8 Arms Control Agreements
Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)
204. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Arms
Trade Treaty (ATT) can be found at paragraphs 192-212 in Volume
II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees'
Conclusion and Recommendation at paragraphs 65 and 66 of the Report.
205. The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation
on the Arms Trade Treaty in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and
the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:
The Committees' Conclusion:
The Committees conclude that the adoption by
the UN of the first ever international arms trade treaty applying
to conventional arms as a whole in the Arms Trade Treaty of 2013
is most welcome and congratulates Ministers and their officials,
under both the previous Labour Government and the present Coalition
Government, on their contribution to this unprecedented international
achievement. The Committees also welcome the fact that the UK
was amongst the first of the countries to sign the Arms Trade
Treaty when it became open for signature on 3 June 2013. The Committees
recommend in its Response that the Government states by what date
the UK will also ratify the Treaty.[197]
The Government's Response:
The Government is proud of the achievement of
the Arms Trade Treaty and is grateful for the support received
from Members of both Houses during the negotiating process.
The UK plans to ratify the Treaty before the
end of the year, after the Treaty has completed 21 sitting days
before both Houses in line with the Constitutional Reform and
Governance Act 2010 (CRAG Act). The Treaty and an Explanatory
Memorandum were laid before Parliament under Command Paper number
8680 on 15 July.
Since parts of the Treaty are exclusive EU competence,
the European Commission has brought forward a Council Decision
authorising Member States to ratify. This Council Decision is
currently undergoing parliamentary scrutiny.[198]
The Committees' Recommendation:
The Committees further recommend that the Government
states in its Response:
a) what changes it will be making to its
arms export controls:
ii. secondary legislation;
iii. Government administrative procedures
and guidance; and
to ensure the UK Government is fully compliant
with all provisions in the Arms Trade Treaty stating, in each
case, the date the change will come into effect; and
b) what steps it will be taking to ensure
that the ratification of the Arms Trade Treaty by the minimum
of 50 countries necessary to bring it into force is achieved in
the shortest possible time.[199]
The Government's Response:
a) i. The UK already implements a robust
and effective system for control of transfers of conventional
arms. No primary legislation is required for UK ratification.
ii. The only changes to secondary legislation
required are described in the response to paragraph 40 [Cm 8707,
page 4] above.
iii. The treaty is consistent with our national
systems for control of transfers of conventional arms and will
be implemented through existing procedures.
iv. Government policy is unchanged;
we will continue to assess exports of conventional
arms on a case by case basis, against the Consolidated Criteria.
The Criteria will be updated as set out in the response to paragraph
46 [Cm 8707, page 8] above.
b) The UK is committed to bringing
the Arms Trade Treaty into force as soon as possible. We are lobbying
States at all levels to sign and ratify the ATT as a matter of
urgency. We are funding projects to promote the ATT, to assist
ratification and to support effective implementation. We will
also donate £100,000 to the United Nations Trust Facility
Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation that has been established
to support early ratification.[200]
206. In its Written Evidence UK Working Group welcomed
the fact that that the UK has commenced the ratification proceedings
in anticipation of EU procedures being completed and urged the
Government to maintain outreach to other states to sign and ratify
as soon as possible. It recommended that:
that the Government does everything possible
to strengthen the international norms embedded in the Treaty.
The UK should make the strongest possible interpretative statement
upon ratifying the Treaty, for example, making it clear that the
UK will continue to regulate a comprehensive list of arms, equipment
and munitions beyond the minimum scope allowed by the Treaty and
calling on other States Parties to do likewise.
It urged the UK Government to "work proactively
to ensure that as many States as possible are able to quickly
sign, ratify and begin to properly implement the Treaty."
UKWG believed that the UK Government should offer technical and
legal assistance to all states which may need it, to assist in
signing the Treaty and said that the UK should be a significant
donor for ATT implementation purposes and to encourage other states
to be generous in this regard.[201]
207. When the Committees asked UKWG about what new
legislation would be required in the UK to implement the ATT Oliver
Sprague, Amnesty International, answered that UKWG had not yet
seen the secondary legislation that would be introduced but understood
that the UK Government would be amending Category B of the current
brokering controls in order to be "more in line with the
ATT scope." He welcomed this amendment as it would mean that
a greater number of Category C goods would be moved to Category
B and they would be subject to full extra-territorial controls.
He added that there would be a secondary benefit which would be
helpful in policy terms. He stated:
It relates to issues of enforcementnot
only trafficking and brokering controls, but arguably in tackling
the brass-plate phenomenon, in that an operative provision in
the implementation section of the ATT requires all Governments
that are signatories to offer full co-operation in terms of legal
and investigative help.
It has been a problem in the past [...] that
it has been difficult to prosecute or to enforce some of these
controls because they involve overseas investigations, and it
is difficult to get information. The ATT therefore has a built-in
tool that will allow you to do that, because all signatory states
will be required to co-operate in those matters. I can see a future
benefit to the ATT in terms of the enforcement policy of UK controls
in that respect.[202]
Roy Isbister, Saferworld, thought that there would
be no change to primary legislation, but:
there are two elements within the criteria section
of the ATT that are slightly interesting when compared with UK
and EU controls, and those relate to gender-based violence and
transnational organised crime. It is arguable, but I think that
there could be some revision of language to reflect more accurately
what the Arms Trade Treaty says on those issues, but there is
still a bit of a conversation going on, certainly at the EU level,
on whether or not it should be changed.[203]
208. In the Westminster Hall debate on the Committees'
2013 Report the BIS Minister, Michael Fallon, said that "the
treaty will be relatively straightforward to ratify because we
already have a highly developed export control system." He
said that the Government hoped to complete the ratification in
the "next few months". The UK Government and its partners
were actively lobbying other governments to encourage them to
sign and ratify the ATT as soon as possible and hoped that the
Treaty would achieve the 50 ratifications that it needed to be
brought into force soon. He added that the UK Government was providing
funding to support states that needed to introduce new legislation
or regulations to bring their export controls up to the higher
standard required by the Treaty.[204]
209. Prior to his evidence session on 8 January 2014
the Foreign Secretary wrote to the Chairman of the Committees.
The relevant text relating to the Arms Trade Treaty was as follows:
Negotiations on the Arms Trade Treaty were successfully
concluded with the near-universal UN adoption of a robust and
effective text on 2 April. For the first time in history, this
Treaty sets clear, high, common standards for the regulation of
the trade in conventional arms globally. This could not have been
done without the combined effort of successive Governments, parliament
and civil society. I am most grateful for the support of your
Committees in our work to achieve this important goal. As the
Prime Minister said: "We should be proud of the role Britain
has played to secure this ambitious agreement, working with international
partners to secure this momentous step that will make our world
safer for all."
We are now working to secure the 50 ratifications
required to bring the Treaty into force as soon as possible. Nationally,
our Parliamentary procedures for ratification were completed on
4 November. The Department for Business, Innovation & Skills
are taking forward, in consultation with industry, a minor expansion
of our extra-territorial controls on brokering. Our ratification
will then only require authorisation from the European Council
(as the Treaty includes some matters of EU exclusive competence)
which we hope will be forthcoming before the Spring.
Internationally, we are encouraging other nations
to sign or ratify as soon as possible and providing assistance
where necessary: we have given £350,000 in this Financial
Year to help states implement the Treaty.
We will also update the Consolidated Criteria
to bring them fully into line with both the Arms Trade Treaty
and the EU Common Position. I will write to you on this in more
detail shortly. The update will clarify that we will not grant
a licence where there is a clear risk of serious violations of
international humanitarian law. We will also state that we will
take account of the risk of serious acts of gender based violence.
However, the updated criteria will not include
any change to the risk threshold for Criterion 2. We will continue
to apply the standard in the EU Common Position, as set out in
the current consolidated criteria: we will not grant a licence
if there is a clear risk that the items might be used for internal
repression.[205]
210. In the Oral Evidence session on 8 January 2014
The Foreign Secretary said that Parliament had completed its procedures
on 4 November 2013.[206]
He added that the UK Government could not ratify the Treaty until
agreement has been achieved in the European parliament because
the Treaty covers matters of EU competence. He did say, however,
that he expected ratification "by spring of this year [2014]."
He said that the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills
was leading on secondary legislation and that the current plan
was to "roll the amendments together with other changes,
such as the ones on the military list, and updates to the Consolidated
Criteria.[207]
211. On 25 March the Chairman of the Committees wrote
to the Foreign Secretary asking for further information in relation
to the Arms Trade Treaty. The Text of the Chairman's letter was
as follows:
I should be grateful if you could provide the
following information in relation to the Arms Trade Treaty:
1. The steps that have been taken by the
Government so far to achieve UK ratification of the Treaty.
2. The steps that remain to be taken and
the timetable for them.
3. Whether for UK ratification to have legal
effect in the UK, it is necessary for all other EU member states
to achieve ratification.
4. The Government's timetable for making
the changes in secondary legislation that will be required to
achieve full UK compliance in law with the terms of the Arms Trade
Treaty.[208]
212. On 2 April 2014 17 European Union Member States,
including the UK, ratified the Arms Trade Treaty, bringing the
total number of countries that had ratified the Treaty to 31.
Fifty countries are required to ratify the Treaty to bring it
into effect.[209] The
Foreign Secretary said in an FCO Press release said:
This Treaty will help make the world safer, by
placing human rights and international humanitarian law at the
heart of decisions about the arms trade. For the first time, countries
have agreed international rules governing everything from small
arms to warships. If these rules are implemented globally and
effectively, they have the power to stop the arms from reaching
terrorists and criminals, and fuelling conflict and instability
around the world.
Our work does not stop here. We urge other countries
- particularly the largest arms exporters - to ratify the Treaty
and ensure it enters into force as quickly as possible. We will
continue to support other nations in their plans to implement
the Treaty, and Mexico's efforts to plan the first Conference
of States Parties.[210]
213. The Foreign Secretary replied on 3 April to
the Chairman's letter of 25 March as follows:
Thank you for your letter of 25 March, asking
for additional information in relation to the Arms Trade Treaty
(ATT).
I am pleased to announce that on 27 March 2014
I signed the instrument of ratification, and on 2 April 2014 the
United Kingdom formally deposited its ratification of the Arms
Trade Treaty in New York. The ratification was marked by a joint
event in which we deposited our ratification alongside 16 EU Member
States and El Salvador, at a stroke more than doubling the total
number of ratifications which now stands at 31.
In terms of the domestic legislative and regulatory
steps needed to ensure the Treaty could enter into force in the
UK, two processes have taken place. On 19 March the Department
for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) laid before Parliament
and Order amending UK trade (brokering) controls to ensure that
they are fully compliant with Article 10 of the ATT. The Export
Control (Amendment) Order 2014 (S.I. 2014 No. 702) adds to
Category B of the trade controls those items listed in Article
2.1 of the ATT that are not already included in Category B, namely:
battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles; large calibre artillery
systems; combat aircraft and attack helicopters; certain warships;
and certain missiles and their launchers. As a result, brokering
of these items by UK persons will be subject to control wherever
in the world those persons are located. The amending Order comes
into force on 9 April.
On 25 March an update to the Consolidated EU
and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria was announced to Parliament
in a Written Ministerial Statement by the Secretary of State for
Business, Innovation and Skills, Dr Vince Cable. This was necessary
before ratification to ensure the UK was compliant with provisions
of the ATT such as Article 7(4), which obliges State Parties to
take into account the risk of conventional arms being used to
commit or facilitate serious acts of Gender based Violence. The
update also brings the Criteria into line with EU Common Position
2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports
of military technology and equipment.
These two changes are sufficient to ensure the
UK export control policy and practice are fully compliant with
the provisions of the ATT.
The UK does not require other EU Member States
to ratify in order for the Treaty to have legal effect in the
UK. This is because the UK has signed up to the Treaty as a State.
The ATT cleared parliamentary scrutiny under the Constitutional
Reform and Governance Act (CRaG) on 5 November 2013. But we were
unable to ratify until we received authorisation from the EU Council
of Ministers. This was necessary because the Treaty is mixed competence
(it covers issues of trade for which the EU has competence). The
Plenary of the European Parliament voted on this on 5 February
2014. The majority of MEPs voted in support of ratification. The
Council decision was approved by the Council of Ministers on 3
March.
The UK is ready for entry into force of the Treaty
(which will happen ninety days after 50 ratifications have been
deposited). The collective ratification event on 2 April has brought
this closer and the UK is rightly proud of its role. We will,
of course, continue to encourage states to sign and ratify the
Treaty so that it can enter into force soon and start having a
substantive impact on arms flows around the world.
I would like to extend my thanks and the warm
appreciation that the Foreign Office has for the role that Parliament
and the CAEC have played in supporting and canvassing for this
Treaty. The unified front of civil society, government, industry
and Parliament enabled the UK to lead convincingly and from the
outset of the process.[211]
214. I propose that the Committees conclude that
the Government's ratification of the Arms Trade Treaty is welcome.
215. I propose that the Committees recommend that
the Government states in its Response:
a) the total number of ratifications now achieved
and the countries who have ratified;
b) the countries which the Government considers
to be the 20 largest arms exporters in view of the Foreign Secretary's
statement on 2 April 2014 that the UK Government would be urging
the largest arms exporters to ratify; and
c) the specific steps the Government is taking
both bilaterally and internationally to persuade individual countries
to ratify the Arms Trade Treaty with particular reference to non-ratifying
P5 countries and countries amongst the largest arms exporters.
EU Council Common Position
216. On December 2008, the EU Council agreed a Common
Position (2008/944/CFSP) defining common rules governing control
of exports of military technology and equipment with which all
EU Member States should comply. The EU Common Position provides
some degree of protection for the UK defence industry from having
its competiveness undermined by other EU Member States whose governments
might otherwise have a less stringent policy on prohibiting arms
exports which might violate human rights, facilitate internal
repression or promote armed conflict than the UK Government. The
full text of the EU Council Common Position is set out in Annex
4.
217. The Chairman of the Committees in submitting
the Committees' response to the Balance of Competencies Review
highlighted the importance of this aspect of the EU Common Position.
The Committees' response letter of 20 August 2013 stated:
Without such EU-wide controls and policies, UK
arms exporters would be placed at a competitive disadvantage to
arms exporters from other EU Member States who had laxer national
controls and policies than those of the UK Government.
218. I propose that the Committees recommend that
the Government when considering its future policy towards the
EU should have in mind the significance of the EU Common Position
in helping to maintain a fair competitive position in the EU for
the UK defence industry.
Cluster Munitions
219. The Committees' previous scrutiny of cluster
munitions can be found at paragraphs 213-225 in Volume II of the
Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Conclusion
and Recommendation at paragraph 67 of the Report.
220. The Committees' Recommendation on cluster munitions
in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response
(Cm8707) were as follows:
The Committees' Recommendation:
The Committees recommend that in its Response
the Government states:
a) how many countries have now signed the Convention
on Cluster Munitions and which countries it is currently urging
to become signatories;
b) how many countries have now ratified the Convention
and which of the countries that are now only signatories it is
currently urging to ratify the Convention;
c) what steps it is taking to encourage the United
States, Russia, China and Israel to become signatories and/or
to ratify the Convention;
d) whether the Government is satisfied or not
with the progress by the financial institutions in producing voluntary
codes of conduct against the indirect financing of the production
of cluster munitions and their components; and
e) whether the Government continues to consider
a Government Code of Conduct or Government legislation against
the indirect financing of the production of cluster munitions
and their components as policy options.[212]
The Government's Response:
a) and b) An up to date list of all the countries
that have signed and ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions
can be found here.
http://unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/67DC5063EB530E02C12574F8002E9E
49?OpenDocument
c) The Government believes that active diplomatic
efforts by the UK and other states to globalise the Convention
and support clearance work in affected countries are the areas
in which the UK Government can add most value to our shared goal
of globalising the ban on cluster munitions and tackling their
humanitarian impact. We will continue to use all appropriate bilateral
and multilateral opportunities to promote the universalisation
of the Convention and its ambition of a world free of cluster
munitions.
d) and e) Indirect financing - such as the purchase
of shares in or the provision of loans to large multinational
conglomerates that amongst often many other activities may be
involved in the manufacture of cluster munitions - is not captured
by the prohibitions of the Act. We consider this form of indirect
financing an issue for individual institutions to consider under
their own investment charters and social corporate responsibility
agendas.[213]
221. Following publication of the Government's
United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012 the
Committees wrote to the Government asking a question about cluster
munitions. The question and answer were as follows:
The Committees' question:
Is the UK Government still on track to destroy
the remainder of its cluster munitions by the end of 2013?
Yes, as stated at the Fourth Meeting of States
Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Lusaka in September.[214]
222. The Fourth Meeting of States Parties (4MSP)
took place in Lusaka, Zambia, from 9 to 13 September 2013 and
gathered some 464 delegates from 58 States parties, 18 Signatory
states, 30 Observer states and 12 international organizations.[215]
The main outcomes of the Meeting were:
· that
the meeting welcomed progress in implementing the Vientianne Action
Plan;
· recognised
the crucial role of timely and efficient clearance of areas contaminated
by cluster munition remnants;
· recognised
the importance of identifying all cluster munition contaminated
areas;
· recognised
that transparency of national reporting was an obligation and
important tool in the promotion of the Convention; and
· agreement
that the formation of the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) would
commence immediately (however a decision on the funding model
for the ISU was delayed until the next meeting).[216]
223. In its Written Evidence UKWG expressed concern
that the Government appeared to have rejected its previous commitment
to end indirect investments in cluster-munition producers.
224. UKWG informed the Committees that an increasing
number of UK-based financial institutions continued to strengthen
their policies on investments in companies involved in the production
of cluster munitions. In discussions between financial institutions
and members of UKWG, it said that all companies had strongly supported
the idea of a jointly-developed, industry-wide Code of Conduct
to end indirect finance and had expressed disappointment that
thus far the Government appeared to have abandoned previous commitments
to help to facilitate its development. UKWG considered that it
is important that the Government engaged with financial institutions
and non-governmental organisations through a multi-stakeholder
process to provide guidance. It said that financial institutions
had indicated that they would benefit from government guidance
and leadership on this issue to harmonise policies and practice.[217]
225. In Oral Evidence Oliver Sprague, Amnesty International,
informed the Committees that:
The previous Government committed themselves
to developing with civil society and financial institutions a
voluntary code of conduct to end the practice of indirect financing
of cluster munitions. When in Opposition, the current Government
tabled a specific amendment in the House of Lords to ensure that
indirect financing was captured under the terms of the Act. They
withdrew that amendment because agreement was reached on a ministerial
statement on the need to develop a voluntary code of conduct.
In other words, when it was announced that a voluntary code of
conduct would be developed and that the Government would seek
to work with civil society and the industry to develop that, the
amendment was withdrawn.
All parties at the time recognised that indirect
finance was a problem that needed to be tackled, and we remain
disappointed that the current Government have not honoured that
commitment and have left it up to the banks to develop their own
code of conduct. I have met representatives of a number of high
street banksa month ago, I was in the offices of a very
large household name that has revised and strengthened its policy,
and its message to me was simple. The banks are crying out for
the Government to get together with all the financial institutions
and civil society NGOs to start the process, because they think
that developing policies in these tricky areas in isolation is
not helpful. What is needed is everybody to get together, because
each financial institution will have a different set of problems
that it needs to address, as it is a complicated area.[218]
226. UKWG called for the setting up of a meeting
of all relevant parties to "thrash out some of the issues."
When asked which would be the lead Department Oliver Sprague told
the Committees that it would be the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
because it was dealing with international treaties. He added that
as the issue touched on financial issues that the Treasury might
also be involved in any future discussions on the indirect financing
of cluster munitions.[219]
227. When the Committees asked the Foreign Secretary
about the Government's policy on developing a code of conduct
on the indirect financing of cluster munitions he replied:
On cluster munitions, [...] direct financing
is clearly prohibited; indirect financing is not. We think that
a voluntary approach is preferable to Government intervention,
but we do not rule out, as I think I said last year, the Government's
taking a more active role. I would like to see how things develop.
I welcome the steps taken on a voluntary basis by a number of
British financial institutions, but we will continue to monitor
this closely. We will look at it again with the financial sector,
if necessary, to see when and whether there is scope and need
for the Government to act.[220]
228. I propose that the Committees conclude that
the Evidence they have received clearly points to both financial
institutions and civil society NGOs wishing to see the Government
involved in developing a code of conduct on the indirect financing
of cluster munitions.
229. I propose that the Committees recommend that
in the light of the Foreign Secretary's statement to the Committees
that: "We will look at it again with the financial sector,
if necessary, to see when and whether there is scope and need
for the Government to act.", the Government states in its
Response whether it will act in helping to develop a Code of Conduct
on the indirect financing of cluster munitions.
Small Arms and Light Weapons
(SALW)
230. The Committees' previous scrutiny of small arms
and light weapons (SALW) can be found at paragraphs 226-230 in
Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the
Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 68 of the Report.
231. The Committees' Recommendation on the Small
Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in their 2013 Report (HC 205)
and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:
The Committees' Recommendation:
The Committees recommend that the Government
states in its Response:
a) what steps it is taking to achieve full
implementation of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat
and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons
in All its Aspects;
b) what steps it is taking to achieve full
implementation of the EU's Small Arms and Light Weapons Strategy;
and
c) how far the UN Programme and the EU Strategy
will, or will not, be superseded by the small arms and light weapons
elements of the Arms Trade Treaty when it comes into force.[221]
The Government's Response:
a) The UK remains firmly committed to achieving
full implementation of the UN Programme of Action to prevent,
combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light
weapons in all its aspects. The UK contributes by funding programmes
through the EU, DfID and NGOs, supporting projects to destroy
existing stockpiles and provide secure storage, and by funding
education.
b) The UK remains firmly committed to achieving
full implementation of the EU's Small Arms and Light Weapons Strategy.
The introduction of the EU strategy outlines the relationship
between itself and the United Nations Programme of Action on small
arms and light weapons:
"The United Nations Programme of Action
to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms
and light weapons in all its aspects, adopted on 20 July 2001,
reaffirms the need for complementarity at global, regional and
national levels in its implementation. By developing a strategy
for combating the accumulation of and illicit trade in SALW and
their ammunition, the EU wishes to fall into line with this essential
complementarity and to provide a contribution."
c) It is difficult to prejudge the impact
of the Arms Trade Treaty on existing arms control provisions.
We believe that the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light
Weapons and the EU Strategy on Small Arms and Light Weapons are
complementary and mutually reinforcing. We hope that as States
Parties implement the Arms Trade Treaty they will draw on these
and other existing instruments to ensure robust controls.[222]
232. Following publication of the Government's United
Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012 the Committees
wrote to the Government asking two questions about small arms
and light weapons. The questions and answers were as follows:
The Committees' question:
What progress has been made in enhancing the
implementation of the International Tracing Instrument to promote
international co-operation in marking and tracing illicit Small
Arms and Light Weapons?
The UN Programme of Action Review Conference
held in August 2012 agreed an Implementation Plan for the International
Tracing Instrument (ITI) for the period 2012-2018. At the Review
Conference, States resolved to increase their efforts to achieve
full and effective implementation of the ITI. More details about
the Implementation Plan can be found at http://www.poa-iss.org/RevCon2/Documents/RevCon-DOC/CRP3-ITI-IP.pdf
The Committees' question:
Has a voluntary sponsorship fund to boost assistance
to less developed states in dealing with illicit Small Arms and
Light Weapons been established? If so, what is the size of the
fund and what amount has the British Government contributed to
it?
A voluntary fund to boost assistance to less
developed states in dealing with illicit small arms and light
weapons has been established. The UK has pledged to donate
£100,000 to the United Nations Trust Facility Supporting
Cooperation on Arms Regulation (UNSCAR) and has allocated a further
£250,000 to fund projects devoted to supporting ATT implementation.
The EU will also provide considerable funding to support ATT implementation.[223]
233. The Fifth Biennial Meeting of States to Consider
Implementation of the Programme of Action (the Fifth Biennial
Meeting of States) will take place in New York from 16 - 20 June
2014. The meeting will include a segment on the International
Tracing Instrument, a separate instrument agreed to by Member
States in 2005 on the marking and tracing of small arms.[224]
234. I propose that the Committees recommend that
the Government states in its Response what were its objectives
at the Fifth Biennial Meeting in New York in June 2014 to consider
Implementation of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat
and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons
in All its Aspects, together with the International Tracing Instrument,
and how far progress was made with each of those objectives or
not.
Landmines
235. The Committees' previous scrutiny of landmines
can be found at paragraphs 231-234 in Volume II of the Committees'
previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at
paragraph 69 of the Report.
236. The Committees' Recommendation on landmines
in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response
(Cm8707) were as follows:
The Committees' Recommendation:
The Committees recommend in its Response that
the Government states:
a) which countries have yet to accede to the
Ottawa Landmines Convention; and
b) what steps it is taking to try to secure
the accession of the remaining countries to the Convention.[225]
The Government's Response:
a) An up to date list of all the countries
that have signed and ratified the Convention on Anti-Personnel
Landmines can be found here.
http://unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/6E65F97C9D695724C12571C0003D0
9EF?OpenDocument
b) The Government continues to use all appropriate
bilateral and multilateral opportunities to promote the universalisation
of the Convention and its ambition of a world free of anti-personnel
landmines.[226]
237. Following publication of the Government's United
Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012 the Committees
wrote to the Government asking a question about landmines. The
question and answer were as follows:
The Committees' question:
What is the area of land in the Falkland Islands
that is still to be cleared of mines and unexploded ordnance and
then released?
There are around 20,000 landmines remaining,
covering an area of approximately 20km2.[227]
238. I propose that the Committees recommend that
the Government states in its Response the countries which have
significant holdings of anti-personnel landmines and have not
signed and ratified the Ottawa Landmines Convention. I propose
that the Committees further recommend that the Government states
in its Response what specific steps it is taking with each of
those countries to secure their ratification of the Landmines
Convention.
Barrel bombs
239. On 28 April 2014 the Chairman of the Committees
wrote to the Foreign Secretary asking if the use of barrel bombs
was contrary to international law. The text of the letter was
as follows:
Please could you state whether the Government
considers that the use of barrel bombs is contrary to international
law, and, if so, please could you also state the provisions in
question.
If not, please could you state whether the Government
would be willing to press for barrel bombs to be brought within
the ambit of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons or
any other international arms control agreement..[228]
The Foreign Secretary replied on 19 May 2014 as follows:
Thank you for your letter of 28 April on the
subject of barrel bombs, and their position under international
law.
There have been regular reports of the use of
barrel bombs by the regime of President Assad in Syria. I raised
the issue on 22 February this year, following a UN Security Council
resolution to allow greater humanitarian access to Syria. I called
on the Assad regime top cease the indiscriminate use of aerial
bombardment across Syria, including the barbaric use of barrel
bombs, and immediately adhere to the obligations set by the Security
Council and allow free and unfettered access for all humanitarian
agencies.
Behind my statement was a condemnation of the
flagrant abuse of the principles of International Humanitarian
Law, specifically regarding the indiscriminate use of weapons,
and the deliberate targeting of civilians and civilian objects.
A barrel bomb, or indeed any weapon, is used unlawfully if it
is deliberately targeted at civilians or civilian objects, or
used in an indiscriminate, disproportionate fashion with insufficient
precautions taken in attack. However, in principle the air-delivery
of weapons is no less capable of being carried out indiscriminately
than any other means of delivery.
HMG does not consider that barrel bombs as a
category of conventional weapon are specifically prohibited under
international law. There may nonetheless be circumstances in which
a barrel bomb or other improvised explosive device is equipped
with chemical weapons, in which case the use of such would be
prohibited in all circumstances under the Chemical Weapons Convention.
HMG does not currently have any plans to bring the issue of barrel
bombs to the UN Convention on certain Conventional Weapons, or
any other fora.
We will continue to condemn President Assad's
flagrant abuses of international humanitarian law, including the
deliberate targeting of civilians and civilian objects.[229]
240. I propose that the Committees conclude that,
like cluster munitions and anti-personnel landmines, barrel bombs
have been used indiscriminately against civilians.
241. I propose that the Committees recommend that
as the use of cluster munitions and anti-personnel landmines has
been banned under international Conventions, the Government should
reconsider its position that "it does not currently have
any plans to bring the issue of barrel bombs to the UN Convention
on Certain Conventional Weapons or any other fora."
The Wassenaar Arrangement
242. The Wassenaar Arrangement was established in
order to contribute to regional and international security and
stability, by promoting transparency and greater responsibility
in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies,
thus preventing destabilising accumulations. Participating States
seek, through their national policies, to ensure that transfers
of these items do not contribute to the development or enhancement
of military capabilities which undermine these goals, and are
not diverted to support such capabilities. The decision to transfer
or deny transfer of any item is the sole responsibility of each
Participating State. All measures with respect to the Arrangement
are taken in accordance with national legislation and policies
and are implemented on the basis of national discretion.
243. Representatives of Participating States meet
regularly in Vienna where the Wassenaar Arrangement's Secretariat
is located. The Participating States of the Wassenaar Arrangement
are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada,
Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia,
South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United
Kingdom and United States.[230]
244. The name comes from Wassenaar, a town located
in a suburb of the Hague, Netherlands, where an agreement was
reached in 1995 to start a new type of multilateral co-operation.[231]
245. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Wassenaar
Arrangement can be found at paragraphs 235-240 in Volume II of
the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees'
Recommendation at paragraph 70 of the Report.
246. The Committees' Recommendation on the Wassenaar
Arrangement in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's
Response (Cm8707) were as follows:
The Committees' Conclusion:
The Committees recommend that the Government in its
Response states:
a) how far its objectives for the Wassenaar Arrangement
were fulfilled at the Plenary meeting in December 2012;
b) what steps it is taking to encourage China
to make an application for membership of the Wassenaar Arrangement;
and
c) which other significant arms exporting countries,
in addition to China, should desirably become members of the Wassenaar
Arrangement;
d) what the Government wishes to see achieved
at the Wassenaar Arrangement Plenary meeting in December 2013;
and
e) what outcome the Government wishes to
see from the review of the Wassenaar Arrangement export control
lists and what input it will be making to this review. [232]
The Government's Response:
a) The Government was satisfied with the
outcome of the December 2012 Plenary meeting as outlined in its
Annual Report on Strategic Export Controls published on 12 July.
Securing agreement for a strategic look at issues related to the
regime's future membership in 2013 was a significant achievement
at the December 2012 Plenary. This represented the culmination
of several months of collaborative work led by the UK. We were
pleased that the States that participate in the Wassenaar Arrangement
welcomed the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty. The Government
hopes that the Arrangement will play a useful role in the effective
implementation of this new treaty.
b) The Government supports the continuing
efforts of Ambassador Griffiths, Head of the Wassenaar Arrangement
Secretariat, in this area, which were outlined in the Foreign
Secretary's letter to the Committees of 8 April. China has yet
to respond formally to Ambassador Griffiths.
c) The Foreign Secretary's letter of 8 April
outlined the UK position, which is that the Government considers
it is desirable for all the major arms exporters and technology
holders to be within the Arrangement. However not all Participating
States are in favour of a significantly expanded membership. Furthermore,
not all major arms exporters/technology holders currently wish
to join the Arrangement. This highlights the importance of the
strategic look at membership agreed at the December 2012 Plenary.
d) As in previous years the Government will
use the opportunity of the plenary in December to work with other
Participating States to ensure the Arrangement continues to fulfil
its aims:
a. ensuring that transfers of conventional arms
and transfers in dual-use goods and technologies are carried out
responsibly and in furtherance of international and regional peace
and security;
b. enabling the exchange of information that
will enhance transparency;
c. enhancing cooperation between Participating
States.
e) The Government looks forward to the strategic
and comprehensive review of the control lists as an opportunity
to ensure that the lists remain coherent and clear for the exporters
and government officials who use them on a daily basis. At the
same time, the Government wants to ensure that the control lists
keep pace with technology as it develops, proposing new controls
as appropriate or amending or deleting existing controls that
no longer have strategic relevance, as we have done in previous
years.[233]
247. Following publication of the Government's United
Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012 the Committees
wrote to the Government asking a question about the Wassenaar
Arrangement. The question and answer were as follows:
The Committees' question:
What are the specific issues relating to the
future membership of the Wassenaar Arrangement at which participating
states will be looking at in 2013?
The Government's Response to the Committees'
Annual Report (Cm 8707) and the Foreign Secretary's letter of
8 April provided an update on membership issues. The General
Working Group is being held on 21-24 October and the Plenary will
be held in December. We will update the Committees in 2014.[234]
248. The 19th Plenary meeting of the Wassenaar Arrangement
was held in Vienna on 3-4 December 2013. The Public Statement
issued at the conclusion of the Plenary session stated that Participating
States had agreed to "conduct further work on addressing
new challenges, including emerging technologies of concern, to
keep pace with advances in technology, research and innovation."
The Participating States had worked to make the existing control
lists more readily understood and user-friendly for licensing
authorities and exporters. Progress had been made on a comprehensive
and systematic review of the Wassenaar Lists. New export controls
had been agreed in a number of areas, including surveillance and
law enforcement/intelligence gathering tools and Internet Protocol
network surveillance systems or equipment, which may be detrimental
to international and regional security and stability.[235]
249. I propose that the Committees recommend that
the Government provides the Committees with its promised update
on Wassenaar Arrangement membership issues no later than in its
Response to this Report.
250. I propose that the Committees further recommend
that the Government states in it Response:
a) whether the comprehensive review of the
Wassenaar controls list has now been completed or is still on-going;
and
b) whether the Wassenaar Arrangement's new
export controls on surveillance and law enforcement/intelligence
gathering tools and Internet Protocol network surveillance systems
or equipment require any amendments to UK primary or secondary
legislation to ensure UK compliance.
The UN Register of Conventional
Arms (UNROCA)
251. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the UN
Register of Conventional Weapons (UNROCA) can be found at paragraphs
241-244 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205),
and the Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation at paragraph
71 of the Report.
252. The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation
on the UN Register of Conventional Weapons in their 2013 Report
(HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:
The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation:
The Committees conclude that the Government is
right to include in its annual report for the UN Register of Conventional
Arms Government military equipment it gifts, as well as sells,
to other States, and recommends that it encourages other Governments
to do likewise. The Committees recommend that the Government states
in its Response what progress it is making in widening the categories
of military equipment that are to be reported to the UN Register
of Conventional Arms.[236]
The Government's Response:
The Government notes the Committees' conclusion.
The UK continues to advocate a widening and broadening
of the categories. We will continue to do so each time the Group
of Governmental Experts (GGE) sits to evaluate the Register.[237]
253. Following publication of the 2012 UNROCA report
the Committees undertook and analysis of the UK's reported information.
Following the analysis the Committees asked the UK Government
a series of questions about apparent discrepancies between the
UNROCA report figures and the ECO quarterly reports of approved
arms export licences. The Committees' questions were as follows:
Ghana: The Committees would like an explanation
for the apparent discrepancy between the Pivot reports for the
number of sniper rifles approved for export in the Pivot reports
for the Q1 2010 - Q4 2012 and the Government's return to the UN
Register of Conventional Weapons (UNROCA) for 2012. The Pivot
reports indicate that there were SIELs for 30 sniper rifles approved
during this period, however the figure given in the UNROCA report
for 2012 lists a total of 4080 sniper rifles exported to Ghana
from the UK in that year.
Madagascar: The Committees would like
an explanation for the apparent discrepancy between the pivot
reports for the number of combat shotguns, rifles and assault
rifles approved for export in the Pivot reports for the Q1 2010
- Q4 2012 and the Government's return to the UN Register of Conventional
Weapons (UNROCA) for 2012. The pivot reports indicate that there
were SIELs for 750 (+ one unspecified quantity) combat shotguns,
1100 rifles and 3850 assault rifles approved during this period,
however the figures given in the UNROCA report for 2012 lists
a total of 1300 combat shotguns, 1500 rifles and 5850 assault
rifles exported to Madagascar from the UK in that year.
Maldives: The Committees would like an
explanation for the apparent discrepancy between the Pivot reports
for the number of combat shotguns, rifles, assault rifles and
pistols approved for export in the Pivot reports for the Q1 2010
- Q4 2012 and the Government's return to the UN Register of Conventional
Weapons (UNROCA) for 2012. The Pivot reports indicate that there
were SIELs for 360 combat shotguns, 1570 rifles, 4850 assault
rifles and 380 pistols approved during this period, however the
figures given in the UNROCA report for 2012 lists a total of 1350
combat shotguns, 4390 rifles, 10500 assault rifles and 1230 pistols
exported to the Maldives from the UK in that year.
Mauritius: The Committees would like an
explanation for the apparent discrepancy between the Pivot reports
for the number of combat shotguns, rifles, assault rifles and
pistols approved for export in the Pivot reports for the Q1 2010
- Q4 2012 and the Government's return to the UN Register of Conventional
Weapons (UNROCA) for 2012. The Pivot reports indicate that there
were SIELs for 560 combat shotguns, 3434 rifles, 6743 assault
rifles and 565 pistols approved during this period, however the
figures given in the UNROCA report for 2012 lists a total of 1354
combat shotguns, 5408 rifles, 10978 assault rifles and 1560 pistols
exported to Mauritius from the UK in that year.
Oman: The Committees would like an explanation
for the apparent discrepancy between the Pivot reports for the
number of combat shotguns, rifles, assault rifles and pistols
approved for export in the Pivot reports for the Q1 2010 - Q4
2012 and the Government's return to the UN Register of Conventional
Weapons (UNROCA) for 2012. The Pivot reports indicate that there
were SIELs for 1320 combat shotguns, 3575 rifles, 6441 assault
rifles and 1151 pistols (+one unspecified quantity) approved during
this period, however the figures given in the UNROCA report for
2012 lists a total of 1600 combat shotguns, 6270 rifles, 12957
assault rifles and 2245 pistols exported to Oman from the UK in
that year.
South Africa: The Committees would like
an explanation for the apparent discrepancy between the Pivot
reports for the number of shotguns, rifles, assault rifles and
pistols approved for export in the Pivot reports for the Q1 2010
- Q4 2012 and the Government's return to the UN Register of Conventional
Weapons (UNROCA) for 2012. The Pivot reports indicate that there
were SIELs for 487 shotguns, 3700 rifles, 6545 assault rifles
and 810 pistols approved during this period, however the figures
given in the UNROCA report for 2012 lists a total of 950 shotguns,
5501 rifles, 10319 assault rifles and 1352 pistols exported to
South Africa from the UK in that year.[238]
The Government answers were as follows:
Ghana: Both the Government's pivot reports
and the returns to UNROCA are based on the quantities of small
arms licensed in the specified periods. The reported quantities
should therefore be consistent in both reports. However the two
reports are compiled using different procedures and we have identified
a technical error which has led to errors in a small number of
cases, as explained below.
The figure of 20 sniper rifles in the
Government's pivot reports is correct (under "Mil" 20
x 1 licence). The figure in the UNROCA report is incorrect. We
have informed UNROCA of the discrepancy and they confirmed they
will correct the Report.
Madagascar: Please see the Government's
response to your question for Ghana on the type of data we report
to UNROCA being based on the quantities of small arms licensed
in the specified periods.
We have reviewed the data and found the following:
For combat shotguns the correct figure is 1500
units. Under "Mil" the unspecified licence has been
amended to 200 and this will show up in our next quarterly pivot
release. Other licences to tally in the pivot report under "Mil"
include 150 x 8 licences and 100 x 1 licence. We have amended
our records and informed UNROCA of the discrepancy;
For rifles, both reports are correct and show
a figure of 1500 units (tally under "Mil" 200 x 6 licences
and 100 x 1 licence; under "Mil & Other" 100 x 2
licences);
For assault rifles, both reports are correct
and show a figure of 5850 units (tally under "Mil" 150
x 1 licence, 200 x 3 licences; 300 x 2 licences, 350 x 1 licence,
450 x 1 licence, 600 x 5 licences; under "Mil and Other"
200 x 2 licences and 300 x 1 licence).
Maldives: Please see the Government's
response to your question for Ghana on the type of data we report
to UNROCA being based on the quantities of small arms licensed
in the specified periods.
We reviewed the data and found the figures in
both the Government's pivot reports and the UNROCA Report to be
correct, as follows:
For combat shotguns, both reports show a figure
of 1350 units (tally under "Mil" 150 x 8 licences, 100
x 1 licence, 50 x 1 licence)
For rifles, both reports show a figure of 4390
units (tally under "Mil" 40 x 1 licence, 100 x 5 licences,
150 x 3 licences, 200 x 6 licences, 300 x 2 licences; under "Mil
and Other" 100 x 16 licences)
For assault rifles, both reports show a figure
of 10,500 units (tally under "Mil" 100 x 2 licences,
150 x 2 licences; 200 x 1 licences, 300 x 1 licences, 350 x 2
licences, 400 x 1 licence, 450 x 3 licences, 600 x 4 licences,
700 x 1 licence, 750 x 1 licence; under "Mil and Other"
200 x 16 licences)
For pistols, both reports show a figure of 1230
units (tally under "Mil" 30 x 6 licences, 50 x 1 licence,
100 x 2 licences; under "Mil & Other" 50 x 16 licences)
Mauritius: Please see the Government's
response to your question for Ghana on the type of data we report
to UNROCA being based on the quantities of small arms licensed
in the specified periods.
We reviewed the data and found the figures in
both the Government's pivot reports and the UNROCA Report to be
correct, as follows:
For combat shotguns, both reports show a figure
of 1354 units (tally under "Mil" 50 X 1 licence, 150
x 6 licences, 200 x 2 licences, 4 x 1 licence for smoothbore weapon.
Please note UNROCA do not have a smoothbore weapon category and
it was therefore added as a combat shotgun to ensure it was reported);
For rifles, both reports show a figure of 5408
units (tally under "Mil" 3 x 1 licence, 5 x 1 licence,
6 x 1 licence, 40 x 1 licence, 100 x 3 licences, 150 x 1 licence,
200 x 5 licence, 204 x 1 licence, 300 x 2 licences, 800 x 1 licence;
under "Mil and Other" 100 x 23 licences);
For assault rifles, both reports show a figure
of 10978 units (tally under "Mil" 9 x 1 licence, 100
x 3 licences, 200 x 2 licences, 300 x 3 licences, 350 x 1 licence,
569 x 1 licence, 600 x 4 licences, 700 x 1 licence, 800 x 1 licence;
under "Mil and Other" section 175 x 2 licences, 200
x 19 licences, 400 x 1 licence);
For pistols, both reports show a figure of 1560
units (tally under "Mil" 30 x 6 licences, 50 x 1 licence,
80 x 1 licence,100 x 2 licences; under "Mil and Other"
50 x 21 licences).
Oman: Please see the Government's response
to your question for Ghana on the type of data we report to UNROCA
being based on the quantities of small arms licensed in the specified
periods.
We have reviewed the data and found the following:
For combat shotguns, the figures in the Government's
pivot reports and the UNROCA report are correct. Both reports
show a figure of 1600 units (tally under "Mil" 50 X
1 licence, 100 x 2 licences, 150 x 5 licences, and 200 x 3 licences);
For rifles, the figure of 6420 in the Government's
pivot reports is correct (tally under "Mil" 40 x 1 licence,
50 x 1 licence, 100 x 7 licences, 150 x 3 licences, 200 x 8 licences;
under "Mil & Other" 80 x 1 licence, 100 x 35 licences).
The figure in the UNROCA report is incorrect. We have informed
UNROCA of the discrepancy and they confirmed they will make the
necessary corrections;
For assault rifles, the figure of 13107 in the
Government's pivot reports is correct (tally under "Mil"
7 x 1 licence, 100 x 5 licences, 150 x 4 licences, 200 x 3 licences,
300 x 3 licences, 350 x 1 licence, 400 x 1 licence, 600 x 4 licences;
under "Mil & Other" 100 x 1 licence, 175 x 2 licences,
200 x 33 licences, 300 x 1 licence). The figure in the UNROCA
report is incorrect. We have informed UNROCA of the discrepancy
and they confirmed they will make the necessary corrections;
For pistols, both reports show a figure of 2245
units (tally under "Mil" 2 X 1 licence, 4 x 1 licence,
19 x 1 licence, 30 x 3 licences, 50 x 1 licence, 80 x 1 licence
and 100 x 2 licences; under "Mil & Other" 50 x 36
licences).
South Africa: Please see the Government's
response to your question for Ghana on the type of data we report
to UNROCA being based on the quantities of small arms licensed
in the specified periods.
We reviewed the data and found the figures in
both the Government's pivot reports and the UNROCA Report to be
correct, as follows:
For shotguns, both reports have a figure of 950
units (tally under "Mil" 50 X 1 licence and 150 x 6
licences);
For rifles, both reports have a figure of 5501
units (tally under "Mil" 1 X 1 licence, 100 x 6 licences,
150 x 2 licences, 200 x 6 licences, 350 x 2 licences, 1000 x 1
licence; under "Mil & Other" 100 x 17 licences);
For assault rifles, both reports have a figure
of 10319 units (tally under "Mil" 2 X 1 licence, 10
x 1 licence, 12 x 1 licence, 20 x 1 licence, 100 x 3 licences,
150 x 6 licences, 200 x 2 licences, 300 x 2 licences, 350 x 1
licence, 400x 1 licence, 450 x 1 licence, 500 x 1 licence, 800
x 1 licence and 600 x 3 licences; under "Mil & Other"
175 x 1 licence, 200 x 12 licences and 300 x 4 licences);
For pistols, both reports have a figure of 1352
units (tally under "Mil" 1 X 1 licence, 4 x 1 licence,
23 x 1 licence, 30 x 4 licences, 44 x 1 licence, 50 x 2 licences,
55 x 1 licence, 100 x 2 licences; under "Mil & Other"
5 x 1 licence and 50 x 16 licences).[239]
254. I propose that the Committees recommend that
the Government reviews its procedures for compiling its returns
to the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) to avoid errors
in its returns in future.
255. I propose that the Committees further recommend
that the Government states in its Response what specific progress
it is making in achieving a widening and broadening of the categories
of military equipment that are to be reported to the UN Register
of Conventional Arms.
The Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons (CCW)
256. The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions
on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed
to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects
as amended on 21 December 2001(CCW) is usually referred to as
the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. It is also known
as the Inhumane Weapons Convention. The purpose of the Convention
is to ban or restrict the use of specific types of weapons that
are considered to cause unnecessary or unjustifiable suffering
to combatants or to affect civilians indiscriminately. The structure
of the CCW - a chapeau Convention and annexed Protocols - was
adopted in this manner to ensure future flexibility. The Convention
itself contains only general provisions. All prohibitions or restrictions
on the use of specific weapons or weapon systems are the object
of the Protocols annexed to the Convention.[240]
257. Following publication of the Government's United
Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012 the Committees
wrote to the Government asking a question about the Convention
on Certain Conventional Weapons. The question and answer were
as follows:
The Committees' question:
What were the Government's policy objectives
at the meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention
on Certain Conventional Weapons held in November 2012 and how
far have these objectives been achieved? Does the Government consider
that any additions should be made to the existing five protocols
which are as follows:
- Protocol I on Non-Detectable Fragments
- Protocol II on the Use of Mines, Booby
Traps and Other Devices
- Protocol III on Prohibitions or Restrictions
on the Use of Incendiary Weapons
- Protocol IV on Blinding Laser Weapons
- Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War
The UK's main objective at the November 2012
meeting was to support Australia in maintaining dialogue on practical
measures to combat the unlawful manufacture and use of Improvised
Explosive Devices (IED) under Protocol II. The UK delivered an
expert presentation on its Counter-IED approach at the conference.
Our work with Australia is continuing in advance of this year's
meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention in November.
More broadly, the UK's main objective remains
to encourage the universalisation of the Convention and to achieve
adherence to the existing protocols. The Government is not currently
considering any additions to these protocols.[241]
258. I propose that the Committees recommend that
the Government states in its Response what were its objectives
at the meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention
on Certain Conventional Weapons in November 2013 and what was
the outcome of the meeting.
259. I propose that the Committees further recommend
that the Government states in its Response which countries are
now Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons and to each of its 5 Protocols.
260. I propose that the Committees also recommend
that the Government states in its Response what specific steps
it is taking to encourage the universalisation of the Convention
and to achieve adherence to the existing Protocols.
The Fissile Material Cut-Off
Treaty (FMCT)
261. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Fissile
Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) can be found at paragraphs 245-252
in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and
the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 73 of the Report.
262. In 1995 the Conference on Disarmament adopted
the Shannon Mandate (named after Canadian Ambassador Gerald Shannon)
to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally
effective verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile
material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.[242]
The use of the word "cut-off" (i.e. preventing
future production) has raised the question as to how the Treaty
would also cover existing stocks of fissile material. The primary
debate that surfaced during the Shannon discussions centred on
the inclusion of rules that would cover both existing stockpiles
and the future production of fissile material.[243]
Pakistan has been the only country blocking the start of negotiations
for more than three years because of a 2008 agreement by the world's
key nuclear technology suppliers to lift long-standing restrictions
on nuclear trade with India. Pakistan has maintained that a fissile
material ban must cover existing stocks of fissile material instead
of only halting future production.[244]
263. The Committees' Recommendation on the Fissile
Material Cut-Off Treaty in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and
the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:
The Committees' Recommendation:
The Committees recommend that the Government
sets out in its Response:
a) what specific routes to starting negotiations
on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) at the Conference
on Disarmament in Geneva the British Government and the other
P5 countries are actively investigating; and
b) whether it will give further consideration
to setting a deadline for the start of negotiations on the FMCT
at the Conference on Disarmament and to transferring the responsibility
for starting the negotiations to the UN, or to another international
forum, if that deadline is not met.[245]
The Government's Response:
a) We are actively engaging with other member
states, including the rest of the P5, to agree a programme of
work which would allow negotiations to start. We supported the
formation of the FMCT group of government experts during last
year's UN General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and
International Security. We are hopeful that the group will provide
the impetus for negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament
in a manner consistent with the Shannon Mandate (document CD/1299),
which was adopted by the Conference in 1995 and set out the agreed
scope of the proposed FMCT. We also submitted our views on a FMCT
to the UN in May - a copy of which is available in the Library
of the House.
b) We believe that setting an arbitrary deadline
for the start of FMCT negotiations would be counterproductive.
The UK has consistently stated that we could only support negotiation
of a FMCT in the consensus-based Conference on Disarmament. We
believe that the practical, step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament,
through existing mechanisms such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) and Conference on Disarmament, is the most effective
means to increase stability and reduce nuclear dangers. We will
continue to work together with P5 colleagues and non-nuclear weapon
states to strengthen mutual confidence and make further progress
toward our goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.[246]
264. I propose that the Committees recommend that
the Government states in its Response by what date it expects
the negotiations on the text of the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty
to start and, if it is unable to provide an expected date, to
state what specific steps it will take to get negotiations started.
The Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR)
265. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) can be found at paragraphs 253-258
in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and
the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 73 of the Report.
266. The Committees' Recommendation on the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in their 2013 Report (HC 205)
and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:
The Committees' Recommendation:
The Government has stated that the main missile
technology exporters who remain outside the Missile Technology
Control Regime include China, Israel, India and Pakistan. The
Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response
with which of those countries it has had, or will be having, discussions
about membership of the MTCR.[247]
The Government's Response:
MTCR outreach is arranged and led by the MTCR
Chair, currently held by Germany; MTCR Partners are encouraged
to send representatives to the outreach meetings. The UK was represented
on the outreach visits this year to Pakistan and UAE in February
and to India in August.[248]
267. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
held its 27th Plenary Meeting in Rome from 14 to 18 October 2013
to review and evaluate its activities and to further intensify
its efforts to prevent the proliferation of WMD delivery means.
MTCR partners reiterated the concept that proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction as well as their means of delivery, constitutes
a threat to international peace and security, as recognized in
UNSC Resolution 1540. They proceeded to a thorough exchange of
information on existing developments and potential missile proliferation
developments that took place since their last plenary meeting
in Berlin. Within the framework of the MTCR mandate, members conducted
extensive discussions on various country issues including DPRK
and Iran and expressed concerns associated with global missile
proliferation activities in particular regarding ongoing missile
programs in the Middle East, Northeast Asia, and South Asia, which
could fuel missile proliferation activities elsewhere. They confirmed
their commitment to implement relevant UNSC resolutions on non-proliferation.[249]
268. Partners welcomed the fact that the MTCR's Guidelines
and control lists constitute an international export control standard
that is increasingly adhered to by non-members of the MTCR and
included in UN documents. They also agreed to redouble their efforts
to inform and assist interested parties that are supportive of
missile non-proliferation and of the objectives and purposes of
the MTCR and called on all countries to exercise extreme vigilance
to prevent the transfer of any items, materials, goods and technology
that could contribute to WMD missile programmes of proliferation
concern, in accordance with their national legislation and consistent
with international law. Partners noted the rapid evolution of
relevant technologies and the related need to take forward looking
actions to address these developments. They recognized that the
Equipment, Software, and Technology Annex is a cornerstone of
the work done by the MTCR to prevent illegal transfers of missile
technologies. Partners
also discussed procurement activities and strategies in support
of programs for WMD delivery means; the risk of intangible technology
transfers and the challenges it entails; key technology trends
in missile programs; and catch-all controls for non-listed items.
[250]
269. Following the Government's statement to the
Committees that it considers that the main missile technology
exporters who remain outside the Missile Technology Control Regime
include China, Israel, India and Pakistan, I propose that the
Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response
whether it has any further countries to add to this list.
270. I propose that the Committees further recommend
that the Government states in its Response what specific steps
it is taking in respect of each of its named main missile technology
exporters currently outside the MTCR to encourage them to become
Missile Technology Control Regime members.
The G8 Global Partnership Against
the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction
271. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the G8
Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials
of Mass Destruction can be found at paragraphs 259-264 in Volume
II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees'
Conclusion and Recommendation at paragraph 74 of the Report.
272. The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation
on the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and
Materials of Mass Destruction in their 2013 Report (HC 205)
and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:
The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation:
The Committees conclude that the UK's expenditure
of £322 million by the previous and present Governments from
2002 to 2012 in the Global Threat Reduction Programmethis
being the UK's contribution to the G8-based Global Partnership
against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destructionhas
been fully merited and very necessary. The Committees recommend
that the Government states in its Response what its Global Threat
Reduction Programme planned expenditure will be in 2013-14, 2014-15
and 2015-16.[251]
The Government's Response:
As part of the G8 Presidency in 2013, the UK
is Chair of the Global Partnership (GP) Against the Spread of
Materials and Weapons of Mass Destruction. A key objective of
the UK is to agree new, targeted GP projects and programmes, by
identifying gaps and priorities, coordinating GP partners and
recipients, and matching funds and expertise to specific requirements,
particularly in the nuclear, radiological and biological fields.
The Government plans to continue delivering projects
through the Global Threat Reduction Programme (GTRP) as part of
the UK's commitment to the Global Partnership, and in order to
address national security priorities. Future expenditure on projects
delivered through GTRP is subject to approval of requirements
and projects; it is expected to be approximately £14.5M in
2013-14, and in 2014-15 and 2015-16 to exceed £10M per year,
based on current estimates.[252]
273. Following publication of the Government's United
Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012 the Committees
wrote to the Government asking a question about the G8 Global
Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass
Destruction. The question and answer were as follows:
The Committees' question:
Will the Government be publishing on the Export
Control Organisation's website entities of potential WMD concern
in countries in addition to Iran, for instance Syria?
The Government has no immediate plans to publish
any additional information about entities of potential WMD concern
in countries in addition to Iran. We will continue to publish
the information for Iran.[253]
274. I propose that the Committees recommend that
the Government states in its Response its updated expenditure
figures for its expenditure under the Global Threat Reduction
Programme (GTRP) in 2013-14, 2014-15, 2015-16 and 2016-17.
275. I propose that the Committees conclude that
the security importance of reducing, and where possible eliminating,
Russia's WMD stockpiles including of chemical weapons is such,
that this programme should continue to be funded and recommends
that the Government states in its Response whether it concurs
with this view.
276. I propose that the Committees further recommend
that the Government should resume producing its Annual Report
"Global Threat Reduction Programme" (the last Report
was in 2010) on its policies and funding contributions in relation
to The G8 (currently G7) Global Partnership Against the Spread
of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction with details of the
specific projects that the UK is funding.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group
277. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Nuclear
Suppliers Group can be found at paragraphs 265-270 in Volume II
of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees'
Recommendation at paragraph 75 of the Report.
278. The Committees' Recommendation on the Nuclear
Suppliers Group in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's
Response (Cm8707) were as follows:
The Committees' Recommendation:
The Government has stated that the major technology
holders who remain outside of the Nuclear Suppliers Group include
India, Pakistan and Israel, and that suppliers of dual-use technology
who are not members include the UAE, Malaysia and Singapore. The
Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response
with which of those countries it has had, or will be having, discussions
about membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.[254]
The Government's Response:
Outreach is led by the Troika, formed of the
current NSG chair with the previous and incoming chairs (respectively
the Czech Republic, USA and unconfirmed).
NSG Participating Governments do not normally
attend in support. The Troika recently conducted an outreach meeting
in India. It also met with a Pakistani delegation in Turkey and
is investigating the possibility of an outreach visit to Islamabad.
India, Pakistan, the UAE, Malaysia and Singapore attended a technical
outreach meeting hosted by the USA in San Francisco, 2-3 May 2013.
The UK made a presentation at the meeting. The UK discusses NSG
membership with interested states bilaterally.[255]
279. Following the Government's statement to the
Committees that it considers that the major nuclear technology
holders who remain outside the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) include
India, Pakistan and Israel, and that it also considers that suppliers
of dual-use technology who are not members include the UAE, Malaysia
and Singapore, I propose that the Committees recommend that the
Government states in its Response whether it has any further countries
to add to either its list of major technology holders outside
the NSG or its list of suppliers of dual-use technology outside
the NSG.
280. I propose that the Committees further recommend
that the Government states in its Response what specific steps
it is taking in respect of each of its named major nuclear technology
holders currently outside the NSG to encourage them to become
Nuclear Suppliers Group members, and also what specific steps
it is taking in respect of each of its named suppliers of dual-use
technology to cease being suppliers of technology that could facilitate
nuclear proliferation.
The Nuclear Security Summit
281. The Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) was held in
The Hague on 24 and 25 March 2014. The Nuclear Security Summit
2014 is a world summit, aiming at preventing nuclear terrorism
around the globe.
282. Since the previous summit in 2012, seven more
states had removed all or most of these dangerous materials from
their territories, and more than a dozen others had taken important
new steps to reduce quantities and to better secure the materials
they held. Today, the number of states with one kilogram or more
of weapons-usable nuclear materials stands at 25, a 22 percent
reduction in just two years.[256]
283. The first summit was held in Washington, D.C.,
in 2010. More than three dozen presidents and prime ministers
attended, along with high-level officials from additional states,
elevating the issue of nuclear materials security to the head-of-government
level in states both with and without weapons-usable nuclear materials.
The 2012 Summit, which was held in Seoul, sustained this high-level
attention to the urgency of securing the materials that could
be used by terrorists to build a nuclear weapon. The third summit,
hosted by the Netherlands, was held in March and a fourthand
perhaps finalsummit has been announced for 2016 in the
United States.[257]
284. Going into the summit it was identified that
the lack of an effective global system for securing weapons-usable
nuclear materials was a major challenge. Despite progress since
2012, there was still no effective global system for how nuclear
materials should be secured. Because each state considered materials
security an exclusively sovereign, not shared, responsibility,
approaches to nuclear security varied widely with little sense
of accountability, even though poor security in any one state
could affect all other states. Several factors addressed by the
NTI Index[258] underscore
this fundamental deficit:
· The
existing legal foundation for global nuclear security remains
weak. A key legal agreement related to nuclear securitythe
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)
and its 2005 Amendmentprovides an important initial foundation
for nuclear materials security. However, the 2005 Amendment still
has not entered into force. A separate agreement, the International
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, commits
states to criminalize acts of nuclear terrorism. However, each
of those agreements has limitations: they are not universally
implemented; they have no enforcement or accountability mechanisms;
and the CPPNM and 2005 Amendment cover only civilian materials,
which make up only 15 percent of global stocks of weapons-usable
nuclear materials.
· Participation
in international peer review is still limited. Of the 25 states
with weapons-usable nuclear materials, only 18 have invited a
peer review in the past five years, and 6 have never invited a
peer review, even though it is a critical tool for strengthening
a state's security practices and assuring others about the effectiveness
of an individual state's security.
· The
vast majority of global stocks of weapons-usable nuclear materialsapproximately
85 percentis military or other non-civilian material and
remains outside any of the existing international nuclear security
mechanisms.[259]
285. Following the conclusion of the 2014 Summit
a communique was issued that stated that 58 world leaders made
concrete agreements to prevent terrorists getting their hands
on nuclear material that could be used to make a nuclear weapon.
The communique said that this will further reduce the threat of
a nuclear attack. It went on to state that new agreements had
been made on:
· reducing
the amount of dangerous nuclear material in the world that terrorists
could use to make a nuclear weapon (highly enriched uranium and
plutonium);
· improving
the security of radioactive material (including low-enriched uranium)
that can be used to make a 'dirty bomb';
· improving
the international exchange of information and international cooperation.[260]
286. On 26 March the Prime Minister on returning
from the Summit made a Statement to the House in which he said:
On combating nuclear terrorism, which was the
subject of the summit in The Hague, the meeting reaffirmed our
determination to push through reforms of global security systems
to ensure that vulnerable nuclear material does not fall into
the wrong hands. This initiative, launched by President Obama
back in 2010, has led to a remarkable amount of nuclear material
being secured and reduced across the world, which should be commended.[261]
The Prime Minister went on to say that:
We have seen 12 countries worldwide removing
all highly enriched uranium from their territory, and 15 metric
tons of highly enriched uranium have been down-blended to low-enriched
uranium since 2012, which is the equivalent to approximately 500
nuclear weapons, so good progress has been made.[262]
287. I propose that the Committees recommend that
the Government states in its Response what are the specific reforms
of global security systems to ensure that vulnerable nuclear material
does not fall into the wrong hands which the Government is determined
to push through, and what are the specific steps it is taking
to achieve such reforms.
The Australia Group
288. The Australia Group (AG) is an informal forum
of countries which, through the harmonisation of export controls,
seeks to ensure that exports do not contribute to the development
of chemical or biological weapons. Co-ordination of national export
control measures assists Australia Group participants to fulfil
their obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention and the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention to the fullest extent
possible. The principal objective of Australia Group participants
is to use licensing measures to ensure that exports of certain
chemicals, biological agents, and dual-use chemical and biological
manufacturing facilities and equipment, do not contribute to the
spread of chemical and biological weapons (CBWs). The Group achieves
this by harmonising participating countries' national export licensing
measures. The Group's activities are especially important given
that the international chemical and biotechnology industries are
a target for proliferators as a source of materials for CBW programmes.
Export licensing measures also demonstrate the determination of
Australia Group participants to avoid not only direct but also
inadvertent involvement in the spread of Chemical and Biological
Weapons, and to express their opposition to the use of these weapons.
It is also in the interests of commercial firms and research institutes
and of their Governments to ensure that they do not inadvertently
supply chemicals, chemical equipment, biological agents or biological
equipment for use in the manufacture of Chemical and Biological
Weapons. Global chemical and biological industries have firmly
supported this principle.[263]
A list of members of the Australia Group can be found at http://www.australiagroup.net/en/participants.html.
289. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Australia
Group can be found at paragraphs 271-274 in Volume II of the Committees'
previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at
paragraph 76 of the Report.
290. The Committees' Recommendations on the Australia
Group in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's
Response (Cm8707) were as follows:
The Committees' Recommendations:
The Committees recommend that, as the Government
has said that the Australia Group focus is on those countries
that have large or developing chemical industries, for example
China, India and Pakistan, or those which act as transhipment
hubs, such as Singapore and Vietnam, it states in its Response
what steps it is taking to ensure UK participation in Australia
Group outreach visits to those countries. The Committees further
recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it
is satisfied with the interface between the Australia Group and
those organisations responsible for implementing and monitoring
the Chemical Weapons Convention.[264]
The Government's Response:
The Government endeavours to ensure participation
in Australia Group outreach visits when it can, resources permitting.
In 2012 the Government sent a representative from the UK to join
an Australia Group outreach visit to India and sent British Embassy
representation to an outreach visit to Vietnam. So far in 2013,
the Government has led an outreach visit to Pakistan on behalf
of the Australia Group and has also sent representatives from
the UK to join outreach visits to Malaysia and China. A British
Embassy representative attended the last outreach visit to India
in May 2013.
All members of the Australia Group (which is
an informal forum of countries, and does not exist as an entity
outside its membership of states) are also members of the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC). Therefore the interface between Australia Group and organisations
responsible for implementing and monitoring the Chemical Weapons
Convention are the States Parties themselves. All AG members have
the opportunity to actively participate in and influence both
BTWC and CWC meetings and negotiations in Geneva and The Hague,
and the effective implementation and monitoring of these Conventions.[265]
291. I propose that the Committees recommend that
the Government states in its Response which of the countries currently
outside the Australia Group that it has said have large or developing
chemical industries, for example China, India and Pakistan, or
act as transhipment hubs for chemicals, such as Singapore and
Vietnam, it would wish to see as members of the Australia Group,
and what specific steps it is taking to achieve Australia Group
membership by the countries concerned.
The Academic Technology Approval
Scheme (ATAS)
292. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Academic
Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS) can be found at paragraphs 275-277
in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and
the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 77 of the Report.
293. The Foreign Secretary in his letter to the Committees
of 12 November 2012, in reply to a question relating to the ATAS
in the Government's Response to the Committees' 2012 report, said
about the ATAS:
The Government is satisfied with its current
policy. The effectiveness of the scheme is continually assessed
to ensure that counter proliferation objectives are met. The
Academic Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS) was set up in 2007,
replacing the Voluntary Vetting Scheme (VVS) for overseas students.
ATAS is designed to prevent those students who pose the greatest
risk from studying potential WMD proliferation subjects. In order
to give the broadest and most efficient coverage, ATAS is built
into the Tier 4 student visa requirement. There is currently
no legal basis for the scheme to include UK students.[266]
294. The Committees' Recommendation on the Academic
Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS) in their 2013 Report (HC 205)
and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:
The Committees' Recommendation:
The Committees recommend that the Government
states in its Response to this Report:
a) whether it remains satisfied that the
UK's Academic Technology Approval Scheme remains effective in
preventing those foreign students who pose the greatest risk from
studying potential Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation
subjects at UK Institutions of Higher Education; and
b) whether it will consider introducing legislation
to extend the Scheme to include those UK students who pose the
greatest risk.[267]
The Government's Response:
The Government's position remains as stated in
the Foreign Secretary's letter to the Committees of 12 November
2012. We have no plans to consider legislation to extend the Scheme
to include UK students.[268]
295. I propose that the Committees again recommend
that the Government states in its Response:
a) whether it remains satisfied that the UK's
Academic Technology Approval Scheme continues to be effective
in preventing those foreign students, who pose the greatest risk,
from studying potential Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation
subjects at UK Institutions of Higher Education; and
b) whether it will consider introducing legislation
to extend the scheme to include any UK students who similarly
pose the greatest risk.
The Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC)
296. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC) can be found at paragraphs 278-282 in
Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the
Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 78 of the Report.
297. The Committees' Recommendation on the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC) in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and
the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:
The Committees' Recommendation:
The Committees recommend that the Government
states in its Response:
a) how far it considers that its objectives
for the Chemical Weapons Review Conference as set out in the Written
Answer of FCO Minister Alistair Burt on 26 March 2013 were, or
were not, fulfilled; and
b) what specific steps it will take to try
to secure accession to the Convention by those 8 states who have
not done so thus far, namely Angola, Egypt, Israel, Myanmar, North
Korea, Somalia, South Sudan and Syria.[269]
The Government's Response:
a) The Government was pleased that the majority
of the objectives outlined in Minister Alistair Burt's Written
Answer to Sir John Stanley of 26 March 2013 were achieved. It
was not possible, however, to secure agreement on the next steps
on the treatment of incapacitating chemical agents in a CWC context
in light of developments in science and technology.
b) The Government led outreach in conjunction
with partners focussed on securing accession by the above 8 states.
This included working alongside the Organisation for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons in offering technical assistance and advice
on acceding to the Convention and National Implementation. The
Government saw immediate positive results with Somalia acceding
to the Convention on 29 May 2013.[270]
298. I propose that the Committees recommend that
the Government states in its Response the countries that have
still to accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the dates
of accession of any country that has acceded since Somalia's accession
on 29 May 2013.
299. I propose that the Committees further recommend
that the Government states to which of the non-acceding countries
it has participated in outreach on the Chemical Weapons Convention
since the beginning of 2013.
The Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention (BTWC)
300. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) can be found at paragraphs
283-288 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205),
and the Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation at paragraphs
79 and 80 of the Report.
301. The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation
on the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in their
2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707)
were as follows:
The Committees' Conclusion:
The Committees conclude that the Government's
statement that establishing a verification regime for the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention remains a long-term UK and EU aim
is welcome, but that the absence of any such regime, because of
US opposition in particular, is a matter of deep concern.[271]
The Government's Response:
The Government notes the Committees' conclusion.
[272]
The Committees' Recommendation:
The Committees recommend that the Government
in its Response
a) lists which States have signed but not
ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), and
which States have neither signed nor ratified the BTWC;
b) sets out what specific steps it will take
to try to secure accession to the BTWC by those States who have
not done so thus far;
c) whether it is aware of States with holdings
of biological or toxin weapons and, if so, which those States
are; and
d) whether it considers the civil population
to be at risk from State or non-State holdings of biological or
toxin weapons and, if so, what steps it is taking both nationally
and internationally to mitigate that risk.[273]
The Government's Response:
a) The following states have signed but not
ratified the BTWC:
1. Central African Republic
10. United Republic of Tanzania
The following states have neither signed nor
ratified the BTWC:
11. Micronesia (Federated States of)
b) The Government, both on its own and with
the EU, actively engages with non-State Parties to encourage them
to become members of the BTWC. EU projects under Council Decision
2012/421/CFSP include awareness-raising workshops and support
for states acceding to or ratifying the BTWC as well as support
for states to implement the BTWC. Recently the Government has
co-funded the attendance of Burma at the August 2013 BTWC Meeting
of Experts and we will also continue to encourage non-members
attending as observers to accede to the BWC.
c) The Government does not generally comment
on specific states by name.
d) In 2010 the National Security Strategy
identified as a Tier One Risk: "International terrorism affecting
the UK or its interests, including a biological attack by terrorists";
and as a Tier Two Risk: "An attack on the UK or its Overseas
Territories by another state or proxy using biological weapons."
The National Counter Terrorism Security Officer
(NaCTSO) co-ordinates the delivery of protective security to hazardous
sites and substances in the UK. Part 7 of the Anti Terrorism Crime
and Security Act (ATCSA) 2001 addresses the issue of security
relating to Pathogens and Toxins held legitimately within the
UK.
There are approximately 220 sites within the
UK which hold Schedule 51 substances. This list is maintained
and managed by NaCTSO. Guidelines for security standards are set
by NaCTSO, in consultation in conjunction with other relevant
Government departments. This allows for a consistent national
approach to the security of sites holding dangerous pathogens
and toxins.
NaCTSO is currently actively involved in the
EU CBRN Action plan B2 action2. The main objective of this is
to initiate a draft document for B2 implementation. This entails
the consolidation of feedback from member states regarding biosecurity
regulations to initiate exchanges for European harmonisation,
specifically for processes to verify facility security arrangements.
The UK believes that steps taken to implement the WHO's International
Health Regulations and comparable programmes of the OIE [International
Office of Epizootics (World Organisation for Animal Health)] and
FAO [Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations]
will help improve national, regional and international surveillance
capabilities for the early detection and identification of outbreaks
of infectious disease whether they are natural, deliberate or
accidental. We are supporting these efforts and programmes through
a range of means such as direct funding, provision of training
and capacity building assistance. In 2014 and 2015 the special
topic for the BTWC intersessional meetings will be Article VII;
this deals with assistance in the event of a State Party 'being
exposed to danger as a result of a violation of the Convention'.
Virtually nothing has been done to give practical effect to this
Article, but it is generally taken to mean humanitarian and medical
counter measures. The UK intends to build on its proposals first
made on this Article at the Seventh Review Conference in 2011
as set out in its Working Paper -http://daccess-
ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G11/640/45/PDF/G1164045.pdf?OpenElement'
In order to mitigate biological risks and threats, as part of
the UK contribution to the Global Partnership, the UK continues
to implement biological security and engagement projects in Central
Asia, the Caucasus, Middle East and North Africa. In order to
maximise efficiency and effectiveness, the UK works in close cooperation
with other Global Partnership members and international organisations,
including the US Departments of State and Defense, the World Health
Organisation, World Organisation for Animal Health, and Food and
Agriculture Organisation.
Current projects are focused on:
· improving
biosafety and biosecurity;
· improving
disease surveillance, diagnostics and reporting systems (in the
areas of human, animal and plant health);
· increasing
awareness of the need to comply with international treaty obligations
(e.g. BTWC) and, thorough educational programmes, of the risks
posed by dual-use science.
These projects also provide broader benefits
to UK health security, such as gaining first-hand knowledge of
disease surveillance in different national contexts, access to
new or different strains or biological agents of concern, and
experience of diseases caused by these agents. These cooperative
projects consequently improve the capability of the UK agencies
to respond to deliberately and/or naturally occurring biological
related health events in the UK.[274]
302. I propose that the Committees conclude that
the detailed response given by the Government to the Committees'
question on the Government's 2013 Annual Report on strategic exports
as to "whether it considers the [UK] civil population to
be at risk from state or non-state holdings of biological or toxin
weapons and, if so, what steps it is taking both nationally and
internationally to mitigate that risk" is welcome.
303. I propose that the Committees recommend that
the Government states in its Response whether it still remains
its long-term aim to establish a verification regime for the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), and, if so, what specific
steps it is taking to try to realise this aim.
304. I propose that the Committees further recommend
that the Government in its Response lists which states have now
signed, but not ratified, the BTWC and which states have neither
signed nor ratified the BTWC.
305. I propose that the Committees also recommend
that the Government states what specific steps it has taken since
the beginning of 2013 to try to secure accession to the BTWC by
those states who have not done so thus far.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT)
306. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) can be found at paragraphs 289-295
in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and
the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 81 of the Report.
307. The Committees' Recommendation on the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in their 2013 Report (HC 205)
and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:
The Committees' Recommendation:
The Committees recommend that the Government
states in its Response in specific terms:
a) the extent to which it considers that
the commitments made at the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) Review Conference, and in the 2010 NPT Action Plans have,
or have not, been fulfilled; and
b) what are the Government's objectives for
the 2015 NPT Review Conference.[275]
The Government's Response:
a) The UK stands by the commitments that
we made at the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review
Conference in 2010, we will continue to work on our 2010 NPT Action
Plan commitments, and encourage other states to reaffirm their
commitment to the Action Plan.
With regard to what extent these commitments
and the Action Plan have been fulfilled, we would argue that there
has been a mixed performance. There has been progress in some
areas, for example, Andorra, Bahrain, the Republic of Congo, Costa
Rica, Gambia, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, Morocco, Moldova, Mozambique,
Namibia, Togo and Vietnam have all ratified the Additional Protocol
since 2010 (Action 28). There is work in progress, for example,
within the P5 discussions continue on reporting and the development
of the P5 glossary of key nuclear terms (Action 5, Action 21).
There are also more challenging areas, for example, on the conference
on the establishment of Middle East Weapons of Mass Destructions
Free Zone, where the UK government regretted the postponement
of the conference in November 2012 and continues to work closely
with the Facilitator and Co-Convenors in order to hold the conference
as soon as possible this year.
As we said in the UK General Statement at the
2013 NPT Preparatory Committee, "We are at the half-way point
of this Review Cycle, half-way to the 2015 Review Conference.
The big success of the 2010 Review Conference was the consensus
outcome on a cross-pillar action plan, and a clear commitment
from all states parties to the grand bargain of the NPT. We must
continually remind ourselves of that achievement and strive to
replicate that success in this PrepCom and the rest of this review
cycle. My government is clear in its wish to strengthen the international
non-proliferation architecture, with the NPT at its core. But
the NPT continues to face pressures and challenges, the nuclear
ambitions of the DPRK and Iran, the risk of a nuclear terrorist
attack, the spread of sensitive nuclear technology as more countries
seek to embark on a civil nuclear path.
We must work together to ensure that the NPT
is strengthened across its 3 pillars during this review cycle,
to ensure that it can remain fit for purpose, and continue to
bring benefits to all its states parties, in terms of enhanced
security and cooperation on civil nuclear energy
This PrepCom
is also an opportunity for States Parties to reaffirm their unconditional
support for the NPT and their commitment to implement the 2010
Action Plan."
b) In an article in the Huffington Post published
on 24 April 2013, the Foreign Office Minister responsible for
Counter Proliferation, Alistair Burt, set out the UK's priorities
for the Non Proliferation Treaty. "We want to encourage action
to deter non-compliance of the NPT. We want to continue our push
for a Treaty that is universal. We want to reiterate our commitment
to work with other countries to achieve our long-term goal of
a world free of nuclear weapons. And we want to do all of this
whilst underlining that we should continue to support the responsible
global expansion of civil nuclear industries." These remain
valid. [276]
308. On 29 April 2014 Hugh Robertson, Minister of
State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office wrote to the Chairman
of the Committees enclosing the UK's national report to the 2014
Nuclear Non-Proliferation preparatory Commission. The text of
the letter is as follows (the report can be found at Annex 8):
I have pleasure in enclosing the United Kingdom's
national report to the 2014 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory
Commission, in line with the commitment made by the UK and other
Nuclear Weapons States in the NPT Action Plan agreed in 2010.
This report will be tabled by the UK delegation
to the NPT Preparatory Committee in New York this week. I have
arranged for a copy to be made available in the Library of the
House. I am also sending the report to Sir Richard Ottaway.[277]
309. The key points in the United Kingdom's national
report to the 2014 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory
Commission were:
· That
the UK considers the NPT to be the cornerstone of global efforts
to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons and is committed to
the step-by-step process agreed by consensus at the 2000 RevCon
and reaffirmed at the 2010 RevCon;
· The
Government will maintain only the minimum credible nuclear deterrent,
under full political control;
· the
UK will only consider using our nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances
of self-defence, including the defence of our NATO Allies;
· the
UK had strengthened its negative security assurance to state that
the UK will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT;
· the
UK had taken steps to lower the operational status of its deterrent
system;
· the
UK Government stated that the security and safety of its nuclear
weapons was given the very highest priority;
· since
the 2010 NPT Review Conference the UK has unilaterally decided
to cut its stockpile of nuclear warheads, as outlined in the SDSR
[Strategic Defence and Security Review]. (Today it has fewer than
225 warheads, all of a single type.); and
· in 2013
the UK extended the scope of its security regulation to cover
civil nuclear sites under construction in order to take account
of the UK's new nuclear build programme.
310. I propose that the Committees recommend that
the Government states as fully as possible in its Response what
are now its objectives for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Review Conference in 2015 and what specific steps it is taking
to try to ensure that its objectives are realised.
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT)
311. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) can be found at paragraphs 296-297
in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and
the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 82 of the Report.
312. The Committees' Recommendation on the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in their 2013 Report (HC 205)
and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:
The Committees' Recommendation:
The Committees recommend that the Government
states in its Response what specific steps it is taking with each
of the remaining 8 countries whose signature and ratification
is necessary to enable the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
to enter into forcenamely China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel,
North Korea, Pakistan and the USAto try to persuade them
to ratify the CTBT.[278]
The Government's Response:
The UK has taken every available opportunity
to press for all states outside the CTBT to sign or ratify the
Treaty as appropriate. This includes repeated calls for China,
Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and the USA
to accede to the Treaty. To this end, the UK will be attending
the Article XIV Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force
of the CTBT this September, which will renew calls for the remaining
states to join. As of July 2013, 159 states have ratified the
Treaty.[279]
313. The Committees had an informal meeting on 10
February 2014 with the Head of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO), Dr Lassina Zerbo.
314. On 27 February the Chairman of the Committees
wrote to the Foreign Secretary asking about Iran and the Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty. The text of the letter was as follows:
I should be grateful if you could tell me the
British Government's position on whether or not the issue of Iran's
ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty should
be brought within the framework of the negotiations taking place
with Iran to ensure that Iran does not become a holder of nuclear
weapons.
Please could you tell me in your reply the reasons
for the policy position that the UK Government has taken on this
issue.[280]
The Foreign Secretary replied on 20 March 2014 as
follows:
Thank you for your letter of 27 February, seeking
the UK government position on whether Iranian ratification of
the Comprehensive Nuclear test Ban Treaty (CTBT) should be brought
within the framework of E3+3 negotiations with Iran.
The purpose of the E3+3 negotiations with Iran
is to reach a negotiated comprehensive solution to the Iranian
nuclear issue which ensures the exclusively peaceful nature of
Iran's nuclear programme. This will require Iran to take significant
action to limit its nuclear programme, and increased monitoring
and verification of its activities. As part of a comprehensive
solution, it is important that all unresolved issues set out in
the UNSC resolutions are addressed.
Iranian ratification of the CTBT would be a further
step in reassuring the international community about the nature
of Iran's nuclear programme. It would also bring the Treaty closer
to entry into force. Dr Lassina Zerbo, the Executive Secretary
of the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the CTBT Organisation,
is encouraging Iran to consider ratification of the CTBT and to
transmit data from the International Monitoring System's Primary
Seismic Station in Tehran to the International Data Centre in
Vienna. These would be welcome steps. I believe, however, that
adding CTBT ratification to the E3+3 negotiations at this stage
would risk further complicating an already complex negotiation.
Securing Iranian commitments to limit Iran's programmes to a point
well short of conducting a test must remain the priority.[281]
315. I propose that the Committees again recommend
that the Government states in its Response what specific steps
it is taking with each of the remaining 8 countries whose signature
and ratification is necessary to enable the Comprehensive Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty to enter into forcenamely China, Egypt,
India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and the USAto
try to persuade them to ratify the CTBT.
Sub-strategic and tactical nuclear
weapons
316. The Committees' previous scrutiny of sub-strategic
and tactical nuclear weapons can be found at paragraphs 298-301
in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and
the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 83 of the Report.
317. The Committees' Recommendation on the sub-strategic
and tactical nuclear weapons in their 2013 Report (HC 205)
and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:
The Committees' Recommendation:
The Committees recommend that the Government
sets out in its Response:
a) what specific action it is taking to reduce
the requirement for short-range nuclear weapons assigned to NATO
in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia, taking into account
greater Russian stockpiles of short-range nuclear weapons stationed
in the Euro-Atlantic area, and developments in the broader security
environment;
b) whether it supports the implementation
of the US B-61 Life Extension Programme in Europe; and
c) whether it favours US and Russian
holdings of short-range nuclear weapons being reduced to zero
on both sides, as achieved for intermediate-range nuclear weapons
in the 1987 INF Treaty, in future negotiations on short-range
nuclear weapons between the US and Russia.[282]
The Government's Response:
Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has dramatically
reduced the number, types and readiness of nuclear weapons stationed
in Europe and will continue to adapt its strategy in line with
the changing security environment.
NATO's Deterrence and Defence Posture Review
(DDPR), adopted at the Chicago Summit in May 2012, emphasised
that nuclear disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation play
an important role in the achievement of NATO's objectives, as
the security and stability provided by the effective control of
weapons is a precursor to a world without nuclear weapons. It
set out NATO's support for US/Russian bilateral arms control measures,
and indicated that Allies would consider further reducing NATO's
requirement for tactical nuclear weapons in the context of reciprocal
steps by Russia, taking into account Russia's larger stockpile.
The Government is committed to the long term
objective of a world without nuclear weapons and would therefore
be supportive of the eventual elimination of tactical nuclear
weapons, including those held by the US and Russia in Europe,
provided that this is achieved in a manner that does not risk
compromising the security of the UK and its Allies. In this context,
the Government strongly welcomed the commitment that President
Obama set out in his speech in Berlin on 19 June, to work with
NATO Allies to seek bold reductions in US and Russian short-range
nuclear weapons in Europe. We will continue to play a key role
in helping to build the right environment for bilateral US-Russia
discussions to make progress. We are working closely with NATO
Allies to develop and exchange transparency and confidence-building
ideas with the Russian Federation, not least through our active
role within NATO's new Special Advisory and Consultative Arms
Control, Disarmament and Non-proliferation Committee, which is
currently exploring such measures.
The DDPR also underlined the Alliance's commitment
that 'all components of NATO's nuclear deterrent shall remain
safe, secure and effective for as long as NATO remains a nuclear
alliance'. The forward deployment of US tactical nuclear weapons
in Europe provides a contribution to the deterrence of potential
adversaries, the assurance of vulnerable Allies, and the sharing
of risks and responsibilities across the Alliance, as well as
providing leverage in arms control efforts vis-à-vis the
Russian Federation. With the weapons nearing the end of their
service lives, it is therefore appropriate that the US embark
upon the B-61 Life Extension Programme to maintain NATO's appropriate
nuclear force posture and to ensure the safety, security and effectiveness
of NATO's arsenal. The Life Extension Programme will also be helpful
in maximising the potential impact of future arms control discussions
by avoiding the capability ending without any commensurate reciprocal
steps from Russia.[283]
318. I propose that the Committees recommend that
the Government states in its Response whether:
a) it remains both the Government's and NATO's
policy "that [NATO] Allies would consider further reducing
NATO's requirement for tactical nuclear weapons in the context
of reciprocal steps by Russia, taking into account Russia's larger
stockpile.";
b) it remains the Government's policy that
it would be supportive of the eventual elimination of tactical
nuclear weapons, including those held by the US and Russia in
Europe, provided that this is achieved in a manner that does not
risk compromising the security of the UK and its Allies;
c) it remains the Government's view that it
is appropriate that the US embark upon the B-61 Life Extension
programme to maintain NATO's appropriate nuclear force posture
and to ensure the safety, security and effectiveness of NATO's
arsenal; and
d) it is the Government' s policy that dialogue
with the Russian Government on sub-strategic and tactical nuclear
weapons should continue, notwithstanding events in Ukraine.
A Middle-East Weapons of Mass
Destruction Free Zone
319. The Committees' previous scrutiny of a Middle-East
Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone can be found at paragraphs
302-312 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205),
and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 84 of the Report.
320. The Committees' Recommendation on a Middle-East
Weapons of Mass Destruction Zone in their 2013 Report (HC 205)
and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:
The Committees' Recommendation:
The Committees recommend that the Government
states in its Response:
a) when it expects the planned regional conference
to discuss a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone
to take place;
b) what are the current positions of Iran
and Israel on attending this conference; and
c) what steps it is taking to try
to ensure this Conference takes place.[284]
The Government's Response:
a) The UK government made clear in our statement
to the 2013 NPT PrepCom that we hope the regional conference on
the establishment of a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction
Free Zone will take place as soon as possible in 2013, and we
continue to work closely with the Facilitator, fellow co-convenors
and regional partners in pursuit of this objective.
b) The Facilitator, Mr Laajava, has continued
his consultations and discussions with all states of the region,
including Iran and Israel, he has also proposed multilateral consultations
in order to agree arrangements for the Conference between the
states of the region. The UK fully supports his work in this regard.
As we have commented previously, Iran has announced
it would be willing to attend the Conference but has set out a
series of expectations on format and process which may be difficult
for all regional states to agree. Israel has publicly stated that
it has yet to make its final decision on whether to attend any
conference.
c) The Foreign Secretary and other FCO Ministers
have discussed the Conference with counterparts in the Middle
East. The UK statement to the 2013 NPT PrepCom made clear our
support for the objective of establishing such a Zone and our
full support for the facilitator of the Conference, Mr Laajava
of Finland. The British Government supports the objective of a
Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone, and the convening
of a conference as soon as possible.
Senior British officials meet regularly with
representatives of the UN and the other co-convenors (the US and
Russia) to discuss progress and provide support to Mr Laajava.
British Officials have also travelled to the region to promote
constructive engagement and support for the work of the Facilitator.[285]
321. Responding to a question from Jeremy Corbyn
MP on 26 March 2014 as to whether he would give an assurance that
"the Government will resolutely work to get a Middle East
Nuclear Free Zone conference under way as a way of reducing and
trying to prevent any nuclear proliferation in that region",
the Prime Minister answered: "I can confirm that we will
be working towards that goal and will continue the excellent work
the Foreign office does on it."[286]
322. I propose that the Committees conclude that
the failure to hold a regional conference on the establishment
of a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in 2013,
as the Government had hoped, was most disappointing.
323. I propose that the Committees recommend that
the Government in its Response states the latest position on the
holding of such a Conference, and on the willingness of Iran and
Israel to attend.
The National Counter-Proliferation
Strategy
324. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the National
Counter-Proliferation Strategy can be found at paragraphs 313-316
in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and
the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 85 of the Report.
325. The Committees' Recommendation on the National
Counter-Proliferation Strategy in their 2013 Report (HC 205)
and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:
The Committees' Recommendation:
The Committees recommend that the Government
sets out in its Response:
a) any amendments or updating it wishes to
make to the National Counter-Proliferation Strategy for 2012-15
since its publication in 2012; and
b) what it considers to be the successes
and failures of the National Counter-Proliferation Strategy for
2012-15 to date.[287]
The Government's Response:
a) Following an intelligence-based assessment
exercise earlier this year the National Counter Proliferation
Strategy for 2012-15 was reviewed by the Cross-Whitehall Counter
Proliferation Implementation Committee (CPIC). CPIC concluded
that the strategic risks and objectives contained in the strategy
remained correct and that there was not a need for amendments
or updates. The strategy has been used as the basis for CPIC's
annual business planning, helping to prioritise Counter Proliferation
work across Whitehall.
b) The strategy has successfully focussed
work across Whitehall in line with its three objectives of
- Preventing State WMD Proliferation; and
- Supporting, strengthening and extending
the rules-based international system for counter proliferation.
There has been progress in all three areas. Examples,
one from each work
- the UK's Chairmanship (as part of the 2013
G8 Presidency) of the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread
of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, a body which is
now coordinating around £1bn/year worth of its members' counter-proliferation
programmes to the highest priority CBRN security projects globally;
- the UK played a leading role in the firm
and united international response to the DPRK nuclear test of
February 2013 (including the adoption of UNSCR 2094); and
- UK lobbying and support for technical assistance
programmes has delivered progress towards universal adherence
to both the Chemical Weapons and Biological Weapons and Toxins
Conventions.
There also remain serious challenges (for example,
Iran continues to advance its nuclear programme in violation of
UNSCRs and defiance of IAEA resolutions, ensuring the security,
and eventual destruction, of Syria's chemical weapons stocks,
delivery of a 2015 Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference
that reaffirms the NPT as the cornerstone of international nuclear
non-proliferation), as would be expected at this stage of a three-year
strategy. We shall continue to monitor performance against the
strategy.[288]
326. I propose that the Committees conclude that
they do not agree with the Government's Response in Cm8707 that
there was not a need for amendments or update to the Government's
National Counter-Proliferation Strategy for 2012-15 published
in 2012.
327. I propose that the Committees further conclude
that the key Government policy area of Counter-Proliferation is
in constant change and recommends that the Government makes a
full report on its National Counter-Proliferation Strategy annually.
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