1 Operation and oversight of the franchise
1. Following a report by the Comptroller and Auditor
General in November 2012[1]
and our subsequent report in February 2013[2],
we held a follow-up session on Hinchingbrooke Health Care NHS
Trust (the Trust). We took evidence from the Department of Health
(the Department), the NHS Trust Development Authority, the Trust
itself, Circle, the Care Quality Commission, and Cambridgeshire
and Peterborough Clinical Commissioning Group.
2. The Trust is a small district general hospital
in Cambridgeshire with some 250 beds and nearly 1,500 staff. In
2013-14, the Trust had an annual income of £111.6 million.
It has had a history of financial difficulties and had an estimated
underlying deficit of between £3 million and £4 million
in 2011-12.[3] In 2007,
the Department gave the then Strategic Health Authority approval
to explore options to implement a new management structure at
Hinchingbrooke, with the aim of making the Trust financially sustainable
and enabling it to repay the cumulative deficit. Following a procurement
process, the Strategic Health Authority awarded Circle, an employee
co-owned organisation with just under 3,000 partners, a 10-year
operating franchise.[4]
3. In February 2012, Circle took operational control
of the Trust, becoming the first private company to run an NHS
hospital. In January 2015, some three years into the 10-year operating
franchise, Circle announced that it had entered into discussions
with the NHS Trust Development Authority with a view to withdrawing
from the contract.[5] Circle
told us that all parties were working towards formal responsibility
for running the Trust being handed back to the NHS by the end
of March 2015.[6]
4. Under the terms of the franchise agreement, the
Trust's services, staff and premises remained within the NHS but
the management functions passed to Circle, which is responsible
for meeting the requirements of the franchise agreement, and ensuring
that safe and high-quality NHS services are provided to the public.
The Trust's chief executive is responsible for the day-to-day
running of the hospital and reports directly to Circle. The Trust
board is responsible for monitoring performance against the franchise
agreement.[7] Cambridgeshire
and Peterborough Clinical Commissioning Group is the Trust's lead
commissioner and monitors its clinical performance. At national
level, the NHS Trust Development Authority, an arm's-length body
of the Department, is responsible for ensuring that NHS trusts,
including Hinchingbrooke, are well governed and financially sustainable;
and the Care Quality Commission, the regulator of health and social
care, is responsible for making sure that services meet quality
and safety standards. The Department is ultimately responsible
for establishing systems that protect health service users and
taxpayers.
5. The Trust needed to make substantial savings to
remain viable. The Comptroller and Auditor General's 2012 report
concluded that Circle's projected savings of £311 million
over ten years were unprecedented as a percentage of annual turnover
in the NHS.[8] Despite
accepting that the expected savings were at an unprecedented level
and had not been fully specified by Circle, the Department told
us at our evidence session in December 2012 that it expected the
franchise to succeed.[9]
In our subsequent report, we concluded that the savings projections
were overly optimistic and unachievable, and expressed concern
that Circle's bid had not been properly risk assessed.[10]
6. Circle told us that three factors underpinned
its decision to withdraw from the contract. The first was the
rising demand for healthcare that the hospital faced, which had
included an 18% rise in A&E attendances, 25% increase in elective
admissions and 11% increase in emergency admissions over the three
years of the franchise. Second, income had not risen in line with
activity, due to real-terms reductions in the tariff prices paid
for healthcare and the imposition of financial penalties by Cambridgeshire
and Peterborough Clinical Commissioning Group because the Trust
had not met its contractual targets. The third reason Circle gave
was that there was no immediate prospect of reform in the local
health economy which would be needed to make the Trust sustainable.[11]
The NHS Trust Development Authority agreed with Circle's analysis.[12]
7. In our 2013 report, we highlighted that, while
some financial risk and demand risk had transferred to Circle,
the NHS could never transfer the operational risk of running a
hospital leaving the taxpayer exposed should the franchise fail.[13]
The Department told us that, at the time of the evidence session,
the taxpayer had not lost money. When the contract was agreed,
Circle had to put £2 million into a security deposit account
for the NHS Trust Development Authority to re-tender in the event
of the contract being terminated. In addition, Circle was obliged
to cover financial deficits of up to £5 million. However,
the Department said that the taxpayer would have to cover the
excess should the total deficit go above £5 million and the
deficit is set to grow.[14]
8. In the first two years of the franchise Circle
made payments totalling £4.8 million to cover the Trust's
financial deficits. The Trust's board papers for January 2015
indicated that the deficit for the first nine months of 2014-15
was £7.5 million, and that the Trust had forecast an in-year
deficit of between £7.7 million and £12.2 million by
the end of the year, compared with a planned surplus of £2
million. The board papers also said that the Trust had applied
to the NHS Trust Development Authority for £9.6 million of
funding.[15]
9. Responsibility and accountability for what happened
at Hinchingbrooke is hugely difficult to pin down, and we needed
to call six witnesses to get the full picture. The Department's
Director of Finance explained that the contract had been reviewed
by HM Treasury but accepted that he was ultimately accountable
for approving it.[16]
The East of England Strategic Health Authority, which was abolished
as part of the reforms to the health system in 2013, evaluated
the franchise bids and awarded the contract. However, we note
that its officials have not been held to account. The witnesses
told us that the Strategic Health Authority's previous chief executive,
Sir Neil McKay received a redundancy payment and had since been
re-employed by the NHS on a consultancy basis.[17]
10. We asked the Department what expertise and exemplars
it had used to help draw up the franchise. The Department said
that the Strategic Health Authority had drawn on external financial
and legal advisers during the course of the bid process. The Department's
note provided after the evidence session highlighted that Hinchingbrooke
was the first contract for a management franchise and there were
no like for like examples in this country. It had no record of
the Strategic Health Authority drawing on examples of similar
hospitals in Europe or the United States.[18]
11. In response to our 2013 report, the Department
said that the NHS Trust Development Authority would monitor progress
and take action if the Trust failed to deliver its plan.[19]
The NHS Trust Development Authority explained that it had different
monitoring arrangements and ways of intervening at Hinchingbrooke,
compared with other NHS trusts, because of its unconventional
board structure (consisting of only three non-executive members)
and the fact that day-to-day operational management had been contracted
to Circle. The NHS Trust Development Authority accepted, however,
that these differences did not change its fundamental duty to
monitor the Trust.[20]
12. In January 2015, the Care Quality Commission
reported that both the Circle management team and the Trust board
thought that the other was responsible for holding the Trust's
executive team to account, and that the governance systems in
place were not sufficiently robust. The NHS Trust Development
Authority accepted that the governance, in terms of its responsibilities
and the role of the Trust board, was confusing and too complicated,
and the Department also said that aspects of the model of accountability
appeared to be 'a little muddled'.[21]
13. Circle told us that other trusts could learn
from the experience of Hinchingbrooke as they sought to improve
quality and efficiency. Specifically, its view was that, by engaging
staff and putting doctors and nurses in charge, the Trust had
transformed quality and delivered above average efficiencies compared
with the rest of the NHS.[22]
It told us that the Trust had made annual savings of 5% over the
three years of the franchise.[23]
14. The Department and the NHS Trust Development
Authority said that there were currently no plans for further
franchise arrangements in the NHS. The Department did not expect
there to be any more franchising until the issues that had arisen
at Hinchingbrooke had been resolved. Cambridgeshire and Peterborough
Clinical Commissioning Group told us that, in the last 18 months,
it had tendered a contract worth £800 million for older people
and adult community services.[24]
The Comptroller and Auditor General has reported that the NHS
as a whole has contracts worth billions of pounds in total each
year.[25] We have previously
reported on how public bodies will not achieve value for money
from their contracts until they become more commercially skilled;
both in letting contracts in the first place, and also in ongoing
contract management.[26]
1 C&AG's Report, The franchising of Hinchingbrooke Health Care NHS Trust, Session 2012-13, HC 628, 8 November 2012 Back
2
Committee of Public Accounts, Department of Health: The Franchising of Hinchingbrooke Health Care NHS Trust and Peterborough and Stamford Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust, Twenty-eighth Report of Session 2012-13, HC 789, 7 February 2013 Back
3
C&AG's Report, para 3.14; Hinchingbrooke Health Care NHS Trust, Annual Report and Accounts 2013/14, 2014 Back
4
C&AG's Report, para 3; Circle Holdings, Annual Report and financial statements 2013, 2014 Back
5
Circle, A statement on Hinchingbrooke, 9 January 2015 Back
6
Q 125 Back
7
C&AG's Report, paras 3.2-3.5 Back
8
C&AG's Report, paras 10 and 2.10 Back
9
Qq 1-2 Back
10
Committee of Public Accounts, Department of Health: The Franchising of Hinchingbrooke Health Care NHS Trust and Peterborough and Stamford Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust, para 16 Back
11
Qq 23-25 Back
12
Qq 1-7 Back
13
Committee of Public Accounts, Department of Health: The Franchising of Hinchingbrooke Health Care NHS Trust and Peterborough and Stamford Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust, p3 Back
14
Qq 129-131; C&AG's Report paras 9 and 2.16 Back
15
Hinchingbrooke Health Care NHS Trust, Finance Report for December 2014, 15 January 2015 Back
16
Qq 1, 37 Back
17
Qq 49-58, 166; C&AG's Report para 3 Back
18
Qq 59-62, Written evidence from the Department of Health, 20 February 2015 Back
19
Q 35; HM Treasury, Government responses on the Twenty Fourth and the Twenty Sixth to the Thirty Fifth Reports from the Committee of Public Accounts Session: 2012-13, Cm 8613, May 2013, p23 Back
20
Qq 68-76 Back
21
Qq 141, 146-48; Care Quality Commission, Hinchingbrooke Health Care NHS Trust: Quality Report. 9 January 2015, p12-13 Back
22
Q 133 Back
23
Qq 26-30 Back
24
Qq 146, 167 Back
25
Comptroller and Auditor General, The role of major contractors in the delivery of public services, HC 810, Session 2013-14, 12 November 2013 Back
26
Committee of Public Accounts, Contracting out public services to the private sector, HC 777, Session 2013-14, 14 March 2014;
and Transforming contract management, HC 585, Session 2014-15, HC 585, 10 December 2014 Back
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