The future of devolution after the Scottish referendum - Political and Constitutional Reform Contents


4  Devolution and the House of Commons

80. Speaking in Downing Street on 19 September, shortly after the announcement of the referendum result, the Prime Minister said:

    It is absolutely right that a new and fair settlement for Scotland should be accompanied by a new and fair settlement that applies to all parts of our United Kingdom. In Wales, there are proposals to give the Welsh government and Assembly more powers. And I want Wales to be at the heart of the debate on how to make our United Kingdom work for all our nations. In Northern Ireland, we must work to ensure that the devolved institutions function effectively.

    I have long believed that a crucial part missing from this national discussion is England. We have heard the voice of Scotland—and now the millions of voices of England must also be heard. The question of English votes for English laws—he so-called West Lothian question-requires a decisive answer.

    So, just as Scotland will vote separately in the Scottish Parliament on their issues of tax, spending and welfare, so too England, as well as Wales and Northern Ireland, should be able to vote on these issues and all this must take place in tandem with, and at the same pace as, the settlement for Scotland.[111]

81. While the Prime Minister's remarks indicated a willingness to review devolution settlements for Wales and for Northern Ireland, they were taken by many to mean that the further devolution to Scotland under the Smith Commission process would be linked to the timetable of progress in implementing changes to House of Commons procedures to achieve 'English votes for English laws'. The Leader of the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party, Ruth Davidson MSP, clarified the meaning of the Prime Minister's remarks in evidence to us:

    The Prime Minister has given both public assurance to the country and private assurance to me personally that looking at English votes for English laws will not affect the timetable for the Smith commission.[112]

This position was also confirmed by the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Scotland, Rt Hon David Mundell MP.[113]

82. The Government has nevertheless proceeded with work on introducing changes to the procedures of the House on 'English votes for English laws'. This formulation is a convenient shorthand for a procedure to resolve the conundrum most commonly known as the 'West Lothian question', namely the situation under devolution where a Member elected to represent a constituency in Scotland is able to vote on legislation affecting England only, whereas a Member with an English constituency is not able to vote on corresponding legislation in Scotland since the legislative competence has been devolved.[114]

83. Addressing the West Lothian Question was a commitment in the Coalition Agreement,[115] and a commission, chaired by Sir William McKay, was established in January 2012 with the remit "to consider how the House of Commons might deal with legislation which affects only part of the United Kingdom, following the devolution of certain legislative powers to the Scottish Parliament, the Northern Ireland Assembly and the National Assembly for Wales."[116]

84. In its report in July 2013, the McKay Commission recommended that the approach to procedural reform in the House of Commons should be founded on two principles, set out by Sir William in his memorandum to us:

·  decisions at UK level which have a separate and distinct effect for England should normally be taken only with the consent of a majority of Members for constituencies in England, obtained before the final decision on any relevant matter is made; and

·  Members representing all parts of the UK need to have the opportunity to participate in the final adoption of legislation, whatever its territorial effect.[117]

The effect of this approach would be that devolution for England "would be localised within the House of Commons, replicating in intention if not in detail statutory devolution in the rest of the UK."[118]

85. The McKay Commission produced a menu of proposals for procedural reform, inviting the Government to choose those which might best satisfy "the demand in England for a voice in the making of legislation." The proposals were not formally addressed by the Government until after the Scottish referendum.

86. In December 2014 the Leader of the House presented a Command Paper on The Implications of Devolution for England, which addressed, among other issues, the question of devolution and the House of Commons. Then paper set out a number of policy and technical choices related to the implementation of 'English votes for English laws', including how the principle of giving English MPs a greater say over English issues (or English and Welsh MPs a greater say over English and Welsh issues) could be achieved under Commons procedures, which legislation should be subject to such procedures (and how the determination should be made), and how a government might change its approach to legislation, particularly if it could not necessarily command a majority in England on an issue: for instance, whether Governments might have to implement legislation they disagreed with, or whether Governments might explore the scope for greater non-legislative activity.

87. The Government itself offered no view on the implementation of changes to Commons procedures, but published the proposals for implementation made by the Coalition parties. The Conservative Party published three options for consultation, and the Leader of the House has since set out the Conservative Party's preferred option.[119] The Liberal Democrat proposals differed from Conservative Party proposals largely in the reckoning of composition of any committees representing English opinion in the House: they have contended that allocation of seats on such committees should be in proportion to votes received by each party in the general election in England, rather than in proportion to seats won.[120] The Leader of the House has indicated his intention to publish draft Standing Orders illustrating his favoured option,[121] but a draft has not been published in time for us to consider it before Dissolution. Although proposals from the Labour Party were not published in the Government's report on the implications of devolution for England, Rt Hon Hilary Benn MP and Rt Hon Sadiq Khan MP have also called for English MPs to have a greater say over English laws. They called for one of the options set out by the McKay Commission—that there be a committee stage made up of only English MPs who would scrutinise and amend legislation that applies only to England—to be looked at, stating: "Done in the right way, this would be a sensible reform which would strengthen England's voice without ending up creating two classes of MP".[122]

88. The proposals announced by the Leader of the House differ from the McKay Commission proposals in one crucial respect: while the latter allow for English-only legislative proposals without the support of a majority of English members to proceed—at an acknowledged cost to the Government in political reputation and parliamentary time—the Leader's proposals enable English Members to veto England-only legislation with which they disagree.

Is procedural change necessary?

89. The Institute for Government told us that as far as MPs for Scottish constituencies are concerned it has, since 1999, been 'very rare' for their votes to make a difference on legislation which does not apply in Scotland, and suggested that pressure to introduce procedural change has never therefore achieved "significant momentum."[123] They did, however, indicate that conditions had changed: the Prime Minister's remarks on 19 September had created an "expectation of reform", the increase in powers to be devolved to the Scottish Parliament would increase the number of issues in England over which Scottish MPs had no direct interest; and recent surveys had indicated that English voters were not satisfied with current constitutional arrangements and favoured the introduction of 'English votes for English laws'. [124]

90. Sir William McKay noted the findings of his Commission on the issue of parliamentary majorities in the UK and in England:

    [E]ver since the First World War, the party or coalition forming the UK government has nearly always had a majority in England. The exceptions were the short-lived Parliaments of 1964-66 and February-October 1974. Secondly, there have been occasions where members of the governing party representing English seats voted against their front bench, which survived only on the votes of non-English Members. These too are rare. Finally, a party with a clear majority in England but without a majority in the UK might opt to form a minority government. Such circumstances have however never arisen.[125]

91. Professor Jim Gallagher, of Nuffield College, Oxford, thought that it was 'the right and proper thing' to find a way for English opinion could have a voice and a vote on English legislation, subject to two key principles: that the UK Parliament is the parliament of England, and that the government formed in the UK Parliament is the government of England.[126] He though the challenge would be to ensure that any proposal for English votes in the House of Commons was consistent with the Union and coherent with the UK's territorial constitution.[127]

92. In evidence we received, the Conservative Group of Cornwall County Council was strongly in favour of introducing English votes.[128] South East Strategic Leaders told us that "English votes for English laws […] in Parliament is an essential, but also a minimum next step" to devolution in England.[129]

93. Alexandra Runswick of Unlock Democracy told us that public attitudes to measures such as English votes for English laws was often favourable because the proposed measures seemed simple and fair, though the outcomes would not necessarily be what the public intended.[130]

Is procedural change desirable?

94. Objections we received to the implementation of procedural changes in the House of Commons fell into a number of categories.

95. Some considered that the introduction of a separate decision-making system on English-only legislation in the House of Commons risked establishing two classes of MP, an outcome the McKay Commission had been keen to avoid in its original proposals: this would especially be the case if English MPs had a veto over English-only legislation. Unlock Democracy suggested that in a situation where a UK government had a majority in the UK but not in England, this could "effectively establish a rival English government at Westminster […] the UK government would be able to deliver its policies in reserved policy areas, but would have to defer to the majority party in England on devolved issues. This would set up an English Parliament in all but name. […] English voters would not be able to hold the UK government and the English majority to account separately."[131] In cases where English MPs did not have a veto over legislation, a UK government without an English majority "would regularly need to overrule English MPs in order to ensure the effective delivery of its policies", leading for demands for greater powers for English MPs and "heighten[ing] separatist tendencies."

96. Some who favour greater devolution of powers to English localities from Westminster were wary of the proposals for changing Commons procedures, fearing that it would do nothing to devolve power away from London. The North East Party said that proposals for procedural change in the Commons "would compound our current difficulties […] doing nothing to address the remoteness of Government and Parliament from daily life in North East England."[132] The North East Chamber of Commerce thought that the question was "largely an irrelevance to the issue of North east economic growth".[133] Unlock Democracy thought that it was no substitute for "wider decentralisation of power within England",[134] and a submission from academics at York University and the University of Manchester argued that "an English Parliament (even within the confines of Westminster) would mean that without some form of proportional representation or wider forms of devolution, the cities of Northern England and elsewhere would find themselves governed by rulers they did not elect."[135] Willie Rennie, Leader of the Scottish Liberal Democrats, told us that procedural change at Westminster was no substitute for further devolution within England:

    We need to make sure we have a proper devolutionary system. […] Unless we can resolve that, it is difficult to see how you can get far-reaching change that will meet the needs and aspirations of people. I think they will be deeply disappointed if the only response in Westminster is to have EVEL based on first past the post. If that is the limit of the change, I think people will think, "Westminster has not got the message."[136]

97. The Mayor of London, Boris Johnson, submitted written evidence to us which stated "it is important that the debate around devolution does not entirely focus on the issue of English votes for English laws—while this is an issue that is worthy of serious discussion, it ultimately will not resolve the urgent need to devolve powers and freedoms to cities to allow them to grow."[137]

98. The McKay Commission report identified a number of practical challenges to the implementation of unsophisticated forms of "English votes for English laws", and other submissions to us focused on the practical difficulties of implementation. Unlock Democracy suggested that because of the operation of the Barnett formula, legislation in England which affected public spending levels in England would also affect public spending in the rest of the UK, limiting the scope of "English votes for English laws".[138] A similar conclusion was also drawn by the Justice Committee in the last Parliament, which observed that

    the current system of territorial financing in the UK post-devolution means that the levels of public finance decided for England determine levels of resource allocation to Scotland and Wales. […] [T]he system could be changed in order to remove this effect, [but] such a change would be a necessary pre-requisite to any system of English votes for English laws.[139]

99. Although the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Scotland, Rt Hon David Mundell MP, told us that "it is pretty obvious what pieces of legislation are essentially English or English and Welsh", the evidence before us indicates that the issue may not be so straightforward. We refer above to the complications relating to the operation of the Barnett formula which mean that many bills which appear on the face of it to be England-only have effects on the devolved nations. Professor Derek Birrell, of the University of Ulster, suggested that "total England-only territorial jurisdiction of legislation is somewhat rare", and that "frequently what appears to be largely England-only legislation contains a number of clauses that apply to Northern Ireland."[140] The Justice Minister of Northern Ireland, David Ford MLA, told us that:

    it is very difficult to see how you could have Bills that are [purely England-only], if nothing else because of financial implications. There will always be some implications that will flow from one region to another, especially if they are Westminster Bills that purport to only apply to England. Once you propose a change in the education system or the health system in England, it may technically only be applying in English facilities but financial implications will flow from that. […] There are a number of Bills in Westminster at the moment where relatively late amendments […] have put us into the position where we have had to consider parallel legislation here or LCMs [legislative consent motions] at very short notice. […] I am not entirely sure that those who work in the Home Office and the MoJ fully understand the consequences for Scotland and Northern Ireland about what they propose.[141]

100. Professor Charlie Jeffery, a member of the McKay Commission, has indicated that bills are often not drafted in clearly territorial terms, and that several changes upstream in the legislative process would be necessary to produce legislation which could be differentiated adequately for the purposes of determining an 'English law'.[142] One prerequisite would be establishing a separate legal jurisdiction for Wales—a matter now to be addressed under the Secretary of State for Wales's recent proposals for further devolution to the Assembly. Another is requiring Whitehall departments to be more systematic about identifying their policy responsibilities for England and for the UK, and to be clearer about the policy and legislative needs for England. Similarly, political parties contesting elections in English seats ought to be clearer about their policy priorities for England (as opposed to the UK).

Our view

101. Detailed and definitive proposals for implementation of English votes for English laws have not been made available to the House, or to this Committee, in time for any proper consideration in this Parliament. While the Leader of the House has now set out the scheme which he would like to implement, there has been no opportunity for the House to examine the means he proposes to give it effect. Any such proposals would have wide-ranging implications for many aspects of the House's business, and the procedural and practical implications would require detailed examination before implementation. We recommend that the Procedure Committee in the new Parliament give detailed scrutiny to the procedural and practical implications of any proposal to introduce 'English votes for English laws'.

102. Providing a means for English MPs alone to vote on legislation which has a separate and distinct effect on England now appears to be a political imperative, although evidence we have received indicates that for many citizens it is not a political priority.

103. As further competences are devolved to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, it is likely that more primary legislation to be passed at Westminster will apply to England only, and will be drafted to enable unambiguous certification as such. Nevertheless, the legislation for England may well have implications for the funding to be allocated to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland under the existing Barnett formula, and Members representing constituencies outside England will consider they are entitled to have their say. If any system of English votes for English laws is to be implemented, Government departments must provide comprehensive and unambiguous justification, in a memorandum accompanying a Bill, that primary legislation for England affects no jurisdiction other than England (or England and Wales).

104. All three major parties at Westminster now appear to be committed to introducing a form of 'English votes for English laws' in the new Parliament. The differences between the parties are around whether the procedure should involve a veto by English Members, and how the party proportion of seats on any committee of English Members should be determined. We note the proposals made by each of the major parties for implementation of English votes for English laws. The implementation of any proposals will be a matter for the new House, and such proposals may of course be varied in the light of that House's composition and the composition of the Government. It is not for us to seek to bind a new House; but we invite the new House, when examining any proposal to implement 'English votes for English laws', to consider the potential impact on the United Kingdom of a situation where an administration, in order to govern effectively, must demonstrate it has the confidence not only of the whole House but also of English Members.


111   Scottish Independence Referendum: statement by the Prime Minister, HM Government, 19 September 2014 Back

112   Q230 Back

113   Q579 Back

114   In this part a reference to English only legislation can be taken as a reference to legislation affecting only England and Wales, with corresponding effect on the Members entitled to vote on such legislation. Back

115   The Coalition: our programme for government, HM Government, May 2010 Back

116   Report of the Commission on the Consequences of Devolution for the House of Commons, The McKay Commission, July 2013; Sir William McKay (PRD 0073) Back

117   Sir William McKay (PRD 0073), paras 5 and 7 Back

118   Ibid., para 8 Back

119   The Implications of Devolution for England, Office of the Leader of the House of Commons, Cm 8969, December 2014, and speech by William Hague on English votes for English laws, 3 February 2015 Back

120   Implications of devolution for England, Office of the Leader of the House of Commons, Cm 8969, 16 December 2014 Back

121   Q572 Back

122   We need to give English MPs a greater say over English laws, PoliticsHome, 12 December 2014 Back

123   Institute for Government (PRD 0083) Back

124   Ibid Back

125   Sir William McKay (PRD 73) para 11 Back

126   Q68 Back

127   Q73 Back

128   Conservative Group on Cornwall Council (PRD 0025), para 1 Back

129   South East Strategic Leaders (PRD 0072), para 1.1.1 Back

130   Q117 Back

131   Unlock Democracy (PRD 0057), para 13 Back

132   North East Party (PRD 0038), para 14 Back

133   North East Chamber of Commerce (PRD 0044), para 16 Back

134   Unlock Democracy (PRD 0057), para 17 Back

135   Dr Sandra León, Professor David Richards and Professor Martin J Smith (PRD 0080), para 12 Back

136   Q285 Back

137   Mayor of London (PRD 0081) Back

138   Unlock Democracy (PRD 0057), para 16 Back

139   Justice Committee, Devolution: A Decade On, Fifth Report of Session 2008-9, HC 529, para 194 Back

140   Professor Derek Birrell (PRD 0062) Back

141   Qq447, 449 Back

142   "Thinking of England", Centre on Constitutional Change blog, 16 December 2014 Back


 
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Prepared 29 March 2015