3 The Government's public bodies reforms
to date
15. The intended outcome of the Government's ongoing
reforms is to make arm's-length bodies "leaner, more efficient
and more accountable".[37]
Additional aims cited in the Government's public bodies reform
strategy include effectiveness, clear purpose, and making a contribution
to economic growth.[38]
The Minister for the Cabinet Office, Francis Maude MP, reiterated
in March 2014 that the main aim of the reforms was accountability:
A major part of the programme of public bodies
reform has been bringing policy functions back to the Government
in a way that provides direct accountability to Parliament through
Ministers. That is a big part of increasing accountability, but
the secondary purpose of the reform of public bodies has been
to save money.[39]
The National Audit Office found that annual administrative
spending reductions achieved by public bodies were an estimated
£723 million in 2012-13 compared with 2010-11.[40]
16. Professor Skelcher told us that, through its
reforms, the Government has shown that its approach to the governance
and accountability of public bodies is more serious than in the
past, but Tom Gash of the Institute for Government argued that
the basic nature of the relationship between departments and arm's-length
bodies has not changed.[41]
As the National Audit Office found in February 2013, the Government
has not collected quantifiable evidence on the wider value of
the reforms for public services, citizen trust and participation.[42]
17. By 31 December 2013 there were 283 fewer public
bodies due to abolition or merger through the Government's Public
Bodies Reform Programme.[43]
To date, the reduction is the result of one-by-one decisions,
whereas our evidence suggests that a more strategic approach is
required.[44] Rob Whiteman,
former Chief Executive of the UK Border Agency, said "structural
pingpong does not necessarily sort out the longterm
issues".[45] The
Government argues that fewer bodies means greater accountability.
For example, the Child Maintenance and Enforcement Commission
is now closer to Ministers as part of the Department for Work
and Pensions.
18. The National Audit Office argued that bringing
a function into a department removes the direct oversight provided
by a board and audit committee.[46]
John Redwood MP told us that, as a Minister, "I could brief
myself very easily for a quango meeting, because I would just
ask to see last year's annual report".[47]
The Chief Executive of NHS England, Simon Stevens, agreed that
"conducting our affairs in public at arm's length from a
Civil Service government department permits greater transparency."[48]
The National Audit Office reported in February 2014 that:
While bringing a function into a department brings
it closer to the control of a minister, it may be more difficult
for Parliament to identify and hold accountable officials who
manage that function. And where [a non-departmental public body]'s
functions are brought into a department or transferred to the
private or voluntary sectors, transparency may be reduced if,
for example, the publication of annual accounts and performance
indicators is discontinued.[49]
Academic research has also highlighted the reduced
accountability to the public of new Cabinet Office controls. Dr
Tonkiss' research with Chairs of public bodies found that gaining
approval for spending from the Cabinet Office has added a hidden
bureaucratic layer to the accountability arrangements of public
bodies.[50] In 2011,
this Committee concluded that stakeholders and civil society play
an important role providing challenge and criticism to public
bodies and that it is easiest for them to do this when they have
a clearly identified body to engage with, not a homogenous central
department.[51]
19. The public bodies reforms have not been coordinated
with the Civil Service Reform Plan and the health reforms, recent
research concludes.[52]
The Civil Service Reform Plan progress updates do not mention
public bodies.[53] There
has not been a coherent approach to the reform of the vast mass
of bodies which sit beneath central government departments, according
to research by our witnesses Professor Skelcher, Dr Tonkiss and
others.[54] Triennial
reviews are part of the reforms. These periodic reviews gather
evidence on non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs) and make recommendations.
The Cabinet Office told us that a triennial review: "rigorously
challenges whether functions continue to be needed and also considers
alternative models for delivery."[55]
20. Triennial reviews are perceived as positive,
research has found.[56]
Nevertheless, the reforms are incomplete. Notably, non-ministerial
departments have been excluded from triennial reviews. Tom Gash
of the Institute of Government described this exclusion as "an
error" due to "the fact that there is no rhyme or reason
as to why a body is a non-ministerial department versus an NDPB."[57]
Executive agencies are also excluded, on the grounds that they
are already accountable, as we heard from Francis Maude MP in
2010.[58] In fact, as
the National Audit Office concluded in February 2014:
A wide range of major public bodies are not covered
by the triennial review programme including: non-ministerial departments
(such as the Forestry Commission); executive agencies (for example
DVLA); public corporations (such as the BBC), or public service
mutual (such as MyCSP); and local bodies (such as internal drainage
boards) or charitable trusts.[59]
21. The Cabinet Office has published guidance on
how to carry out triennial reviews.[60]
In practice reviews vary, in terms of the appointment of independent
review board members, the process for signing off reports, the
role of the Cabinet Office, and how to balance the evidence produced
by a review with political considerations, as in the case of Natural
England and the Environment Agency.[61]
22. The aims of triennial reviews have expanded over
time. They now include aims around efficiency, transparency, and
whether and how the body contributes to economic growth.[62]
The Institute for Government argues that some of this should be
business-as-usual in the department-public body relationship.[63]
23. Significant reforms of public bodies have
been implemented, but have not been coordinated with Civil Service
reforms and health reforms. We are unconvinced that the reforms
have in fact increased accountability. Accountability does not
depend on organisational form. In some cases, increased direct
accountability to Ministers has come at the cost of reduced transparency
and accountability to Parliament and to the public. The Government's
approach so far has been limited, based on a transactional notion
of accountability, without enough emphasis on the human factors
that contribute to the effectiveness of arm's-length bodies.
24. The Government's triennial reviews are welcome
but limited to the bodies and topics they cover. Triennial reviews
should not become 'Christmas trees' on which more and more additional
aims are hung, intended to right all wrongs.
25. Triennial reviews should also apply to executive
agencies, non-ministerial departments, public corporations, and
NHS bodies. The Cabinet Office should produce central guidance
and support on the principles that underpin triennial reviews
and the aims of the process. Rather than being viewed as a threat
by public bodies, triennial reviews should be focussed on the
quality of the relationship between a public body and its sponsoring
department, which is the more significant factor determining accountability.
37 Q467 [Nick Hurd MP] Back
38
Cabinet Office, Public Bodies Reform Strategy Document, July 2014 Back
39
HC Deb, 12 March 2014, col 301 Back
40
National Audit Office, Progress on public bodies reform,
HC (2013-2014) 1048 Back
41
Q26, Q1 Back
42
National Audit Office, Progress on public bodies reform,
HC (2013-2014) 1048 Back
43
As above Back
44
Q66 [Professor Skelcher] Back
45
Q171 Back
46
National Audit Office, Progress on public bodies reform,
HC (2013-2014) 1048 Back
47
Q199 Back
48
Q238 Back
49
National Audit Office, Progress on public bodies reform,
HC (2013-2014) 1048 Back
50
Katherine Tonkiss, Delegation in hard times: the financial
management of arm's length bodies in the UK, (2014) unpublished
manuscript, p11 Back
51
Public Administration Select Committee, Fifth Report of Session
2010-11, Smaller Government: Shrinking the Quango State,
HC 537 Back
52
Katharine Dommett, Matthew Flinders, Chris Skelcher, and Katherine
Tonkiss, "Did they read before burning? The Coalition and
quangos", Political Quarterly, vol 85, April-June
(2014) Back
53
Cabinet Office, Civil Service Reform Plan: One Year On Report,
July 2013, and Cabinet Office, Civil Service Reform Plan Progress Report,
October 2014 Back
54
Katharine Dommett, Matthew Flinders, Chris Skelcher, and Katherine
Tonkiss, "Did they read before burning? The Coalition and
quangos", Political Quarterly, vol 85, 2, April-June
(2014) Back
55
Cabinet Office (QPB14) Back
56
Katherine Dommett, Triennial reviews and public body reform in the UK
(2014) Back
57
Q69 Back
58
Oral evidence taken on 3 November 2010, (2010-11), HC 537, Q86 Back
59
National Audit Office, Progress on public bodies reform,
HC (2013-2014) 1048 Back
60
Cabinet Office, Triennial reviews: guidance and schedule, July
2014 Back
61
Katherine Dommett, Triennial reviews and public body reform in the UK
(2014) Back
62
Cabinet Office (QPD14) Back
63
Q65 Back
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