codification were regarded as a building block
process with a written constitution as it projected endpoint,
might well be a commission set up on executive action (in other
words, under the royal prerogative). Its composition would need
to be agreed between the parties, and could be political in nature
(for example, a government minister as Chairman to drive the process
forward and link it with the Cabinet, with twelve Commissioners
from the two Houses of Parliament nominated by and representing
the government, opposition and minor parties in a manner ensuring
cross-party co-operation so far as possible, and three co-opted
Commissioners), or comprising independent members approved by
party agreement, or a combination of these two types, with the
nominations being approved by a vote in each House of Parliament.
The government initiating the process would need to ensure that
the Commission had adequate resources for a secretariat and advisory
group necessary for any purposes the Commission thought necessary
in performing its task. Further consideration is given to such
a body in the conclusions and recommendations below (paragraphs
212-217) with a proposal it be termed a Commission for Democracy.
878 These types of body are discussed below. Back
See below, and Blackburn, Case Studies, C. Back
See ancillary Blackburn, Case Studies, D. Back
Do We Need a Constitutional Convention for the UK?, 2012-13,
HC 371. Back
See below and Blackburn, Case Studies, on overseas precedents. Back
Towards a New Politics, February 2, 2010. Back
Commons Hansard, 10 June 2009, col 798. Back
The Cabinet Manual, 2010-12, HL 107. Back
Constitutional Implications of the Cabinet Manual, 2010-12,
HC 734, p.10. Back
See Blackburn, Case Studies, B. Back
Cd. 5163 (1910). Back
Cd. 6210 (1912), Cd. 7338 (1914). Back
Cmd. 3909 (1931). Back
Cmd. 9613 (1955). Back
Cmd. 1798 (1923). Back
Cmd. 1164 (1960). Back
Cmd. 3436 (1929). Back
England, Cmd. 4040 (1973). Back
Cmd. 1728 (1962). Back
Cmd. 5460 (1973), Back
A House for the Future, Cm. 4534 (2000). Back
Cmd. 4060 (1931). Back
Cmd. 218 (1957). Back
Cm. 4090 (1998). Back
Commission on a Bill of Rights, A UK Bill of Rights? The Choice
Before Us (December 2012). Back
HC 779, 29 November 2012. Back
For example, only 5 of the 53 members of the last three Royal
Commissions combined were women. Back
See Blackburn, Case Studies, B. Back
For a detailed study of the preparation, passage and outcome of
this major constitutional reform see Robert Blackburn, "Laying
the Foundations of the Modern Voting System: The Representation
of the People Act 1918", in Philip Norton (ed), A Century
of Constitutional Reform (Parliamentary History, 2011, pp.33-52).
A second such Conference was held in 1944 to examine the parliamentary
constituency boundaries, reform of the franchise, conduct and
costs of elections, and methods of election, which led to the
Representation of the People Act 1944. Since then, there have
been five further Speaker's Conferences, all dealing with matters
of parliamentary representation and election law. The most recent
was established in 2009 to examine female and ethnic minority
representation, whether the voting age should be reduced to sixteen
years of age, and on which day voting should take place. Back
Cmd. 692 (1920), Conference on Devolution: Letter from Mr Speaker
to the Prime Minister. Back
Such a programme was conducted, for example, by the Ministry of
Justice in 2009-10 on the question of citizenship rights and responsibilities:
see Rights and Responsibilities: Developing Our Constitutional
Framework, Cm 7860 (2010). Back
House of Commons Committee on Political Constitutional Reform,
Do We Need a Constitutional Convention for the UK?, 2012-13,
HC 371. In 2007 a private member's bill presented by Julia Goldsworthy
had proposed a Citizens' Convention drawn from all sections of
society to consider and make recommendation on the way in which
the UK is governed, which the Secretary of State would be required
to consider and take steps to implement: Citizens' Convention
Bill, 2006-07, HC 136. Back
See section 6, and Blackburn, Case Studies, U and V. Back
See Blackburn, Case Studies, D. Back
The content of these publications are discussed in the ancillary
paper, Literature Review. Back
For a detailed account see ancillary Case Studies, Case Study
C. See also Graham Zellick, The Law Commission and Law Reform
(1988); Michael Zander, The Law-Making Process (2004),
ch. 9; and Lord Justice Munby, Shaping the Law - The Law Commission
at the Crossroad (Denning Lecture, 2011). Back
See Blackburn, Case Studies, for further details. Back
Law Commission of England and Wales, 11th Programme, 330. Back
See for example R. Brazier, Constitutional Reform (3rd
ed., 2008), ch. 2. Back
See Blackburn, Case Studies, G. Back
See Blackburn, Case Studies, M, O and Q. Bodies of this
representative nature have been called either Assembly or Convention:
for example in Geneva and Iceland an Assembly, and in Ireland
a Convention. Back