1 Planning for rail investment
1. Over the past 20 years or so the Government has
overseen several major programmes to improve UK rail infrastructure
and deliver improvements in transport benefits. Over the last
few years we have taken evidence on the Department's sponsorship
of five of these programmes: the modernisation of the West Coast
Mainline and the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (now known as High Speed
1), which are now complete; Crossrail and Thameslink which are
under construction; and High Speed 2, which is being planned.
These programmes include both new lines and upgrades to existing
lines and are all expensive. Costs range from £3.6 billion
for Thameslink and up to £50 billion for both phases of High
Speed 2. These rail infrastructure programmes also take a long
time to complete, with some taking nearly 30 years from planning
to completion, and construction alone taking up to 10 years.
2. The Department has faced a number of issues during
its sponsorship of these programmes. For example it faced challenges
such as setting out a clear case for investment, planning effectively,
and evaluating and realising programme benefits. The Department
is currently looking at further possible rail infrastructure programmes.
These include proposals for new routes to including another new
high speed line to link cities in the north of England, currently
known as High Speed 3, and Crossrail 2, which would be a new underground
line running north to south through London. On the basis of a
Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, which brought together
lessons from these programmes, we took evidence from the Department
for Transport on the steps it is taking to apply these lessons.[1]
3. The Department told us that it is a "long-term
planning business" and that in rail it is important to have
a portfolio of short, medium and long-term programmes to achieve
its objectives. The Department provided the Committee with examples
of work that is being carried out across the network in addition
to its major programmes, such as electrifying lines in the north
of England and buying new trains for the East Coast Mainline as
part of the Intercity Express Programme. However, it did not point
to a clear strategic vision for the railway, and did not provide
a clear explanation for how it prioritises programmes in which
it invests.[2]
4. We were concerned about the extent to which the
Department appears to treat rail programmes for particular routes
in isolation from each other. The Department is now putting together
a report about options for a high speed line between cities in
the north of England (currently known as High Speed 3), but it
appeared to us that High Speed 3 could have been considered alongside
High Speed 2, which is well into the detailed planning phase.
The Department explained that with High Speed 2 it has been focusing
on the key north to south routes that it claims are close to full
capacity and that, on the West Coast Mainline, traffic and passenger
volumes having trebled since completion of the West Coast Mainline
modernisation programme. However, the Department could not fully
explain why it had not considered High Speed 3 before, or at least
alongside, High Speed 2—despite High Speed 3 having the
potential to reduce demands on routes between the north and south,
and those demands having been relevant to the business case for
HS2. The Department acknowledged that there are interdependencies
between different programmes, and that there is the potential
for one project to impact on another, requiring the Department
to revisit and review the benefit-cost ratios of its programme.[3]
5. The Department is only now—with preparations
for High Speed 2 well underway—working with the Scottish
Government and HS2 Limited on the question of whether or not the
route should be extended to Scotland and, if not, how Scotland
may benefit from the new railway. The Department was hoping to
have the results of its appraisal of a range of options in the
summer of this year, but that has now been delayed.[4]
6. We are pleased to see that the Department is now
focusing on its role as sponsor of its major rail programmes,
rather than the deliverer, and that it is putting similar governance
arrangements in place on High Speed 2 to those on Crossrail. However,
we have reported before on the capability of the Department to
effectively sponsor its programmes.[5]
The Department told us that it understands the need to increase
its capability, and provided some examples of steps it has taken
in this regard.[6] For
example, it has set up a team to look specifically at joining
up the infrastructure, rolling stock and operational elements
of its rail programmes in major parts of the country.[7]
The Department also told us that it is recruiting from the industry
and has recently recruited staff from Network Rail and a train
operating company. In addition, it has started a commercial fast-track
scheme with which it aims to train graduates in the commercial
skills the Department needs.[8]
7. With several rail infrastructure programmes either
underway or proposed, the engineering industry also needs to have
the skills and capacity required to build them all in a similar
timeframe. Sir David Higgins, the Chair of HS2 Limited, has suggested
that High Speed 2 and High Speed 3 could be built at the same
time. When we asked whether the Department agreed with Sir David,
it told us that it would need to carry out further work to establish
whether it was feasible.[9]
The Department told us that the area in which there is the scarcest
resource is in signalling a crucial element of rail programmes.[10]
1 C&AG's Report, Lessons from major rail infrastructure programmes, Session 2014-15, HC 267, 29 October 2014 Back
2
Qq 18, 19, 30-31 Back
3
Qq 34, 73, 85, 100-101 Back
4
Qq 115-130 Back
5
Committee of Public Accounts, High Speed 2: a review of early progress, Session 2013-14, HC 478, 9 September 2013, paragraph 18, page 12 Back
6
Q 102 Back
7
Qq 96-97 Back
8
Qq 49, 110-112, 161 Back
9
Qq 98-99 Back
10
Q 102, 107 Back
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