2 Identifying where skills are needed
The need for
better data
18. In its 2011 report Identifying and meeting
central government's skills requirements the National Audit
Office found that "data weaknesses limit the understanding
that different departments have of the skills they possess, and
hence the development activities that are required".[34]
The National Audit Office reported that as result of these weaknesses
in departmental information systems "knowledge of existing
skills remains patchy at a corporate level."[35]
This report also found that only 40 per cent of the respondents
to their survey considered that their organisation "was 'very'
or 'fairly' effective in maintaining information on the skills
of staff."[36]
19. This is a view shared by the Cabinet Office.
In January 2015 Francis Maude agreed that there is "much
more that needs to be done" in this area, while John Manzoni
confirmed to us that the Cabinet Office does "not have […]
very good cross-Civil Service human resource data."[37]
Asked whether better data would assist the Cabinet Office
John Manzoni told us:
You are absolutely right. I have this conversation
[…] all the time. I say, "Why do we not have that?"[38]
20. The Civil Service does not have a clear picture
of its current skills. It does not know who has what skills or
where they sit in the Civil Service. Without this knowledge the
impact of any central attempt to improve Civil Service skills
will always be limited.
21. We recommend that the Cabinet Office introduce
a standardised framework for auditing departmental skill levels.
This should led by the Cabinet Office and implemented by each
department as soon as possible.
| Box 1: The West Coast mainline franchise competition: case study
In October 2012 the Secretary of State for Transport announced that the competition to award the West Coast mainline franchise had been cancelled because of the discovery of "significant technical flaws" in the way in which the procurement had been conducted.[39]
Following the decision to cancel the competition, the Department for Transport (DfT) commissioned two of its non-executive directors, Sam Laidlaw and Ed Smith, to oversee a review of what had gone wrong. Released in December 2012, the Report of the Laidlaw Inquiry lists "deficiencies in organisational structure and resourcing"[40] as contributory factors to the failure of the competition. Specifically it found that "a number of senior, experienced individuals left the DfT over the course of the InterCity West Coast franchise process without being replaced" and that "the key members of the project team were relatively junior and less experienced in comparison with the bidder counterparties they were facing."
The Laidlaw report was complemented by a further report, commissioned by the Secretary of State for Transport, from Richard Brown, the Chairman of Eurostar. Released a month later in January 2013, The Brown Review of the Rail Franchising Programme echoes the Laidlaw focus on skills gaps within DfT, stating that "the Department has relied too much on the legacy of commercially experienced and industry knowledgeable people from the SRA [Strategic Rail Authority]. It has not been successful in refreshing its capability since then."
Commenting on the findings of the Laidlaw Report, DfT Permanent Secretary Philip Rutnam stated in December 2012: "We will implement all of Mr Laidlaw's recommendations, and go further, to ensure we have the right set of skills, support and training to ensure failures like this do not happen again."[41]
It is estimated by DfT that refunding bidders' costs as a result of cancelling the franchise competition, cost somewhere "in the region of £40 million to £45 million".
|
The need for more honesty
22. The example of the Department for Transport (DfT)
and the West Coast mainline (see Box 1) not only demonstrates
the need for better data on skills, but also the importance of
basing such data on an honest appraisal of a departmental capabilities.
Speaking to us about the changes that had been introduced at DfT,
following the cancelation of the West Coast mainline franchise
competition, the Director General for Rail, Clare Moriarty, told
us that one of the main lessons learnt by the Department "was
that we simply did not have the dedicated resource".[42]
Reporting on the changes that had been introduced since, Ms Moriarty
said:
Every single franchise competition now has a
franchise project team leader at a senior level. We have fully
staffed and dedicated teams for each franchise competition. We
have our financial, legal and technical advisers in place.[43]
23. While DfT are now publically expressing confidence
in the corrective steps that they have been able to take, recent
National Audit Office reports suggest that skill gaps may still
exist in the Department. In its January 2014 report Crossrail,
the National Audit Office assessed evidence collected between
August 2013 and November 2013 and reported:
As with other Department for Transport programmes,
the Department's senior representatives overseeing the programme
have changed frequently, reflecting the number of programmes that
the Department is sponsoring and a scarcity of staff with the
right skills and experience.[44]
24. In its July 2014 report Procuring new trains
the National Audit Office examined the procurement of new trains
under two recent programmes: Intercity Express (awarded in July
2012, with further awards made in April 2014) and Thameslink (awarded
in June 2013). Here similar findings were reached when evidence
collected between October 2013 and April 2014 was assessed:
Having enough staff with the right skills and
experience is vital to manage such programmes. As we have reported
on other major programmes run by the Department, the Department's
teams are often stretched and this was the case again.[45]
25. Both of these National Audit Office reports are
based on evidence gathered only a short period after the findings
of the Laidlaw report and the Brown review were published. They
include the examination of programmes that began prior to this
point. However, given the financial constraints that Civil Service
departments are currently being asked to operate under, the potential
difference of opinion that appears to exist between DfT and the
National Audit Office highlights the need to ensure objectivity
in any departmental skills assessment.
26. It is essential
that any central audit of Civil Service skills is both open and
honest. Many parts of the Civil Service currently operate under
severe resourcing constraints. However, without an honest appraisal
of where skill gaps lie, further failures, such as the cancellation
of the West Coast mainline franchise competition, are unavoidable.
Short-term presentational gains should not be given preference
over long-term cost for the taxpayer.
27. We recommend that the Cabinet Office ask the
National Audit Office to carry out a Civil Service wide skills
audit on a regular basis. This will ensure that results are robust
and based on an honest and realistic appraisal of current departmental
capabilities.
34 National Audit Office, Identifying and meeting central government's skills requirements,
HC 1276, July 2011 Back
35
As above Back
36
As above Back
37
Oral evidence taken on 14 January 2015, (2014-15), HC 922, Q 27
and Hansard (2015) 7 Jan : Column 253 Back
38
Oral evidence taken on 14 January 2015, (2014-15), HC 922, Q 54 Back
39
Transport Select Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2012-13,
Cancellation of the InterCity West Coast franchise competition,
HC 537, January 2013 Back
40
Department for Transport, Report of the Laidlaw Inquiry: Inquiry into the Lessons Learned for the Department for Transport from the InterCity West Coast Competition,
December 2012 Back
41
Department for Transport, West Coast Main Line: final report of the Laidlaw inquiry,
December 2012 Back
42
Q 169 Back
43
As above Back
44
National Audit Office, Crossrail, HC 965, January 2014 Back
45
National Audit Office, Procuring new trains, HC 531, July 2014 Back
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