Leadership for the long term: Whitehall's capacity to address future challenges - Public Administration Contents

3  Current Government capacity

Who does what

49. A large number of high quality bodies and processes inside and outside Government influence thinking ahead and planning for known trends and unknown shocks. These include key activities such as public spending reviews which the Treasury carries out. It also publishes the Whole of Government Accounts. The Cabinet Office has oversight of some of the activities covered in this chapter, though they do not set out fully in their written evidence who does what.[111] We discuss:

·  The National Risk Register;

·  The Cabinet Office horizon scanning programme team;

·  The Government Office for Science;

·  Strategic Defence and Security Reviews;

·  The Joint Intelligence Committee;

·  The Civil Contingencies Secretariat;

·  The National Security Council;

·  The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre;

·  Other government departments and networks;

·  Public bodies and the wider public sector, including Parliament;

·  Spending reviews; and

·  Whole of Government Accounts.


50. The Government's National Risk Register for Civil Emergencies, last published in July 2013, takes likelihood and impact into account, and considers the highest priority risks to be pandemic influenza, coastal flooding, catastrophic terrorist attacks, and severe volcanic eruptions abroad.[112]

51. Professor Dame Sally Davies explained to us how work to coordinate and check the risk register is carried out. She said that at least once a year, the chief scientific advisers sit down to look at and cross-check the risks. She explained that some risks, such as anti-microbial resistance, appear on more than one department's risk register.[113] Chief Scientific Advisers are working with the Civil Contingencies Secretariat to add anti-microbial resistance to the national risk register.[114]

52. The Government Chief Scientific Adviser was not consulted on the first National Risk Assessment, leaving the UK unprepared for the threat that materialised in 2010 over Icelandic volcanic ash, at substantial cost to the aviation industry, travellers and the economy.[115] Scientific advice was subsequently included in the development of the register.[116]


53. Since March 2014 a small joint Cabinet Office and Government Office for Science team of about five members of staff has run the Government's horizon scanning programme, reporting to Jon Day, Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, and Sir Mark Walport, the Government's Chief Scientific Adviser. The Cabinet Secretary acts as the 'senior champion' for horizon scanning.[117] The programme is overseen by the Minister for Government Policy, the Rt Hon Oliver Letwin MP, "who takes a close interest in the programme and actively engages with it."[118]

54. The unit acts as a centre of expertise for the rest of Government, and coordinates meetings which bring together civil servants from across Government and others to think ahead on particular themes and topics, for example, on emerging economies. The team works with the Civil Service Policy Profession to "expose and embed horizon scanning tools and techniques", tools such as a 'Futures Toolkit'.[119] Though it aims to be as transparent as possible, not all its papers can be published, Oliver Letwin MP wrote.[120]

55. Dr Claire Craig, Director of the Government Office for Science, has said that "it's easier to do horizon scanning than it is to get the people you want to listen to it, to listen to it".[121] Professor Michael Clarke of the Royal United Services Institute expressed frustration to us that government horizon scanning does not reach as far as policy.[122] As Jon Day's review of government horizon scanning found, it is rare for horizon scanning products to include policy implications or an analysis of how the information presented could be used to inform decision making.[123] The Minister for Government Policy acknowledged the need for greater take-up of horizon scanning: "rather than putting that in some little unit somewhere, […] we need to take it much further—what I believe in the jargon is called mainstreaming; i.e. putting this in the hands of the people who are really most important around Whitehall."[124] Jon Day explained to us that horizon scanning has to "battle with the current agenda" and "there is not always a mechanism to get this information to Ministers."[125]

56. No data is held on the academic backgrounds of civil servants involved in horizon scanning.[126] Jon Day told us his impression and experience was that they are no more or less short-termist than other civil servants.[127] Written evidence by the Academy of Social Sciences states that there is no independent evidence about the effectiveness or value of Whitehall horizon scanning.[128] The equivalent capacity in the Canadian federal Government is organised somewhat differently (see Box 2).

Box 2: An example of central government horizon scanning capacity: Policy Horizons Canada
Policy Horizons Canada was set up by Janice Charette, the Clerk of the Privy Council, (Canadian equivalent to Cabinet Secretary) in 2011. This addressed the need for Deputy Ministers (equivalent to Permanent Secretaries) to be exposed to long-term thinking, fresh ideas and challenge. The organisation employs around 25 staff and relies on a large number of external experts. It is funded by the Department for Employment and Social Development but is governed by a committee made up of Deputy Ministers from across the Canadian federal Government. It produces outputs, largely unpublished, intended to inform and challenge the whole of Government. Its aim as the centre of foresight is not to build foresight units within departments, but to build capacity for long-term thinking among public servants. A number of officials in senior roles across the Canadian federal government have spent a period within Policy Horizons Canada, and therefore comprise the 'community of strategists' we called on the UK Government to develop in our report, Who Does UK National Strategy?[129]


57. The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills houses the Government Office for Science, led by the Government's Chief Scientific Adviser, Sir Mark Walport.[130] Its 'Foresight' unit of about 15 staff, described as "long-established and much lauded" by the Science and Technology Select Committee, carries out in-depth studies "looking ahead 10-100 years on topics of national importance" and publishes reports, for example, on the future of manufacturing.[131] Written evidence from the Cabinet Office stated that GO-Science, as it is known:

      Ensures that government policies and decisions are informed by the best scientific evidence and strategic long-term thinking. Foresight projects use the latest scientific evidence and futures analysis to address complex issues and provide strategic options to inform decisions that need to be taken now, and over the longer term.[132]

The Science and Technology Select Committee recommended in May 2014 that GO-Science should be moved into the Cabinet Office, to increase its cross-department influence.[133]


58. The Government published the outcome of the Strategic Defence and Security Review, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty, in October 2010.[134] Previous reviews covered only defence, and the expansion to also cover security in 2010 was welcomed by the Defence Select Committee.[135] However, the Committee concluded there was a risk that immediate or short-term security issues and threats might dominate to the exclusion of longer-term defence assessments.[136] The review decided to fit two aircraft carriers to allow short take offs and vertical landing; shortly afterwards, in 2012, the decision was reversed. Sir Peter Luff MP, a former Defence Minister, has suggested that the 2010 decision was partly the result of rushed and inaccurate costing to accommodate a new Secretary of State's preferences.[137]

59. The Defence Select Committee concluded in a 2012 Report that the review's decision to cancel the maritime patrol aircraft ('Nimrod') programme, a decision that was primarily financially driven, has weakened the UK's ability to undertake the military tasks envisaged by the review.[138] They were unconvinced that the Armed Forces could manage this capability gap within existing resources.[139] The Secretary of State for Defence, the Rt Hon Michael Fallon MP, has acknowledged weaknesses in the review, saying that "some things were not foreseen: the Arab spring, for example, the resurgence of Russia, the annexation of the Crimea and the interference in eastern Ukraine."[140] However, Oliver Letwin MP defended the 2010 review, telling us the conclusions it reached had "pretty well stood the test of time".[141]

60. The Institute for Government has identified rushed post-election spending reviews as a problem: "the 2010 spending review provided for aircraft carriers but not the planes to go with them, because it didn't allow time to complete a serious defence and security review".[142] The majority of work on the review, it has been claimed, was conducted over a six-week period in summer 2010 with key people unavailable on holiday at times.[143] However, Oliver Letwin said he was "pretty intimately involved in the strategic defence review, and it continued throughout [summer 2010] pretty energetically".[144] Sir Nicholas Macpherson told us that "There is a risk that, if you try to do something that is of a scale of a strategic defence review to meet a very early public spending timetable, something is going to give."[145] However, when we asked Oliver Letwin he did not have any particular view about the time it should take to conduct the next review.[146]


61. The Joint Intelligence Committee's role is to produce "objective, cross-departmental, all sources assessments, bringing together secret intelligence, diplomatic reporting and open source material."[147] It produces these assessments for current events but also looks ahead to identify potential risks, and to provide the Government with early warning, Cabinet Office written evidence claims.[148] The Committee's secretariat is the Joint Intelligence Organisation, based in the Cabinet Office (see Box 3).[149]

Box 3: Organisational chart


62. Written evidence from the Cabinet Office stated that its Civil Contingencies Secretariat is responsible for improving the UK's ability to absorb, respond to and recover from emergencies.[150] It is part of the wider National Security Secretariat which employs about 200 people.[151] The team assesses disruptive civil challenges to the UK in the short, medium and long term.[152] Its unpublished National Risk Assessment informs the publicly available National Risk Register.[153]

63. The UK is well-placed geographically, not having major fault lines, active volcanoes or an extreme climate. Perhaps helped in part by this, the work of the Secretariat is well regarded internationally.[154] Dame Deirdre Hines, former Chief Medical Officer for Wales, carried out a largely positive independent review of the UK response to the 2009 H1N1 swine flu pandemic. This "provided confirmation of the value of planning and preparedness" and "demonstrated that the four UK Governments can work together effectively and successfully to meet such an emergency".[155]


64. The National Security Council is now the Cabinet committee for collective discussion of the Government's objectives for national security. The Cabinet Office stated that it meets weekly and is chaired by the Prime Minister.[156] Witnesses to our previous inquiry Who does UK National Strategy? welcomed the establishment of the Council, but witnesses to our previous inquiry, Strategic thinking in Government, pressed for greater analytical support for the Council.[157] Former Special Adviser Matt Cavanagh recommended that "the Secretariat needs to be beefed up if [it] is really to play a role in terms of co-ordinating the different Departments".[158] The National Security Secretariat coordinates security and intelligence issues across Government and leads work on National Security Strategy and the Strategic Defence and Security Review.[159] An update to the National Security Strategy is expected in 2015.[160]


65. The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre describes itself as an internal think tank of the Ministry of Defence.[161] The staff team of around 65 are drawn from the Army, Navy, Air Force and Civil Service.[162] The Centre's origins can be traced to the 1998 strategic defence review, which recognised a need for a clearer long-term, joint vision of how the Government expects the armed forces to operate, but their work necessarily embraces the whole of Government.[163] The Cabinet Office's written evidence to this inquiry does not mention the Centre.[164]

66. The Centre produces a range of strategies, reviews and plans, including publishing UK Defence Doctrine. This is not a set of beliefs or policies but guidance on how to think; a body of theory, methodology and practice.[165] The Cabinet Secretary has acknowledged that "the MoD and the security side of Whitehall do this [horizon scanning] better, in some ways, than the domestic, economic side of the Government".[166] Professor Michael Clarke told us that the Centre does some very distinguished work in horizon scanning.[167]


67. Individual departments' horizon scanning and foresight outputs are not always explicitly identified as such.[168] Examples include the Department for Energy and Climate Change's 2050 Pathways Calculator, the Government's Industrial Strategy and the Department of Health's UK Five Antimicrobial Resistance Strategy, 2013-2018. Cabinet Office written evidence to this inquiry does not set out a complete list of these activities, nor detail how the centre of Government oversees them.[169]

68. Twenty five professional networks exist that civil servants with a particular expertise are able to join, such as the Government Economic Service. [170] These groups maintain professional standards, play a role in recruitment and develop guidance and resources for use across government departments.[171]

69. The Government set up a network of 'What Works Centres' in 2013, intended to improve the way Government creates, shares and uses evidence for decision-making.[172] The Royal Statistical Society says "there should be further investment in investigating what policy works, including through the successful 'What Works' network. Money invested in the short-term to support good policy will ensure unnecessary costs and mistakes are avoided at a later date." The centres cover health and social care, educational achievement, crime reduction, early intervention, local economic growth, ageing and wellbeing.

70. The centres are:

·  The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE);

·  The Sutton Trust/Educational Endowment Foundation;

·  The College of Policing;

·  The Early Intervention Foundation;

·  The LSE/Arup/Centre for Cities What Works Centre for Local Economic Growth;

·  The Centre for Ageing Better; and

·  The What Works Centre for Wellbeing.[173]

There is a What Works National Adviser, David Halpern, who together with his team in the Cabinet Office supports the network.


71. Cabinet Office written evidence names the Office for Budget Responsibility, the Office for National Statistics and the Met Office as organisations outside central government which aim to provide expert, impartial advice and understanding of future trends.[174] Other bodies in the wider public sector, including universities and the Research Councils, also carry out this work.

72. The Office for Budget Responsibility examines and reports publicly on the sustainability of the public finances and publishes an annual Fiscal Sustainability Report, assessing the long-term economic and fiscal impact of government decisions. The Office investigates the impact of trends and policies on the public finances through forecasting, projections up to fifty years ahead and balance sheet analysis.[175]

73. The Met Office is a world-leading centre of expertise on weather and long-run climate modelling, the Cabinet Office's written evidence states.[176] Its Chief Scientist Professor Dame Julia Slingo told us that the Office has built a strong relationship with the Research Councils and leading universities, and so "when I am thinking about what Government need, I do not just look at what I have been contracted to do in the Met Office; I look at what I believe are the big science opportunities and where the innovation is in science that I can bring forward and operationalise into better services."[177]

74. Universities can play a key role in advising the Government on potential threats, risks and other emerging issues by providing expertise and evidence for future policy decisions.[178] The precursor to what is today the Economic and Social Research Council was created to provide Government with imaginative thinking about social and economic possibilities.[179] Its strategic priorities to some extent reflect consensus about the problems facing state, society and economy in years to come, the Academy of Social Sciences wrote.[180]


75. Our predecessors recommended in 2007 that Parliament strengthen its capacity to think ahead and engage with outside experts and the wider public.[181] The Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology is undertaking a programme of horizon scanning work looking at major trends in society, technology, the environment, education and politics.[182]

76. The Finnish Parliament's Committee for the Future, established in 1993 and made permanent in 2000, aims to conduct dialogue with the Prime Minister's office and the government on long-term issues affecting the policies and work of the Government.[183] Following a general election, the Finnish Government is required to produce a 'Report on the Future'.[184] The Committee examines this report, forming the basis for Parliament's scrutiny of the Government during that Parliament.[185]

77. Scotland's Futures Forum, a company limited by guarantee, was created by the Scottish Parliament in 2006 to help its Members think about future challenges and opportunities.[186] It publishes reports and organises events on topics including wellbeing, business succession and social finance.[187] It has a small staff overseen by a Board of Directors which includes MSPs.


78. Spending reviews determine how funding is allocated between departments, looking forward one or more years. The Government stated in 2012 that the strategic goals and ambitions of the country should be the basis of spending review and budget processes.[188] Cipfa argue that spending decisions and commitments should be based on "long-term affordability, rather than short term electioneering."[189] To overcome the problems caused by departmental boundaries, Cipfa argued that the Government should set spending plans in terms of what needs to be jointly achieved. To achieve this, they suggest that central government budget setting and financial management should be reviewed to remove constraints on local service innovation and to make services more coordinated, based on evidence of outcomes.[190]

79. There is an appetite for a spending review covering a whole Parliament. Sir Nicholas Macpherson told us that, "ideally", the next public spending review would set plans for the whole next Parliament. The Political and Constitutional Reform Select Committee recommended in July 2013 that spending reviews should reflect the same timetable as five-year fixed term Parliaments.[191] The Institute for Government said that rushed reviews cause more problems later, and Cipfa call on the Government to allow departments the time to carry out reviews effectively.[192] Polling commissioned for the Institute for Government found that 84% of adults in Great Britain agreed that it is important that politicians should take time to get the facts right when making spending decisions.[193] The 2010 spending review, covering financial years 2011-12, 2012-13, 2013-14 and 2014-15, was published on 20 October 2010, five and a half months after the general election.[194]

80. The School of International Futures suggests that the Treasury could have a powerful impact by using horizon scanning studies as part of the spending review process, by asking departments to demonstrate that their plans are robust in different future scenarios.[195]

81. The Public Accounts Committee concluded that the 2010 spending review provided no incentives for departments to collaborate on cross-government issues.[196] When we asked Oliver Letwin MP who in Government is responsible for ensuring that spending plans are coherent across Government, he cited: a Department, the Treasury; a process, the spending review; and a Cabinet sub-committee, covering public expenditure.[197] Our evidence shows that there remain limitations in cross-departmental financial planning, for example, in respect of health and social care (see Box 4).

Box 4: The relationship between health care and social care
Care services tend to be fragmented, reflecting the professional and institutional boundaries of care providers such as the between the NHS and local government, rather than co-ordinated around the needs of the individual.[198] Performance is assessed against three 'outcomes frameworks' covering the NHS, public health, and social care separately.[199]

Sir Nicholas Macpherson told us the relationship between the NHS and local authorities, which are responsible for social care, is "absolutely critical" because "you can squeeze one bit of the system, but the problem just re-emerges somewhere else."[200]

The Minister for Government Policy explained why progress has been very slow. He said it was "an almost unsolvable problem, because of the differences between local authorities and the centrally funded NHS. We are now breaking those barriers down […] The difficulty is one of breaking down these bureaucratic barriers and finding ways of getting people to pool budgets and work together […] It is much too late—we should have been doing it 20, 30 and 40 years ago—but at least it is now beginning."[201]

The Better Care Fund, which will pool at least £3.8 billion from April 2015, aims to provide more coordinated local services to older and disabled people to care for them in the community, keep them out of hospital and avoid long hospital stays.[202] The National Audit Office found that the quality of early preparation and planning did not match the scale of this ambition.[203] Oliver Letwin MP described progress on the fund as "very slow" because of what he describes as "an almost unsolvable problem", the differences between local authorities and the NHS.[204] He said "we are now breaking those barriers down."


82. Whole of Government Accounts are a consolidated set of financial statements for the UK public sector. They are "a kind of horizon scanning", argued the Academy of Social Sciences.[205] Sir Nicholas Macpherson welcomed them as: "one positive development in recent years" because they "force us to make provisions for nuclear decommissioning along with medical negligence. This has provided quite an important discipline to the Treasury."[206]

83. The most recently published set of Whole of Government Accounts showed that the Government is liable for total future costs of £2,893 billion, including long-term liabilities of public sector pensions (£1,172 billion), nuclear de-commissioning (£69.8 billion) and the potential liabilities arising from litigation for medical negligence in the NHS (£26.1 billion).[207] Other government liabilities are accounting provisions for the future costs that the public sector is not certain to incur but where the probability is greater than 50%. Contingent liabilities, reported separately, are costs that the public sector may incur in the future, but where the probability is less than 50%, such as clinical negligence claims that are less likely to succeed, and guarantees to underwrite debt for infrastructure projects such as Crossrail. These total £88 billion.[208]

84. The National Audit Office has qualified the Whole of Government Accounts every year since their introduction due to "significant continuing issues with the quality and consistency of the data included". However, it reported: "as the Treasury now has more Whole of Government Accounts trend data, it is starting to highlight some of the longer-term risks on the balance sheet. They are beginning to use this information to help inform Government's spending plans."[209] Cipfa advocate greater use of the Whole of Government Accounts as the foundation for fiscal and spending decisions:

      The UK boasts one of the most complete sets of Whole of Government Accounts globally, including central and local Government as well as public corporations. We are therefore able to quantify our long-term commitments […] and use this information to determine long-term affordability.[210]

Limitations in government capacity

Limitations in financial planning and management

85. We previously concluded in our Report Strategic thinking in Government that the Budget process should improve the link between long-term objectives and specific budgetary measures.[211]

86. Sir Nicholas Macpherson assured us the Treasury is improving financial management: "We are going to have fewer economists and a few more strategic financial managers."[212] The Treasury's review of financial management in Government, published 2013, concluded that, while financial management had been on an "improving trajectory" for many years, "concerted effort" was required to improve costing, financial management information and standards of management accounting .[213]

87. John Manzoni, Chief Executive of the Civil Service, acknowledged:

      Normally, in the headquarters of a company, it is the functionality that parts of the Treasury and Cabinet Office do. They would be in one headquarters. They are in two different places here in government.[214]

Their separation "makes it slightly more complex" but he insisted "they can work across those boundaries."[215] John Manzoni praised the good cooperative working between the Treasury and Cabinet Office and said "whatever the boxes and the structure are, we have to create a mode of working that is structure-agnostic".[216]

88. In a report published in February 2014, GovernUp, a think tank, proposed the establishment of a single centre of Government, an 'Office of Budget and Management', combining functions from the Treasury and Cabinet Office.[217] The United States federal government has an Office of Management and Budget to coordinate cross-government spending plans.[218] In Canada, the Treasury Board Secretariat plays a central role in government financial planning.[219] Similar arrangements are in place in other governments.


89. The lack of a central training college for Whitehall is a gaping void, argued Major General Jonathan Shaw, and one which impedes cross-government working.[220] He argued that a training college, a "national centre of Government execution" should be set up to ensure common language across politicians, civil servants and the military. The Institute for Risk Management argued that civil servants should have greater access to training on risk management.[221] Satisfaction among civil servants with the learning and development available to them is under 50%.[222] In part to address these concerns, in February 2015 GovernUp called for the introduction of a "proper programme of training and development for ministers before and during their time in office".[223] The Institute for Government's Julian McCrae wrote in response: "I'm more convinced than ever that it is perfectly possible to help politicians become more effective ministers, and that there is a real appetite for such support among front-benchers."[224] The Armed Forces Parliamentary Scheme has for over twenty years offered members of the House of Commons, House of Lords and European Parliament experience of spending a number of days with the armed forces over the course of a year.[225] We will be reporting on these matters soon on our inquiry into Civil Service Skills.

90. There is an impressive array of high quality long-term thinking and horizon scanning across Government. The Civil Contingencies Secretariat and Met Office provide an excellent public sector capability. We welcome the Parliamentary Office for Science and Technology's work in this area, prompted by our previous recommendation. We also welcome the establishment of the Cabinet Office's horizon scanning programme team and its aim to coordinate work between departments. However, this central resource is much too small. It needs the capacity and the authority to address gaps and duplications and to coordinate a comprehensive and coherent analysis of the risks and challenges facing the whole of Government.

91. We commend the development of the National Risk Register. It is a vital tool to enable and encourage thinking about better management of short and long term risks. Together with Whole of Government Accounts, which provides a deeper understanding of long term actual and potential financial liabilities, they set down the context which decision makers must consider. The challenge is to ensure that this information is used in advice to ministers, and not ignored.

92. The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre is generating world class horizon scanning which embraces the whole of Government. Though its work is used across Whitehall it is not even acknowledged by the Cabinet Office in their written evidence. This shows that horizon scanning is still regarded as ancillary rather than central to the business of Government, and requires wider awareness of horizon scanning and changes in attitude.

93. Long-term thinking and the consideration of emerging trends need to be the driving force behind financial management and far more coordinated with public investment decisions. At present, horizon scanning has little impact on financial planning, though we commend the desire of the Cabinet Secretary, the Treasury Permanent Secretary and the Civil Service Chief Executive to address this problem.

94. Comprehensive Spending Reviews reflect the Treasury's legitimate preoccupation with setting spending limits department by department. But there is insufficient understanding of the cross-departmental effects of investment decisions, and a lack of capacity to create genuinely cross-government financial plans. The comment made by John Manzoni, Civil Service Chief Executive, that "normally, in the headquarters of a company, […] parts of the Treasury and Cabinet Office […] would be in one headquarters [… which] makes it slightly more complex", shows that the present structure does not serve the interests of financial planning and management. Other governments including the federal governments of Canada and the United States have a single body to conduct financial planning. Some, like the think tank GovernUp, have recommended that functions from the Treasury and Cabinet Office should be combined in a new Office of Budget and Management. The present divide between the Treasury and Cabinet Office is a structural impediment to effective financial planning and management.

111   Cabinet Office (WFC12) Back

112   Cabinet Office, National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies, 2013 Back

113   Q 132. (The Department of Health and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs) Back

114   As above Back

115   Jill Rutter in Centre for Science and Policy, Future directions for scientific advice in Whitehall, April 2013 Back

116   James Wilsdon and Robert Doubleday in Centre for Science and Policy, Future directions for scientific advice in Whitehall, April 2013 Back

117   Cabinet Office, Horizon Scanning Programme Team, undated Back

118   Government Response to the Science and Technology Committee's Ninth Report of Session 2013-14, Government horizon scanning, HC 592 Back

119   Letter from Rt Hon Oliver Letwin MP to Andrew Miller MP, House of Commons Science and Technology Committee Legacy Report - Parliament 2010-2015 - Government Horizon Scanning, 8 December 2014; Cabinet Office, The Futures Toolkit: Tools for strategic futures for policy-makers and analysts, August 2014 Back

120   As above Back

121   Speaking at Westminster Higher Education Forum Keynote Seminar: Utilising academic research in policymaking - Horizon Scanning, trend analysis and engagement with academics and business, 25 November 2014 Back

122   Q 116 Back

123   Cabinet Office, Review of cross-government horizon scanning, January 2013 Back

124   Q 465 Back

125   Q 135-136 Back

126   Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (WFC14) Back

127   Q 154 Back

128   Academy of Social Sciences (WFC4) Back

129   Public Administration Select Committee, First Report of Session 2010-12, Who does UK National Strategy?, HC 435, October 2010 Back

130   Cabinet Office (WFC12) Back

131   Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Foresight projects, October 2013 and Science and Technology Committee Ninth Report of Session 2013-14, Government horizon scanning, HC 592, May 2014 Back

132   Cabinet Office (WFC12) Back

133   Science and Technology Committee Ninth Report of Session 2013-14, Government horizon scanning, HC 703, May 2014 Back

134   HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, October 2010 Back

135   Defence Committee, First Report of Session 2010-11, The Strategic Defence and Security Review, HC 345, September 2010 and Defence Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2010-11, The Strategic Defence and Security Review and the National Security Strategy, HC 761, August 2011 Back

136   As above Back

137   Sir Peter Luff, Decision Making in Defence Policy: Carriers Decisions, December 2014 Back

138   Defence Select Committee, Fifth Report of Session 2012-13, Future Maritime Surveillance, HC 110 [incorporating HC 1918-i of Session 2010-12], September 2012 Back

139   As above Back

140   Minutes of evidence taken before the Defence Select Committee, Future Force 2020, Q 333, HC512, December 2014  Back

141   Q 487 Back

142   Institute for Government, A programme for effective government, September 2014 Back

143   Roland Berger, Whither defence? Preparing for the next SDSR, November 2014 Back

144   Q 490 Back

145   Q 279 Back

146   Q 488 Back

147   Cabinet Office (WFC12) Back

148   As above Back

149   Cabinet Office, National security and intelligence, undated Back

150   Cabinet Office (WFC12) Back

151   Minutes of evidence taken before the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, National Security Strategy, Q 12, HC1040, January 2014 Back

152   As above Back

153   Q 132 Back

154   Informal evidence gathered on Committee visit to North America, November 2014 Back

155   Pandemic Flu Response Review Team/Cabinet Office, The 2009 Influenza Pandemic, July 2010 Back

156   Cabinet Office, National Security Council, undated Back

157   Public Administration Select Committee, First Report of Session 2010-12, Who does UK National Strategy?, HC 435, October 2010 and Public Administration Select Committee, Twenty-Fourth Report of Session 2010-12, Strategic thinking in Government: without National Strategy, can viable Government strategy emerge?, HC 1625, April 2012 Back

158   Public Administration Select Committee, Twenty-Fourth Report of Session 2010-12, Strategic thinking in Government: without National Strategy, can viable Government strategy emerge?, HC 1625, April 2012 Back

159   Cabinet Office, National security and intelligence, undated Back

160   'Government advisers say don't release new national security strategy in 2015', Civil Service World, 21 October 2014 Back

161   Ministry of Defence, Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, undated Back

162   As above Back

163   As above Back

164   Cabinet Office (WFC12) Back

165   Ministry of Defence, UK Defence Doctrine, November 2014 Back

166   Oral evidence taken on 24 May 2012, (2012-13), HC 113-i, Q 28 Back

167   Q 116 Back

168   Government Response to the Science and Technology Committee's Ninth Report of Session 2013-14, Government horizon scanning, HC 592 Back

169   Cabinet Office (WFC12) Back

170   Civil Service, Working for the Civil Service, undated Back

171   Minister for the Cabinet Office, Capabilities and Skills in the Civil Service, October 2014 Back

172   Cabinet Office, What Works Network, June 2013 Back

173   As above Back

174   Cabinet Office (WFC12) Back

175   As above Back

176   As above Back

177   Q 80 Back

178   Russell Group of Universities, Government horizon scanning, October 2013 Back

179   Academy of Social Sciences (WFC4) Back

180   As above Back

181   Public Administration Select Committee, Second Report of Session 2006-07, Governing the future, HC 123i, March 2007 Back

182   Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, Planned work, undated Back

183   Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, Futures and foresight, POST Note, May 2009 Back

184   Committee for the Future, Parliament of Finland, Presentation of the Committee, October 2014 Back

185   As above Back

186   Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, Futures and foresight, POST Note, May 2009 Back

187   http://scotlandfutureforum.org/ Back

188   Government Response to the Twenty Fourth Report of the Public Administration Select Committee, Strategic thinking in Government: without National Strategy, can viable Government strategy emerge?, Session 2010-12, HC 1625 Back

189   Cipfa (WFC16) Back

190   Chartered Institute of Public Finance & Accountancy, Cipfa Manifesto 2015, November 2014 Back

191   Q 281 and Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, The role and powers of the Prime Minister: The impact of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 on Government, Fourth Report of Session 2013-14, HC 440, July 2013 Back

192   Institute for Government, Preparing for the Next Spending Review A briefing note, September 2014 and Cipfa (WFC16) Back

193   Institute for Government, A programme for effective government, September 2014 Back

194   HM Treasury, Spending Review 2010, May 2013  Back

195   School of International Futures (WFC11) Back

196   Public Accounts Committee, Thirty-Fourth Report of Session 2012-13, Managing Budgeting in Government, HC 661, March 2013 Back

197   Q 475 Back

198   British Heart Foundation (WFC13) Back

199   As above Back

200   Q 248 Back

201   Q 482 Back

202   National Audit Office, Planning for the Better Care Fund, HC 781, November 2014 Back

203   As above Back

204   Q 482 Back

205   Academy of Social Sciences (WFC4) Back

206   Q 254 Back

207   NHS Litigation Authority Report and Accounts 2013-14, p10 (public sector pensions), p26 (nuclear decommissioning) and p59 (medical negligence) Back

208   HM Treasury, Whole of Government Accounts, June 2014 Back

209   National Audit Office, Whole of Government Accounts 2012-13, June 2014 Back

210   Cipfa (WFC16) Back

211   Public Administration Select Committee, Twenty-Fourth Report of Session 2010-12, Strategic thinking in Government: without National Strategy, can viable Government strategy emerge?, HC 1625, April 2012 Back

212   Q 291 Back

213   HM Treasury, Review of financial management in government, December 2013 Back

214   Oral evidence taken on 14 January 2015, (2014-15), HC 922, Q 14  Back

215   As above Back

216   Oral evidence taken on 14 January 2015, (2014-15), HC 922, Q 13 Back

217   Martin Wheatley, Repurposing Whitehall, GovernUp, 2015 Back

218   Congressional Research Service, Executive Budget Process: an overview, 2012, p2 Back

219   Committee visit to North America, November 2014 Back

220   Q 223  Back

221   Institute of Risk Management (WFC2) Back

222   Cabinet Office, Civil Service People Survey, November 2014 Back

223   Martin Wheatley, Repurposing Whitehall, GovernUp, 2015 Back

224   Institute for Government, Plenty of food for thought - but choose carefully from the menu, February 2015 Back

225   Armed Forces Parliamentary Scheme, www.af-ps.info, 2015 Back

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