1 Performance and reporting
1. On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and
Auditor General, we took evidence from the Home Office (the Department)
about progress in reforming the UK border and immigration system.[1]
2. The Department took direct control of border and
immigration activities in March 2013 following the abolition of
the UK Border Agency (the Agency). The Home Secretary cited four
main issues that prompted the decision: the Agency's large size
which made it difficult to operate effectively and manage crises;
inadequate IT systems; the overly complex policy and legal framework
in which it operated; and a lack of transparency and accountability.[2]
3. Two new directorates were created within the Home
Office to handle the former Agency's work. UK Visas and Immigration
considers and concludes all applications to visit, study, work
and stay in the UK: in 2013-14 it processed some 3.5 million separate
applications for visas. Immigration Enforcement is responsible
for ensuring people who do not have a right to remain in the UK
depart.[3] A third directorate,
Border Force, which is responsible for maintaining the border
controls that are the first point of contact with the 100 million
individuals that arrive in the UK each year, had already been
split off from the Agency in March 2012.[4]
The Department plans in total to spend some £1.8 billion
on immigration and border operations in 2014-15.[5]
4. In 2012 the Department set up the 'Older Live
Cases Unit' to deal with some 400,000 pre-March 2007 asylum and
migration claims that were still in the system. This caseload
was reduced to 41,000 cases after a review which removed errors,
duplicates and individuals who had already left the country.[6]
The Department told us that the number of outstanding cases now
stood at 29,000, with a worrying 11,000 backlog cases where no
initial decision had been reached. The Department noted that it
was on track to make a decision on all of these 11,000 cases by
the end of 2014.[7]
5. The Department considered that there were two
main reasons why older asylum claims had not been resolved. First,
many of the applicants made further submissions based on changes
in their circumstances.[8]
Secondly, the Department told us it had inherited a very large
number of these asylum claims from the former Agency. However,
most of the staff now working in the Department had worked in
the Agency prior to the transfer.[9]
The delay in resolving asylum claims was also due in part to a
lack of incentives for caseworkers to work on claims once the
targets for how long an asylum decision should take were missed.[10]
6. The Department took over the Agency's work to
improve performance. But the Department is already missing its
new targets for processing new asylum claims. As a result, the
number of asylum claims awaiting an initial decision increased
by 70% to 16,273 in the first quarter of 2014 compared to the
same period in 2013.[11]
The Department admitted that the asylum system was under pressure
and attributed this in part to "an ill-judged decision"
in 2012 by the Agency, subsequently reversed by the Department,
to downgrade asylum caseworkers from Higher Executive Officer
(HEO) to Executive Officer (EO), which led to 120 HEOs leaving
the Department. The Department told us it wanted to recruit an
additional 400 staff to help deal with asylum cases.[12]
While it was not meeting its own internal targets for processing
asylum claims, the Department planned to do so by March 2015 for
all cases deemed 'workable' (those not blocked because a decision
cannot be made, for example if they are part of a criminal investigation).[13]
7. When the Department created the immigration directorates
it also created an independent performance directorate responsible
for producing reports required to track progress dealing with
immigration and asylum applications.[14]
The Accounting Officer noted that this new directorate provided
better management information than that available to his predecessors
and was confident that these management reports gave the Board
a "single version of the truth." However, the Department
admitted that it had not completely resolved data quality issues.
In April 2014 the Department conducted random checks on data stored
on the Casework Information Database and found basic data missing:
34% of sampled asylum cases did not have the minimum data required
at the decision stage, while 84% of removal cases did not have
the minimum data required to complete a removal (for example,
a correct address or postcode).[15]
Previous reports from this Committee have recommended that the
Department improve the quality of its case data and it is disappointing
to see there has not been more improvement.[16]
8. A major cause of poor data quality on individual
cases is the old-fashioned IT systems in use. The Department told
us that the planned Immigration Case Work (ICW) IT programme would
have allowed data on individual cases to be automatically aggregated
in management reports. However, as a result of the failure of
that project the Department has to continue to rely on existing
legacy IT systems to store case data and produce management reports.[17]
The lack of accurate and timely management data make it difficult
to hold the Department to account for its performance. In a subsequent
note provided after the evidence session, the Department still
did not provide information on the number of asylum claims in
the system that are not currently being worked on. They were still
unable to tell us the impact on asylum support costs of delays
in making initial decisions on asylum claims.[18]
9. The Agency had planned to reduce costs by £594
million between 2011-12 and 2014 -15. The Department told us that
£345 million of those savings had been delivered by the Agency
before it was abolished and the remaining £249 million savings
had subsequently been allocated across the new immigration directorates.[19]
However this had not been done by identifying specific efficiencies
and savings. Instead the budgets for each directorate had been
reduced. The Department admitted that its systems were not developed
enough to identify the impact of savings in specific business
areas. The Department also accepted it was not as efficient as
it should be and that it had not yet made adjustments to its business
processes to increase productivity and make savings.[20]
1 C&AG's Report, Reforming the UK Border and
immigration system, HC 445 Session 2014-15, 22 July 2014 Back
2
C&AG's Report, paras 1.4-1.5 Back
3
Qq 13-16, C&AG's Report, paras 1.4-1.9 Back
4
C&AG's Report, paras 2, 1.10, Figure 2 Back
5
C&AG's Report, para 4.3 Back
6
C&AG's Report, para 2.17 Back
7
Qq 6-8 Back
8
Qq 12, 23 Back
9
Qq 12-13 Back
10
Qq 20-21 Back
11
C&AG's Report, para 2.11 Back
12
Qq 3, 53-54, C&AG's Report, para 4.8 Back
13
Qq 9-10, 24-26 Back
14
C&AG's Report, paras 1.11, 3.8 Back
15
Qq 177-180, C&AG's Report, para 4.16 Back
16
Q 177, Committee of Public Accounts, Returning failed asylum
applicants thirty-fourth report of 2005-06, HC 620, 14 March
2006, Committee of Public Accounts, Immigration: the Points
Based System - Work Routes, thirty-fourth report of 2010-12,
HC 913, 17 May 2011 Back
17
Qq 177-178 Back
18
Written evidence from the Home Office to PAC, 12 September 2014,
p1 Back
19
Qq 158-161 Back
20
Qq 161-166 Back
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