The effective management of tax reliefs - Public Accounts Contents


2  Monitoring and reporting the cost and impact of tax reliefs

10. HMRC told us that there were various influences on the costs of tax reliefs that meant that simply thinking that an increase in cost was either a sign of abuse or a sign of a lack of accountability was problematic. HMRC believed it should be held accountable for watching these things and providing advice but considered that tax reliefs should not be seen as the same as spending. HMRC accepted that it should make enquiries into unexpected increases in the costs of tax reliefs and noted that changes in cost had driven it to investigate whether there was abuse in Seafarers' Earnings Deduction. HMRC considered that its risk approach worked successfully but accepted it should be more systematic in using cost data to monitor tax reliefs.[11]

11. The National Audit Office found that there was a difference of around £2 billion between HMRC's forecasts of the costs of Entrepreneurs' relief after adjusting for the changes to the scope of the relief and the actual cost. HMRC told us that a significant element of the cost variation was as a result of multiple changes in the scope of the relief. HM Treasury told us that this was a highly uncertain area. There was no quantified measure of how much investment there should be or how many people should be impacted.[12]

12. We asked HMRC whether, given the significant sums involved, Entrepreneurs' relief was value for money. HMRC told us it had no evidence to suggest that there was systematic abuse of Entrepreneurs' relief and no evidence to suggest that Parliament's intentions were not being achieved. We asked whether HMRC could provide positive assurance that there was no systematic abuse. HMRC offered to seek more positive assurance.[13]

13. The National Audit Office reported that HMRC had detected large scale abuse of Share Loss Relief in 2006-07 but did not monitor changes in the use of the relief until 2013. In 2006-07 the cost of share loss relief claims against income tax rose from £385 million to £1,206 million, but this was not calculated by HMRC until 2013 and was not published until the details were included in the National Audit Office's report. We asked the Departments why they had not published this cost data sooner. HMRC told us it had not done so because it did not think it was sufficiently accurate to publish. HMRC noted that it knew the value of the share losses on which relief was claimed, but could not estimate the amount of tax relief that flowed from that because there were so many variables it would have to look on a case-by-case basis to calculate the amount involved. In response to our concern that such technical issues needed to be resolved to provide proper accountability to Parliament for the relief, HMRC noted that they were now monitoring Share Loss Relief more closely as it was now subject to an annual cap introduced in 2011 to limit the amount of income tax relief any individual person can claim. HMRC expected the cap to have a major effect on whether the relief was used as a vehicle for tax avoidance.[14]

14. We asked HMRC whether it should be checking that a tax relief designed to change behaviour produced the desired result. HMRC told us it had undertaken behavioural research in relation to Research & Development (R&D) relief, Entrepeneurs' relief and Business Premises Renovation Allowance. It said that with Business Premises Renovation Allowance, which had the objective of encouraging the renovation of unused commercial buildings in disadvantaged areas, it had seen abusive features and had responded by tightening up the relevant legislation. HMRC accepted that it should be looking at whether reliefs work. In this case the issue had been identified by tracking behaviour rather than by tracking costs.[15]

15. The National Audit Office found that the costs of R&D relief had increased from £100 million in 2001 to £1,060 million in 2011-12 while the actual amount of business expenditure on R&D had stayed more or less static. We asked HMRC about the effectiveness of this relief and whether it was meeting Parliament's intentions. HM Treasury postulated that without the relief, R&D expenditure by businesses might have gone down. However, HMRC said that some of its evidence suggested it was a relief claimed by businesses' tax departments and it was not featuring in their internal business cases to decide whether to invest in R&D. It said the decision to create an "above-the-line" relief is precisely intended to make sure that businesses take the relief into account when making decisions about how much to spend on R&D. HMRC told us it was important that research be done to determine whether recent policy changes had led to R&D relief having a greater behavioural effect than in the past. Accordingly, HMRC had commissioned two evaluation projects to look at R&D tax credit. One of them was looking specifically at decision making within small businesses, and how that was affected by R&D tax credits.[16]

16. Unlike the practice in some other countries, decisions to increase or reduce a department's funding do not take into account the revenue foregone through tax reliefs that operate in the department's area of responsibility. For example, Parliament votes on funding for the Arts Council without taking into account the effectiveness of those tax reliefs intended to stimulate more culture and media productions. These include the Film Tax Relief, the High-end TV tax relief, the Orchestra Tax Relief, the Video Games tax relief, and the Children's Television tax relief, HMRC told us that film tax relief alone had cost £225 million in 2013-14. Clear and accurate data on the costs of reliefs are essential to help Parliament consider the value for money of reliefs and whether their costs reflect its priorities in providing financial support to different parts of the economy. We asked the Departments whether tax reliefs and expenditure should be considered together in this way to increase transparency and accountability. HM Treasury told us it believed accountability was in place to Parliament and the Treasury Committee. Whilst we recognised that Parliament has an opportunity to debate changes to tax reliefs in finance bills, we did not agree that this is sufficient to provide adequate accountability after tax reliefs have been introduced.[17]


11   Qq 9, 45, 62 Back

12   Qq 60-68; C&AG's Report, paras 2.11-2.14, Figure 8 Back

13   Qq 64, 68-71 Back

14   Qq 46-49; C&AG's report, 7 April 2014, para 19  Back

15   Q44 Back

16   Qq 90-96; C&AG's Report, Online Appendix 4 Dashboards Back

17   Q3-8,21-23, 54-56; C&AG's Report, 7 April 2014, para 15 Back


 
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Prepared 26 March 2015