Appendix: Government response
Government Responses to Conclusions
and Recommendations
[The Committee's conclusions and recommendations
are highlighted in bold]
1. We welcome the Government's agreement that
Departments should be alive to the advantages afforded by fixed-term
Parliaments. It is important that these are given active consideration
over the coming year, and that lessons learnt are carried forward
to the next Parliament. We also welcome the statement that Permanent
Secretaries are willing to meet us to discuss these issues further,
and look forward to holding a seminar with Permanent Secretaries
so that we can make progress on the recommendations set out in
this Report. (Paragraph 9)
2. Our evidence clearly shows that the establishment
of fixed-term Parliaments makes it easier for Governments to plan
for the medium-term. It might also facilitate better planning
over longer timeframes than a single five-year Parliament. (Paragraph
14)
3. The Government agrees with the Committee that
one of the benefits of the fixed Parliamentary term is the ability
to plan effectively, especially where plans depend upon legislation.
While the full consequences of the move to fixed terms can only
be assessed over time, the Government continues to consider how
greater certainty about the date of UK Parliamentary general elections
can assist with planning.
Legislative
Planning
4. A number of our witnesses argued that, in light
of the greater certainty about the date of the next general election,
the final year of the Parliament could be spent having a constructive
debate on long-term issues so as to inform policy formation. (Paragraph
21)
5. The establishment of fixed-term Parliaments
means that the Government can plan its legislative programme over
a full five-year term. This should mean that there is no need
for legislation to be rushed through Parliament in the first year,
and that Parliament is able to scrutinise legislation in the final
year without being held hostage by the threat of a general election.
The Minister for Government Policy told us that we would find
the legislative programme for the final year of this Parliament
"very serious and very full", while others witnesses
predicted that the programme might be lighter. We believe that
having a lighter legislative programme in the final year of the
Parliament should not be considered a bad thing. If there is a
lighter legislative programme, the Government could usefully spend
the time on implementation and review. (Paragraph 29)
6. Fixed Parliamentary terms enable the Government
to plan a full legislative programme for the final session of
the Parliament, with a reasonable degree of confidence. This has
benefits for the planning and management of the final session.
7. The legislative programme announced on 4 June
was a full programme that includes important Bills designed to
help deliver a stronger economy and a fairer society. In formulating
the programme the Government has sought to deliver important measures
which are needed to fulfil existing and new commitments, but also
to allow enough time for full Parliamentary scrutiny. Under this
Government much more time has been allowed for the House of Commons
to consider Bills at Report stage and the vast majority of Public
Bill Committees have finished early.
Pre-legislative
Scrutiny
8. We have previously stated that pre-legislative
scrutiny should be an integral and mandatory part of the consideration
of every bill, unless there is an accepted and pressing need for
immediate legislation. The ability of a Government to plan its
legislative programme over a full five years means that in future
Parliaments there will be no excuse for not submitting legislation
for pre-legislative scrutiny, unless there is an accepted and
pressing need for immediate legislation. The presumption should
be that legislation is published in draft for pre-legislative
scrutiny, and the Standing Orders should be amended to that effect.
(Paragraph 30)
9. We recommend that the Government take advantage
of having a full final year in which to pursue its legislative
programme by publishing new legislation in draft for pre-legislative
scrutiny, and ensuring there is sufficient time in both Houses
to examine in detail the legislation set out in the Queen's speech.
(Paragraph 31)
10. The fixed Parliamentary term facilitates better
Parliamentary scrutiny, giving more certainty about the likely
time available for a bill to progress through Parliament. The
Government has published more bills in draft for pre-legislative
scrutiny during this Parliament than any of its predecessors.
11. Two major Bills announced in the Queen's Speech,
the Modern Slavery Bill and the Recall of MPs Bill, have been
published for pre-legislative scrutiny. It was also announced
in the Queen's Speech that three further Bills would be published
in draft in the current session. However, pre-legislative scrutiny
is not the only way in which views can be sought on new legislation.
The policy contained in the new Bills has been the subject of
extensive public consultation, such as the measures in the Infrastructure
Bill on invasive non-native species which stemmed from a Law Commission
report, and the new reforms on private pensions which were subject
to a public consultation. The Government believes that a flexible
approach to the scrutiny of legislation best serves the interests
of both the House and departments and to enshrine a presumption
in Standing Orders would be both unnecessary and ineffective.
Ministers and officials of course work closely with stakeholders
during the development of policies prior to the introduction of
legislation.
12. In the final Session, the Government continues
to implement legislation from previous sessions and to facilitate
post-legislative scrutiny by select committees within a three
to five year period of Royal Assent. The Government believes that
the focus on implementation would be enhanced by further activity
from select committees on post-legislative scrutiny, particularly
as the majority of post-legislative memoranda produced by the
Government have not been examined by select committees.
Financial
Planning
13. We continue to recommend that the Government
should produce rolling five-year Spending Reviews, more closely
aligned to the term of a Parliament. By this we mean that the
Government should produce a firm Spending Review in the autumn
following the general election, covering the next three financial
years, together with an indicative spending review for the following
two financial years. In the third year of the Parliament, the
indicative spending review for the remaining two financial years
should be replaced with a firm Spending Review. (Paragraph 36)
14. We have been told that there needs to be a
secure basis for fiscal debate, especially in the final year of
a Parliament. We note that the OBR currently produces biannual
five-year forecasts for the economy and public finances, and annual
fiscal sustainability reports. (Paragraph 40)
15. It is in everyone's interests that the policy
of any party which might potentially form part of the Government
is properly thought through and preferably costed. We therefore
welcome the possibility of party policy being costed by an independent
body ahead of general elections. This would better inform the
electorate and should improve both the quality of debate in the
pre-election period, and policy formation itself. We note that
in the absence of a political consensus on this point, it is unlikely
that arrangements will be put in place ahead of the 2015 election.
(Paragraph 45)
16. The Government agrees that appropriate financial
planning is vital to enable the effective implementation of policy,
and has taken steps to ensure greater certainty for financial
planning over the course of this Parliament. Decisions about the
duration of the next and subsequent Spending Reviews will be a
matter for the government of the day.
17. By providing the Office for Budget Responsibility
(OBR) with a duty to produce the official economic and fiscal
forecasts, the Government has addressed a key weakness of the
past. However, to fulfil its role effectively the OBR must be
seen as impartial and independent. The OBR is a young organisation
that has yet to see an election. Requiring the OBR to cost political
parties' manifesto commitments would risk it being drawn into
the political debate, potentially undermining its perceived independence
and, by extension, the credibility of the UK's official forecasts.
Autumn Statement 2013 announced that, as required by legislation,
the OBR would launch an independent, external review of its publications
over the course of 2014. Following the outcome of this review,
the Government will hold its own review of the OBR at the start
of the next Parliament.
The
Length of the Parliamentary Term & the Operation of the Fixed-term
Parliaments Act 2011
18. It is likely that the benefits of greater
certainty about the date of the next general election will only
materialise if Parliaments do, in practice, last full five-year
terms. Although it is essential that it is possible for early
elections to be held in certain circumstances, it is generally
desirable that early elections be avoided for this reason. (Paragraph
49)
19. We recommend that the next Government considers
at an early stage how it can make most effective use of greater
certainty about the length of the Parliament. This should include
consideration both of the recommendations set out in this Report,
and of the operation of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 in
the final year of this Parliament. Such consideration could usefully
inform the next Government's plans for the 2015-20 Parliament,
and also serve as a prelude to the Committee the Prime Minister
is required to appoint in 2020, which will be tasked with reviewing
the operation of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act. (Paragraph 76)
20. The Government believes that there are advantages
to having certainty about when a Parliament will end, which is
why it brought forward legislation to set the duration of a Parliament.
The Government agrees that there may be circumstances in which
it is necessary for an early election to take place, which is
why the Act provides for early elections to be called if a motion
is agreed by at least two thirds of the House or without a division;
or if a motion of no confidence is passed and no alternative Government
is confirmed by the House of Commons within 14 days.
21. The Government believes that fixed-term Parliaments
provide a number of practical advantages to both Government and
Parliament as they give greater predictability and continuity,
enabling better long term legislative and financial planning.
To this end, the Government agrees that future governments should
consider how to make best use of the fixed Parliamentary term
and have regard to how the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 has
operated in the past. This will help inform wider considerations
about the operation of the Act, including those of the Committee
the Prime Minister is required to appoint to review the Act in
2020.
Pre-election
Contacts between Civil Servants and the Opposition
22. Pre-election contacts between the Civil Service
and Opposition are essential to ensure that both the Civil Service
and any parties that might be involved in forming a Government
after a general election are prepared for the possibility of a
change in Government. Now that the Fixed-term Parliaments Act
2011 has abolished the Prime Minister's prerogative to call an
election, there is no reason that the authority to decide when,
to whom, and in what way these contacts are conducted should be
retained by the Prime Minister. It is disappointing that the Prime
Minister has decided to limit pre-election contacts to the final
seven months of this Parliament, and that he did not wait to consider
either our views, or those of the Institute for Government, before
coming to this decision. (Paragraph 63)
23. In light of the greater certainty provided
by the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 about the date of the next
general election, we recommend that the arrangements for pre-election
contacts between the Civil Service and Opposition ahead of a general
election be formalised. After 2015 these contacts should be permitted
automatically in the last year of a Parliament, and the Cabinet
Manual should be updated to this effect. Ahead of the 2015 general
election, we suggest that further consideration be given to the
possibility of allowing pre-election contacts to begin immediately
after the European and local elections in May. (Paragraph 64)
24. Our inquiry has identified several points
where the guidance on pre-election contacts is either unclear
or is in need of revision as a result of both the Fixed-term Parliaments
Act 2011 and coalition government. The Cabinet Manual and Civil
Service Guidance should be updated in light of the points we have
outlined. (Paragraph 66)
25. The constitutional position is that the civil
service serves the Government of the day. The Fixed-term Parliaments
Act 2011 only acted to fix the date of UK Parliamentary general
elections. It did not otherwise affect the customary privileges
and powers of the Prime Minister.
26. Official contacts between the civil service and
the opposition parties have been authorised since 1964 and the
modern convention of authorising that contacts can take place
from sixteen months before the latest possible date for a General
Election has been in place since 1995. That convention was applied
up to the end of the 2005-2010 Parliament and reflected the need
to account for early general elections. There has not been a standard
length of time for pre-election contacts since its inception.
The introduction of fixed term Parliaments has of course meant
that the Prime Minister needed to consider what would be an appropriate
length of time for effective and meaningful contact. As the Minister
for Government Policy made clear in his letter to the Committee,
the Prime Minister felt that seven months was an appropriate period
of time, and in line with previous practice. The direction of
the civil service in this regard is a matter for the Prime Minister,
not for Parliament.
27. Advice is issued to permanent secretaries on
the operation of pre-election contacts before each general election
and will be issued again in due course. As Lord O'Donnell said
in his evidence to the Committee, we have not yet seen out a full
fixed-term Parliament, and it seems appropriate to wait until
we have before updating the Cabinet Manual on this issue. The
Directory of Civil Service Guidance will be revised to reflect
any changes in due course.
The
Impacts on Parliament
28. A House Business Committee would have come
into its own in the final year of a Parliament, by providing a
clear forum for consideration of how best House time could be
spent in the year ahead of a general election. Although the Government
has gone back on its promise to establish such a Committee, if
the Government could relax its control over House time in the
final year of the Parliament, it would be possible for there to
be a resurgence of debate in the House, led by backbenchers. We
accept of course that backbenchers will want to spend time in
the final year of a Parliament campaigning in their constituencies,
but we believe that there would still be interest in attending
debates, particularly if backbenchers were able to have greater
say over the topics chosen. (Paragraph 24)
29. Greater certainty about the date of the next
general election should enable Select Committees better to plan
their work over the course of a Parliament, and assess their effectiveness
as a Parliament comes to a close. (Paragraph 72)
30. As the final year of the current Parliament
approaches, we will be considering what we have achieved to date
this Parliament, and what we hope to do in the time remaining.
Other Committees may wish to do the same, and also consider how
their work could be passed forward to their successors in the
next Parliament. (Paragraph 73)
31. The Committee accepts that backbenchers will
want to spend time campaigning in their constituencies in the
final session of the Parliament, but also argues for more time
to be devoted to backbench business. The 2014-15 Session should
see a higher proportion of time being devoted to backbench business
than in previous sessions, given that the number of days is specified
in Standing Orders and the dates of the start and end of the Session
are now known. The choice of debates in backbench time is a matter
for the Backbench Business Committee, not the Government, so the
opportunity exists for debates to be focussed on the issues raised
by the Committee, if it makes a convincing case. It will be for
the Backbench Business Committee and others to review how effectively
the time is used in the final session of Parliament in the light
of experience and make recommendations for the future.
32. Whilst it is for select committees to plan their
future work, the Government agrees that the final session of a
Parliament presents an opportunity for them to review their effectiveness
and achievements against any objectives set at the start of the
Parliament and to seek to set an agenda for their successors.
In particular, the final session could be used to follow up earlier
inquiries and potentially conduct post- legislative scrutiny of
Acts passed in the first Session.
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