Scrutiny of arms Exports and Arms Control - Committees on Arms Export Controls Contents


8  Arms Control Agreements

Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)

204. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) can be found at paragraphs 192-212 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation at paragraphs 65 and 66 of the Report.

205. The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation on the Arms Trade Treaty in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

    The Committees' Conclusion:

    The Committees conclude that the adoption by the UN of the first ever international arms trade treaty applying to conventional arms as a whole in the Arms Trade Treaty of 2013 is most welcome and congratulates Ministers and their officials, under both the previous Labour Government and the present Coalition Government, on their contribution to this unprecedented international achievement. The Committees also welcome the fact that the UK was amongst the first of the countries to sign the Arms Trade Treaty when it became open for signature on 3 June 2013. The Committees recommend in its Response that the Government states by what date the UK will also ratify the Treaty.[197]

    The Government's Response:

    The Government is proud of the achievement of the Arms Trade Treaty and is grateful for the support received from Members of both Houses during the negotiating process.

    The UK plans to ratify the Treaty before the end of the year, after the Treaty has completed 21 sitting days before both Houses in line with the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 (CRAG Act). The Treaty and an Explanatory Memorandum were laid before Parliament under Command Paper number 8680 on 15 July.

    Since parts of the Treaty are exclusive EU competence, the European Commission has brought forward a Council Decision authorising Member States to ratify. This Council Decision is currently undergoing parliamentary scrutiny.[198]

    The Committees' Recommendation:

    The Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response:

    a)  what changes it will be making to its arms export controls:

    i.  primary legislation;

    ii.  secondary legislation;

    iii.  Government administrative procedures and guidance; and

    iv.  Government policy

    to ensure the UK Government is fully compliant with all provisions in the Arms Trade Treaty stating, in each case, the date the change will come into effect; and

    b)  what steps it will be taking to ensure that the ratification of the Arms Trade Treaty by the minimum of 50 countries necessary to bring it into force is achieved in the shortest possible time.[199]

    The Government's Response:

    a)  i. The UK already implements a robust and effective system for control of transfers of conventional arms. No primary legislation is required for UK ratification.

    ii. The only changes to secondary legislation required are described in the response to paragraph 40 [Cm 8707, page 4] above.

    iii. The treaty is consistent with our national systems for control of transfers of conventional arms and will be implemented through existing procedures.

    iv. Government policy is unchanged;

    we will continue to assess exports of conventional arms on a case by case basis, against the Consolidated Criteria. The Criteria will be updated as set out in the response to paragraph 46 [Cm 8707, page 8] above.

    b)  The UK is committed to bringing the Arms Trade Treaty into force as soon as possible. We are lobbying States at all levels to sign and ratify the ATT as a matter of urgency. We are funding projects to promote the ATT, to assist ratification and to support effective implementation. We will also donate £100,000 to the United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation that has been established to support early ratification.[200]

206. In its Written Evidence UK Working Group welcomed the fact that that the UK has commenced the ratification proceedings in anticipation of EU procedures being completed and urged the Government to maintain outreach to other states to sign and ratify as soon as possible. It recommended that:

    that the Government does everything possible to strengthen the international norms embedded in the Treaty. The UK should make the strongest possible interpretative statement upon ratifying the Treaty, for example, making it clear that the UK will continue to regulate a comprehensive list of arms, equipment and munitions beyond the minimum scope allowed by the Treaty and calling on other States Parties to do likewise.

It urged the UK Government to "work proactively to ensure that as many States as possible are able to quickly sign, ratify and begin to properly implement the Treaty." UKWG believed that the UK Government should offer technical and legal assistance to all states which may need it, to assist in signing the Treaty and said that the UK should be a significant donor for ATT implementation purposes and to encourage other states to be generous in this regard.[201]

207. When the Committees asked UKWG about what new legislation would be required in the UK to implement the ATT Oliver Sprague, Amnesty International, answered that UKWG had not yet seen the secondary legislation that would be introduced but understood that the UK Government would be amending Category B of the current brokering controls in order to be "more in line with the ATT scope." He welcomed this amendment as it would mean that a greater number of Category C goods would be moved to Category B and they would be subject to full extra-territorial controls. He added that there would be a secondary benefit which would be helpful in policy terms. He stated:

    It relates to issues of enforcement—not only trafficking and brokering controls, but arguably in tackling the brass-plate phenomenon, in that an operative provision in the implementation section of the ATT requires all Governments that are signatories to offer full co-operation in terms of legal and investigative help.

    It has been a problem in the past [...] that it has been difficult to prosecute or to enforce some of these controls because they involve overseas investigations, and it is difficult to get information. The ATT therefore has a built-in tool that will allow you to do that, because all signatory states will be required to co-operate in those matters. I can see a future benefit to the ATT in terms of the enforcement policy of UK controls in that respect.[202]

Roy Isbister, Saferworld, thought that there would be no change to primary legislation, but:

    there are two elements within the criteria section of the ATT that are slightly interesting when compared with UK and EU controls, and those relate to gender-based violence and transnational organised crime. It is arguable, but I think that there could be some revision of language to reflect more accurately what the Arms Trade Treaty says on those issues, but there is still a bit of a conversation going on, certainly at the EU level, on whether or not it should be changed.[203]

208. In the Westminster Hall debate on the Committees' 2013 Report the BIS Minister, Michael Fallon, said that "the treaty will be relatively straightforward to ratify because we already have a highly developed export control system." He said that the Government hoped to complete the ratification in the "next few months". The UK Government and its partners were actively lobbying other governments to encourage them to sign and ratify the ATT as soon as possible and hoped that the Treaty would achieve the 50 ratifications that it needed to be brought into force soon. He added that the UK Government was providing funding to support states that needed to introduce new legislation or regulations to bring their export controls up to the higher standard required by the Treaty.[204]

209. Prior to his evidence session on 8 January 2014 the Foreign Secretary wrote to the Chairman of the Committees. The relevant text relating to the Arms Trade Treaty was as follows:

    Negotiations on the Arms Trade Treaty were successfully concluded with the near-universal UN adoption of a robust and effective text on 2 April. For the first time in history, this Treaty sets clear, high, common standards for the regulation of the trade in conventional arms globally. This could not have been done without the combined effort of successive Governments, parliament and civil society. I am most grateful for the support of your Committees in our work to achieve this important goal. As the Prime Minister said: "We should be proud of the role Britain has played to secure this ambitious agreement, working with international partners to secure this momentous step that will make our world safer for all."

    We are now working to secure the 50 ratifications required to bring the Treaty into force as soon as possible. Nationally, our Parliamentary procedures for ratification were completed on 4 November. The Department for Business, Innovation & Skills are taking forward, in consultation with industry, a minor expansion of our extra-territorial controls on brokering. Our ratification will then only require authorisation from the European Council (as the Treaty includes some matters of EU exclusive competence) which we hope will be forthcoming before the Spring.

    Internationally, we are encouraging other nations to sign or ratify as soon as possible and providing assistance where necessary: we have given £350,000 in this Financial Year to help states implement the Treaty.

    We will also update the Consolidated Criteria to bring them fully into line with both the Arms Trade Treaty and the EU Common Position. I will write to you on this in more detail shortly. The update will clarify that we will not grant a licence where there is a clear risk of serious violations of international humanitarian law. We will also state that we will take account of the risk of serious acts of gender based violence.

    However, the updated criteria will not include any change to the risk threshold for Criterion 2. We will continue to apply the standard in the EU Common Position, as set out in the current consolidated criteria: we will not grant a licence if there is a clear risk that the items might be used for internal repression.[205]

210. In the Oral Evidence session on 8 January 2014 The Foreign Secretary said that Parliament had completed its procedures on 4 November 2013.[206] He added that the UK Government could not ratify the Treaty until agreement has been achieved in the European parliament because the Treaty covers matters of EU competence. He did say, however, that he expected ratification "by spring of this year [2014]." He said that the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills was leading on secondary legislation and that the current plan was to "roll the amendments together with other changes, such as the ones on the military list, and updates to the Consolidated Criteria.[207]

211. On 25 March the Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Foreign Secretary asking for further information in relation to the Arms Trade Treaty. The Text of the Chairman's letter was as follows:

    I should be grateful if you could provide the following information in relation to the Arms Trade Treaty:

    1.  The steps that have been taken by the Government so far to achieve UK ratification of the Treaty.

    2.  The steps that remain to be taken and the timetable for them.

    3.  Whether for UK ratification to have legal effect in the UK, it is necessary for all other EU member states to achieve ratification.

    4.  The Government's timetable for making the changes in secondary legislation that will be required to achieve full UK compliance in law with the terms of the Arms Trade Treaty.[208]

212. On 2 April 2014 17 European Union Member States, including the UK, ratified the Arms Trade Treaty, bringing the total number of countries that had ratified the Treaty to 31. Fifty countries are required to ratify the Treaty to bring it into effect.[209] The Foreign Secretary said in an FCO Press release said:

    This Treaty will help make the world safer, by placing human rights and international humanitarian law at the heart of decisions about the arms trade. For the first time, countries have agreed international rules governing everything from small arms to warships. If these rules are implemented globally and effectively, they have the power to stop the arms from reaching terrorists and criminals, and fuelling conflict and instability around the world.

    Our work does not stop here. We urge other countries - particularly the largest arms exporters - to ratify the Treaty and ensure it enters into force as quickly as possible. We will continue to support other nations in their plans to implement the Treaty, and Mexico's efforts to plan the first Conference of States Parties.[210]

213. The Foreign Secretary replied on 3 April to the Chairman's letter of 25 March as follows:

    Thank you for your letter of 25 March, asking for additional information in relation to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).

    I am pleased to announce that on 27 March 2014 I signed the instrument of ratification, and on 2 April 2014 the United Kingdom formally deposited its ratification of the Arms Trade Treaty in New York. The ratification was marked by a joint event in which we deposited our ratification alongside 16 EU Member States and El Salvador, at a stroke more than doubling the total number of ratifications which now stands at 31.

    In terms of the domestic legislative and regulatory steps needed to ensure the Treaty could enter into force in the UK, two processes have taken place. On 19 March the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) laid before Parliament and Order amending UK trade (brokering) controls to ensure that they are fully compliant with Article 10 of the ATT. The Export Control (Amendment) Order 2014 (S.I. 2014 No. 702) adds to Category B of the trade controls those items listed in Article 2.1 of the ATT that are not already included in Category B, namely: battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles; large calibre artillery systems; combat aircraft and attack helicopters; certain warships; and certain missiles and their launchers. As a result, brokering of these items by UK persons will be subject to control wherever in the world those persons are located. The amending Order comes into force on 9 April.

    On 25 March an update to the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria was announced to Parliament in a Written Ministerial Statement by the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Dr Vince Cable. This was necessary before ratification to ensure the UK was compliant with provisions of the ATT such as Article 7(4), which obliges State Parties to take into account the risk of conventional arms being used to commit or facilitate serious acts of Gender based Violence. The update also brings the Criteria into line with EU Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment.

    These two changes are sufficient to ensure the UK export control policy and practice are fully compliant with the provisions of the ATT.

    The UK does not require other EU Member States to ratify in order for the Treaty to have legal effect in the UK. This is because the UK has signed up to the Treaty as a State. The ATT cleared parliamentary scrutiny under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act (CRaG) on 5 November 2013. But we were unable to ratify until we received authorisation from the EU Council of Ministers. This was necessary because the Treaty is mixed competence (it covers issues of trade for which the EU has competence). The Plenary of the European Parliament voted on this on 5 February 2014. The majority of MEPs voted in support of ratification. The Council decision was approved by the Council of Ministers on 3 March.

    The UK is ready for entry into force of the Treaty (which will happen ninety days after 50 ratifications have been deposited). The collective ratification event on 2 April has brought this closer and the UK is rightly proud of its role. We will, of course, continue to encourage states to sign and ratify the Treaty so that it can enter into force soon and start having a substantive impact on arms flows around the world.

    I would like to extend my thanks and the warm appreciation that the Foreign Office has for the role that Parliament and the CAEC have played in supporting and canvassing for this Treaty. The unified front of civil society, government, industry and Parliament enabled the UK to lead convincingly and from the outset of the process.[211]

214. I propose that the Committees conclude that the Government's ratification of the Arms Trade Treaty is welcome.

215. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:

a)  the total number of ratifications now achieved and the countries who have ratified;

b)  the countries which the Government considers to be the 20 largest arms exporters in view of the Foreign Secretary's statement on 2 April 2014 that the UK Government would be urging the largest arms exporters to ratify; and

c)  the specific steps the Government is taking both bilaterally and internationally to persuade individual countries to ratify the Arms Trade Treaty with particular reference to non-ratifying P5 countries and countries amongst the largest arms exporters.

EU Council Common Position

216. On December 2008, the EU Council agreed a Common Position (2008/944/CFSP) defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment with which all EU Member States should comply. The EU Common Position provides some degree of protection for the UK defence industry from having its competiveness undermined by other EU Member States whose governments might otherwise have a less stringent policy on prohibiting arms exports which might violate human rights, facilitate internal repression or promote armed conflict than the UK Government. The full text of the EU Council Common Position is set out in Annex 4.

217. The Chairman of the Committees in submitting the Committees' response to the Balance of Competencies Review highlighted the importance of this aspect of the EU Common Position. The Committees' response letter of 20 August 2013 stated:

    Without such EU-wide controls and policies, UK arms exporters would be placed at a competitive disadvantage to arms exporters from other EU Member States who had laxer national controls and policies than those of the UK Government.

218. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government when considering its future policy towards the EU should have in mind the significance of the EU Common Position in helping to maintain a fair competitive position in the EU for the UK defence industry.

Cluster Munitions

219. The Committees' previous scrutiny of cluster munitions can be found at paragraphs 213-225 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation at paragraph 67 of the Report.

220. The Committees' Recommendation on cluster munitions in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

    The Committees' Recommendation:

    The Committees recommend that in its Response the Government states:

a)  how many countries have now signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions and which countries it is currently urging to become signatories;

b)  how many countries have now ratified the Convention and which of the countries that are now only signatories it is currently urging to ratify the Convention;

c)  what steps it is taking to encourage the United States, Russia, China and Israel to become signatories and/or to ratify the Convention;

d)  whether the Government is satisfied or not with the progress by the financial institutions in producing voluntary codes of conduct against the indirect financing of the production of cluster munitions and their components; and

    e)  whether the Government continues to consider a Government Code of Conduct or Government legislation against the indirect financing of the production of cluster munitions and their components as policy options.[212]

    The Government's Response:

a) and b) An up to date list of all the countries that have signed and ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions can be found here.

    http://unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/67DC5063EB530E02C12574F8002E9E 49?OpenDocument

c) The Government believes that active diplomatic efforts by the UK and other states to globalise the Convention and support clearance work in affected countries are the areas in which the UK Government can add most value to our shared goal of globalising the ban on cluster munitions and tackling their humanitarian impact. We will continue to use all appropriate bilateral and multilateral opportunities to promote the universalisation of the Convention and its ambition of a world free of cluster munitions.

    d) and e) Indirect financing - such as the purchase of shares in or the provision of loans to large multinational conglomerates that amongst often many other activities may be involved in the manufacture of cluster munitions - is not captured by the prohibitions of the Act. We consider this form of indirect financing an issue for individual institutions to consider under their own investment charters and social corporate responsibility agendas.[213]

221. Following publication of the Government's United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012 the Committees wrote to the Government asking a question about cluster munitions. The question and answer were as follows:

    The Committees' question:

    Is the UK Government still on track to destroy the remainder of its cluster munitions by the end of 2013?

    The Government's answer:

    Yes, as stated at the Fourth Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Lusaka in September.[214]

222. The Fourth Meeting of States Parties (4MSP) took place in Lusaka, Zambia, from 9 to 13 September 2013 and gathered some 464 delegates from 58 States parties, 18 Signatory states, 30 Observer states and 12 international organizations.[215] The main outcomes of the Meeting were:

·  that the meeting welcomed progress in implementing the Vientianne Action Plan;

·  recognised the crucial role of timely and efficient clearance of areas contaminated by cluster munition remnants;

·  recognised the importance of identifying all cluster munition contaminated areas;

·  recognised that transparency of national reporting was an obligation and important tool in the promotion of the Convention; and

·  agreement that the formation of the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) would commence immediately (however a decision on the funding model for the ISU was delayed until the next meeting).[216]

223. In its Written Evidence UKWG expressed concern that the Government appeared to have rejected its previous commitment to end indirect investments in cluster-munition producers.

224. UKWG informed the Committees that an increasing number of UK-based financial institutions continued to strengthen their policies on investments in companies involved in the production of cluster munitions. In discussions between financial institutions and members of UKWG, it said that all companies had strongly supported the idea of a jointly-developed, industry-wide Code of Conduct to end indirect finance and had expressed disappointment that thus far the Government appeared to have abandoned previous commitments to help to facilitate its development. UKWG considered that it is important that the Government engaged with financial institutions and non-governmental organisations through a multi-stakeholder process to provide guidance. It said that financial institutions had indicated that they would benefit from government guidance and leadership on this issue to harmonise policies and practice.[217]

225. In Oral Evidence Oliver Sprague, Amnesty International, informed the Committees that:

    The previous Government committed themselves to developing with civil society and financial institutions a voluntary code of conduct to end the practice of indirect financing of cluster munitions. When in Opposition, the current Government tabled a specific amendment in the House of Lords to ensure that indirect financing was captured under the terms of the Act. They withdrew that amendment because agreement was reached on a ministerial statement on the need to develop a voluntary code of conduct. In other words, when it was announced that a voluntary code of conduct would be developed and that the Government would seek to work with civil society and the industry to develop that, the amendment was withdrawn.

    All parties at the time recognised that indirect finance was a problem that needed to be tackled, and we remain disappointed that the current Government have not honoured that commitment and have left it up to the banks to develop their own code of conduct. I have met representatives of a number of high street banks—a month ago, I was in the offices of a very large household name that has revised and strengthened its policy, and its message to me was simple. The banks are crying out for the Government to get together with all the financial institutions and civil society NGOs to start the process, because they think that developing policies in these tricky areas in isolation is not helpful. What is needed is everybody to get together, because each financial institution will have a different set of problems that it needs to address, as it is a complicated area.[218]

226. UKWG called for the setting up of a meeting of all relevant parties to "thrash out some of the issues." When asked which would be the lead Department Oliver Sprague told the Committees that it would be the Foreign and Commonwealth Office because it was dealing with international treaties. He added that as the issue touched on financial issues that the Treasury might also be involved in any future discussions on the indirect financing of cluster munitions.[219]

227. When the Committees asked the Foreign Secretary about the Government's policy on developing a code of conduct on the indirect financing of cluster munitions he replied:

    On cluster munitions, [...] direct financing is clearly prohibited; indirect financing is not. We think that a voluntary approach is preferable to Government intervention, but we do not rule out, as I think I said last year, the Government's taking a more active role. I would like to see how things develop. I welcome the steps taken on a voluntary basis by a number of British financial institutions, but we will continue to monitor this closely. We will look at it again with the financial sector, if necessary, to see when and whether there is scope and need for the Government to act.[220]

228. I propose that the Committees conclude that the Evidence they have received clearly points to both financial institutions and civil society NGOs wishing to see the Government involved in developing a code of conduct on the indirect financing of cluster munitions.

229. I propose that the Committees recommend that in the light of the Foreign Secretary's statement to the Committees that: "We will look at it again with the financial sector, if necessary, to see when and whether there is scope and need for the Government to act.", the Government states in its Response whether it will act in helping to develop a Code of Conduct on the indirect financing of cluster munitions.

Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)

230. The Committees' previous scrutiny of small arms and light weapons (SALW) can be found at paragraphs 226-230 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 68 of the Report.

231. The Committees' Recommendation on the Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

    The Committees' Recommendation:

    The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:

    a)  what steps it is taking to achieve full implementation of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects;

    b)  what steps it is taking to achieve full implementation of the EU's Small Arms and Light Weapons Strategy; and

    c)  how far the UN Programme and the EU Strategy will, or will not, be superseded by the small arms and light weapons elements of the Arms Trade Treaty when it comes into force.[221]

    The Government's Response:

    a)  The UK remains firmly committed to achieving full implementation of the UN Programme of Action to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects. The UK contributes by funding programmes through the EU, DfID and NGOs, supporting projects to destroy existing stockpiles and provide secure storage, and by funding education.

    b)  The UK remains firmly committed to achieving full implementation of the EU's Small Arms and Light Weapons Strategy. The introduction of the EU strategy outlines the relationship between itself and the United Nations Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons:

    "The United Nations Programme of Action to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, adopted on 20 July 2001, reaffirms the need for complementarity at global, regional and national levels in its implementation. By developing a strategy for combating the accumulation of and illicit trade in SALW and their ammunition, the EU wishes to fall into line with this essential complementarity and to provide a contribution."

    c)  It is difficult to prejudge the impact of the Arms Trade Treaty on existing arms control provisions. We believe that the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and the EU Strategy on Small Arms and Light Weapons are complementary and mutually reinforcing. We hope that as States Parties implement the Arms Trade Treaty they will draw on these and other existing instruments to ensure robust controls.[222]

232. Following publication of the Government's United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012 the Committees wrote to the Government asking two questions about small arms and light weapons. The questions and answers were as follows:

    The Committees' question:

    What progress has been made in enhancing the implementation of the International Tracing Instrument to promote international co-operation in marking and tracing illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons?

    The Government's answer:

    The UN Programme of Action Review Conference held in August 2012 agreed an Implementation Plan for the International Tracing Instrument (ITI) for the period 2012-2018. At the Review Conference, States resolved to increase their efforts to achieve full and effective implementation of the ITI. More details about the Implementation Plan can be found at http://www.poa-iss.org/RevCon2/Documents/RevCon-DOC/CRP3-ITI-IP.pdf

    The Committees' question:

    Has a voluntary sponsorship fund to boost assistance to less developed states in dealing with illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons been established? If so, what is the size of the fund and what amount has the British Government contributed to it?

    The Government's answer:

    A voluntary fund to boost assistance to less developed states in dealing with illicit small arms and light weapons has been established.  The UK has pledged to donate £100,000 to the United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation (UNSCAR) and has allocated a further £250,000 to fund projects devoted to supporting ATT implementation. The EU will also provide considerable funding to support ATT implementation.[223]

233. The Fifth Biennial Meeting of States to Consider Implementation of the Programme of Action (the Fifth Biennial Meeting of States) will take place in New York from 16 - 20 June 2014. The meeting will include a segment on the International Tracing Instrument, a separate instrument agreed to by Member States in 2005 on the marking and tracing of small arms.[224]

234. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response what were its objectives at the Fifth Biennial Meeting in New York in June 2014 to consider Implementation of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects, together with the International Tracing Instrument, and how far progress was made with each of those objectives or not.

Landmines

235. The Committees' previous scrutiny of landmines can be found at paragraphs 231-234 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 69 of the Report.

236. The Committees' Recommendation on landmines in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

    The Committees' Recommendation:

    The Committees recommend in its Response that the Government states:

a)  which countries have yet to accede to the Ottawa Landmines Convention; and

    b)  what steps it is taking to try to secure the accession of the remaining countries to the Convention.[225]

    The Government's Response:

    a)  An up to date list of all the countries that have signed and ratified the Convention on Anti-Personnel Landmines can be found here.

    http://unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/6E65F97C9D695724C12571C0003D0 9EF?OpenDocument

    b)  The Government continues to use all appropriate bilateral and multilateral opportunities to promote the universalisation of the Convention and its ambition of a world free of anti-personnel landmines.[226]

237. Following publication of the Government's United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012 the Committees wrote to the Government asking a question about landmines. The question and answer were as follows:

    The Committees' question:

    What is the area of land in the Falkland Islands that is still to be cleared of mines and unexploded ordnance and then released?

    The Government's answer:

    There are around 20,000 landmines remaining, covering an area of approximately 20km2.[227]

238. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the countries which have significant holdings of anti-personnel landmines and have not signed and ratified the Ottawa Landmines Convention. I propose that the Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response what specific steps it is taking with each of those countries to secure their ratification of the Landmines Convention.

Barrel bombs

239. On 28 April 2014 the Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Foreign Secretary asking if the use of barrel bombs was contrary to international law. The text of the letter was as follows:

    Please could you state whether the Government considers that the use of barrel bombs is contrary to international law, and, if so, please could you also state the provisions in question.

    If not, please could you state whether the Government would be willing to press for barrel bombs to be brought within the ambit of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons or any other international arms control agreement..[228]

The Foreign Secretary replied on 19 May 2014 as follows:

    Thank you for your letter of 28 April on the subject of barrel bombs, and their position under international law.

    There have been regular reports of the use of barrel bombs by the regime of President Assad in Syria. I raised the issue on 22 February this year, following a UN Security Council resolution to allow greater humanitarian access to Syria. I called on the Assad regime top cease the indiscriminate use of aerial bombardment across Syria, including the barbaric use of barrel bombs, and immediately adhere to the obligations set by the Security Council and allow free and unfettered access for all humanitarian agencies.

    Behind my statement was a condemnation of the flagrant abuse of the principles of International Humanitarian Law, specifically regarding the indiscriminate use of weapons, and the deliberate targeting of civilians and civilian objects. A barrel bomb, or indeed any weapon, is used unlawfully if it is deliberately targeted at civilians or civilian objects, or used in an indiscriminate, disproportionate fashion with insufficient precautions taken in attack. However, in principle the air-delivery of weapons is no less capable of being carried out indiscriminately than any other means of delivery.

    HMG does not consider that barrel bombs as a category of conventional weapon are specifically prohibited under international law. There may nonetheless be circumstances in which a barrel bomb or other improvised explosive device is equipped with chemical weapons, in which case the use of such would be prohibited in all circumstances under the Chemical Weapons Convention. HMG does not currently have any plans to bring the issue of barrel bombs to the UN Convention on certain Conventional Weapons, or any other fora.

    We will continue to condemn President Assad's flagrant abuses of international humanitarian law, including the deliberate targeting of civilians and civilian objects.[229]

240. I propose that the Committees conclude that, like cluster munitions and anti-personnel landmines, barrel bombs have been used indiscriminately against civilians.

241. I propose that the Committees recommend that as the use of cluster munitions and anti-personnel landmines has been banned under international Conventions, the Government should reconsider its position that "it does not currently have any plans to bring the issue of barrel bombs to the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons or any other fora."

The Wassenaar Arrangement

242. The Wassenaar Arrangement was established in order to contribute to regional and international security and stability, by promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing destabilising accumulations. Participating States seek, through their national policies, to ensure that transfers of these items do not contribute to the development or enhancement of military capabilities which undermine these goals, and are not diverted to support such capabilities. The decision to transfer or deny transfer of any item is the sole responsibility of each Participating State. All measures with respect to the Arrangement are taken in accordance with national legislation and policies and are implemented on the basis of national discretion.

243. Representatives of Participating States meet regularly in Vienna where the Wassenaar Arrangement's Secretariat is located. The Participating States of the Wassenaar Arrangement are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States.[230]

244. The name comes from Wassenaar, a town located in a suburb of the Hague, Netherlands, where an agreement was reached in 1995 to start a new type of multilateral co-operation.[231]

245. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Wassenaar Arrangement can be found at paragraphs 235-240 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 70 of the Report.

246. The Committees' Recommendation on the Wassenaar Arrangement in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

    The Committees' Conclusion:

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response states:

a)  how far its objectives for the Wassenaar Arrangement were fulfilled at the Plenary meeting in December 2012;

b)  what steps it is taking to encourage China to make an application for membership of the Wassenaar Arrangement; and

c)  which other significant arms exporting countries, in addition to China, should desirably become members of the Wassenaar Arrangement;

d)  what the Government wishes to see achieved at the Wassenaar Arrangement Plenary meeting in December 2013; and

    e)  what outcome the Government wishes to see from the review of the Wassenaar Arrangement export control lists and what input it will be making to this review. [232]

    The Government's Response:

    a)  The Government was satisfied with the outcome of the December 2012 Plenary meeting as outlined in its Annual Report on Strategic Export Controls published on 12 July. Securing agreement for a strategic look at issues related to the regime's future membership in 2013 was a significant achievement at the December 2012 Plenary. This represented the culmination of several months of collaborative work led by the UK. We were pleased that the States that participate in the Wassenaar Arrangement welcomed the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty. The Government hopes that the Arrangement will play a useful role in the effective implementation of this new treaty.

    b)  The Government supports the continuing efforts of Ambassador Griffiths, Head of the Wassenaar Arrangement Secretariat, in this area, which were outlined in the Foreign Secretary's letter to the Committees of 8 April. China has yet to respond formally to Ambassador Griffiths.

    c)  The Foreign Secretary's letter of 8 April outlined the UK position, which is that the Government considers it is desirable for all the major arms exporters and technology holders to be within the Arrangement. However not all Participating States are in favour of a significantly expanded membership. Furthermore, not all major arms exporters/technology holders currently wish to join the Arrangement. This highlights the importance of the strategic look at membership agreed at the December 2012 Plenary.

    d)  As in previous years the Government will use the opportunity of the plenary in December to work with other Participating States to ensure the Arrangement continues to fulfil its aims:

    a. ensuring that transfers of conventional arms and transfers in dual-use goods and technologies are carried out responsibly and in furtherance of international and regional peace and security;

    b. enabling the exchange of information that will enhance transparency;

    c. enhancing cooperation between Participating States.

    e)  The Government looks forward to the strategic and comprehensive review of the control lists as an opportunity to ensure that the lists remain coherent and clear for the exporters and government officials who use them on a daily basis. At the same time, the Government wants to ensure that the control lists keep pace with technology as it develops, proposing new controls as appropriate or amending or deleting existing controls that no longer have strategic relevance, as we have done in previous years.[233]

247. Following publication of the Government's United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012 the Committees wrote to the Government asking a question about the Wassenaar Arrangement. The question and answer were as follows:

    The Committees' question:

    What are the specific issues relating to the future membership of the Wassenaar Arrangement at which participating states will be looking at in 2013?

    The Government's answer:

    The Government's Response to the Committees' Annual Report (Cm 8707) and the Foreign Secretary's letter of 8 April provided an update on membership issues. The General Working Group is being held on 21-24 October and the Plenary will be held in December. We will update the Committees in 2014.[234]

248. The 19th Plenary meeting of the Wassenaar Arrangement was held in Vienna on 3-4 December 2013. The Public Statement issued at the conclusion of the Plenary session stated that Participating States had agreed to "conduct further work on addressing new challenges, including emerging technologies of concern, to keep pace with advances in technology, research and innovation." The Participating States had worked to make the existing control lists more readily understood and user-friendly for licensing authorities and exporters. Progress had been made on a comprehensive and systematic review of the Wassenaar Lists. New export controls had been agreed in a number of areas, including surveillance and law enforcement/intelligence gathering tools and Internet Protocol network surveillance systems or equipment, which may be detrimental to international and regional security and stability.[235]

249. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government provides the Committees with its promised update on Wassenaar Arrangement membership issues no later than in its Response to this Report.

250. I propose that the Committees further recommend that the Government states in it Response:

a)  whether the comprehensive review of the Wassenaar controls list has now been completed or is still on-going; and

b)  whether the Wassenaar Arrangement's new export controls on surveillance and law enforcement/intelligence gathering tools and Internet Protocol network surveillance systems or equipment require any amendments to UK primary or secondary legislation to ensure UK compliance.

The UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA)

251. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the UN Register of Conventional Weapons (UNROCA) can be found at paragraphs 241-244 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation at paragraph 71 of the Report.

252. The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation on the UN Register of Conventional Weapons in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

    The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation:

    The Committees conclude that the Government is right to include in its annual report for the UN Register of Conventional Arms Government military equipment it gifts, as well as sells, to other States, and recommends that it encourages other Governments to do likewise. The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response what progress it is making in widening the categories of military equipment that are to be reported to the UN Register of Conventional Arms.[236]

    The Government's Response:

    The Government notes the Committees' conclusion.

    The UK continues to advocate a widening and broadening of the categories. We will continue to do so each time the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) sits to evaluate the Register.[237]

253. Following publication of the 2012 UNROCA report the Committees undertook and analysis of the UK's reported information. Following the analysis the Committees asked the UK Government a series of questions about apparent discrepancies between the UNROCA report figures and the ECO quarterly reports of approved arms export licences. The Committees' questions were as follows:

    Ghana: The Committees would like an explanation for the apparent discrepancy between the Pivot reports for the number of sniper rifles approved for export in the Pivot reports for the Q1 2010 - Q4 2012 and the Government's return to the UN Register of Conventional Weapons (UNROCA) for 2012. The Pivot reports indicate that there were SIELs for 30 sniper rifles approved during this period, however the figure given in the UNROCA report for 2012 lists a total of 4080 sniper rifles exported to Ghana from the UK in that year.

    Madagascar: The Committees would like an explanation for the apparent discrepancy between the pivot reports for the number of combat shotguns, rifles and assault rifles approved for export in the Pivot reports for the Q1 2010 - Q4 2012 and the Government's return to the UN Register of Conventional Weapons (UNROCA) for 2012. The pivot reports indicate that there were SIELs for 750 (+ one unspecified quantity) combat shotguns, 1100 rifles and 3850 assault rifles approved during this period, however the figures given in the UNROCA report for 2012 lists a total of 1300 combat shotguns, 1500 rifles and 5850 assault rifles exported to Madagascar from the UK in that year.

    Maldives: The Committees would like an explanation for the apparent discrepancy between the Pivot reports for the number of combat shotguns, rifles, assault rifles and pistols approved for export in the Pivot reports for the Q1 2010 - Q4 2012 and the Government's return to the UN Register of Conventional Weapons (UNROCA) for 2012. The Pivot reports indicate that there were SIELs for 360 combat shotguns, 1570 rifles, 4850 assault rifles and 380 pistols approved during this period, however the figures given in the UNROCA report for 2012 lists a total of 1350 combat shotguns, 4390 rifles, 10500 assault rifles and 1230 pistols exported to the Maldives from the UK in that year.

    Mauritius: The Committees would like an explanation for the apparent discrepancy between the Pivot reports for the number of combat shotguns, rifles, assault rifles and pistols approved for export in the Pivot reports for the Q1 2010 - Q4 2012 and the Government's return to the UN Register of Conventional Weapons (UNROCA) for 2012. The Pivot reports indicate that there were SIELs for 560 combat shotguns, 3434 rifles, 6743 assault rifles and 565 pistols approved during this period, however the figures given in the UNROCA report for 2012 lists a total of 1354 combat shotguns, 5408 rifles, 10978 assault rifles and 1560 pistols exported to Mauritius from the UK in that year.

    Oman: The Committees would like an explanation for the apparent discrepancy between the Pivot reports for the number of combat shotguns, rifles, assault rifles and pistols approved for export in the Pivot reports for the Q1 2010 - Q4 2012 and the Government's return to the UN Register of Conventional Weapons (UNROCA) for 2012. The Pivot reports indicate that there were SIELs for 1320 combat shotguns, 3575 rifles, 6441 assault rifles and 1151 pistols (+one unspecified quantity) approved during this period, however the figures given in the UNROCA report for 2012 lists a total of 1600 combat shotguns, 6270 rifles, 12957 assault rifles and 2245 pistols exported to Oman from the UK in that year.

    South Africa: The Committees would like an explanation for the apparent discrepancy between the Pivot reports for the number of shotguns, rifles, assault rifles and pistols approved for export in the Pivot reports for the Q1 2010 - Q4 2012 and the Government's return to the UN Register of Conventional Weapons (UNROCA) for 2012. The Pivot reports indicate that there were SIELs for 487 shotguns, 3700 rifles, 6545 assault rifles and 810 pistols approved during this period, however the figures given in the UNROCA report for 2012 lists a total of 950 shotguns, 5501 rifles, 10319 assault rifles and 1352 pistols exported to South Africa from the UK in that year.[238]

The Government answers were as follows:

    Ghana: Both the Government's pivot reports and the returns to UNROCA are based on the quantities of small arms licensed in the specified periods. The reported quantities should therefore be consistent in both reports. However the two reports are compiled using different procedures and we have identified a technical error which has led to errors in a small number of cases, as explained below.

    The figure of 20 sniper rifles in the Government's pivot reports is correct (under "Mil" 20 x 1 licence). The figure in the UNROCA report is incorrect. We have informed UNROCA of the discrepancy and they confirmed they will correct the Report.

    Madagascar: Please see the Government's response to your question for Ghana on the type of data we report to UNROCA being based on the quantities of small arms licensed in the specified periods.

    We have reviewed the data and found the following:

    For combat shotguns the correct figure is 1500 units. Under "Mil" the unspecified licence has been amended to 200 and this will show up in our next quarterly pivot release. Other licences to tally in the pivot report under "Mil" include 150 x 8 licences and 100 x 1 licence. We have amended our records and informed UNROCA of the discrepancy;

    For rifles, both reports are correct and show a figure of 1500 units (tally under "Mil" 200 x 6 licences and 100 x 1 licence; under "Mil & Other" 100 x 2 licences);

    For assault rifles, both reports are correct and show a figure of 5850 units (tally under "Mil" 150 x 1 licence, 200 x 3 licences; 300 x 2 licences, 350 x 1 licence, 450 x 1 licence, 600 x 5 licences; under "Mil and Other" 200 x 2 licences and 300 x 1 licence).

    Maldives: Please see the Government's response to your question for Ghana on the type of data we report to UNROCA being based on the quantities of small arms licensed in the specified periods.

    We reviewed the data and found the figures in both the Government's pivot reports and the UNROCA Report to be correct, as follows:

    For combat shotguns, both reports show a figure of 1350 units (tally under "Mil" 150 x 8 licences, 100 x 1 licence, 50 x 1 licence)

    For rifles, both reports show a figure of 4390 units (tally under "Mil" 40 x 1 licence, 100 x 5 licences, 150 x 3 licences, 200 x 6 licences, 300 x 2 licences; under "Mil and Other" 100 x 16 licences)

    For assault rifles, both reports show a figure of 10,500 units (tally under "Mil" 100 x 2 licences, 150 x 2 licences; 200 x 1 licences, 300 x 1 licences, 350 x 2 licences, 400 x 1 licence, 450 x 3 licences, 600 x 4 licences, 700 x 1 licence, 750 x 1 licence; under "Mil and Other" 200 x 16 licences)

    For pistols, both reports show a figure of 1230 units (tally under "Mil" 30 x 6 licences, 50 x 1 licence, 100 x 2 licences; under "Mil & Other" 50 x 16 licences)

    Mauritius: Please see the Government's response to your question for Ghana on the type of data we report to UNROCA being based on the quantities of small arms licensed in the specified periods.

    We reviewed the data and found the figures in both the Government's pivot reports and the UNROCA Report to be correct, as follows:

    For combat shotguns, both reports show a figure of 1354 units (tally under "Mil" 50 X 1 licence, 150 x 6 licences, 200 x 2 licences, 4 x 1 licence for smoothbore weapon. Please note UNROCA do not have a smoothbore weapon category and it was therefore added as a combat shotgun to ensure it was reported);

    For rifles, both reports show a figure of 5408 units (tally under "Mil" 3 x 1 licence, 5 x 1 licence, 6 x 1 licence, 40 x 1 licence, 100 x 3 licences, 150 x 1 licence, 200 x 5 licence, 204 x 1 licence, 300 x 2 licences, 800 x 1 licence; under "Mil and Other" 100 x 23 licences);

    For assault rifles, both reports show a figure of 10978 units (tally under "Mil" 9 x 1 licence, 100 x 3 licences, 200 x 2 licences, 300 x 3 licences, 350 x 1 licence, 569 x 1 licence, 600 x 4 licences, 700 x 1 licence, 800 x 1 licence; under "Mil and Other" section 175 x 2 licences, 200 x 19 licences, 400 x 1 licence);

    For pistols, both reports show a figure of 1560 units (tally under "Mil" 30 x 6 licences, 50 x 1 licence, 80 x 1 licence,100 x 2 licences; under "Mil and Other" 50 x 21 licences).

    Oman: Please see the Government's response to your question for Ghana on the type of data we report to UNROCA being based on the quantities of small arms licensed in the specified periods.

    We have reviewed the data and found the following:

    For combat shotguns, the figures in the Government's pivot reports and the UNROCA report are correct. Both reports show a figure of 1600 units (tally under "Mil" 50 X 1 licence, 100 x 2 licences, 150 x 5 licences, and 200 x 3 licences);

    For rifles, the figure of 6420 in the Government's pivot reports is correct (tally under "Mil" 40 x 1 licence, 50 x 1 licence, 100 x 7 licences, 150 x 3 licences, 200 x 8 licences; under "Mil & Other" 80 x 1 licence, 100 x 35 licences). The figure in the UNROCA report is incorrect. We have informed UNROCA of the discrepancy and they confirmed they will make the necessary corrections;

    For assault rifles, the figure of 13107 in the Government's pivot reports is correct (tally under "Mil" 7 x 1 licence, 100 x 5 licences, 150 x 4 licences, 200 x 3 licences, 300 x 3 licences, 350 x 1 licence, 400 x 1 licence, 600 x 4 licences; under "Mil & Other" 100 x 1 licence, 175 x 2 licences, 200 x 33 licences, 300 x 1 licence). The figure in the UNROCA report is incorrect. We have informed UNROCA of the discrepancy and they confirmed they will make the necessary corrections;

    For pistols, both reports show a figure of 2245 units (tally under "Mil" 2 X 1 licence, 4 x 1 licence, 19 x 1 licence, 30 x 3 licences, 50 x 1 licence, 80 x 1 licence and 100 x 2 licences; under "Mil & Other" 50 x 36 licences).

    South Africa: Please see the Government's response to your question for Ghana on the type of data we report to UNROCA being based on the quantities of small arms licensed in the specified periods.

    We reviewed the data and found the figures in both the Government's pivot reports and the UNROCA Report to be correct, as follows:

    For shotguns, both reports have a figure of 950 units (tally under "Mil" 50 X 1 licence and 150 x 6 licences);

    For rifles, both reports have a figure of 5501 units (tally under "Mil" 1 X 1 licence, 100 x 6 licences, 150 x 2 licences, 200 x 6 licences, 350 x 2 licences, 1000 x 1 licence; under "Mil & Other" 100 x 17 licences);

    For assault rifles, both reports have a figure of 10319 units (tally under "Mil" 2 X 1 licence, 10 x 1 licence, 12 x 1 licence, 20 x 1 licence, 100 x 3 licences, 150 x 6 licences, 200 x 2 licences, 300 x 2 licences, 350 x 1 licence, 400x 1 licence, 450 x 1 licence, 500 x 1 licence, 800 x 1 licence and 600 x 3 licences; under "Mil & Other" 175 x 1 licence, 200 x 12 licences and 300 x 4 licences);

    For pistols, both reports have a figure of 1352 units (tally under "Mil" 1 X 1 licence, 4 x 1 licence, 23 x 1 licence, 30 x 4 licences, 44 x 1 licence, 50 x 2 licences, 55 x 1 licence, 100 x 2 licences; under "Mil & Other" 5 x 1 licence and 50 x 16 licences).[239]

254. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government reviews its procedures for compiling its returns to the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) to avoid errors in its returns in future.

255. I propose that the Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response what specific progress it is making in achieving a widening and broadening of the categories of military equipment that are to be reported to the UN Register of Conventional Arms.

The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)

256. The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects as amended on 21 December 2001(CCW) is usually referred to as the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. It is also known as the Inhumane Weapons Convention. The purpose of the Convention is to ban or restrict the use of specific types of weapons that are considered to cause unnecessary or unjustifiable suffering to combatants or to affect civilians indiscriminately. The structure of the CCW - a chapeau Convention and annexed Protocols - was adopted in this manner to ensure future flexibility. The Convention itself contains only general provisions. All prohibitions or restrictions on the use of specific weapons or weapon systems are the object of the Protocols annexed to the Convention.[240]

257. Following publication of the Government's United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012 the Committees wrote to the Government asking a question about the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. The question and answer were as follows:

    The Committees' question:

    What were the Government's policy objectives at the meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons held in November 2012 and how far have these objectives been achieved? Does the Government consider that any additions should be made to the existing five protocols which are as follows:

    -  Protocol I on Non-Detectable Fragments

    -  Protocol II on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices

    -  Protocol III on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons

    -  Protocol IV on Blinding Laser Weapons

    -  Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War

    The Government's answer:

    The UK's main objective at the November 2012 meeting was to support Australia in maintaining dialogue on practical measures to combat the unlawful manufacture and use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) under Protocol II. The UK delivered an expert presentation on its Counter-IED approach at the conference. Our work with Australia is continuing in advance of this year's meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention in November.

    More broadly, the UK's main objective remains to encourage the universalisation of the Convention and to achieve adherence to the existing protocols. The Government is not currently considering any additions to these protocols.[241]

258. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response what were its objectives at the meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in November 2013 and what was the outcome of the meeting.

259. I propose that the Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response which countries are now Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and to each of its 5 Protocols.

260. I propose that the Committees also recommend that the Government states in its Response what specific steps it is taking to encourage the universalisation of the Convention and to achieve adherence to the existing Protocols.

The Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT)

261. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) can be found at paragraphs 245-252 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 73 of the Report.

262. In 1995 the Conference on Disarmament adopted the Shannon Mandate (named after Canadian Ambassador Gerald Shannon) to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally effective verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.[242] The use of the word "cut-off" (i.e. preventing future production) has raised the question as to how the Treaty would also cover existing stocks of fissile material. The primary debate that surfaced during the Shannon discussions centred on the inclusion of rules that would cover both existing stockpiles and the future production of fissile material.[243] Pakistan has been the only country blocking the start of negotiations for more than three years because of a 2008 agreement by the world's key nuclear technology suppliers to lift long-standing restrictions on nuclear trade with India. Pakistan has maintained that a fissile material ban must cover existing stocks of fissile material instead of only halting future production.[244]

263. The Committees' Recommendation on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

    The Committees' Recommendation:

    The Committees recommend that the Government sets out in its Response:

    a)  what specific routes to starting negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva the British Government and the other P5 countries are actively investigating; and

    b)  whether it will give further consideration to setting a deadline for the start of negotiations on the FMCT at the Conference on Disarmament and to transferring the responsibility for starting the negotiations to the UN, or to another international forum, if that deadline is not met.[245]

    The Government's Response:

    a)  We are actively engaging with other member states, including the rest of the P5, to agree a programme of work which would allow negotiations to start. We supported the formation of the FMCT group of government experts during last year's UN General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International Security. We are hopeful that the group will provide the impetus for negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament in a manner consistent with the Shannon Mandate (document CD/1299), which was adopted by the Conference in 1995 and set out the agreed scope of the proposed FMCT. We also submitted our views on a FMCT to the UN in May - a copy of which is available in the Library of the House.

    b)  We believe that setting an arbitrary deadline for the start of FMCT negotiations would be counterproductive. The UK has consistently stated that we could only support negotiation of a FMCT in the consensus-based Conference on Disarmament. We believe that the practical, step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament, through existing mechanisms such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Conference on Disarmament, is the most effective means to increase stability and reduce nuclear dangers. We will continue to work together with P5 colleagues and non-nuclear weapon states to strengthen mutual confidence and make further progress toward our goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.[246]

264. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response by what date it expects the negotiations on the text of the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty to start and, if it is unable to provide an expected date, to state what specific steps it will take to get negotiations started.

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)

265. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) can be found at paragraphs 253-258 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 73 of the Report.

266. The Committees' Recommendation on the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

    The Committees' Recommendation:

    The Government has stated that the main missile technology exporters who remain outside the Missile Technology Control Regime include China, Israel, India and Pakistan. The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response with which of those countries it has had, or will be having, discussions about membership of the MTCR.[247]

    The Government's Response:

    MTCR outreach is arranged and led by the MTCR Chair, currently held by Germany; MTCR Partners are encouraged to send representatives to the outreach meetings. The UK was represented on the outreach visits this year to Pakistan and UAE in February and to India in August.[248]

267. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) held its 27th Plenary Meeting in Rome from 14 to 18 October 2013 to review and evaluate its activities and to further intensify its efforts to prevent the proliferation of WMD delivery means. MTCR partners reiterated the concept that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security, as recognized in UNSC Resolution 1540. They proceeded to a thorough exchange of information on existing developments and potential missile proliferation developments that took place since their last plenary meeting in Berlin. Within the framework of the MTCR mandate, members conducted extensive discussions on various country issues including DPRK and Iran and expressed concerns associated with global missile proliferation activities in particular regarding ongoing missile programs in the Middle East, Northeast Asia, and South Asia, which could fuel missile proliferation activities elsewhere. They confirmed their commitment to implement relevant UNSC resolutions on non-proliferation.[249]

268. Partners welcomed the fact that the MTCR's Guidelines and control lists constitute an international export control standard that is increasingly adhered to by non-members of the MTCR and included in UN documents. They also agreed to redouble their efforts to inform and assist interested parties that are supportive of missile non-proliferation and of the objectives and purposes of the MTCR and called on all countries to exercise extreme vigilance to prevent the transfer of any items, materials, goods and technology that could contribute to WMD missile programmes of proliferation concern, in accordance with their national legislation and consistent with international law. Partners noted the rapid evolution of relevant technologies and the related need to take forward looking actions to address these developments. They recognized that the Equipment, Software, and Technology Annex is a cornerstone of the work done by the MTCR to prevent illegal transfers of missile technologies. Partners also discussed procurement activities and strategies in support of programs for WMD delivery means; the risk of intangible technology transfers and the challenges it entails; key technology trends in missile programs; and catch-all controls for non-listed items. [250]

269. Following the Government's statement to the Committees that it considers that the main missile technology exporters who remain outside the Missile Technology Control Regime include China, Israel, India and Pakistan, I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it has any further countries to add to this list.

270. I propose that the Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response what specific steps it is taking in respect of each of its named main missile technology exporters currently outside the MTCR to encourage them to become Missile Technology Control Regime members.

The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction

271. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction can be found at paragraphs 259-264 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation at paragraph 74 of the Report.

272. The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation on the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

    The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation:

    The Committees conclude that the UK's expenditure of £322 million by the previous and present Governments from 2002 to 2012 in the Global Threat Reduction Programme—this being the UK's contribution to the G8-based Global Partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction—has been fully merited and very necessary. The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response what its Global Threat Reduction Programme planned expenditure will be in 2013-14, 2014-15 and 2015-16.[251]

    The Government's Response:

    As part of the G8 Presidency in 2013, the UK is Chair of the Global Partnership (GP) Against the Spread of Materials and Weapons of Mass Destruction. A key objective of the UK is to agree new, targeted GP projects and programmes, by identifying gaps and priorities, coordinating GP partners and recipients, and matching funds and expertise to specific requirements, particularly in the nuclear, radiological and biological fields.

    The Government plans to continue delivering projects through the Global Threat Reduction Programme (GTRP) as part of the UK's commitment to the Global Partnership, and in order to address national security priorities. Future expenditure on projects delivered through GTRP is subject to approval of requirements and projects; it is expected to be approximately £14.5M in 2013-14, and in 2014-15 and 2015-16 to exceed £10M per year, based on current estimates.[252]

273. Following publication of the Government's United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012 the Committees wrote to the Government asking a question about the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. The question and answer were as follows:

    The Committees' question:

    Will the Government be publishing on the Export Control Organisation's website entities of potential WMD concern in countries in addition to Iran, for instance Syria?

    The Government's answer:

    The Government has no immediate plans to publish any additional information about entities of potential WMD concern in countries in addition to Iran.  We will continue to publish the information for Iran.[253]

274. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response its updated expenditure figures for its expenditure under the Global Threat Reduction Programme (GTRP) in 2013-14, 2014-15, 2015-16 and 2016-17.

275. I propose that the Committees conclude that the security importance of reducing, and where possible eliminating, Russia's WMD stockpiles including of chemical weapons is such, that this programme should continue to be funded and recommends that the Government states in its Response whether it concurs with this view.

276. I propose that the Committees further recommend that the Government should resume producing its Annual Report "Global Threat Reduction Programme" (the last Report was in 2010) on its policies and funding contributions in relation to The G8 (currently G7) Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction with details of the specific projects that the UK is funding.

The Nuclear Suppliers Group

277. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Nuclear Suppliers Group can be found at paragraphs 265-270 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 75 of the Report.

278. The Committees' Recommendation on the Nuclear Suppliers Group in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

    The Committees' Recommendation:

    The Government has stated that the major technology holders who remain outside of the Nuclear Suppliers Group include India, Pakistan and Israel, and that suppliers of dual-use technology who are not members include the UAE, Malaysia and Singapore. The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response with which of those countries it has had, or will be having, discussions about membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.[254]

    The Government's Response:

    Outreach is led by the Troika, formed of the current NSG chair with the previous and incoming chairs (respectively the Czech Republic, USA and unconfirmed).

    NSG Participating Governments do not normally attend in support. The Troika recently conducted an outreach meeting in India. It also met with a Pakistani delegation in Turkey and is investigating the possibility of an outreach visit to Islamabad. India, Pakistan, the UAE, Malaysia and Singapore attended a technical outreach meeting hosted by the USA in San Francisco, 2-3 May 2013. The UK made a presentation at the meeting. The UK discusses NSG membership with interested states bilaterally.[255]

279. Following the Government's statement to the Committees that it considers that the major nuclear technology holders who remain outside the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) include India, Pakistan and Israel, and that it also considers that suppliers of dual-use technology who are not members include the UAE, Malaysia and Singapore, I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it has any further countries to add to either its list of major technology holders outside the NSG or its list of suppliers of dual-use technology outside the NSG.

280. I propose that the Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response what specific steps it is taking in respect of each of its named major nuclear technology holders currently outside the NSG to encourage them to become Nuclear Suppliers Group members, and also what specific steps it is taking in respect of each of its named suppliers of dual-use technology to cease being suppliers of technology that could facilitate nuclear proliferation.

The Nuclear Security Summit

281. The Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) was held in The Hague on 24 and 25 March 2014. The Nuclear Security Summit 2014 is a world summit, aiming at preventing nuclear terrorism around the globe.

282. Since the previous summit in 2012, seven more states had removed all or most of these dangerous materials from their territories, and more than a dozen others had taken important new steps to reduce quantities and to better secure the materials they held. Today, the number of states with one kilogram or more of weapons-usable nuclear materials stands at 25, a 22 percent reduction in just two years.[256]

283. The first summit was held in Washington, D.C., in 2010. More than three dozen presidents and prime ministers attended, along with high-level officials from additional states, elevating the issue of nuclear materials security to the head-of-government level in states both with and without weapons-usable nuclear materials. The 2012 Summit, which was held in Seoul, sustained this high-level attention to the urgency of securing the materials that could be used by terrorists to build a nuclear weapon. The third summit, hosted by the Netherlands, was held in March and a fourth—and perhaps final—summit has been announced for 2016 in the United States.[257]

284. Going into the summit it was identified that the lack of an effective global system for securing weapons-usable nuclear materials was a major challenge. Despite progress since 2012, there was still no effective global system for how nuclear materials should be secured. Because each state considered materials security an exclusively sovereign, not shared, responsibility, approaches to nuclear security varied widely with little sense of accountability, even though poor security in any one state could affect all other states. Several factors addressed by the NTI Index[258] underscore this fundamental deficit:

·  The existing legal foundation for global nuclear security remains weak. A key legal agreement related to nuclear security—the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its 2005 Amendment—provides an important initial foundation for nuclear materials security. However, the 2005 Amendment still has not entered into force. A separate agreement, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, commits states to criminalize acts of nuclear terrorism. However, each of those agreements has limitations: they are not universally implemented; they have no enforcement or accountability mechanisms; and the CPPNM and 2005 Amendment cover only civilian materials, which make up only 15 percent of global stocks of weapons-usable nuclear materials.

·  Participation in international peer review is still limited. Of the 25 states with weapons-usable nuclear materials, only 18 have invited a peer review in the past five years, and 6 have never invited a peer review, even though it is a critical tool for strengthening a state's security practices and assuring others about the effectiveness of an individual state's security.

·  The vast majority of global stocks of weapons-usable nuclear materials—approximately 85 percent—is military or other non-civilian material and remains outside any of the existing international nuclear security mechanisms.[259]

285. Following the conclusion of the 2014 Summit a communique was issued that stated that 58 world leaders made concrete agreements to prevent terrorists getting their hands on nuclear material that could be used to make a nuclear weapon. The communique said that this will further reduce the threat of a nuclear attack. It went on to state that new agreements had been made on:

·  reducing the amount of dangerous nuclear material in the world that terrorists could use to make a nuclear weapon (highly enriched uranium and plutonium);

·  improving the security of radioactive material (including low-enriched uranium) that can be used to make a 'dirty bomb';

·  improving the international exchange of information and international cooperation.[260]

286. On 26 March the Prime Minister on returning from the Summit made a Statement to the House in which he said:

    On combating nuclear terrorism, which was the subject of the summit in The Hague, the meeting reaffirmed our determination to push through reforms of global security systems to ensure that vulnerable nuclear material does not fall into the wrong hands. This initiative, launched by President Obama back in 2010, has led to a remarkable amount of nuclear material being secured and reduced across the world, which should be commended.[261]

The Prime Minister went on to say that:

    We have seen 12 countries worldwide removing all highly enriched uranium from their territory, and 15 metric tons of highly enriched uranium have been down-blended to low-enriched uranium since 2012, which is the equivalent to approximately 500 nuclear weapons, so good progress has been made.[262]

287. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response what are the specific reforms of global security systems to ensure that vulnerable nuclear material does not fall into the wrong hands which the Government is determined to push through, and what are the specific steps it is taking to achieve such reforms.

The Australia Group

288. The Australia Group (AG) is an informal forum of countries which, through the harmonisation of export controls, seeks to ensure that exports do not contribute to the development of chemical or biological weapons. Co-ordination of national export control measures assists Australia Group participants to fulfil their obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention to the fullest extent possible. The principal objective of Australia Group participants is to use licensing measures to ensure that exports of certain chemicals, biological agents, and dual-use chemical and biological manufacturing facilities and equipment, do not contribute to the spread of chemical and biological weapons (CBWs). The Group achieves this by harmonising participating countries' national export licensing measures. The Group's activities are especially important given that the international chemical and biotechnology industries are a target for proliferators as a source of materials for CBW programmes. Export licensing measures also demonstrate the determination of Australia Group participants to avoid not only direct but also inadvertent involvement in the spread of Chemical and Biological Weapons, and to express their opposition to the use of these weapons. It is also in the interests of commercial firms and research institutes and of their Governments to ensure that they do not inadvertently supply chemicals, chemical equipment, biological agents or biological equipment for use in the manufacture of Chemical and Biological Weapons. Global chemical and biological industries have firmly supported this principle.[263] A list of members of the Australia Group can be found at http://www.australiagroup.net/en/participants.html.

289. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Australia Group can be found at paragraphs 271-274 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 76 of the Report.

290. The Committees' Recommendations on the Australia Group in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

    The Committees' Recommendations:

    The Committees recommend that, as the Government has said that the Australia Group focus is on those countries that have large or developing chemical industries, for example China, India and Pakistan, or those which act as transhipment hubs, such as Singapore and Vietnam, it states in its Response what steps it is taking to ensure UK participation in Australia Group outreach visits to those countries. The Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it is satisfied with the interface between the Australia Group and those organisations responsible for implementing and monitoring the Chemical Weapons Convention.[264]

    The Government's Response:

    The Government endeavours to ensure participation in Australia Group outreach visits when it can, resources permitting. In 2012 the Government sent a representative from the UK to join an Australia Group outreach visit to India and sent British Embassy representation to an outreach visit to Vietnam. So far in 2013, the Government has led an outreach visit to Pakistan on behalf of the Australia Group and has also sent representatives from the UK to join outreach visits to Malaysia and China. A British Embassy representative attended the last outreach visit to India in May 2013.

    All members of the Australia Group (which is an informal forum of countries, and does not exist as an entity outside its membership of states) are also members of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Therefore the interface between Australia Group and organisations responsible for implementing and monitoring the Chemical Weapons Convention are the States Parties themselves. All AG members have the opportunity to actively participate in and influence both BTWC and CWC meetings and negotiations in Geneva and The Hague, and the effective implementation and monitoring of these Conventions.[265]

291. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response which of the countries currently outside the Australia Group that it has said have large or developing chemical industries, for example China, India and Pakistan, or act as transhipment hubs for chemicals, such as Singapore and Vietnam, it would wish to see as members of the Australia Group, and what specific steps it is taking to achieve Australia Group membership by the countries concerned.

The Academic Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS)

292. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Academic Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS) can be found at paragraphs 275-277 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 77 of the Report.

293. The Foreign Secretary in his letter to the Committees of 12 November 2012, in reply to a question relating to the ATAS in the Government's Response to the Committees' 2012 report, said about the ATAS:

    The Government is satisfied with its current policy. The effectiveness of the scheme is continually assessed to ensure that counter proliferation objectives are met. The Academic Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS) was set up in 2007, replacing the Voluntary Vetting Scheme (VVS) for overseas students. ATAS is designed to prevent those students who pose the greatest risk from studying potential WMD proliferation subjects. In order to give the broadest and most efficient coverage, ATAS is built into the Tier 4 student visa requirement. There is currently no legal basis for the scheme to include UK students.[266]

294. The Committees' Recommendation on the Academic Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS) in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

    The Committees' Recommendation:

    The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response to this Report:

    a)  whether it remains satisfied that the UK's Academic Technology Approval Scheme remains effective in preventing those foreign students who pose the greatest risk from studying potential Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation subjects at UK Institutions of Higher Education; and

    b)  whether it will consider introducing legislation to extend the Scheme to include those UK students who pose the greatest risk.[267]

    The Government's Response:

    The Government's position remains as stated in the Foreign Secretary's letter to the Committees of 12 November 2012. We have no plans to consider legislation to extend the Scheme to include UK students.[268]

295. I propose that the Committees again recommend that the Government states in its Response:

a)  whether it remains satisfied that the UK's Academic Technology Approval Scheme continues to be effective in preventing those foreign students, who pose the greatest risk, from studying potential Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation subjects at UK Institutions of Higher Education; and

b)  whether it will consider introducing legislation to extend the scheme to include any UK students who similarly pose the greatest risk.

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)

296. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) can be found at paragraphs 278-282 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 78 of the Report.

297. The Committees' Recommendation on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

    The Committees' Recommendation:

    The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:

    a)  how far it considers that its objectives for the Chemical Weapons Review Conference as set out in the Written Answer of FCO Minister Alistair Burt on 26 March 2013 were, or were not, fulfilled; and

    b)  what specific steps it will take to try to secure accession to the Convention by those 8 states who have not done so thus far, namely Angola, Egypt, Israel, Myanmar, North Korea, Somalia, South Sudan and Syria.[269]

    The Government's Response:

    a)  The Government was pleased that the majority of the objectives outlined in Minister Alistair Burt's Written Answer to Sir John Stanley of 26 March 2013 were achieved. It was not possible, however, to secure agreement on the next steps on the treatment of incapacitating chemical agents in a CWC context in light of developments in science and technology.

    b)  The Government led outreach in conjunction with partners focussed on securing accession by the above 8 states. This included working alongside the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in offering technical assistance and advice on acceding to the Convention and National Implementation. The Government saw immediate positive results with Somalia acceding to the Convention on 29 May 2013.[270]

298. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the countries that have still to accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the dates of accession of any country that has acceded since Somalia's accession on 29 May 2013.

299. I propose that the Committees further recommend that the Government states to which of the non-acceding countries it has participated in outreach on the Chemical Weapons Convention since the beginning of 2013.

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)

300. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) can be found at paragraphs 283-288 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation at paragraphs 79 and 80 of the Report.

301. The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation on the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

    The Committees' Conclusion:

    The Committees conclude that the Government's statement that establishing a verification regime for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention remains a long-term UK and EU aim is welcome, but that the absence of any such regime, because of US opposition in particular, is a matter of deep concern.[271]

    The Government's Response:

    The Government notes the Committees' conclusion. [272]

    The Committees' Recommendation:

    The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response

    a)  lists which States have signed but not ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), and which States have neither signed nor ratified the BTWC;

    b)  sets out what specific steps it will take to try to secure accession to the BTWC by those States who have not done so thus far;

    c)  whether it is aware of States with holdings of biological or toxin weapons and, if so, which those States are; and

    d)  whether it considers the civil population to be at risk from State or non-State holdings of biological or toxin weapons and, if so, what steps it is taking both nationally and internationally to mitigate that risk.[273]

    The Government's Response:

    a)  The following states have signed but not ratified the BTWC:

    1.  Central African Republic

    2.  C¼te d'Ivoire

    3.  Egypt

    4.  Haiti

    5.  Liberia

    6.  Burma

    7.  Nepal

    8.  Somalia

    9.  Syrian Arab Republic

    10.  United Republic of Tanzania

    The following states have neither signed nor ratified the BTWC:

    1.  Andorra

    2.  Angola

    3.  Chad

    4.  Comoros

    5.  Djibouti

    6.  Eritrea

    7.  Guinea

    8.  Israel

    9.  Kiribati

    10.  Mauritania

    11.  Micronesia (Federated States of)

    12.  Namibia

    13.  Niue

    14.  Samoa

    15.  South Sudan

    16.  Tuvalu

    b)  The Government, both on its own and with the EU, actively engages with non-State Parties to encourage them to become members of the BTWC. EU projects under Council Decision 2012/421/CFSP include awareness-raising workshops and support for states acceding to or ratifying the BTWC as well as support for states to implement the BTWC. Recently the Government has co-funded the attendance of Burma at the August 2013 BTWC Meeting of Experts and we will also continue to encourage non-members attending as observers to accede to the BWC.

    c)  The Government does not generally comment on specific states by name.

    d)  In 2010 the National Security Strategy identified as a Tier One Risk: "International terrorism affecting the UK or its interests, including a biological attack by terrorists"; and as a Tier Two Risk: "An attack on the UK or its Overseas Territories by another state or proxy using biological weapons."

    Nationally

    The National Counter Terrorism Security Officer (NaCTSO) co-ordinates the delivery of protective security to hazardous sites and substances in the UK. Part 7 of the Anti Terrorism Crime and Security Act (ATCSA) 2001 addresses the issue of security relating to Pathogens and Toxins held legitimately within the UK.

    There are approximately 220 sites within the UK which hold Schedule 51 substances. This list is maintained and managed by NaCTSO. Guidelines for security standards are set by NaCTSO, in consultation in conjunction with other relevant Government departments. This allows for a consistent national approach to the security of sites holding dangerous pathogens and toxins.

    Internationally

    NaCTSO is currently actively involved in the EU CBRN Action plan B2 action2. The main objective of this is to initiate a draft document for B2 implementation. This entails the consolidation of feedback from member states regarding biosecurity regulations to initiate exchanges for European harmonisation, specifically for processes to verify facility security arrangements. The UK believes that steps taken to implement the WHO's International Health Regulations and comparable programmes of the OIE [International Office of Epizootics (World Organisation for Animal Health)] and FAO [Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations] will help improve national, regional and international surveillance capabilities for the early detection and identification of outbreaks of infectious disease whether they are natural, deliberate or accidental. We are supporting these efforts and programmes through a range of means such as direct funding, provision of training and capacity building assistance. In 2014 and 2015 the special topic for the BTWC intersessional meetings will be Article VII; this deals with assistance in the event of a State Party 'being exposed to danger as a result of a violation of the Convention'. Virtually nothing has been done to give practical effect to this Article, but it is generally taken to mean humanitarian and medical counter measures. The UK intends to build on its proposals first made on this Article at the Seventh Review Conference in 2011 as set out in its Working Paper -http://daccess-

    ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G11/640/45/PDF/G1164045.pdf?OpenElement' In order to mitigate biological risks and threats, as part of the UK contribution to the Global Partnership, the UK continues to implement biological security and engagement projects in Central Asia, the Caucasus, Middle East and North Africa. In order to maximise efficiency and effectiveness, the UK works in close cooperation with other Global Partnership members and international organisations, including the US Departments of State and Defense, the World Health Organisation, World Organisation for Animal Health, and Food and Agriculture Organisation.

    Current projects are focused on:

·  improving biosafety and biosecurity;

·  improving disease surveillance, diagnostics and reporting systems (in the areas of human, animal and plant health);

·  increasing awareness of the need to comply with international treaty obligations (e.g. BTWC) and, thorough educational programmes, of the risks posed by dual-use science.

    These projects also provide broader benefits to UK health security, such as gaining first-hand knowledge of disease surveillance in different national contexts, access to new or different strains or biological agents of concern, and experience of diseases caused by these agents. These cooperative projects consequently improve the capability of the UK agencies to respond to deliberately and/or naturally occurring biological related health events in the UK.[274]

302. I propose that the Committees conclude that the detailed response given by the Government to the Committees' question on the Government's 2013 Annual Report on strategic exports as to "whether it considers the [UK] civil population to be at risk from state or non-state holdings of biological or toxin weapons and, if so, what steps it is taking both nationally and internationally to mitigate that risk" is welcome.

303. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it still remains its long-term aim to establish a verification regime for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), and, if so, what specific steps it is taking to try to realise this aim.

304. I propose that the Committees further recommend that the Government in its Response lists which states have now signed, but not ratified, the BTWC and which states have neither signed nor ratified the BTWC.

305. I propose that the Committees also recommend that the Government states what specific steps it has taken since the beginning of 2013 to try to secure accession to the BTWC by those states who have not done so thus far.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

306. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) can be found at paragraphs 289-295 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 81 of the Report.

307. The Committees' Recommendation on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

    The Committees' Recommendation:

    The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response in specific terms:

    a)  the extent to which it considers that the commitments made at the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, and in the 2010 NPT Action Plans have, or have not, been fulfilled; and

    b)  what are the Government's objectives for the 2015 NPT Review Conference.[275]

    The Government's Response:

    a)  The UK stands by the commitments that we made at the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference in 2010, we will continue to work on our 2010 NPT Action Plan commitments, and encourage other states to reaffirm their commitment to the Action Plan.

    With regard to what extent these commitments and the Action Plan have been fulfilled, we would argue that there has been a mixed performance. There has been progress in some areas, for example, Andorra, Bahrain, the Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Gambia, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, Morocco, Moldova, Mozambique, Namibia, Togo and Vietnam have all ratified the Additional Protocol since 2010 (Action 28). There is work in progress, for example, within the P5 discussions continue on reporting and the development of the P5 glossary of key nuclear terms (Action 5, Action 21). There are also more challenging areas, for example, on the conference on the establishment of Middle East Weapons of Mass Destructions Free Zone, where the UK government regretted the postponement of the conference in November 2012 and continues to work closely with the Facilitator and Co-Convenors in order to hold the conference as soon as possible this year.

    As we said in the UK General Statement at the 2013 NPT Preparatory Committee, "We are at the half-way point of this Review Cycle, half-way to the 2015 Review Conference. The big success of the 2010 Review Conference was the consensus outcome on a cross-pillar action plan, and a clear commitment from all states parties to the grand bargain of the NPT. We must continually remind ourselves of that achievement and strive to replicate that success in this PrepCom and the rest of this review cycle. My government is clear in its wish to strengthen the international non-proliferation architecture, with the NPT at its core. But the NPT continues to face pressures and challenges, the nuclear ambitions of the DPRK and Iran, the risk of a nuclear terrorist attack, the spread of sensitive nuclear technology as more countries seek to embark on a civil nuclear path.

    We must work together to ensure that the NPT is strengthened across its 3 pillars during this review cycle, to ensure that it can remain fit for purpose, and continue to bring benefits to all its states parties, in terms of enhanced security and cooperation on civil nuclear energy… This PrepCom is also an opportunity for States Parties to reaffirm their unconditional support for the NPT and their commitment to implement the 2010 Action Plan."

    b)  In an article in the Huffington Post published on 24 April 2013, the Foreign Office Minister responsible for Counter Proliferation, Alistair Burt, set out the UK's priorities for the Non Proliferation Treaty. "We want to encourage action to deter non-compliance of the NPT. We want to continue our push for a Treaty that is universal. We want to reiterate our commitment to work with other countries to achieve our long-term goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. And we want to do all of this whilst underlining that we should continue to support the responsible global expansion of civil nuclear industries." These remain valid. [276]

308. On 29 April 2014 Hugh Robertson, Minister of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office wrote to the Chairman of the Committees enclosing the UK's national report to the 2014 Nuclear Non-Proliferation preparatory Commission. The text of the letter is as follows (the report can be found at Annex 8):

    I have pleasure in enclosing the United Kingdom's national report to the 2014 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Commission, in line with the commitment made by the UK and other Nuclear Weapons States in the NPT Action Plan agreed in 2010.

    This report will be tabled by the UK delegation to the NPT Preparatory Committee in New York this week. I have arranged for a copy to be made available in the Library of the House. I am also sending the report to Sir Richard Ottaway.[277]

309. The key points in the United Kingdom's national report to the 2014 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Commission were:

·  That the UK considers the NPT to be the cornerstone of global efforts to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons and is committed to the step-by-step process agreed by consensus at the 2000 RevCon and reaffirmed at the 2010 RevCon;

·  The Government will maintain only the minimum credible nuclear deterrent, under full political control;

·  the UK will only consider using our nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances of self-defence, including the defence of our NATO Allies;

·  the UK had strengthened its negative security assurance to state that the UK will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT;

·  the UK had taken steps to lower the operational status of its deterrent system;

·  the UK Government stated that the security and safety of its nuclear weapons was given the very highest priority;

·  since the 2010 NPT Review Conference the UK has unilaterally decided to cut its stockpile of nuclear warheads, as outlined in the SDSR [Strategic Defence and Security Review]. (Today it has fewer than 225 warheads, all of a single type.); and

·  in 2013 the UK extended the scope of its security regulation to cover civil nuclear sites under construction in order to take account of the UK's new nuclear build programme.

310. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states as fully as possible in its Response what are now its objectives for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in 2015 and what specific steps it is taking to try to ensure that its objectives are realised.

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

311. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) can be found at paragraphs 296-297 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 82 of the Report.

312. The Committees' Recommendation on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

    The Committees' Recommendation:

    The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response what specific steps it is taking with each of the remaining 8 countries whose signature and ratification is necessary to enable the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty to enter into force—namely China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and the USA—to try to persuade them to ratify the CTBT.[278]

    The Government's Response:

    The UK has taken every available opportunity to press for all states outside the CTBT to sign or ratify the Treaty as appropriate. This includes repeated calls for China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and the USA to accede to the Treaty. To this end, the UK will be attending the Article XIV Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT this September, which will renew calls for the remaining states to join. As of July 2013, 159 states have ratified the Treaty.[279]

313. The Committees had an informal meeting on 10 February 2014 with the Head of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO), Dr Lassina Zerbo.

314. On 27 February the Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Foreign Secretary asking about Iran and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The text of the letter was as follows:

    I should be grateful if you could tell me the British Government's position on whether or not the issue of Iran's ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty should be brought within the framework of the negotiations taking place with Iran to ensure that Iran does not become a holder of nuclear weapons.

    Please could you tell me in your reply the reasons for the policy position that the UK Government has taken on this issue.[280]

The Foreign Secretary replied on 20 March 2014 as follows:

    Thank you for your letter of 27 February, seeking the UK government position on whether Iranian ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear test Ban Treaty (CTBT) should be brought within the framework of E3+3 negotiations with Iran.

    The purpose of the E3+3 negotiations with Iran is to reach a negotiated comprehensive solution to the Iranian nuclear issue which ensures the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. This will require Iran to take significant action to limit its nuclear programme, and increased monitoring and verification of its activities. As part of a comprehensive solution, it is important that all unresolved issues set out in the UNSC resolutions are addressed.

    Iranian ratification of the CTBT would be a further step in reassuring the international community about the nature of Iran's nuclear programme. It would also bring the Treaty closer to entry into force. Dr Lassina Zerbo, the Executive Secretary of the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the CTBT Organisation, is encouraging Iran to consider ratification of the CTBT and to transmit data from the International Monitoring System's Primary Seismic Station in Tehran to the International Data Centre in Vienna. These would be welcome steps. I believe, however, that adding CTBT ratification to the E3+3 negotiations at this stage would risk further complicating an already complex negotiation. Securing Iranian commitments to limit Iran's programmes to a point well short of conducting a test must remain the priority.[281]

315. I propose that the Committees again recommend that the Government states in its Response what specific steps it is taking with each of the remaining 8 countries whose signature and ratification is necessary to enable the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty to enter into force—namely China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and the USA—to try to persuade them to ratify the CTBT.

Sub-strategic and tactical nuclear weapons

316. The Committees' previous scrutiny of sub-strategic and tactical nuclear weapons can be found at paragraphs 298-301 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 83 of the Report.

317. The Committees' Recommendation on the sub-strategic and tactical nuclear weapons in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

    The Committees' Recommendation:

    The Committees recommend that the Government sets out in its Response:

    a)  what specific action it is taking to reduce the requirement for short-range nuclear weapons assigned to NATO in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia, taking into account greater Russian stockpiles of short-range nuclear weapons stationed in the Euro-Atlantic area, and developments in the broader security environment;

    b)  whether it supports the implementation of the US B-61 Life Extension Programme in Europe; and

    c)  whether it favours US and Russian holdings of short-range nuclear weapons being reduced to zero on both sides, as achieved for intermediate-range nuclear weapons in the 1987 INF Treaty, in future negotiations on short-range nuclear weapons between the US and Russia.[282]

    The Government's Response:

    Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has dramatically reduced the number, types and readiness of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and will continue to adapt its strategy in line with the changing security environment.

    NATO's Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (DDPR), adopted at the Chicago Summit in May 2012, emphasised that nuclear disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation play an important role in the achievement of NATO's objectives, as the security and stability provided by the effective control of weapons is a precursor to a world without nuclear weapons. It set out NATO's support for US/Russian bilateral arms control measures, and indicated that Allies would consider further reducing NATO's requirement for tactical nuclear weapons in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia, taking into account Russia's larger stockpile.

    The Government is committed to the long term objective of a world without nuclear weapons and would therefore be supportive of the eventual elimination of tactical nuclear weapons, including those held by the US and Russia in Europe, provided that this is achieved in a manner that does not risk compromising the security of the UK and its Allies. In this context, the Government strongly welcomed the commitment that President Obama set out in his speech in Berlin on 19 June, to work with NATO Allies to seek bold reductions in US and Russian short-range nuclear weapons in Europe. We will continue to play a key role in helping to build the right environment for bilateral US-Russia discussions to make progress. We are working closely with NATO Allies to develop and exchange transparency and confidence-building ideas with the Russian Federation, not least through our active role within NATO's new Special Advisory and Consultative Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-proliferation Committee, which is currently exploring such measures.

    The DDPR also underlined the Alliance's commitment that 'all components of NATO's nuclear deterrent shall remain safe, secure and effective for as long as NATO remains a nuclear alliance'. The forward deployment of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe provides a contribution to the deterrence of potential adversaries, the assurance of vulnerable Allies, and the sharing of risks and responsibilities across the Alliance, as well as providing leverage in arms control efforts vis-à-vis the Russian Federation. With the weapons nearing the end of their service lives, it is therefore appropriate that the US embark upon the B-61 Life Extension Programme to maintain NATO's appropriate nuclear force posture and to ensure the safety, security and effectiveness of NATO's arsenal. The Life Extension Programme will also be helpful in maximising the potential impact of future arms control discussions by avoiding the capability ending without any commensurate reciprocal steps from Russia.[283]

318. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether:

a)  it remains both the Government's and NATO's policy "that [NATO] Allies would consider further reducing NATO's requirement for tactical nuclear weapons in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia, taking into account Russia's larger stockpile.";

b)  it remains the Government's policy that it would be supportive of the eventual elimination of tactical nuclear weapons, including those held by the US and Russia in Europe, provided that this is achieved in a manner that does not risk compromising the security of the UK and its Allies;

c)  it remains the Government's view that it is appropriate that the US embark upon the B-61 Life Extension programme to maintain NATO's appropriate nuclear force posture and to ensure the safety, security and effectiveness of NATO's arsenal; and

d)  it is the Government' s policy that dialogue with the Russian Government on sub-strategic and tactical nuclear weapons should continue, notwithstanding events in Ukraine.

A Middle-East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone

319. The Committees' previous scrutiny of a Middle-East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone can be found at paragraphs 302-312 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 84 of the Report.

320. The Committees' Recommendation on a Middle-East Weapons of Mass Destruction Zone in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

    The Committees' Recommendation:

    The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:

    a)  when it expects the planned regional conference to discuss a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone to take place;

    b)  what are the current positions of Iran and Israel on attending this conference; and

    c)  what steps it is taking to try to ensure this Conference takes place.[284]

    The Government's Response:

    a)  The UK government made clear in our statement to the 2013 NPT PrepCom that we hope the regional conference on the establishment of a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone will take place as soon as possible in 2013, and we continue to work closely with the Facilitator, fellow co-convenors and regional partners in pursuit of this objective.

    b)  The Facilitator, Mr Laajava, has continued his consultations and discussions with all states of the region, including Iran and Israel, he has also proposed multilateral consultations in order to agree arrangements for the Conference between the states of the region. The UK fully supports his work in this regard.

    As we have commented previously, Iran has announced it would be willing to attend the Conference but has set out a series of expectations on format and process which may be difficult for all regional states to agree. Israel has publicly stated that it has yet to make its final decision on whether to attend any conference.

    c)  The Foreign Secretary and other FCO Ministers have discussed the Conference with counterparts in the Middle East. The UK statement to the 2013 NPT PrepCom made clear our support for the objective of establishing such a Zone and our full support for the facilitator of the Conference, Mr Laajava of Finland. The British Government supports the objective of a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone, and the convening of a conference as soon as possible.

    Senior British officials meet regularly with representatives of the UN and the other co-convenors (the US and Russia) to discuss progress and provide support to Mr Laajava. British Officials have also travelled to the region to promote constructive engagement and support for the work of the Facilitator.[285]

321. Responding to a question from Jeremy Corbyn MP on 26 March 2014 as to whether he would give an assurance that "the Government will resolutely work to get a Middle East Nuclear Free Zone conference under way as a way of reducing and trying to prevent any nuclear proliferation in that region", the Prime Minister answered: "I can confirm that we will be working towards that goal and will continue the excellent work the Foreign office does on it."[286]

322. I propose that the Committees conclude that the failure to hold a regional conference on the establishment of a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in 2013, as the Government had hoped, was most disappointing.

323. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government in its Response states the latest position on the holding of such a Conference, and on the willingness of Iran and Israel to attend.

The National Counter-Proliferation Strategy

324. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the National Counter-Proliferation Strategy can be found at paragraphs 313-316 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 85 of the Report.

325. The Committees' Recommendation on the National Counter-Proliferation Strategy in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

    The Committees' Recommendation:

    The Committees recommend that the Government sets out in its Response:

    a)  any amendments or updating it wishes to make to the National Counter-Proliferation Strategy for 2012-15 since its publication in 2012; and

    b)  what it considers to be the successes and failures of the National Counter-Proliferation Strategy for 2012-15 to date.[287]

    The Government's Response:

    a)  Following an intelligence-based assessment exercise earlier this year the National Counter Proliferation Strategy for 2012-15 was reviewed by the Cross-Whitehall Counter Proliferation Implementation Committee (CPIC). CPIC concluded that the strategic risks and objectives contained in the strategy remained correct and that there was not a need for amendments or updates. The strategy has been used as the basis for CPIC's annual business planning, helping to prioritise Counter Proliferation work across Whitehall.

    b)  The strategy has successfully focussed work across Whitehall in line with its three objectives of

    -  CBRN Security;

    -  Preventing State WMD Proliferation; and

    -  Supporting, strengthening and extending the rules-based international system for counter proliferation.

    There has been progress in all three areas. Examples, one from each work

    strand, include:

    -  the UK's Chairmanship (as part of the 2013 G8 Presidency) of the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, a body which is now coordinating around £1bn/year worth of its members' counter-proliferation programmes to the highest priority CBRN security projects globally;

    -  the UK played a leading role in the firm and united international response to the DPRK nuclear test of February 2013 (including the adoption of UNSCR 2094); and

    -  UK lobbying and support for technical assistance programmes has delivered progress towards universal adherence to both the Chemical Weapons and Biological Weapons and Toxins Conventions.

    There also remain serious challenges (for example, Iran continues to advance its nuclear programme in violation of UNSCRs and defiance of IAEA resolutions, ensuring the security, and eventual destruction, of Syria's chemical weapons stocks, delivery of a 2015 Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference that reaffirms the NPT as the cornerstone of international nuclear non-proliferation), as would be expected at this stage of a three-year strategy. We shall continue to monitor performance against the strategy.[288]

326. I propose that the Committees conclude that they do not agree with the Government's Response in Cm8707 that there was not a need for amendments or update to the Government's National Counter-Proliferation Strategy for 2012-15 published in 2012.

327. I propose that the Committees further conclude that the key Government policy area of Counter-Proliferation is in constant change and recommends that the Government makes a full report on its National Counter-Proliferation Strategy annually.


197   HC (2013-14) 205, para 65 Back

198   Cm8707, p 21 Back

199   HC (2013-14) 205, para 66 Back

200   Cm8707, p 21 Back

201   Qq 116-119 Back

202   Q 1 [Oliver Sprague] Back

203   Q 1 [Roy Isbister] Back

204   HC Deb, 21 November 2013, col 426WH Back

205   Ev w194 - Letter from William Hague to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 6 January 2014 Back

206   Miscellaneous No.3 (2013) Arms Trade Treaty, Adopted at new York on 2 April 2013 and Opened for Signature at New York on 3 June 2013 (Cm 8680) Back

207   Q189 Back

208   Ev w206 - Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to William Hague dated 25 March 2014 Back

209   "World's leading arms exporters push for change with landmark UN treaty", The Guardian, 2 April 2104 Back

210   "Foreign Secretary welcomes UK ratification of the Arms Trade Treaty", Foreign and Commonwealth Office Press Notice, 2 April 2014 Back

211   Ev w208 - Letter from William Hague to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 3 April 2014 Back

212   HC (2013-14) 205, para 67 Back

213   Cm8707, p 23 Back

214   Annex 2 - The Committees' questions on the Government's United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012 (HC 561) and the Government's answers  Back

215   Fourth meeting of State Parties, Convention on Cluster Munitions, http://www.clusterconvention.org/meetings/msp/4msp/

 Back

216   Fourth Meeting of States Parties: Final Document, Convention on Cluster Munitions, CCM/MSP/2013/6, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/K13/540/89/PDF/K1354089.pdf?OpenElement Back

217   Ev w130 Back

218   Q 22 Back

219   Qq 22-23 Back

220   Q 190 Back

221   HC (2013-14) 205, para 68 Back

222   Cm8707, pp 23-4 Back

223   Annex 2 - The Committees' questions on the Government's United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012 (HC 561) and the Government's answers  Back

224   Fifth biennial Meeting of States 2014, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, http://www.poa-iss.org/bms5/ Back

225   HC (2013-14) 205, para 69 Back

226   Cm8707, p 24 Back

227   Annex 2 - The Committees' questions on the Government's United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012 (HC 561) and the Government's answers  Back

228   Ev w222 - Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to William Hague dated 28 April 2014 Back

229   Ev w490 - Letter from William Hague to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls date 19 May 2014 Back

230   "Introduction", Wassenaar Arrangement, http://www.wassenaar.org/introduction/index.html Back

231   "Frequently Asked Questions", Wassenaar Arrangement, http://www.wassenaar.org/faq/index.html Back

232   HC (2013-14) 205, para 70 Back

233   Cm8707, pp 25-26 Back

234   Annex 2 - The Committees' questions on the Government's United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012 (HC 561) and the Government's answers  Back

235   Wassenaar Arrangement, Public Statement 2013 Plenary Meeting, http://www.wassenaar.org/  Back

236   HC (2013-14) 205, para 71 Back

237   Cm8707, p 26 Back

238   See: Annex 1 - The Committees' quarterly licence questions (2013 Q3) Back

239   See: Annex 1 -The Committees' quarterly licence questions (2013 Q3) Back

240   United Nations Office at Geneva, The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/4F0DEF093B4860B4C1257180004B1B30?OpenDocument  Back

241   Annex 2 - The Committees' questions on the Government's United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012 (HC 561) and the Government's answers  Back

242   International Panel on Fissile Materials, Banning the production of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons: Country Perspectives on the Challenges to a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty, 2008, Pp 2-3 Back

243   United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, A Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty: Understanding the Critical Issues, 2010, p 2  Back

244   "Pakistan's Nuclear Buildup Vexes FMCT talks", Arms Control Association, http://www.armscontrol.org/ Back

245   HC (2013-14) 205, para 72 Back

246   Cm8707, pp 26-27 Back

247   HC (2013-14) 205, para 73 Back

248   Cm8707, p 27 Back

249   Plenary Meeting of the Missile Technology Control Regime, Rome, Italy, 14-18 October 2013, Missile Technology Control Regime, http://www.mtcr.info/english/press/Italy2013.htm Back

250   Plenary Meeting of the Missile Technology Control Regime, Rome, Italy, 14-18 October 2013, Missile Technology Control Regime, http://www.mtcr.info/english/press/Italy2013.htm Back

251   HC (2013-14) 205, para 74 Back

252   Cm8707, p 27 Back

253   Annex 2 - The Committees' questions on the Government's United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012 (HC 561) and the Government's answers  Back

254   HC (2013-14) 205, para 75 Back

255   Cm8707, pp 27-28 Back

256   2014 and 2016 Nuclear Security Summits, NTI Nuclear materials : Security Index, http://ntiindex.org/the-road-ahead/2014-and-2016-nuclear-security-summits/ Back

257   2014 and 2016 Nuclear Security Summits, NTI Nuclear materials : Security Index, http://ntiindex.org/the-road-ahead/2014-and-2016-nuclear-security-summits/ Back

258   The 2014 Nuclear Threat Initiative Nuclear Materials Security Index is the second edition of a unique public assessment of nuclear materials security conditions around the world. Developed with the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), the NTI Index was created to assess the security of nuclear materials around the world and to encourage governments to take actions and provide assurances about the security of the world's deadliest materials. Back

259   2014 Findings, NTI Nuclear materials : Security Index http://ntiindex.org/data-results/2014-findings/ Back

260   "Outcome of NSS 2014: a major step towards a safer world", Nuclear Security Summit 2014, https://www.nss2014.com/en/news/outcome-of-nss-2014-a-major-step-towards-a-safer-world Back

261   HC Deb, 26 March 2014, col 349  Back

262   HC Deb, 26 march 2014, col 363  Back

263   "The Australia Group", The Australia Group, www.australiagroup.net Back

264   HC (2013-14) 205, para 76 Back

265   Cm8707, p 28 Back

266   See: HC (2013-14) 205, Ev w116 Back

267   HC (2013-14) 205, para 77 Back

268   Cm8707, p 29 Back

269   HC (2013-14) 205, para 78 Back

270   Cm8707, p 29 Back

271   HC (2013-14) 205, para 79 Back

272   Cm8707, p 29 Back

273   HC (2013-14) 205, para 80 Back

274   Cm8707, pp 29-32 Back

275   HC (2013-14) 205, para 81 Back

276   Cm8707, pp 32-33 Back

277   Ev w223 - Letter from Hugh Robertson to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 29 April 2014 Back

278   HC (2013-14) 205, para 82 Back

279   Cm8707, p 33 Back

280   Ev w202 - Letter from Chairman of the Committees on Arms Exports to William Hague, dated 27 February 2014 Back

281   Ev w205 - letter from William Hague to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 20 March 2014 Back

282   HC (2013-14) 205, para 83 Back

283   Cm8707, pp 34-35 Back

284   HC (2013-14) 205, para 84 Back

285   Cm8707, pp 34-35 Back

286   HC Deb, 26 March 2014, cols 361-362 Back

287   HC (2013-14) 205, para 82 Back

288   Cm8707, p 36 Back


 
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Prepared 23 July 2014