2 Making sure the systems in place
are effective
22. Public Concern at Work told us that there is
often a gap between the quality of the whistleblowing policies
and how arrangements work in practice.[31]
The NAO had found that departments generally had adequate whistleblowing
policies in place that sought to reassure whistleblowers, and
that there were suitable governance systems to support these.
In recent years departments have improved their policies; for
example, more departments are using the good practice policies
produced by the Civil Service Employee Policy service.[32]
23. However, we heard little evidence that departments
had yet achieved the culture change that was needed to ensure
whistleblowing policies worked effectively. For example, Public
Concern at Work told us that most of the policies it had looked
at were overly legalistic, and that they were looking at the issue
from "the wrong end of the stick".[33]
The Department of Health told us that culture change was not achieved
overnight, and it admitted: "There is a huge amount more
that we need to do, particularly to enable employees in front-line
operations and providers to feel that the culture and leadership
in those organisations is one where they do feel more confident
about speaking up."[34]
24. Some departments acknowledged at our hearing
that they do not collect good quality intelligence in connection
with whistleblowing. We found, for example, that departments do
not record even the most basic information on whether whistleblowing
has been detrimental to an individual or damaging to their careers.
None of the departments could tell us how many whistleblowers
went on long-term sick leave after raising a concern. This indicator
is one that is used by the US Congress and by European institutions
to gauge whether arrangements are working appropriately.[35]
25. We also heard that departments were not making
best use of what whistleblowing intelligence is available, for
example, to help them identify systemic issues. Departments such
as the Department for Education and the Department of Health operate
in sectors comprising many organisations, such as schools, academies,
trusts, arm's-length bodies and regulators. Whistleblowers from
these organisations can be a vital source of intelligence for
the department as they provide a perspective that is not readily
available in other ways. This intelligence would help the departments
to identify areas that need further examination, for example by
highlighting a pattern of incidents occurring in a specific organisation,
or group of organisations, that is indicative of a wider issue.[36]
But the Department for Education told us that it does not collect
intelligence on whistleblowing issues that are resolved at an
individual school or academy level, and that it was unaware of
whether some academy chains have more whistleblowing cases than
others do. The Department argued that this approach was consistent
with its attempts to reduce the amount of information that it
collects from individual schools, and to create an education system
comprising autonomous institutions that are responsible for their
own management. However, this absence of intelligence creates
the risk that systemic issues will go undetected.
[37]
26. There is no-one with cross-government responsibility
for driving improvements in whistleblowing arrangements. There
are sources of advice and guidance on whistleblowing, but no organisation
has responsibility for challenging departments or for leading
change. This has led to inconsistencies in whistleblowing arrangements,
with the risk that policies will not necessarily be of sufficient
quality, standards may not be maintained, and good practice may
not be disseminated and acted on.[38]
27. Currently, responsibility for aspects of whistleblowing
arrangements is split across three organisations. The Civil Service
Employee Policy service has designed a good practice whistleblowing
policy that departments can adopt. But its role is discretionary
and confined to policy matters, and it does not have the authority
to mandate the use of its good practice policy. The Department
for Business, Innovation and Skills has responsibility for the
relevant legislation that provides protection for whistleblowers,
but its remit does not extend to the whistleblowing arrangements
within individual organisations. The Civil Service Commission
can receive whistleblowing concerns from civil servants, and also
provides advice on whistleblowing routes.[39]
28. HM Revenue & Customs told us that it had
benefited from the role of the Civil Service Employee Policy service,
and that the guidance it produces was useful. However, HM Revenue
& Customs also felt that it would be useful and appropriate
for organisations to be asked questions if they were not matching
up to best practice, something that does not currently happen.
It said, however, that such an approach should not be absolutely
rigid, as it would need to take account of the particular circumstances
of each organisation.[40]
29. In our previous report on special severance payments,
we recommended that the Cabinet Office issue revised guidance
requiring public sector organisations to seek approval from the
Cabinet Office for all special severance payments and associated
compromise agreements where they relate to cases of whistleblowing.[41]
The Government agreed with our recommendation, and stated that
Cabinet Office guidance would make it clear that settlement agreements
should not be used to terminate a person's employment relating
to cases of whistleblowing. The guidance would also include standard
wording on confidentiality clauses to make it clear that no provision
in the agreement or undertaking could prevent an employee from
whistleblowing. However the Government's response did not address
the point that public sector organisations should secure approval
from the Cabinet Office for all special severance payments and
associated compromise agreements where they relate to cases of
whistleblowing. The target of having the Cabinet Office guidance
in place by 1st April 2014 has also not been met, despite assurances
we had previously received.[42]
30. After our evidence sessions the Secretary of
State announced that Sir Robert Francis QC will lead an independent
policy review into whistleblowing and creating a culture of openness
and honesty in the NHS.[43]
31 Q 9 Back
32
C&AG's Report, paras 2.6, 4.3, 4.10, 4.17 Back
33
Q 1 Back
34
Q 41 Back
35
Qq 42, 44-46, 69 Back
36
Qq123-125, 129; C&AG's Report, para 3.14 and Figure 16 Back
37
Qq 47-49, 52, 62, 123-125 Back
38
Q 155; C&AG's Report, paras 5, 2.5 Back
39
C&AG's Report, paras 2.2-2.4 Back
40
Q 155 Back
41
Confidentiality Clauses and Special Severance Payments, Thirty-sixth
Report, Committee of Public Accounts, HC 477, Session 2013-14,
24 January 2014 Back
42
Treasury Minute, Government Response on the Thirty Sixth Report
from the Committee of Public Accounts, Session 2013-14, Cm 8847,
April 2014 Back
43
Letter from Una O'Brien dated 23 June 2014. Back
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