



House of Commons  
Committee of Public Accounts

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# Strategic Flood Risk Management

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**Forty-eighth Report of Session 2014–15**

*Report, together with formal minutes relating  
to the report*

*Ordered by the House of Commons  
to be printed 16 March 2015*

## Committee of Public Accounts

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### Publications

The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including press notices) are on the internet at [www.parliament.uk/pac](http://www.parliament.uk/pac). A list of Reports of the Committee in the present Parliament is at the back of this volume. Additional written evidence may be published on the internet only.

### Committee staff

The current staff of the Committee is Sarah Petit (Clerk), Claire Cozens (Committee Specialist), James McQuade (Senior Committee Assistant), Sue Alexander, Jamie Mordue and Jim Camp (Committee Assistants) and Janet Coull Trisic (Media Officer).

### Contacts

All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk, Committee of Public Accounts, House of Commons, 7 Millbank, London SW1P 3JA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 4099; the Committee’s email address is [pubaccom@parliament.uk](mailto:pubaccom@parliament.uk)

# Contents

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<b>Report</b>	<i>Page</i>
<b>Summary</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Introduction</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Conclusions and Recommendations</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>1 Funding for flood risk management</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>2 Working with partners</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>Formal Minutes</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>Witnesses</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>Published written evidence</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament</b>	<b>17</b>

## Summary

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Given financial constraints, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (the Department) and the Environment Agency (the Agency) have done a good job in improving the cost effectiveness of their approach to flood risk management. They have adopted rational methods to prioritise spending on both new capital flood defences and maintaining existing ones. However, risks remain to the sustainability of current levels of flood protection. The Agency will need to make difficult decisions about how it prioritises its maintenance budget, including some defences where it will need to reduce or stop maintenance. In these cases, there is a risk that lack of maintenance will mean that capital costs are incurred sooner, when defences require replacement earlier. Since our evidence session, the Agency has published a long term investment strategy, which presents a number of flooding scenarios and outlines how much funding would be needed to protect against these.

## Introduction

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The Environment Agency (the Agency) estimates that 1 in 6 homes in England are at risk of flooding from coastal, river and surface water. Climate change means that the weather is becoming more unpredictable, leading to increased risk of severe weather. Effective flood risk management is important so that the country is in the best position to protect against these risks, and to safeguard homes, communities, businesses and infrastructure. The Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs (the Department) has national policy responsibility for flood risk management and the Agency has a strategic overview role and is responsible for the management of flood risk from main rivers and the sea. There are many other bodies with responsibilities for flood risk management, including local authorities. In 2014–15, the Department provided £795 million for flood risk management, which included £180 million of the £270 million additional funding following the winter floods. Excluding this additional money, funding for managing flood risk fell in cash terms from 2010–11 to 2013–14; by 18% for capital spending and 10% for revenue spending.

## Conclusions and Recommendations

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1. **There are major risks to the sustainability of current levels of flood protection, which could impact on long-term value for money.** The current capital budget for flood risk management has been approved for a 6 year period from 2015, which enables the Agency to plan and programme work on a long-term basis and negotiate lower unit costs with contractors. But the revenue budget, which funds the flood defence maintenance programme, is only approved on an annual basis. Longer term settlements from HM Treasury for the revenue budget would provide more certainty over the availability of funding, allowing the Agency to plan with certainty and secure savings. The Agency has shown its ability to secure these efficiencies, both in capital construction and on maintenance for the Thames Estuary, where the Agency was able to take a longer term approach. The effects of climate change heighten the importance of being able to plan for the longer term effects of flooding.

*Recommendation: The Department should work with HM Treasury on lengthening the budget settlements for revenue funding, so that the Agency and others can plan for the longer term. The Agency's new long term investment strategy should be used as a basis to negotiate future settlements.*

2. **Reducing the spend on maintaining some flood defences may be a false economy, as additional spending could be needed if those defences then fail earlier than they would otherwise have done.** The Agency has a rational approach to prioritise where it spends its money on maintenance. It has introduced an annual exercise to identify the maintenance needed for flood defences in each area, and it prioritises maintenance work based on a calculation of economic benefit relative to cost. Some defences will have their maintenance needs met in full and others, where the benefit is less, will have 'minimal' maintenance. In some cases, the Agency will decide not to

maintain defences at all. However, reducing the maintenance on flood defences in order to save revenue funding may mean that capital work is required sooner than originally anticipated, as defences deteriorate faster where maintenance is reduced.

**Recommendation:** *The Agency should review what impact its decisions on reducing or stopping maintenance will have on longer term value for money.*

3. **There is a lack of transparency around the consequences of allowing some defences to fail.** The Agency has to make difficult decisions about where to fund in full, in part or stop maintaining flood defences. In 10 areas it has handed over maintenance responsibility for defences to local communities. In some cases the Agency has not been as clear as it could be with communities on the reasons behind changes to maintenance regimes and what the implications are for those living locally. Communities will also need to understand the likely effect, should, in future, the Agency deem a flood defence to be uneconomic, or de-prioritise it for maintenance.

**Recommendation:** *The Agency should be open and transparent with local communities and communicate clearly to them the consequences of the difficult decisions it has to make around prioritising maintenance, even allowing for the local pressure this may bring.*

4. **The approach to accessing partnership funding does not yet have the strategic focus needed to match government's ambitions for it.** Central government cannot fund all flood defence schemes. By the end of March 2015, the Department's partnership funding programme—designed to increase investment for capital flood defence projects from outside of central government—was expected to have attracted an estimated additional funding of £140 million since 2011. This funding has allowed more projects to be delivered and several to go ahead which would not have otherwise, such as the Morpeth Flood Alleviation Scheme. However, the Department did not set a target for how much funding it would achieve at the outset of the programme, and lacks data on the potential funding levels against which to judge whether the £140 million figure is good or bad, high or low. From 2015, as a condition of its funding, HM Treasury has set the Department a target that a minimum of 15% of all funding comes from partnership funding sources, which will be a significant step up.

**Recommendation:** *The Department and the Agency should implement a clear strategy for accessing partnership funding, which should include understanding what best practice looks like, so the lessons from successful schemes can be applied elsewhere.*

5. **The Agency could do more to share flood modelling information so there is a consistent view at a local level of flood risk.** In 2009, the Agency set up the Flood Forecasting Centre as a joint collaboration with the Met Office. Data from the Centre allows the Agency to provide effective early warnings and advance support to local

bodies and communities. We recognise that the Agency has improved its flood modelling and continues to work to improve both the data and the way it is presented. However, information from other partners, such as the insurance industry and local authorities, could be used to provide better local data, which could be shared more widely with all interested parties.

**Recommendation:** *The Agency should work with partners to build on the sophistication of flood modelling data, so stakeholders can have a shared view of flood risk, both nationally and locally.*

- 6. Local authority flood strategies are crucial to the success of flood risk management, but a very significant number are incomplete.** The Flood and Water Management Act of 2010 put more responsibilities on local authorities to address flood risk in their areas. As part of this strategy, lead local authorities were supposed to produce a strategy, outlining how flood risk will be managed in their areas. However, by March 2014 only 16% of local authorities had a flood strategy in place. The Department has no powers to mandate that these strategies are produced by a particular time. The Minister of State, in conjunction with the Local Government Association, wrote in July 2014 to all local authorities outlining that he would like to see progress by the end of 2014. The lack of local strategies creates a risk that planning decisions will not be informed by the local flood strategy and therefore may run counter to effective flood risk management.

**Recommendation:** *The Department should use all opportunities available—including working with the Department for Communities and Local Government—to ensure a complete set of plans is in place at local authority level as soon as possible.*

- 7. There is a lack of public awareness of the realities of flood risk management.** The Flood and Water Management Act also placed responsibilities on local landowners and third parties to maintain flood defences. However, what constitutes a flood defence may not be obvious to the landowner; for example, a boundary wall in a garden. Its removal may affect not only the property in question but others around it during times of flooding. Because of this, the Agency is working on a pilot scheme in the Midlands to help landowners understand what their responsibilities are in relation to the flood defences that are on their property or land.

**Recommendation:** *The Agency should consider how to improve the understanding of third parties who have responsibilities for flood defences. It should be more explicit about the realities of flooding and the impact of the choices that are made in removing flood defences.*





# 1 Funding for flood risk management

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1. On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (the Department) and the Environment Agency (the Agency) about strategic flood risk management in England.<sup>1</sup>
2. Some 5 million properties in England—1 in 6—are at risk of flooding. Of these, 2.4 million are at risk of flooding from rivers or the sea and 3 million are susceptible to surface water flooding. The 2012 Climate Change Risk Assessment reported that climate change will significantly increase flood risk in the UK. The government expects changes in the coming decades will include rising sea levels, increased rainfall and a higher frequency of severe weather events.<sup>2</sup> In 2013, the risk of flooding from the coast was one of the highest priority risks on the National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies.<sup>3</sup>
3. The Department has policy responsibility for flooding. At a national level, the Agency is responsible for managing flood risk, with lead local flood authorities and other bodies responsible for managing risk locally. These include regional flood and coastal committees, that ensure plans are in place to identify, communicate and manage flood risks across catchments and shoreline areas. Internal drainage boards are responsible for water-level management in low-lying areas.<sup>4</sup>
4. In 2014–15, the Department provided £795 million for flood risk management to the Agency and other local bodies, which included £180 million of the additional £270 million it allocated following the winter floods of 2013–14.<sup>5</sup> The Department and Agency told us that the additional funding allowed them to respond quickly to events, and to begin restoring the condition of flood defence assets.<sup>6</sup>
5. The Agency's 2009 Long Term Investment Strategy set out that in order to maintain the current level of flood protection, total funding would need to increase by £20 million in current prices every year until 2035.<sup>7</sup> However, the C&AG's report noted that between 2010–11 and 2013–14, funding for managing flood risk has fallen by 18% for capital and 10% for revenue in cash terms, excluding the extra allocations given for the repair of damage following the winter floods of 2013–14.<sup>8</sup>
6. In December 2014, after our evidence session, the Agency published an update of its 2009 strategy. The new strategy outlines that the optimal investment levels for first 10 years

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1 [C&AG's Report, \*Strategic Flood Risk Management, Session 2014–15, HC 780, 5 November 2014\*](#)

2 [C&AG's Report, para 1.1 and 2.16](#)

3 [Cabinet Office, \*National risk register of civil emergencies 2013 edition, 2013\*](#)

4 [C&AG's Report, para 1.2 and Figure 2](#)

5 [C&AG's Report, para 2.2 and Figure 8](#)

6 [Q 70](#)

7 [C&AG's Report, para 2.8](#)

8 [C&AG's Report, para 2.2 and Figure 8](#)

will be around £750 to £800 million a year in current prices. The Agency expects this to rise to £850 to £900 million a year for the 2020–2040 period.<sup>9</sup>

7. From 2015–16, HM Treasury has agreed a 6-year settlement of £2.3 billion for the capital flood risk management budget.<sup>10</sup> The Department and Agency told us that long term settlements help them to plan their work and ensure long-term value for money. For example, the Agency told us that in 2012 it had implemented a new long term construction framework contract which has reduced unit costs compared to its previous contract.<sup>11</sup>

8. However, the revenue budget settlement is agreed by HM Treasury on an annual basis and can only be planned as far as the end of the current cross-government spending period. This limits the Agency's ability to take a long term approach to planning and procuring maintenance, which is funded from the revenue budget. The Agency told us that a longer term settlement for revenue would enable it to drive efficiencies by planning work over a longer period, as it is doing for capital construction. In the case of Thames Estuary Phase 1 maintenance programme, the Agency was able to plan maintenance work over a longer period because the extent of the benefits give the programme a persistently high priority. The Agency is confident it will secure better value for money by providing certainty to the contractor and leveraging economies of scale.<sup>12</sup>

9. The Agency told us that, in response to financial constraints, it has carried out an efficiency exercise and is on track to meet a 15% cost reduction target by the end of the current spending review period. It has made savings from its capital construction programme totalling £44 million which it has reinvested back into the flood risk management programme.<sup>13</sup>

10. However, the Agency has limited resources, and must make difficult decisions about what it can and cannot fund. On maintenance—where the C&AG's report noted that funding declined by 6% in real terms between 2010–11 and 2014–15—the Agency supports these decisions with a process that prioritises funding according to area.<sup>14</sup> It told us that the exercise is undertaken annually, and combines data on the benefits provided in a given area with the maintenance needs of each flood defence.<sup>15</sup> The Agency then ranks areas according to cost-benefit ratio. It uses this ranking to decide whether to fund an area's defences to a 'minimum' level (which only addresses statutory requirements) or to meet

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9 [Q 12, Environment Agency, \*Flood and coastal erosion risk management, Long-term investment scenarios \(LTIS\) 2014, December 2014\*](#)

10 [Q 1; C&AG's Report, para 16](#). Since the hearing, this settlement has been included in the National Infrastructure Plan [HM Treasury, \*National Infrastructure Plan 2014, December 2014, para 9.A\*](#)

10 [Qq 9, 11](#)

11 [Qq 19, 21](#)

12 [Qq 9–11](#)

13 [Qq 12, 16; C&AG's Report para 2.3](#)

14 [C&AG's Report, Paras 2.3, 2.11](#)

15 [Q 17; C&AG's Report, para 2.5](#)

‘identified needs’ through pro-active maintenance. As of August 2014, around half of all asset systems were on a ‘minimum’ regime.<sup>16</sup>

11. Whilst the Agency’s prioritisation exercise is a robust way of rationing a limited revenue budget, it may have an adverse effect on the total budget in the future. This is because flood defences maintained only to a minimal level may need repair or replacement sooner because they are not pro-actively maintained—thus bringing forward future capital expenditure.<sup>17</sup> The Agency told us that some of the assets in these areas are uneconomic so may not be replaced; however, many are simply deprioritised for maintenance reasons. The Agency recognises that in these cases it might have to spend money reinstating defences sooner where a ‘minimum’ regime is in place.<sup>18</sup>

12. In a small number of cases, the Agency is looking to stop maintaining flood defences because it considers they provide insufficient benefit compared to the cost of maintenance. Where the Agency identifies defences as uneconomic, it will discuss this with local partners who may be in a position to take responsibility. The Agency told us that it has identified around 60 areas where it hopes to relinquish its maintenance responsibilities. In 10 areas it has come to an agreement with local authorities, landowners or farmers to take on the maintenance of those defences and is currently in discussions in the remaining 50 locations.<sup>19</sup>

13. The Agency stated that for these locations, the decision to cease maintenance is categorical and the choice given to communities—between taking on maintenance and having the assets unattended—is clear. The C&AG’s report notes the potential for community and political pressure to play a part in such situations.<sup>20</sup>

14. As well as maintenance ceasing altogether, communities may also experience reductions in maintenance regimes because of efficiency measures (such as reducing grass cutting) or because maintenance has been deprioritised in their area (as described above).<sup>21</sup> The C&AG’s report found that while the Agency has engaged extensively with communities, there were some cases in which it could have managed expectations better by providing more clarity about the nature and impact on any changes to maintenance regimes.<sup>22</sup>

15. In 2011, the Department introduced a new partnership funding model which aimed to increase investment for capital flood defence projects from outside of central government. By the end of March 2015, the Department estimates that it will have attracted additional funding of some £140 million into flood defence projects.<sup>23</sup> The Department told us that

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16 [Q29](#)

17 [Q 18](#)

18 [Qq 53, 72](#)

19 [Q 53](#)

20 [C&AG’s Report, Para 30](#)

21 [Q 72](#)

22 [C&AG’s Report, Para 3.19](#)

23 [Q 61; C&AG’s Report, Para 2.20 – 2.22](#)

partnership funding has changed the way in which local partners now consider flood defence schemes and how they are funded, with an increased awareness that central government cannot afford to fund all schemes. The Agency considers that partnership funding can have a significant effect on discussions at a local level, increasing the ownership taken by areas in finding solutions for their flood risk.<sup>24</sup>

16. The Department told us that partnership funding has helped bring forward more flood defence projects and that it may have helped increase the total number of projects by up to 25%. This includes projects which have been funded and delivered which would not have otherwise attracted funding, such as the Morpeth Flood Alleviation Scheme, which was one of the first to be delivered under the partnership funding programme.<sup>25</sup>

17. The Department considers that the partnership funding programme has been a success, but as it did not set a target at the outset for what level of additional contributions it expected, it cannot say whether the estimated £140 million raised is good or bad, high or low. It does not have enough data on which to base an informed view of how much partnership funding it could potentially raise.<sup>26</sup> The Department told us that it recognises the need to improve the data it collects about projects being run by other bodies. However it has been restricted from requesting this data because of an agreement with the Department for Communities and Local Government to reduce burdens on local authorities.<sup>27</sup>

18. The Department and Agency have started to learn from their experiences in the early years of the partnership funding model. An important part of this has been the consideration of the incentives for both public and private sector bodies to invest in schemes.<sup>28</sup> HM Treasury has instructed the Department that a minimum of 15% of all funding be from partnership funding sources, which the Agency told us equates to around £350 million.<sup>29</sup> Since our evidence session, HM Treasury has published the National Infrastructure Plan, which outlines a target of £600 million to be achieved from local contributions.<sup>30</sup> This corresponds to what the Agency had told us—that considerably more contributions above the 15% target would be needed to deliver the flood risk management programme.<sup>31</sup>

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24 [Qq 31, 64](#)

25 [Q 61; C&AG's Report, Para 2.24 and Case Study pages 36–37](#)

26 [Qq 61–63](#)

27 [Q 94; C&AG's Report, Footnote 23](#)

28 [Q 64](#)

29 [Q 29](#)

30 [HM Treasury, National Infrastructure Plan 2014, December 2014, para 9.6](#)

31 [Q 29](#)

## 2 Working with partners

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19. The Agency takes a risk based approach to flood risk management. To inform its assessments of risk, it has developed a number of models which help predict where and how severe flooding might occur. Since we last reported in 2011, the Agency has made improvements in the way it presents its data, making it more consistent and clear as well as publishing its flood maps online for public use. The C&AG's report noted that the Agency has improved the way it presents flood modelling data, and has committed to more improvements in both sophistication and ease of use.<sup>32</sup>

20. The Agency told us that it works with the Met Office closely through the Flood Forecasting centre. This joint unit, set up in 2009, provides weather data to feed into the Agency's flood risk models. For example, the Met Office provides rainfall predictions which inform the Agency's hydraulic models; these models analyse patterns of water drainage in an area, and are used to help predict where flooding may occur. The Agency uses this analysis to provide warnings and advice to local communities to help them prepare for potential flooding.<sup>33</sup>

21. The Agency gave us an example of how predictive models have helped communities to take action against flooding. During the east coast tidal surge in winter 2013/14, the highest such surge for more than 60 years, the Flood Forecasting Centre provided weather and sea level forecasts, based on tide and weather conditions. Using this data, the Agency was aware some 6 days ahead that the surge was likely to be substantial. As a result it put local authorities and emergency services on alert days ahead of the event.<sup>34</sup> The information was also provided to local bodies and the public through a series of flood warnings focusing on specific areas, which significantly aided the evacuation of people in affected areas.<sup>35</sup>

22. The Agency told us it also works closely with local authorities to manage flood risk.<sup>36</sup> Under the 2010 Flood and Water Management Act, some local authorities are designated 'lead local flood authorities' and have increased responsibilities. Specifically, the Act requires these local authorities to develop and consult on a local flood strategy, maintain a register of flood risk assets and manage flood risk from surface water, ground water and ordinary water courses.<sup>37</sup>

23. The Agency and the Department have provided support to local authorities to assist them in delivering their flood strategies, in the form of workshops, training courses and secondments.<sup>38</sup> The Department and the Agency told us that this support has been well

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32 [C&AG's Report, Paras 3.2 and 3.3](#)

33 [Q 55-56; C&AG's Report, Para 3.7](#)

34 [Q 55](#)

35 [Q 58](#)

36 [Qq 2, 33](#)

37 [C&AG's Report, Para 3.16](#)

38 [Q 93](#)

received, and that it has helped to build the capacity of local authorities to deliver their flood risk commitments.<sup>39</sup>

24. However, many local authorities are falling short of the expectations enshrined in the new Act—as of March 2014, only 16% had a flood strategy in place.<sup>40</sup> Whilst the Act requires local authorities to produce a strategy, there is no deadline for completion and the Department has no powers to mandate their delivery by a specific date.<sup>41</sup> These delays create a risk that local decision making will lack strategic direction and may undermine the broader aims of the local authority and effective flood risk management. For example, planning decisions on new development may not take adequate account of the impact on surface water risk of building over ground previously used for drainage.<sup>42</sup>

25. In July 2014, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Water, Forestry, Rural Affairs and Resource Management wrote jointly with the Local Government Association to encourage local authorities to progress with their strategies, with the aim of putting them out to consultation or to be published by the end of 2014. The Department and Agency's expectation is that significant advances will have been made by the next time progress is reported to Parliament in March 2015.<sup>43</sup>

26. The Agency is responsible for the maintenance of only 45% of all flood defences. The rest are the responsibility of local authorities, internal drainage boards and private landowners. The Act has placed greater responsibilities on local landowners and third parties in maintaining flood defences which are located on their land or property. However, the Agency told us that in some cases there is still a lack of awareness over who is responsible for managing and maintaining flood defences, and what these responsibilities entail.<sup>44</sup>

27. This lack of awareness can have serious consequences. The Agency shared an example of where a landowner removed an earth bund and a flood bank as part of the property's improvement, as they had no idea these were acting as a flood defence.<sup>45</sup> The Agency is currently working on a pilot scheme in the Midlands to assist landowners in understanding their responsibilities relating to flood defences, and their awareness of what constitutes a flood defence on their land.<sup>46</sup>

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39 [Q 9; C&AG's Report, Para 3.15](#)

40 [Q 86; C&AG's Report, Para 3.16](#)

41 [Q 89](#)

42 [Q 37](#)

43 [Q 88](#)

44 [Qq 65–68](#)

45 [C&AG's Report, Para 3.10](#)

46 [Q 65](#)

# Formal Minutes

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**Monday 16 March 2015**

Members present:

Mrs Margaret Hodge, in the Chair

Mr Richard Bacon  
Guto Bebb  
Meg Hillier  
Stewart Jackson

Dame Anne McGuire  
Austin Mitchell  
John Pugh

Draft Report (*Strategic flood risk management*), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

*Ordered*, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 27 read and agreed to.

Conclusions and recommendations agreed to.

Summary agreed to.

*Resolved*, That the Report be the Forty-eighth Report of the Committee to the House.

*Ordered*, That the Chair make the Report to the House.

*Ordered*, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No. 134.

[Adjourned till Monday 23 March at 3.00 pm]

## Witnesses

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The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the Committee's inquiry page at [www.parliament.uk/pac](http://www.parliament.uk/pac).

**Monday 24 November 2014**

*Question number*

**Bronwyn Hill**, Permanent Secretary, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs; **Paul Leinster**, Chief Executive, Environment Agency; and **David Rooke**, Executive Director, Environment Agency

[Q1-96](#)

## Published written evidence

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The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the Committee's inquiry web page at [www.parliament.uk/pac](http://www.parliament.uk/pac). SFR numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.

- 1 Department For Environment, Food And Rural Affairs ([SFR0001](#))



# List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

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All publications from the Committee are available on the Committee's website at [www.parliament.uk/pac](http://www.parliament.uk/pac).

The reference number of the Government's response to each Report is printed in brackets after the HC printing number.

## Session 2014–15

First Report	Personal Independence Payment	HC 280
Second Report	Help to Buy equity loans	HC 281
Third Report	Tax reliefs	HC 282
Fourth Report	Monitor: regulating NHS Foundation Trusts	HC 407
Fifth Report	Infrastructure investment: impact on consumer bills	HC 406
Sixth Report	Adult social care in England	HC 518
Seventh Report	Managing debt owed to central government	HC 555
Eighth Report	Crossrail	HC 574
Ninth Report	Whistleblowing	HC 593
Tenth Report	Major Projects Authority	HC 147
Eleventh Report	Army 2020	HC 104
Twelfth Report	Update on preparations for smart metering	HC 103
Thirteenth Report	Local government funding: assurance to Parliament	HC 456
Fourteenth Report	DEFRA: oversight of three PFI waste projects	HC 106
Fifteenth Report	Maintaining strategic infrastructure: roads	HC 105
Sixteenth Report	Early contracts for renewable electricity	HC 454
Seventeenth Report	Child maintenance 2012 scheme: early progress	HC 455
Nineteenth Report	The centre of government	HC 107
Twentieth Report	Reforming the UK Border and Immigration System	HC 584
Twenty First Report	The Work Programme	HC 457
Twenty Second Report	Out-of-hours GP services in England	HC 583
Twenty Third Report	Transforming contract management	HC 585
Twenty Fourth Report	Procuring new trains	HC 674
Twenty Fifth Report	Funding healthcare: making allocations to local areas	HC 676
Twenty Sixth Report	Whole of government accounts 2012–13	HC 678
Twenty Seventh Report	Housing benefit fraud and error	HC 706
Twenty Eight Report	Lessons from major rail infrastructure programmes	HC 709
Twenty Ninth Report	Managing and removing foreign national offenders	HC 708
Thirtieth Report	Managing and replacing the Aspire contract	HC 705
Thirty First Report	16- to 18-year-old participation in education and training	HC 707
Thirty Second Report	School oversight and intervention	HC 735
Thirty Third Report	Oversight of the Private Infrastructure Development Group	HC 675

Thirty Fourth Report	Financial sustainability of local authorities 2014	HC 833
Thirty Fifth Report	Financial Sustainability of NHS Bodies	HC 736
Thirty Sixth Report	Implementing reforms to civil legal aid	HC 808
Fortieth Report	Excess Votes 2013–14	HC 1046
Forty First Report	Financial support for students at alternative higher education providers	HC 811
Forty Second Report	Universal Credit: progress update	HC 810
Forty Third Report	Public Health England's grant to local authorities	HC 893
Forty Fourth Report	Children in Care	HC 809
Forty Fifth Report	Progress in improving cancer services and outcomes in England	HC 894
Forty Sixth Report	An update on Hinchingsbrooke Health Care NHS Trust	HC 971