2 Maximising impact from inspection
16. We asked the Chief Inspectors what needed to
happen to secure improvements in their respective sectors and
to get greater impact out of the recommendations made in their
reports. Inspectors pointed to the impact of their
reports through putting information into the public domain, for
example, enabling police and crime commissioners and public opinion
to apply pressure on the police to make improvements. Each Chief
Inspector provided examples of where their work had had impact.
For instance, recommendations from an investigation into border
controls by the former Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration
led to much greater consistency of checking at the border.[33]
HM Chief Inspector of Prisons pointed to the profound cultural
impact of regular inspection, establishments knowing they will
be visited again and again, and the application of a consistent
set of inspection standards. He credited impacts achieved to staff
on the ground, for example in prisons making real improvements
to address points identified in inspections.
[34]
However, the National
Audit Office found that inspectorates made only limited assessments
of their impact. Inspectorates' annual reports summarised findings
from their inspections in their annual reports, but none included
detailed examples of how their work had led to better performance,
and they did not collate systematic evidence of their impact.[35]
17. The Home Office pointed to significant improvements
that had been made that it could attribute directly to the work
of the former Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration and his
inspectorate. It also recognised the powerful lever of public
scrutiny as an impact enabled by inspection.[36]
The Ministry told us that the most valuable thing about inspection
of prisons was that something practical happened as a result of
inspections.[37] Nevertheless,
neither the Home Office nor the Ministry of Justice measured the
impact of the work their inspectorates have on the bodies they
are inspecting.[38] The
Ministry of Justice told us that it was difficult to determine
whether improvements in inspected bodies were the result of inspection.
The Home Office did not consider that assessing the separate impact
of inspections would be useful.[39]
The Home Office had not made a separate value for money assessment
in respect of increasing the budget of HMI Constabulary. Rather,
it had looked at the expected impact of an increased budget in
terms of better public reassurance, and more detailed inspection
of police forces. The Home Office told us it would reflect on
how it could assess the value for money of inspectorates.[40]
18. We identified a varying standard of implementing
recommendations and lessons arising from inspection reports. There
were inconsistencies across the five inspectorates in terms of
review and approval of implementation plans, and in terms of sharing
good practice and extracting learning from inspection reports
about what works best.[41]
For borders and immigration we were told far more concentration
was needed on consistently getting the basics right. Greater oversight
and synergies were required within the three immigration directorates
within the Home Office, with much more quality assurance by managers
of what was happening.[42]
HM Chief Inspector of Prisons told us of his frustration that
opportunities were being missed to apply learning from new prisons,
which took too long to get up to speed and working properly. He
referred to learning lessons from what happened at prisons such
as Oakwood, Thamesmead and Isis when they opened. He
also felt he could do more to use the depth of knowledge that
inspectors had built up, to spread good practice and draw lessons
together. He also considered greater use of sector knowledge and
experience could lead to savings.[43]
19. The National Audit Office found that inspectorates'
analysis of inspection reports was extremely limited, and that
inspectorates did not generally link findings and recommendations
across their reports.[44]
The Home Office told us that while it focussed on the impact of
implementing inspectors' recommendations such as the increase
in the quality and quantity of checks at the border as a result
of inspection, it nonetheless agreed that it needed to do more
to learn from inspection reports about what works best.[45]
The Ministry acknowledged that it too needed to do more to exploit
learning and good practice across the inspectorates. It told us
it would extend its system for following up HMI Prisons' recommendations
to having its audit committee look at them and ask how many were
outstanding and why.[46]
20. The five inspectorates carry out joint work with
each other and with other partners, for example, in the case of
Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Prisons, with Ofsted and the Care
Quality Commission. We challenged whether inspectorates were working
together effectively enough, identifying issues such as sex crime,
rape, reoffending and trafficking for sexual exploitation as relevant
across all five inspectorates. We asked the departments about
the role of inspection in improvement and how it could be used
to improve agencies working together.[47]
21. The Criminal Justice Joint Inspection group,
led by the Chief Inspectors, includes four of the inspectorates
and complemented the inspection of individual delivery bodies
by the individual inspectorates. It enables inspectorates to examine
thematic issues across the justice system and end-to-end processes
that involve more than one criminal justice agency.[48]
In its report, the National Audit Office found that the Criminal
Justice Joint Inspection regime had struggled to make joint inspection
work effectively and to maximise its impact.[49]
The departments valued the inspection work done by the joint group
so far; for example, a report on multi-agency public protection
agreements had led to changes in the Ministry's work in that area.
We were told that Ministers discussed proposed thematic work with
the chief inspectors, but the National Audit Office found no overall
accountability for the impact of the joint programme, and a lack
of clarity among inspectorates and departments about how to track
and follow up its recommendations.[50]
The impact of the joint programme was also not immediately clear
to us. The Home Office acknowledged the policy challenges to make
connections between different parts of the criminal justice system
and beyond into education and local government. It told us it
needed to address the issue of coherent independent scrutiny across
the system.[51]
22. Sir Thomas Winsor, HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary,
has recently been appointed chairman of the Criminal Justice Joint
Chief Inspectors' group. He told us that inspectorates could do
more to learn from each other. He explained plans to establish
a common web portal accessible to staff so that sharing of work
programmes and inspection schedules between inspectorates was
clearer, with the benefit of minimising inspection burden. The
group had established a common methodology and was developing
standard approaches to inspection in some areas. It was committed
to sharing good practice and having joint training.[52]
33 Qq 108-109, 112-113 Back
34
Q 112, 127 Back
35
C&AG's Report, paras 14 and 2.18 Back
36
Q 125, 128 Back
37
Q 55 Back
38
Q 115, C&AG's Report, para 2.20 Back
39
Qq 117,121, 123, 126 Back
40
Q 122, 123 Back
41
Q 129 Back
42
Q 109 Back
43
Q 112 Back
44
C&AG's Report, paras 13, 2.16 Back
45
Q 123, 129 Back
46
Q 130 Back
47
Qq 130-132 Back
48
Q 131; C&AG's Report, para 4.16 Back
49
C&AG's Report, paras 21, 4.20 Back
50
Q 131; C&AG's Report, para 21; C&AG's Report, paras 21, 4.20 Back
51
Q 131, 132 Back
52
Q 132 Back
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