Scrutiny of arms Exports and Arms Control - Committees on Arms Export Controls Contents

9  Arms export control policies

Arms exports and human rights

328. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports and human rights can be found at paragraphs 317-319 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Conclusion at paragraph 86 of the Report.

329. The Committees' Conclusion on arms exports and human rights in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

The Committees' Conclusion:

The Committees continue to conclude that, whilst the promotion of arms exports and the upholding of human rights are both legitimate Government policies, the Government would do well to acknowledge that there is an inherent conflict between strongly promoting arms exports to authoritarian regimes whilst strongly criticising their lack of human rights at the same time rather than claiming, as the Government continues to do, that these two policies "are mutually reinforcing".[289]

The Government's Response:

The Government notes the Committees conclusion and refers to its previous responses, most recently in Cm 8441 which was its reply to the Committees' previous Annual Report (HC 419). These responses can be found on pages Ev173-174 of the Committees' current report.[290]

The responses referred to were:

The Government is committed to both a thriving British defence and security industry and some of the strictest export controls in the world. The Government believes that its security, prosperity and values agendas are mutually reinforcing. Effective arms export controls prevent arms exports which could undermine our own security or the promotion of UK values of human rights and democracy, and enable continued UK prosperity by allowing the UK's defence and security industries to compete effectively in the global defence market. The UK already has one of the most rigorous and transparent arms export control systems in the world. All controlled military goods, are assessed on a case by case basis, against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Exports Licensing Criteria, (Consolidated Criteria). Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are mandatory considerations for all export licence applications. [291]

and

Increasing defence and security exports does not by definition mean ignoring the promotion of democracy and human rights abroad. All countries have the right to an effective, secure defence and the Government will use its export licensing powers to ensure that the UK only permits responsible defence exports.[292]

330. I propose that the Committees continue to conclude that, whilst the promotion of arms exports and the upholding of human rights are both legitimate Government policies, the Government would do well to acknowledge that there is an inherent conflict between strongly promoting arms exports to authoritarian regimes whilst strongly criticising their lack of human rights at the same time rather than claiming, as the Government continues to do, that these two policies "are mutually reinforcing".

331. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it will report to the Committees all breaches of its human rights policies and its international human rights commitments with the use of British Government approved exports of controlled goods, software, technology and components as and when any such breaches occur.

Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) Human Rights Guidance

332. The Committees' previous scrutiny of Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) Human Rights Guidance can be found at paragraphs 320-324 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 87 of the Report.

333. The Committees' Recommendation on Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) Human Rights Guidance in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

The Committees' Recommendation:

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response by what date its review of the Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) Human Rights Guidance will be completed, and whether it has accepted the Committees' previous recommendation that the requirement on officials in the current OSJA Guidance merely to consult the Consolidated Arms Export Licensing Criteria if military and security equipment is being exported in an OSJA Programme should be replaced by a requirement to adhere strictly to the Licensing Criteria and procedures.[293]

The Government's Response:

The Government's review of the Overseas and Security Justice Assistance (OSJA) Guidance is now complete. Revised Guidance will be published shortly that will make clear that an assessment under the Consolidated Criteria will be required, in addition to any OSJA assessment, if the assistance provided involves the provision of controlled equipment. We will ensure a copy of the revised Guidance is provided to the Committees as soon as this has been finalised.[294]

334. On 26 February 2014 the Foreign Secretary wrote informing the Committees of the update to the Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) Human Rights Guidance which included notification that the Committees' Recommendation (above) had been implemented.[295] The text of the latter was as follows:

I am writing to inform the Committees of the publication of revised Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) Guidance.

The Guidance remains a vital tool for assessing the human rights implications of our overseas assistance work in the security and justice sectors. The Committees recommended that the Guidance should be updated to refer more clearly to the additional assessments against the EU and National Consolidated Criteria that need to be undertaken if the assistance involves the provision of equipment which is controlled under Export Control legislation.

A review of the Guidance has provided the opportunity to make amendments in response to the Committees' recommendation. A revised version of the Guidance is attached and is available on the www.gov.uk website. In particular, new paragraph 11 states:

"It is important to stress that an assessment under this guidance is not in itself sufficient when the provision of licensable equipment is envisaged as part of a project. A further assessment under the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria will be required. Please contact the FCO's Arms Export Licensing Department for further advice on how such an assessment will need to be undertaken. There is also no requirement to undertake an OSJA assessment if the assistance to be provided consists solely of the provision of licensable equipment and an assessment under the EU Consolidated Criteria has been or will be undertaken."

I hope this amendment to the Guidance addresses the Committees' concerns. I have also made a Written Ministerial Statement announcing publication of the revised Guidance and have written in similar terms to Sir Richard Ottaway and Sir Malcolm Rifkind. Let me take this opportunity to thank you for your engagement in the review process.[296]

In the related Ministerial Written Statement the Foreign Secretary stated:

[...] we have made some minor amendments to the guidance to clarify key points, including defining more clearly the circumstances in which the guidance should be applied and highlighting the additional assessments against the EU and national consolidated criteria that need to be undertaken if the assistance involves the provision of equipment which is controlled under export control legislation.[297]

335. I propose that the Committees conclude that the Government's acceptance of their recommendation that the requirement on officials in the previous Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) Human Rights Guidance merely to consult the Consolidated Arms Export Licensing Criteria if military and security equipment is being exported in an OSJA programme should be replaced by a requirement to adhere strictly to the licensing criteria and procedures is welcome.

336. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government keeps the implementation of the revised OSJA Human Rights Guidance under close scrutiny and reports to the Committees any uses of goods exported from the UK in an OSJA programme in breach of UK or international human rights policies.

Surveillance technology and equipment

337. The Committees' previous scrutiny of surveillance technology and equipment can be found at paragraphs 325-328 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 88 of the Report.

338. The Committees' Recommendation on surveillance technology and equipment in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

The Committees' Recommendation:

The Committees recommend that in its Response to this Report the Government states what progress has been made both within the EU and within the Wassenaar Arrangement to prevent exports of surveillance technology and equipment to repressive regimes who may use this technology and equipment to suppress human rights.[298]

The Government's Response:

The EU adopted measures in sanctions to prohibit the supply to Syria and Iran of certain specified equipment and software for "monitoring or interception of internet or telephone communications". These measures were adopted on 18 January 2012 (through Council Regulation 36/2012) and 23 March 2012 (through Council Regulation 264/2012) respectively.

The Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) adopted controls on mobile phone intercept and monitoring equipment on 14 December 2011, which is yet to be incorporated into the EU Dual-Use Regulation.

The UK submitted a formal proposal to the WA on 4 March 2013 concerning Advanced Persistent Threat software and related equipment (offensive cyber tools), which is currently being discussed, and a decision is due at the WA plenary meeting scheduled for December 2013.[299]

339. Privacy International, in its written evidence, stated that ten years ago the value of the global surveillance industry was negligible; today, industry experts value it at around $5 billion a year. It stated:

New technologies allow the financial transactions, communications activity and geographic movements of millions of people to be captured, analysed and stored both cheaply and efficiently. The emerging information and communications infrastructures of developing countries are being hijacked for surveillance purposes, and the information thereby collected is facilitating unlawful interrogation practices, torture and extrajudicial executions.

It continued by stating that: "Regulatory oversight in the form of export controls is urgently required if the UK wants to meet its human rights commitments and foreign policy objectives."[300]

340. When the Committees put a series of questions to the Government on surveillance technology and equipment following its Response to the Committees Recommendations in its 2012 Report the Government said:

The Government's current view is that such concerted action at international level is by some measure the best option, if further regulation is required. A unilaterally imposed national restriction on the export from the UK of surveillance equipment without international support is unlikely to be effective, as it could be more easily circumvented given the likelihood that many of the companies which manufacture such equipment will have offices in other EU and third countries.[301]

341. The Guardian newspaper reported on 19 November 2013 that a large number of British companies were selling surveillance technologies to developing countries "with promises that 'off the shelf' equipment will allow them to snoop on millions of emails, text messages and phone calls". The article went on to say that the market had "raised concerns among human rights groups and ministers". It said that ministers were "poised to announce new rules about the sale of such equipment from Britain." Privacy International was quoted in the article as stating that: "There is a culture of impunity permeating across the private surveillance market, given that there are no strict export controls on the sale of this technology, as there are on the sale of conventional weapons."[302]

342. In the Westminster Hall debate on 21 November 2013 Ann McKechin MP said:

There are disturbing stories about the hacking of dissidents not only in their own country, but in the UK, where some are currently taking refuge. Some fairly small, relatively unknown companies are now involved in the sector, and given that the equipment is exceptionally portable and that technical specifications can change rapidly, the detection of illegal exports is bound to be difficult.

The power and reach of such equipment is considerable. A Dubai-based company markets a product called Cerebro, a DIY system similar to the Tempora programme run by GCHQ, that has the ability to tap information from fibre-optic cables carrying internet traffic and to analyse texts, mobile calls, billing data, e-mails and social networks in real time.[303]

343. When this subject was raised in the Oral Evidence session with BIS on 18 December the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, stated that BIS was aware of the "problems around surveillance equipment" and that his Department "had been engaged" with the Foreign Office in trying to update the Wassenaar convention".[304] Chris Chew, Head of Policy, Export Control Organisation, said:

On 4 December, the participating states of the Wassenaar arrangement agreed to adopt new controls on two specific technologies. One is software tools that allow someone to insert what is effectively a virus on someone's computer or smartphone, which extracts data or tracks their movements without their knowledge. The second is equipment or software that extracts data from internet traffic and can extract information about who you communicate with and what your social networks are. Those controls were agreed and the 41 participating states of the Wassenaar arrangement have committed to introducing those controls. The UK, along with France, has been instrumental in reaching that agreement and it is something that we worked very hard to achieve. We now need to get those changes implemented in EU law through the EU dual-use regulation, and we will be working hard to make that happen.[305]

When asked when the changes would be implemented, Chris Chew replied:

There is a window of opportunity between now and the European Parliament elections in May next year, because it needs the approval of the European Parliament. If we cannot do it in that time, we will have to start from whenever the European Parliament first sits after the May election, so it would be the second half of the year. So there is a small window of opportunity to do it in the next four or five months, but if not it would be the second half of the year.[306]

344. When the Foreign Secretary, William Hague, was asked, in the Oral Evidence session on 8 January 2014, whether he shared the concerns that were being raised about surveillance equipment being used in countries with bad human rights records he replied:

We agree that action is necessary to strengthen export controls in this area, over certain cyber security-related equipment and software. These products have legitimate uses in defending networks, and tracking and disrupting criminals. Many of the exports listed under cryptographic headings are also, for instance, equipment for mobile telephone networks that have a cryptographic aspect to them. Sometimes when you see that several billion pounds of cryptographic material has been exported, it is an item of that kind, but we have to recognise that such equipment can also be used to conduct espionage, to track and disrupt political opponents and to restrict freedom of expression. We need to move the policy on, on this subject. That is why the UK has been leading work in the Wassenaar arrangement, which resulted in agreement last month to adopt new controls on specific technologies of concern. These are going to be implemented through the EU's controls on dual-use items. We also made further proposals to the relevant countries as necessary. We are also helping industry to produce guidance on the potential risks posed by cyber-security exports. Our policy is moving forward on this as technology is changing, and we are also open to further suggestions and ideas about what we should do.[307]

When asked if any international action on surveillance equipment was pending or had taken place the Foreign Secretary replied:

It is under way and we are at the forefront of it. We are leading it. We are putting forward proposals. Officials in the FCO and BIS are doing a very good job on this. We are working with other member states, with the European Commission and the European Parliament to implement these changes, I hope, before the European Parliament elections in May. If that does not prove possible, we certainly want them adopted later this year. We are pushing for changes in this area, and successfully so.[308]

345. On 24 April 2014 the Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Foreign Secretary, William Hague, regarding The text of the letter was as follows:

It was reported in The Independent on 7 January that the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) will be investigating supplies to Israeli security services from G4S.

Please could you tell me if the British Government is co-operating with the OECD in its investigation. If so, please could you state what information has been submitted by the Government to the OECD in connection with its investigation.[309]

The Business Secretary, Vince Cable replied on behalf of the Foreign Secretary replied on 8 May in a letter covering a number of requests for information The relevant part of the letter relating to the OECD and G4S was as follows:

G4S, Israel and the OECD

I believe that the news report you refer to relates to the complaints process under the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. As you may know, the Guideline are voluntary standards for responsible business conduct in areas including human rights, employment and the environment. Unfortunately, the news report does not reflect the complaints process accurately. Each government that adheres to the OECD Guidelines is required to maintain a National Contact Point (NCP) to consider complaints under the Guidelines. The UK NCP is maintained by the UK Government to meet this requirement. It is not part of the OECD and has no wider responsibilities for OECD functions. The UK NCP is staffed by a small team of officials based in the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), and operates independently of BIS Ministers in its consideration of complaints.

The UK NCP does not usually comment on a complaint before it makes an Initial Assessment but all its Initial Assessments are published at http://www.gov.uk/government/collections/uk-national-contact-point-statements. The NCP generally expects to make and Initial Assessment within 3 months of receiving a complaint, although I understand that a spike in its caseload at the end of last year has led to some assessments taking a little longer. I would be happy to provide a copy of the Initial Assessment to the Committees once it has been published.[310]

346. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:

a)  whether it is the Government's policy that EU Council Regulations 36/2012 and 264/2012 prohibiting the supply to Syria and Iran of certain specified equipment and software for "monitoring or interception of internet or telephone communications" should be extended to other countries, and, if so, to which other countries;

b)  whether the EU has now agreed to incorporate fully into the EU Dual-Use Regulation the new controls over the export of mobile phone intercept and monitoring equipment agreed at the Wassenaar Arrangement meeting in December 2011, and, if not, what steps the Government is taking to have this incorporation implemented by the EU at the earliest possible date;

c)  what are the specific new controls and what are the specific technologies of concern agreed by the states participating in the Wassenaar Arrangement at their meeting in December 2013 referred to by the Foreign Secretary in his Oral Evidence of 8 January 2014;

d)  whether the EU has now agreed to incorporate fully into the EU Dual-Use Regulation the new controls over the export of the specific surveillance technologies and equipment of concern agreed at the Wassenaar Arrangement meetings in December 2013, and, if not, what steps the Government is taking to have this incorporation implemented by the EU at the earliest possible date; and

e)  whether the Government will make subject to UK export controls those items of surveillance technology and equipment agreed at the Wassenaar Arrangement meetings in December 2011 and December 2013 if not yet incorporated into the EU Dual-Use Regulation.

Cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components

347. Cryptographic equipment is used to encrypt data such that only users with a valid encryption key can decrypt an encrypted message into plain, readable text.

348. The Committees latest Report (HC 205) contained a list of extant arms export licences to the FCO's main countries of human rights concern in Annex 13 of Volume II. That list of extant licences showed that 23 of the FCO's 27 countries of human rights concern had received UK Government approval for the export of cryptographic equipment, cryptographic technology, cryptographic software and cryptographic components, including China, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe. Tables 6 and 7, below, show the number of extant SIEL and OIEL licences for cryptographic software, technology and components to the FCO's countries of human rights concern and the Committees' additional countries of concern, as of May 2013.[311]

Table 6 - Extant licences for cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components to FCO Countries of Human Rights Concern (May 2013)
	Number of licences (OIELs and SIELs)	Value of SIELs (£)[312]
Afghanistan	16	2,304,195
Belarus	4	0
Burma	1	0
China	194	571,796,383
Colombia	11	81,482
Congo, Democratic Republic of	13	315,564
Eritrea	2	0
Fiji	1	0
Iran	6	80,258,212
Iraq	20	1,728,540
Israel	109	7,807,876,744
Libya	16	5,517,567
Occupied Palestinian Territories	1	5,539
Pakistan	22	8,760,228
Russia	39	22,071,765
Saudi Arabia	53	13,869,907
Somalia	9	713,315
Sri Lanka	6	10,346
Sudan	7	216,262
Turkmenistan	4	0
Uzbekistan	6	0
Vietnam	22	7,209,190
Yemen	4	0
Zimbabwe	41	2,705,940
Total	607	8,525,441,180

Source: Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 10 May 2013 (see HC (2013-14) 205 Ev w170)

Table 7 - Extant licences for cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components to CAEC Countries of interest (May 2013)
	Number of licences (OIELs and SIELs)	Value of SIELs (£)[313]
Argentina	19	7,040,727
Bahrain	22	7,322,159
Egypt	31	365,410
Madagascar	5	865
Tunisia	15	782,489
Total	92	15,511,651

Source: Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 10 May 2013 (see HC (2013-14) 205 Ev w170)

349. In the Westminster Hall debate on 21 November 2013 the Chairman of the Committees, Sir John Stanley, stated that the two recipients of the largest approvals for cryptographic exports to the Government's top countries of human rights concern were China, with almost 200 extant licence approvals (with a value of £571million) and Israel with 109 extant licence approvals (with a value of over £7.8billion). The Chairman commented that for China "It would seem highly likely that there is a real risk that some cryptographic exports that may be going into the private sector initially end up being utilised by security services in China" and that for Israel ", it seems highly likely that some of that massive cryptographic export to Israel will be used, sooner or later, to the advantage of the Israeli security services in operations against Palestinians." [314]

350. When the Foreign Secretary was asked about the granting of export licences for cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components to countries of human rights concern he replied:

The majority of such licences are for commercial equipment for commercial end use: building public mobile phone networks; internet infrastructure; or building virtual private networks for private companies. We would not grant a licence if there was a clear risk that the items might be used for internal repression.[315]

When asked specifically about whether the any of the 194 cryptographic licences to China might have a clear risk or might be used to facilitate internal repression the Foreign Secretary said:

We go through each of these licences individually. Something that is to build a virtual private network for a private company is not something where there is a clear risk of it being used for internal repression in China. The majority of licences are for things of that kind, […][316]

When pressed on the fact that it was difficult to make a distinction between the public and private sector in China the Foreign Secretary responded:

China has become a more complex economy and society. That is one point. Secondly, given that it is now the second biggest economy in the world, it is not surprising that it shows up to a large extent in export figures. Thirdly, we are able to analyse to a good level of detail the uses to which particular technologies can be put, and we are very mindful of that in assessing each licence.[317]

351. The Committees analysed the extant arms export licences for cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components from the updated list of extant licences provided by the Business Secretary, Vince Cable in the Annexes to his letter of 12 May 2014.[318]

Table 8 - Extant licences for cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components to FCO Countries of Human Rights Concern 2014
	Number of licences (OIELs and SIELs)	Value of SIELs
Afghanistan	12	1,304,064
Belarus	4	120,000
Burma	5	4,632
Central African Republic (CAR)	1	0
China	232	636,310,330
Colombia	14	56,851
Congo, Democratic Republic of	21	340,849
Eritrea	3	0
Fiji	2	0
Iran	4	47,778
Iraq	32	5,874,040
Israel	139	7,830,601,148
Libya	34	7,529,576
Occupied Palestinian Territories	0	0
Pakistan	22	14,146,706
Russia	42	77,305,028
Saudi Arabia	58	19,525,839
Somalia	10	973,675
South Sudan	5	24,966
Sri Lanka	6	1,329,743
Sudan	4	7,525,162
Turkmenistan	9	156,736
Uzbekistan	4	0
Vietnam	17	20,519
Yemen	3	0
Zimbabwe	57	2,617,091
Total	738	8,605,814,734

Source: Ev w239 - Annex to letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 12 May 2014

Table 9 - Extant licences for cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components to CAEC Countries of concern 2014
		Number of licences (OIELs and SIELs)		Value of SIELs
Argentina		15		25,408,417
Bahrain		27		32,475,493
Egypt		28		5,404,393
Tunisia		11		1,223,537
Ukraine		12		18,163,905
Total		93		82,675,745

Source: Ev w239 - Annex to letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 12 May 2014

352. Analysis of the extant licences for cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components reveals the following highlights:

i.  The value of cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components to China has risen from £571m (194 licences) to £636m (232 licences) - a increase of 11.2% in value and 19.6% in quantity;

ii.   The value of cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components to Iran has fallen from £80.2m (6 licences) to £47,000 (4 licences);

iii.  The value of cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components to Iraq has risen from £1.7m (20 licences) to £5.87m (32 licences) - a increase of 340% in value;

iv.  The value of cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components to Pakistan has risen from £8.76m (22 licences) to £14.1m (22 licences) - a increase of 61.5% in value;

v.  The value of cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components to Russia has risen from £22m (39 licences) to £77.3m (42 licences) - a increase of 350% in value;

vi.  The value of cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components to Saudi Arabia has risen from £13.9m (53 licences) to £19.5m (58 licences) - a increase of 40.7% in value;

vii.  The value of cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components to Sri Lanka has risen from £10,346 (6 licences) to £1.33m (6 licences);

viii.  The value of cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components to Sudan has risen from £216,262 to £7.5m; and

ix.  The value of cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components to Vietnam has fallen from £7.2m (22 licences) to £20,519 (17 licences)

The total number of extant arms export licences for cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components has risen from 607 to 738 (an increase of 21.6%) from 2013 to 2014, however the value of these licences has only risen from £8,525,441,180 to £8,605,814,734 (0.1%) - Note that the increase in value is significantly distorted by the single extant licence to Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories to the value of £7.7bn.)

353. I propose that the Committees conclude that the scale of the Government's approval of export licences for cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components both to the Government's principal Countries of Human Rights concern and to the Committees on Arms Export Controls' additional countries of concern is a matter of considerable disquiet, particularly given the fact that each and every one of the items involved by virtue of being subject to export licensing has an actual or possible military use.

354. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether Ministers themselves will give greater scrutiny to export licence applications for cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components to the Government's principal Countries of Human Rights concern and to the Committees' additional countries of concern.

Sniper rifles

355. The Committees scrutiny of extant Government approved exports of sniper rifles as at May 2014 showed that of the FCO's current list of 28 countries of top human rights concern there were extant sniper rifles to 3 of those countries. These countries were, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Sri Lanka.

356. The Committees scrutiny also showed that as of May 2014 of the Committees' 5 additional countries of concern, there were extant sniper rifle licences to 2 of those countries. These were Bahrain and Egypt.

357. The Committees have made particular scrutiny of the export of sniper rifles to Ukraine since the first quarter of 2011. On 24 April 2014 the Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Foreign Secretary as follows:

In your Oral Evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee on 18 March on Ukraine we had the following exchange:

Q7: Sir John Stanley: "Foreign Secretary, there were widespread reports in the press, on which the Foreign Office declined to comment following the change of Government in Kiev, that British personnel—whether Government personnel or Government-approved personnel—had gone to Kiev to give expert ballistic advice as to the location of sniper positions from which those demonstrating peacefully were killed in Kiev. Against that background, do you have any regrets to express to the Committee that in each quarter of 2011, the British Government gave export licence approval to sniper rifles to Ukraine, and did so again in 2012 and in 2013?"

Mr Hague: "We have to base our decisions on the information available at the time, of course, and that will always be the way. We will always have the benefit of hindsight on some of these things. I would have to look at the details of any applications before giving any detailed opinion about that, but I am satisfied that all our export licence decisions are based on the information available at the time."

I attach in Ukrainian a copy of the article that appeared in "Minding Russia" on the internet on 24 February 2014. I also reproduce immediately below what we have been told is the article's translation into English:

Rada Commission Determines Who Shot People in Kiev

Author Voronz, Vsk, 23/02/2014 - 13:22

The Verkhovna Rada [parliamentary] commission to investigate the massacre in Kiev, chaired by Hennadiy Moskal, deputy from the Bitkivshchina [Fatherland] Party, has determined that the sniper rifles with which people were shot in Kiev on the morning of 20 February were purchased for the Crimean Territorial Department of Internal Forces, UNIAN reported, citing a statement from commission chairman Moskal.

This special sub-division was created personally by Stanislav Shulyak, a commander of the Ukrainian internal troops; its commander is Col. Sergei Asavalyuk, Moskal stated.

According to Moskal's report, soldiers from the Crimean special division were captured on video by journalists, and their radio chatter was recorded. Information about the purchase of 80 British AVK type sniper rifles for this sub-division is contained in the Vestnik gosudarstvennykh zakupok Ukrainy [Bulletin of State Purchases of Ukraine].

Please could you tell the Committees whether the statement in the article that 80 British AVK type sniper rifles were purchased for the Crimean Territorial Department of Internal Forces is correct, and whether the fact that this information is contained in the Vestnik gosudarstvennykh zakupok Ukrainy [Bulletin of State Purchases of Ukraine] is also correct. If so, please could you state on what date or dates the Government gave export licence approval for the export of these sniper rifles from the UK to the Ukraine.

Finally, please could you provide details of all UK Government export licence approvals of sniper rifles to Ukraine from the beginning of 2010 giving the same information as in the Table to my letter to the Business Secretary of March 6, a copy of which is attached for convenience, i.e. providing the following information in respect of each licence approved namely: date of licence approval, type of sniper rifle, quantity, value, usage (i.e. how many were exported to Ukraine), stated end-use, stated end-user.

Annex 1 - original Ukrainian article

Êîìèññèÿ Ðàäû âûÿñíèëà, êòî ðàññòðåëèâàë ëþäåé â Êèåâå

Àâòîð Voronz, Âñê, 23/02/2014 - 14:22

Ìîñêàëü Ãåíà

Êîìèññèÿ Âåðõîâíîé Ðàäû ïî ðàññëåäîâàíèþ áîéíè â Êèåâå ïîä ïðåäñåäàòåëüñòâîì äåïóòàòà îò ïàðòèè «Áèòüêèâùèíà» Ãåííàäèÿ Ìîñêàëÿ âûÿñíèëà, ÷òî ñíàéïåðñêèå âèíòîâêè, èç êîòîðûõ áûëè ðàññòðåëÿíû ëþäè â Êèåâå óòðîì 20 ¼åâðàëÿ, áûëè çàêóïëåíû äëÿ Êðûìñêîãî òåððèòîðèàëüíîãî óïðàâëåíèÿ âíóòðåííèõ âîéñê Óêðàèíû.

Îá ºòîì ñîîáùàåò ÓͲÀÍ ñî ññûëêîé íà çàÿâëåíèå ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ êîìèññèè Ìîñêàëÿ.

Ýòî ñïå½ïîäðàçäåëåíèå áûëî ñîçäàíî ëè÷íî êîìàíäóþùèì âíóòðåííèõ âîéñê Óêðàèíû Ñòàíèñëàâîì ¾óëÿêîì, åãî êîìàíäóþùèì ÿâëÿåòñÿ ïîëêîâíèê Ñåðãåé Àñàâàëþê, çàÿâèë íàðîäíûé äåïóòàò.

Ïî ñîîáùåíèþ äåïóòàòà îò ïàðòèè «Áàòüêèâùèíà», áîé½û êðûìñêîãî ñïå½íàçà áûëè îòñíÿòû íà âèäåî æóðíàëèñòàìè, à èõ ðàäèîïåðåãîâîðû çàïèñàíû». Äàííûå î çàêóïêå 80 àíãëèéñêèõ ñíàéïåðñêèõ âèíòîâîê òèïà ÀÂÊ äëÿ äàííîãî ïîäðàçäåëåíèÿ åñòü â «Âåñòíèêå ãîñóäàðñòâåííûõ çàêóïîê Óêðàèíû».

Ñìîòðèòå òàêæå: Ñíàéïåðû "Áåðêóòà" óáèâàþò áåçîðóæíûõ ëþäåé íà Èíñòèòóòñêîé. ÂÈÄÅÎ ïîïàâ¾åãî ïîä îáñòðåë[319]

358. The Business Secretary, Vince Cable, replied on 14 May 2014. The relevant section of his letter was as follows:

Ukraine - sniper rifles

Following a thorough search of our records, and having consulted our Post in Kiev and weapons specialists in MOD, I have been unable to verify any of the claims regarding the UK made in the article to which you refer. What I can say is that:

We are not aware of the existence of any UK-made weapon known as an "AVX sniper rifle", and we have no record of having granted any export licence for a weapon described in these terms.

The phrase "AK variant" is routinely used to describe weapons; however these are not made in the UK. The images we have seen from Ukraine appear to show marksmen using Dragonov SVD sniper rifles which are a derivative of the AK series of weapons and are produced by Russia and in other former communist states under licence.

We have no record of ever having granted any export licence where the Crimean Territorial Department of Internal Forces was named as end-user, consignee or third party on the licence application.

Since 2010 we have granted 17 licences for export of a total of 83 sniper rifles to Ukraine. The stated end-use in each case was for hunting or sports shooting and the end-users were authorised gun dealers or private individuals. Information about these licences is given at Annex 3.

The only licence granted for supply of sniper rifles to the Ukrainian government was in November 2000. This was for 10 rifles and the end-user was named as "the Security Service of the Ukraine".

We do have concerns about the use of hunting and sporting weapons in the recent disturbances in Ukraine, including those described as "sniper rifles". That is why the majority of the suspended licences listed in Annex 3 were for such weapons, or for components or silencers for such weapons. However I have seen nothing that would persuade me that the media report you refer to is accurate.[320]

Annex 3

Export licences for sniper rifles for Ukraine, 2010-2013

Date Licence Granted	Goods Description	Quantity	Total Licensed Value (£)	End-User
28/09/2010	Stock System, Rifle Calibre .300, Rifle Calibre .308, 700 Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .308	6	15000	Arm Elit
14/01/2011	Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .338	10	36000	Arm Elit
27/06/2011	Hunting Rifle Calibre .308	5	15000	Arm Elit
30/06/2011	NATO Model Rifle Calibre 7.62 x 51	5	15000	Arm Elit
06/07/2011	Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .308, Ammunition Calibre .300, Ammunition	15	113400	Arm Elit
19/08/2011	Hunting Rifle Calibre .308	5	15000	Arm Elit
26/09/2011	Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .308	6	18000	Arm Elit
27/10/2011	Semi Automatic Rifle Calibre .308, Spare Magazine, Suppressor.	3	11605	Arm Elit
14/03/2012	Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .300	1	2500	Arm Elit
15/08/2012	Repeating Target Rifle (6.5x47mm) with 2 spare barrels.	3	1500	Private Individual
21/12/2012	Bolt Action Rifle. Calibre .338	3	16000	Arm Elit
07/01/2013	Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .338 with interchangeable spare barrels in calibre .300 & .308	3	30000	Arm Elit
15/04/2013	Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .308	5	22500	Arm Elit
12/04/2013	Desert Tactical Arms SRS Chassis System with Conversion Kit, Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .308 22" Barrel	6	24000	Arm Elit
23/07/2013	Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .338 with Spare Barrel Calibre .338	3	7000	Private Individual
26/07/2013	Bolt Action Rifle .338	1	5300	Private Individual
24/09/2013	Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .22-250, Bolt Action Rifle Calibre 6.5-284	3	36500	Arm Elit

359. I propose that the Committees recommend that, given the utility of sniper rifles for internal repression, particularly in situations of conflict or potential conflict, the Government should give closer scrutiny to export licence applications for sniper rifles to countries where human rights abuses are prevalent or are likely to increase.

Tasers

360. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the export of Tasers can be found at paragraphs 329-332 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 89 of the Report.

361. The Committees' Recommendation on the export of Tasers in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

The Committees' Recommendation:

The Committees continue to recommend that the Government specifically reports breaches of export controls in relation to Tasers, and on the enforcement action taken, in the next UK Strategic Export Controls Annual report following any breach, stating in each case to where the Tasers were exported or were due to be exported.[321]

The Government's Response:

The Government confirms that it will continue to report on breaches of export controls, and on enforcement action taken, including in relation to Tasers, in the UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report. This reporting will include details relating to prosecutions, confiscation proceedings, seizures, disruptions and compound penalties.[322]

362. I propose that the Committees conclude that the Government's confirmation that it will continue to report on breaches of export controls, and on enforcement action taken, including in relation to Tasers, in the UK Strategic Export Annual Report, and that this reporting will include details relating to prosecutions, confiscation proceedings, seizures, disruptions and compound penalties is welcome.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) "Drones"

363. The Committees' previous scrutiny of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) "Drones" can be found at paragraphs 333-337 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Conclusion and Recommendations at paragraph 90 of the Report.

364. The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendations on the unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) "Drones" in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendations:

The Committees conclude that the Foreign Secretary's statement to the Committees with regard to the export from the UK of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) or drones that "we want to have a tough, strong export control regime at all times into the future" is welcome. In the light of that policy, the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:

a)  what specific action it is taking within the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to ensure that the MTCR is not weakened in relation to drones, components of drones and drone technology; and

b)  whether it considers that any changes to UK export controls in relation to drones, components of drones and drone technology are necessary to achieve the Government's stated policy, and, if so, what those changes are and the date by which they will be implemented.

The Committees further recommend that the Government states its policy on approving export licences for drones.[323]

The Government's Response:

a)  The Government actively contributes to the MTCR's technical working group, which updates the regime's control lists to account for all relevant proliferation threats, including UAVs.

b)  The Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) and the MTCR both control UAVs. The WA controls all UAVs "specially designed or modified for military use" as well as civil UAVs with specific characteristics. The MTCR's controls apply to UAVs with a range greater than 300kms. The UK's export controls are wholly in line with both these regimes, which form the authoritative multilateral controls for UAVs. Updates to control lists are agreed within each of the regimes on a consensus basis and these are then reflected in UK export controls lists.

Export licenses for UAVs are approved in accordance with the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria, which include an explicit requirement to comply with the UK's commitments under the regimes. More information can be found here:

http://www.mtcr.info/english/guidetext.htm

http://www.wassenaar.org/controllists/index.html

https://www.gov.uk/assessment-of-export-licence-applications-criteria-and-policy.[324]

365. In its written submission to this inquiry Reprieve stated that it had identified a number of licences granted to UK companies for the export of components to the United States which appeared to have been used on weaponised UAVs. It stated that the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) had confirmed, in correspondence with Reprieve, that some licences had been granted for the export of goods which had been intended for use by the US Government in weaponised UAVs. BIS had indicated that in granting these licences it had applied the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria including :

·  "the respect for human rights" (Criterion 2);

·  refraining from issuing export licenses which would "provoke or prolong armed conflicts" or "aggravate existing tensions or conflicts" in the country of final destination (Criterion 3);

·  refraining from issuing export licenses where there is a clear risk that the intended recipient would use the proposed export "aggressively against another country" (Criterion 4); and

·  the behaviour of the buyer country with regard to … respect for international law (Criterion 6).

366. Reprieve wrote that the Export Control Act 2002 states that controls may be imposed for military equipment and technology if their exportation or use is "capable of having a relevant consequence". "Relevant consequences" include "the carrying out anywhere in the world of (or of acts which facilitate) (a) acts threatening international peace and security; (b) acts contravening the international law of armed conflict; ... (d) breaches of human rights". It continued:

The US's use of drones in non-war zones, such as Pakistan and Yemen, is inconsistent with these criteria. In particular, it is in breach of the international law of armed conflict. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force by one state against another, other than in certain very limited circumstances. The US's use of drones in areas where there is no armed conflict, including Pakistan and Yemen, fall so far short of the international humanitarian and human rights law requirements for legality, that none of those exceptions - such as arguments of 'state consent' or 'self-defence' - could render them lawful.

367. Reprieve also stated that it was aware of certain components being exported to the US for use in Predator and Reaper UAVs which did not appear on the Consolidated List, and therefore did not currently require export licences. Reprieve was greatly concerned, because, it said, that it undermines the entire purpose of the export licensing regime, in that components specifically intended for use on weapons capable of carrying out great destruction may be exported free from any governmental scrutiny at all. Reprieve informed the Committees that it had spoken to BIS on this issue and that BIS had indicated it did not intend to add such components to the list because this export control would operate solely at the national level and therefore could easily be circumvented and would have no effect on the export of these products from other parts of the European Union. Reprieve did not accept that properly implemented controls could be easily circumvented purely because those same controls are not in place elsewhere in the EU. Reprieve called for the UK Government to consider and put in place its export controls on the basis of its own priorities and international obligations, rather than adopting a passive approach which would result in the lowest standard of regulation being applied across all EU countries.[325]

368. On 12 May 2014 the Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Business Secretary requesting information regarding export licence approval for weaponised UAVs. The text of the letter was as follows:

I should be grateful for the following information regarding Government export licence approval for weaponised, as opposed to surveillance, UAVs, their software, technology and components.

1. Please could you list the countries to which the Government has given export licence approval for weaponised UAVs, their software, technology or components since coming into office, stating in the case of each country and each licence:

a)  the nature of the goods approved for export;

b)  the number of licences approved by country;

c)  their value by country;

d)  the date each licence was approved; and

e)  any end-user undertakings sought and given.

2. Please could you state whether the present Government has given any export licence approval for Brimstone, its software, technology or components and, if so, please could you provide the same information as in paragraph 1 above.

3. Please could you also state whether any export licence applications for Brimstone, its software, technology or components have been submitted to your department and are awaiting decision.[326]

The Business Secretary, Vince Cable, replied on 6 June 2014. The relevant section of his letter dealing with UAVs was as follows:

"Weaponised" UAVs and Brimstone

Let me start by clarifying that the UK does not classify "weaponised" UAVs separately from "non-weaponised" UAVs and that many components will be common to both. Consequently, in the context of your request we have searched our records for all 'military' UAVs and components falling within control entry ML10c1 (previously ML10c) in the UK Strategic Export Control Lists and for related software and technology. We then sought to identify from the detailed goods description any licences that were for items intended for "weaponised" UAVs.

On this basis we have found no record of any export licences granted by the present Government for "weaponised" UAVs, their software, technology or components.

I can also confirm that no licences have been granted by this Government for the Brimstone missile, its software, technology or components. However we have granted one export licence for software for modelling, simulating and evaluating the Brimstone Missile System. Information about this licence is included at Annex A.

Finally, there are no applications for Brimstone, its software, technology or components, currently awaiting decision.[327]

Annex

	STANDARD INDIVIDUAL LICENCE (PERMANENT) FOR SOFTWARE RELATED TO BRIMSTONE
Goods Description	Goods Summary	Destination	Goods Value (£)	Date of Approval	End User Undertaking provided?
CD containing version of the Dual Mode Brimstone UOR standard DIMODS 6 DoF Mathematical Model	Software for modelling / simulating / evaluating weapon systems	United States	20000	31-Jul-2012	Yes

369. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:

a)  the circumstances, if any, in which it considers the giving of Government export licence approval to the export of weaponised, as opposed to surveillance, UAVs, their software, technology or components would be compatible with the Government's national and international human rights undertakings and with international law; and

b)  the end-use undertakings it would seek from recipients of UK exports of weaponised UAVs, their software, technology or components before giving Government export licence approval.

Arms exports to counter piracy

370. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to counter piracy can be found at paragraphs 338-341 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 91 of the Report.

371. The Committees' Recommendation on arms exports to counter piracy in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

The Committees' Recommendation:

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether there have been any breaches to date in the conditions the Government has attached to licences of exported arms to be used by private security companies for counter-piracy purposes, and, if so, what are the breaches that have occurred and by which private security companies.[328]

The Government's Response:

During 2012 eight Maritime Anti-Piracy companies were found to be non-compliant with the terms of their licence. These breaches occurred as a result of a change in policy by the Sri Lankan Government which forced all private security companies operating from Sri Lanka to use a "floating armoury" outside their territorial waters rather than land-based armouries for the storage of weapons. The use of floating armouries was not, at that time, permitted by the licence. We believe, however, that the companies concerned retained sufficient controls over the goods whilst located on these particular armouries such that there was no increased risk of loss or diversion. Given the sensitivity of such activities - and the underlying cause of the non-compliance - the Government considers that disclosing the names of the companies who were found to be non-compliant would not be justified. As the Minister of State for Business and Enterprise, the Rt Hon Michael Fallon MP, explained in his letter to the Chairman of the Committees of 7 July 2013, the use of floating armouries is becoming increasingly common and it is important that our licensing policy evolves to take account of this fact. We are now granting licences for export or trade activity in support of maritime counter-piracy operations involving the use of floating armouries subject, of course, to careful and detailed risk assessment.[329]

372. The letter and Annex that the Chairman of CAEC received from the Business Minister, Michael Fallon, dated 7 July 2013 was as follows:

I am writing to bring you up to date on export licensing matters relating to counter-piracy efforts. I know that you take a close interest in this area and wanted me to inform you that my Department will soon begin issuing UK trade licences authorising the use of floating armouries for the storage of controlled equipment, particularly firearms.

As you know, UK Private Security Companies (PSCs) have a strong presence in the region, which is encouraging because these companies are comprised of highly disciplined ex-UK forces personnel and a high standard of security is provided. This is also a commercial success story.

The biggest difficulty facing PSCs is a logistical one relating to the storage of controlled goods. While initially the land-based armouries, operating primarily under government or police oversight, were welcoming and accommodating of PSCs engaged in counter-piracy efforts, increasingly storage has been problematic. This is due to a combination of armouries reaching capacity, armouries operating restrictive hours not conducive to twenty four hour operations, spiralling costs due to excessive demand and, also, the Sri Lankan MOD choosing to close its land-based naval armoury to commercial companies and offering only an off-shore vessel outside their territorial waters.

The available solution to this problem is the operation of off-shore vessels designed to store controlled goods like firearms securely, and in some cases, accommodate personnel as well. Whilst authorising transfers of controlled goods to platforms operating in international waters is not new to us — we have long supported UK exports of strategic goods to the UK Continental Shelf — the difference here is that the goods include weapons, which represent new challenges for us when it comes to assessing the risks.

We have been working with our advisors, principally officials in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to find a way to manage these risks. We have decided to adopt a case by case approach and assess a range of points for each vessel. These points are set out in an annex to this letter.

We have focused initially on a vessel called the MV Mahanuwara, which is operated by a company called Avant Garde Maritime Services of Sri Lanka, which is operated under the authorisation and the protection of the Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence. Having collected and assessed the information set out in the annex our advisors and my officials concur that the risks of allowing PSCs to use this vessel, as a short term storage solution, is acceptable. We will therefore begin authorising licences for the use of this vessel with immediate effect.

We will then move to assess other vessels that the UK PSCs have expressed an interest in using. We are working with officials at the Department of Transport and the Home Office to determine any additional conditions that they may wish to place on UK-flagged vessels. This is due to be discussed this month at a cross-Government Ministerial Working Group on Counter-Piracy. UK vessels should be inherently lower risk but you will appreciate that they will need to comply with DfT guidance on the use of armed guards and relevant Home Office firearms legislation.

Please do let me know if you or any members of the CAEC have any questions arising from this letter.

Annex

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION HMG WILL REQUIRE TO ASSESS THE RISK OF FLOATING ARMOURIES AGAINST THE CONSOLIDATED CRITERIA

·  The vessel name and International Maritime Organisation (IMO) number.

·  Details of the flag under which the vessel operates.

·  The size/class of the vessel and a description.

·  The vessel's minimum and maximum crew complements.

·  The location(s) where the vessel operates including ports.

·  Details of the operation and accessibility to the vessel's armoury.

·  Details of which personnel, apart from the crew, will be allowed access to the vessel and under what circumstances.

·  Details of the insurance of the vessel.

·  The maximum armoury capacity of the vessel and the types of weapons they will be permitted to be stored.

·  Details of the plans for disposal of surplus/abandoned equipment.

·  Details of the protection measures for the vessel.

·  Details of what legislation and regulations the vessel is subject to, including details of any inspections undertaken to date.

·  Details of any circumstances under which the vessel may lease capacity to other organisations.

·  Details about any circumstances under which weapons may be leased to other organisations.

Licence holders will be required to monitor these points, and to notify ECO of any changes. As with all activity undertaken under a UK trade licence, records of transactions will be kept and inspected by ECO officials during each compliance audit. We are also exploring the viability of conducting on-vessel inspections. Companies will be required to report on licence use on a quarterly basis.[330]

373. Following publication of the Government's United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012 the Committees wrote to the Government asking a question about arms exports to counter piracy. The question and answer were as follows:

The Committees' question:

Why are companies who are being assessed for counter-piracy Open General Trade Licences or Individual Trade Control Licences not being assessed against the Foreign Secretary's policy statement to the Committees on 7 February 2012 that the export would not be permitted of controlled goods "which might be used to facilitate internal repression", as well as against the UK's Consolidated Criteria?

The Government's answer:

Please refer to the Foreign Secretary's letter of 6 October, which confirms that our policy is to assess against the Consolidated Criteria.[331]

374. The Export Control Organisation, within the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills published on its website a list of companies who are registered to use Open General Trade Control Licences (Maritime Anti-piracy). Companies registered to use the licence need to meet all the terms and conditions of the licences and are subject to compliance audits conducted by ECO's Compliance Unit. At the time of the Committees' last report (HC 205) there were 55 companies registered to use the licence; this year the number has increased to 88.[332] A complete list of these companies can be found at Anne X of this Report.

375. Since April 2012 the Government has indicated in its quarterly reports on arms export licences those goods that have been licensed for anti-piracy operations. The table below shows the total number of various categories of goods that have been licensed from April 2012 until 30 September 2013:

Table 10 - Arms exports licence approvals for goods for use in anti-piracy operations April 2012 - 30 September 2013

Country	Assault Rifles	Combat shotguns	Machine guns	Pistols	Rifles	Sniper rifles	Sporting Guns
Comoros	1,900	300	0	110	1,150	0	0
Djibouti	1,100	150	0	130	200	0	300
Egypt	700	150	0	60	0	200	700
Ghana	0	0	0	0	0	20	0
Kenya	300	100	0	50	101	0	200
Madagascar	4,900	750	0	490	1,000	204	300
Maldives	6,150	550	0	490	1,600	200	850
Mauritius	5,119	700	0	420	3,254	1	716
Oman	3,700	900	0	240	1,250	200	600
Russia	17	0	0	0	0	19	0
Seychelles	12	0	22	0	0	0	0
South Africa	7,519	850	6	776	3,151	357	1,528
Sri Lanka	2,360	500	0	180	910	200	100
Tanzania	600	150	0	30	200	0	0
Total	34,377	5,100	28	2,976	12,816	1,401	5,294

Source: Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Quarterly pivot reports 2012 Q2 - 2013 Q3

376. When we questioned the NGOs about the proliferation of arms export licence approvals for anti-piracy operations Oliver Sprague (Amnesty UK) informed the Committees that in addition to the SIEL licences, highlighted in the table above, there was also an Open General Export Licence (OGEL) for the supply of ML1 and ML2[333] goods for anti-piracy operations. He stated that over 85 UK private military security companies had registered to use the OGEL. He continued:

As a general rule, we would be opposed to the idea that you could have an open general licence to allow the transfer of assault rifles and combat shotguns for private military security companies operating overseas. It seems to be a very lax licensing regime for those sorts of activities, not least because we have long-standing concerns about the conduct of private military security companies operating overseas stemming from real concerns about accountability and oversight. We have seen from numerous examples, not just relating to anti-piracy, that there is an accountability gap. When things go wrong, what legal recourse is available to ensure that the perpetrators of atrocities are held to account?

Mr Sprague continued by saying that:

It seems to us that the only eligibility requirement at the moment for these licences is that you need to be signed up to the international voluntary code of conduct on private military companies.

We have long argued that a voluntary regulatory approach to something as serious as the provision of private and military security companies is wholly inadequate and that we need a legal framework and a licensing system. In general terms, we are concerned about the proliferation of the huge number of small arms and light weapons and their related ammunition for private military companies engaged in anti-piracy.[334]

When pressed further Mr Sprague said:

It is certainly the case that the current reporting requirements on the open general anti-piracy licence fall well below the international standards to which the UK Government subscribe. The international marking and tracing regime for small arms and light weapons, of which the UK was a big supporter, has a requirement to keep records for 20 years. The ATT [Arms Trade Treaty]says that records for small arms exports must be kept for a mandatory 10 years. The reporting requirement on the OGEL is that companies are required to keep records for only four years, which is five times less than under the international agreement that we have signed up to, and it is clearly at odds with requirements under the ATT. We simply do not know what is being exported under those licences.[335]

377. When we questioned the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, about whether he had any evidence of diversion of goods licensed for anti-piracy operations he said: "There is no evidence of diversion" and that the proper procedures that were followed were "entirely correct."[336] When asked if all of the weapons exported for the purposes of anti-piracy were going to British companies, Edward Bell, Head of Export Control Organisation, BIS, told the Committees that they "are going to British companies in all cases and rigorous terms are applied to the licences for all these shipments." When asked whether other countries were supplying weapons for anti-piracy operations to their own nationals, related companies or other Governments Chris Chew, Head of Policy, ECO, said: "As far as we are aware, around 70% or 80% of the private security companies operating in this sector are UK companies. So the vast majority of the weapons are going to UK companies, and they are being supplied by UK companies."[337] When pressed further about other countries supplying arms for anti-piracy operations Mr Chew said: "There is a small number, and we have had some discussions with some of our international partners, but because of the different ways in which we license these activities it is difficult at the moment to make any fair comparison—but the vast majority of the activity is UK-based."[338]

378. The Committees were surprised at the reaction of Edward Bell when he was informed of the numbers of the weapons that had been licensed for anti-piracy operations by his Department. He said to the Committees: "having now heard about the volumes, I would like to do a bit more digging around that. […] I certainly will have a closer look at the volumes involved."[339]

379. When the Foreign Secretary was asked, in the Oral evidence session on 8 January 2014, about the apparently large volume of arms being granted licences for anti-piracy operations he said:

[…] we do have to bear certain things in mind. One is that the vast majority of the private maritime security companies operating in the Indian Ocean are British, so probably a large proportion of the volume of such weapons is coming through our licensing system rather than that of another country. Secondly, a proportion of the weapons is in maintenance at any one time. Thirdly, the companies need a degree of operational flexibility; they will always have more such weapons than they are deploying. Furthermore, approximately 4,500 ships transit the high-risk area every month. Once you think about that figure—4,500 ships every month—it puts these figures into something of the right perspective, but that does not mean we should not have a look at this and satisfy ourselves and the Committee on the point you raise about the overall quantity.[340]

380. When asked what controls exist for monitoring shipments of counter-piracy weapons once they had been shipped the Foreign Secretary said: "There are a lot of controls." He continued by stating that companies had to meet strict conditions and keep detailed records, in addition to training staff. He said that the UK offices of the companies were regularly inspected by BIS and that they had to sign up to an international code of conduct for private security service providers. When asked specifically about the 5,00 assault rifles and 3,200 rifles that had been authorised for shipment to Mauritius the Foreign Secretary replied:

There are 4,500 ships per month transiting through that area, which is close by Mauritius. We do not have evidence of the diversion of any of these weapons. If we did, we would take it extremely seriously. It is important to point out that, so far, this policy has been a contributing factor to the huge reduction in pirate attacks in recent times. It is one of the factors. Not a single merchant ship carrying private armed security guards has been hijacked. This is part of a successful policy overall. We have to be very vigilant about it. You are quite right to ask these questions, but we are vigilant about it. It is a successful policy, so far, and we have not seen evidence of any diversion.[341]

381. The Business Secretary wrote to the Chairman of CAEC on 3 February. The section of his letter referring to maritime anti-piracy was as follows:

On the issue of export licences for maritime anti-piracy, while we do not have any concerns as to the decision-making process, we committed to look again at the volumes of goods involved in these licences. I can confirm that this work is underway and I will write to you about this matter by the end of March.[342]

382. On 12 May 2014 the Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Business Secretary requesting information regarding the volume of arms export licences for counter-piracy. The text of the letter was as follows:

I should be grateful for your letter on the volume of weapons being exported under Government licences for counter-piracy which you said in your Oral Evidence that you would be sending to me by the end of March.[343]

The Business Secretary replied on 6 June 2014. The section relating to licences for maritime anti-piracy was as follows:

Licences for Maritime Anti-Piracy

The Committees raised concerns at the December 2013 hearing about the volume of weapons licensed for use by Private Marine Security Companies (PMSCs). Mr Mike Gapes MP quoted export data for the period April 2012 to June 2013, indicating that "a total of 30,000 assault rifles, 2,536 pistols and 11,000 rifles were supplied to a number of countries on the East Coast of Africa and to the Arab world, and also to South Africa and Russia". Mr Gapes went on to ask "whether such quantities…seem reasonable in terms of the need, which clearly exists, for anti-piracy work". He also asked if there was "evidence of diversion of any of these weapons away from the purposes for which they were supplied". My officials committed to look at these points.

Firstly, let me be clear that I stand by what I said in December. There is no evidence of diversion. All the British security companies involved in anti-piracy activities are subject to a code of conduct and rigorous pre-licensing checks. Holders of the Open General Trade Control Licence (Marine Anti-Piracy) are also subject to post-licensing audits. The vast majority of Private Marine Security Companies are British and they play an important role in ensuring the safety of shipping off the coast of East Africa.

My officials have examined all the exports of automatic weapons and small arms during 2012 and 2013 in support of the Marine Anti-Piracy (MAP) sector. They looked at weapons, accessories and ammunition falling within control entries ML1a, ML1b, ML1d, ML3a and PL5017 as outlined in Schedule 1 of the Open General Trade Control Licence (Marine Anti-Piracy).

As well as looking at the quantity of items licensed over the two year period they also identified what was actually exported. The investigation showed that the overall percentage of goods shipped against licences granted for automatic weapons and small arms was only some 1.8 per cent of the total figure licensed in 2012 and 2013. Although 181,708 individual items were licensed over the two year period, only 3,273 were shipped (2,332 assault rifles; 83 combat shot guns; 6 machine guns; 63 pistols; 623 rifles; 166 sporting guns).

It is clear from contacts with exporters that they have routinely been applying for licences to cover volumes of exports vastly in excess of what is actually exported. This is because they have no firm estimate of likely exports over the two year validity period of each licence at the point they apply for licences.

The volumes listed in many of these licences are not therefore an accurate prediction of the eventual level of exports. Although the overall volume shipped is proportionate to the activities of British PMSCs - and there is no evidence of diversion - this is not a satisfactory situation. My officials will be working with the suppliers of automatic weapons and small arms to PMSCs over the next few months to put new licensing arrangements in place to closely align the volumes licensed and actual exported volumes. These arrangements will enable the UK Government to exercise greater supervision of these exports and will include regular reporting of volumes exported to be included in the routine quarterly publication of export licensing data.

We also announced a review of the mainstay licensing cover for PMSCs, the Open General Trade Control Licence (Marine Anti-Piracy), at a recent meeting of the Security in Complex Environments Group (SCEG). SCEG is the trade association for the sector. Our aim will be to ensure that the licence remains fit for purpose and it is our intention to put a revised version in place by the end of this year.[344]

383. I propose that the Committees conclude that it is a matter of much concern that both Ministers and their officials in the Business Department appeared to have been unaware of the volume of weapons for which the Department had given export licence approval to Private Marine Security Companies for counter-piracy purposes, 34,377 assault rifles, 5,100 shotguns, 28 machine guns, 2,976 pistols, 12,816 rifles, 1,401 sniper rifles, and 5,294 sporting guns in the period April 2012 to September 2013 alone, until this was brought to their attention by the Committees in the Oral Evidence session on 18 December 2013, notwithstanding the fact that all the information referred to by the Committees came from the Business Department's own quarterly arms export licence reports.

384. I propose that the Committees conclude that it is also a matter of much concern that the Business department in the two-year period 2012 and 2013 gave licence approval to private Marine Security Companies to export automatic weapons and small arms for counter-piracy purposes vastly in excess of the number actually needed and shipped - 181,708 individual items approved for export but only 3,273 (1.8%) actually shipped comprising 2,332 assault rifles; 83 combat shotguns; 6 machine guns; 63 pistols; 623 rifles; and 166 sporting guns.

385. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:

a)  whether the Business Secretary's change of policy to put new licensing arrangements in place to closely align the volumes licensed and actual exported volumes has been put into effect and, if not, the date by which it will be;

b)  that it will inform the Committees when the revised version of the Open General Trade Control (Marine Anti-Piracy) licence has been put in place;

c)  whether the vessel MV Mahanuwara operated by Avant Garde Maritime Services of Sri Lanka and under the authorisation and protection of the Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence is still being used as an armoury for weapons for counter-piracy exported with Government approval from the UK;

d)  what other vessels, and under what flags, are currently being used as armouries for weapons for counter-piracy exported with Government approval from the UK;

e)  whether the Government remains satisfied that none of the weapons it has approved for export for counter-piracy purposes has been diverted for other purposes;

f)  whether it has any evidence that any of the weapons the Government has approved for export for counter-piracy purposes have been used to facilitate internal repression in Sri Lanka or in any other authoritarian country;

g)  how many security companies currently registered to use Open General Export Licences for the export of weapons for counter-piracy from the UK are also UK registered companies, in what other countries and territories are the non-UK registered companies domiciled, and whether the Government have any plans to terminate the OGEL registration of some of the companies as the piracy threat diminishes; and

h)  what prohibitions the Government has put in place, if any, to prevent Private Marine Security Companies who have been given Government export licence approval to export weapons for counter-piracy purposes from the UK subsequently transferring or on-selling from outside the UK's jurisdiction some or all of such weapons to third parties.

The licensing of security services

386. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the licensing of security services can be found at paragraphs 342-344 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 92 of the Report.

387. The Committees' Recommendation on the licensing of security services in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

The Committees' Recommendation:

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:

a)  whether the governance mechanism to monitor compliance with the International Code of Conduct for private security service providers has now been established, and, if so, what the details of the mechanism are; and

b)  whether it remains the Government's position that it has no plans to extend legislation, other than the requirement for export or trade control licences, to UK-based Private Military and Security Companies.[345]

The Government's Response:

a)  On 22 February 2013 International Code of Conduct (ICoC) stakeholders reached agreement to establish an independent governance and oversight mechanism in the form of a Geneva-based association governed by Swiss law to be known as the ICoC Association. The mechanism is intended to ensure the effective implementation of the ICoC through the certification and monitoring of private security providers, as well as through the adoption of a complaint procedure.

136 companies worldwide have applied to be founding members of the Association, including 51 from the UK. The launch conference of the Association took place in Geneva on 19-20 September, and the UK is a founding member.

b)  The Government's position remains as stated in the Foreign Secretary's letter of 30 September 2012.[346]

388. The Foreign Secretary's letter of 30 September 2012, referred to in the Government's Response above, was as follows:

Where UK-based Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) are involved in the export from the UK, or the movement overseas, of military goods, they require export or trade control licences in the usual way. However, the provision of security services per se does not fall within the ambit of the UK's current strategic export controls legislation and the Government has no plans to extend that legislation to encompass them. ·

The question of how best to regulate the private security industry is one that has been considered carefully by both the previous Government and this one. Following a full public consultation, the Government decided against statutory regulation. Nevertheless were main committed to promoting high standards of conduct by PMSCs internationally, as I made clear in my Written Ministerial Statement of 16 September 2010 (copy attached for information).

Following my statement, the Security in Complex Environments Group (SCEG) was established on 21 June 2011 as the Government's Industry Partner for the regulation and accreditation of private security providers.

The SCEG is working with the Government on developing the UK's national accreditation process. This is likely to involve certification by nationally accredited independent auditors to internationally recognise professional standards derived from the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICOC). The Government will use its leverage as a key buyer of private security services to promote compliance with the ICOC and to encourage other PMSC clients to do likewise. The ICOC now has over 460 signatory companies from 60 different countries. At an international level, the UK, along with the Swiss, US and Australian governments is now working with nongovernmental and industry partners to establish a mechanism to monitor compliance with the code. We hope to be in a position to establish the governance mechanism in early 2013.[347]

389. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response

a)  how many UK-registered Private Marine Security Companies are now members of the International Code of Conduct Association and the names of those companies; and

b)  whether it remains the Government's position that it has no plans to extend legislation, other than the requirement for export or trade control licences, to UK-based Private Military and Security Companies.

Arms exports and internal repression

390. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports and internal repression can be found at paragraphs 345-351 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Conclusions at paragraph 93 of the Report. The Government's Response is in Cm8707, pages 39-40.

391. The Government's policy on arms exports and internal repression has been the subject of exhaustive exchanges between the Committees and the Government for most of the present Parliament.[348] The wording of the key statements are set out in chronological order below.

392. In a Written Answer on 26 October 2000[349], the then Minister of State in the FCO, Peter Hain, stated on behalf of the then Government the UK's Consolidated Criteria against which arms export licence applications would be approved or refused. In his Answer he made two policy statements with regard to arms exports and internal repression. The first was: "An export licence will not be issued if the arguments for doing so are outweighed by […] concern that the goods might be used for internal repression." The second was that the Government will "not grant a licence if there is a clear risk that the items might be used for internal repression." There was thus established two tests — the what might be termed the "broad test", namely "concern that the goods might be used for internal repression", and what might be termed the "narrow test" — namely "if there is a clear risk that the items might be used for internal repression."

393. The limitations of the narrow test — the clear risk test — were highlighted by the Chairman of the Committees , Sir John Stanley, in the Westminster Hall debate on 20 October 2011 when he said "We could say, "Well, there's a bit of a risk, but it's not a clear risk, so we can sell." We would probably draw the line at Chairman Kim Jong Il in North Korea, President Mugabe and the Burmese military junta, but for everyone else, we could say, "Well, the risk isn't clear. Let's get on and sell."[350]

394. The two test policy was accurately endorsed by the then Foreign office Minister, Alistair Burt in his Press Statement of 18 February 2011 in which he said: "The longstanding British position is clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression."[351]

395. It was further accurately endorsed by the Foreign Secretary, William Hague, himself on 7 February 2012 in Oral Evidence to the Committees. The key exchange was:

Chair: Secretary of State, I want to start with what is a major policy issue, if not the major policy issue for our Committees, which is whether there has been a change in Government policy on the approval of arms export licences for arms and ammunition and military equipment that could be used for internal repression. The Committees took a deliberate decision in our report of last April to publish in full, as Annex 1, the Written Answer that was given by the then Minister of State in the Foreign Office, Peter Hain, on 26 October 2000 in which he set out in full the consolidated criteria for arms exports.

As far as arms exports that involve weapons that could be used for internal repression are concerned, your junior Minister, Alistair Burt, in his press release statement on 18 February last year, entirely accurately and correctly summarised the previous Government's position carried forward by the present Government on policy in this area. He summarised that accurately in these words: "The longstanding British position is clear. We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression." Foreign Secretary, has that policy changed, or is it as correctly stated by Mr Alistair Burt?

Mr Hague: That is still the policy. The "or", as you have pointed out on other occasions, is important.

Chair: It is profoundly important, Foreign Secretary, and I am glad that you have acknowledged that.[352]

Significantly the Foreign Secretary chose to highlight the importance of the comma between the two halves of the final sentence separating the broad test from the narrow "clear risk" test.

396. Coming before the Committees again on 8 January 2014 the Foreign Secretary made an extraordinary re-interpretation of his evidence to the Committees on 7 February 2012. He said:

The "clear risk" applies to both parts of the sentence, in line with our long-established policy. […] To be absolutely clear about that, it is the long-standing policy to follow criterion two of the consolidated criteria. We will not grant a licence if there is a clear risk that the items might be used for internal repression, so "clear risk" applies to the whole of the sentence of two years ago.[353]

This was even more confusing as the Foreign Secretary had written to the Chairman of the Committees only a couple of days earlier and said, when referring to the test for suspending arms export licences to Egypt that the Government had "applied suspension to 'equipment which might be used for internal repression'."[354]

397. On 25 March 2014 the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, announced the Government's revised Consolidated Criteria in a Written Ministerial Statement.[355] The wording of the previous broad test which had been in place since 2000 namely that "concern that the goods might be used for internal repression" was omitted. The Business Secretary claimed in his Statement that: "None of these amendments should be taken to mean that there has been any substantive change in policy."[356]

398. On 7 April 2014 the Committees took Oral Evidence from the previous Foreign Office Minister Peter Hain. When asked whether the previous Government had had a two-test policy on arms exports and internal repression — a broad test and a narrow test — Peter Hain answered:

I agree with you that there was the broad test that related to concern, which is stated in the preamble to my written ministerial statement, […] and then there was a narrow test that related to clear risk.[357]

When asked if there had been a change of policy by the present Government Peter Hain answered:

In the statement issued by the Business Secretary last month, yes, it has. It has been relaxed in the sense that the broader test that I applied no longer exists. […] then there is a repeat of the second test, as it were, the narrow test, which is welcome, but the broader test has been dropped. So I do think the policy has changed. It is a more relaxed approach to arms exports.[358]

He followed that statement by saying later: "By omitting the broader test of concern, we have relaxed the policy."[359]

399. The Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Business Secretary on 28 April 2014 and included the following question:

Why has the policy statement in the previous Criteria announced on 26 October 2000 by the then Minister of State at the FCO, Peter Hain, that "An export licence will not be issued if the arguments for doing so are outweighed … by concern that the goods might be used for internal repression or international aggression" been omitted?[360]

The Business Secretary replied to the question on 14 May 2014 as follows:

The statement you refer to was a general statement that formed part of the introductory text, it did not form part of the Consolidated Criteria itself. Licence applications have always been assessed against the eight Criteria and not against general statements contained in the introductory text.[361]

400. I propose that the Committees conclude that the evidence of the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, that: "Licence applications have always been assessed against the eight Criteria and not against general statements contained in the introductory text" is in direct contradiction with the evidence of the former Foreign Office Minister, Peter Hain, who when asked if there had been a change of policy by the present Government, answered: "In the statement issued by the Business Secretary last month, yes, it has. It has been relaxed in the sense that the broader test that I applied no longer exists. […] then there is a repeat of the second test, as it were, the narrow test, which is welcome, but the broader test has been dropped. So I do think the policy has changed. It is a more relaxed approach to arms exports." He subsequently added: "By omitting the broader test of concern, we have relaxed the policy".

401. I propose that the Committees further conclude that, contrary to the Government's claim when the Business Secretary announced the revised Criteria for the Government's approval or refusal of arms exports that: "None of these amendments should be taken to mean that there has been any substantive change in policy.", the omission of the wording in the previous Consolidated Criteria that: "An export licence will not be issued if the arguments for doing so are outweighed by […] concern that the goods might be used for internal repression" does constitute a substantive change of policy.

402. I propose that the Committees further conclude that the Government's welcome decision to use the broad test of "equipment which might be used for internal repression" rather that the narrow test of a "clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression" when exercising its power to suspend arms export licences as stated in the Foreign Secretary's letter to the Chairman of the Committees on 6 January 2014 makes it even more anomalous and regrettable that the Government has omitted the broad test from its revised Criteria for arms exports.

403. As the broad test that: "An export licence will not be issued if the arguments for doing so are outweighed by […] concern that the goods might be used for internal repression" which has been Government policy since October 2000 provides an important safeguard against military and dual-use goods, components, software and technology being exported from the UK from being used for internal repression, I propose that the Committees recommend that this now omitted wording is re-introduced into the Government's arms exports controls policy.

The Government's Arab Spring arms export policy review

404. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Government's Arab Spring arms export policy review can be found at paragraphs 352-368 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 94 of the Report.

405. The Committees' Recommendation on the Government's Arab Spring arms export policy review in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

The Committees' Recommendation:

The Committees recommend that in its Response to this Report the Government states:

a)  how many arms export licence applications to date have been suspended using the Government's new suspension mechanism; and

b)  the nature of the goods and country of export destination in each case.[362]

The Government's Response:

a) and b) Use of the suspension mechanism has been considered on several occasions but pursued in only one instance, in respect of Egypt. EU Member States agreed on 21 August to suspend all export licensing for equipment which might be used for internal repression and to reassess export licences of equipment covered by Common Position 2008/944/CFSP. The Business Secretary announced on 28 August that the UK had suspended 48 extant licences as a result of this agreement. This suspension will be kept under review until such time as conditions in Egypt indicate that it is appropriate to lift these restrictions. The suspended licences cover a wide range of equipment including spares for helicopters and aircraft, specialist software and communications equipment.[363]

406. In its Written Evidence to the Committees UK Working Group (UKWG) stated that despite the UK Government's announcement of the outcome of its review of the UK arms transfer control system in the light of events in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), which claimed to have established more robust procedures, UKWG had seen "little evidence of an impact on actual decision making" and that there still appeared to be tendency for the Government to react to events after they had happened rather than to evaluate risks ahead of time.[364] UKWG highlighted that the FCO had identified eight countries from the MENA region[365] and that the Committees had identified an additional three countries from the MENA region in their 2013 Report as of concern to it.[366] UKWG did not argue that all licences issued for arms exports to these countries were problematic, however it suggested that "little has changed in terms of UK licensing practice as a consequence of the Arab Spring or subsequent transfer control reviews."[367]

407. When we questioned UKWG in more depth about this issue at the Oral Evidence session 0n 4 November 2013 Roy Isbister (Saferworld) said:

Looking at the MENA region as a whole, there is little indication that there has been a change in the pattern of exports. I have some figures showing, for example, that licences to the MENA region as a proportion of total licences issued increased from 9.5% in 2008 to 30% in 2012, and that, by value, arms licences—SIELS—to the Middle East were over 50% of total arms exports in 2012. […][368]

408. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it has any additions or amendments to make to its previous statements on the outcome of its Arab Spring arms export policy review.

Arms export licence revocations

409. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms export licence revocations can be found at paragraphs 369-378 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 95 of the Report.

410. In their 2011 Report (HC 686) the Committees recommended that: "The Government provides us with full details on arms export licences it has revoked since the beginning of January 2011 when the recent uprisings and demonstrations in the Middle East and North Africa started.[369] The information requested was provided in the Government's Response (Cm8079) to the Committees' Report and is set out in full on pages 21-45 of that Response.[370] In the case of each and every one of the 158 arms export licence revocations listed, the reason given by the Government for the revocation was that the licence now contravened both Criteria 2 (internal repression) and Criteria 3 (provoking or prolonging armed conflict). The Government cited the end user countries to be Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar and Tunisia.

411. During the period of 7 November 2012 to 7 May 2013 the Chairman of the Committees wrote a number of letters to the Foreign Secretary requesting details of any further arms export revocations since the Government's initial response in Cm 8079. In total the Government had made a total of 209 revocations of extant arms export licences to 16 countries as follows:

Table 11: Revocations of extant arms export licences from January 2011 to May 2014

Country	Number of revocations
Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar	2
Argentina	37
Bahrain	39
Bahrain/Egypt	4
Belarus	1
China	3
Egypt	43
Iraq	1
Libya	72
Mauritius	1
Oman	2
South Africa	1
Syria	1
Tunisia	1
Zambia	1
Total	209

Source: Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm8079, Annex 1; Letter from the Foreign Secretary to the CAEC Chairman dated 6 December 2012, Annex B; and letter from Foreign Secretary to CAEC Chairman dated 16 May 2013 (See HC (2013-14) 205 Ev w262)

412. The Committees' Recommendation on arms export revocations in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

The Committees' Recommendation:

The Committees recommend that the Government informs them of all strategic export licence revocations as soon as each revocation is made stating in each case as in Annex 1 of the Government's Response to the Committees' 2011 Report (Cm8079):

a)  the End-user Country;

b)  the Annual Report Summary;

c)  the rating; and

d)  the reason for revocation.[371]

The Government's Response:

Revocations brought about by a change in policy, such as with Argentina in April 2012, or by a change in the political situation such as with Egypt in July 2013, are already announced at the time of revocation. But other revocations of a routine nature will continue to be made public, with all other licensing decisions, in the Quarterly Reports.[372]

413. On 17 April 2014 the Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Business Secretary requesting details of all arms export licence revocations between 14 May 2013 and 10 April 2014. The text of the letter was as follows:

Arms export licence revocations for the period 14 May 2013 to the present

Please could you provide details of all licence revocations made in the period 14 May 2013 to the present, by country.

Please could you provide the information in the same format as in Annex 1 of Cm 8079 (SIELS/OIELS/etc., End User Country, Annual Report Summary, Rating, Reason for Revocation). Please could you also include the date of revocation in each case.

I should be grateful for this information by 8 May.[373]

The Business Secretary replied on 6 June 2014. The section of his letter relating to revocations was as follows:

Arms export licence revocations

In your letter dated 17 April 2014, you requested details of all licence revocations made in the period 14 May 2013 to the present, listed by country.

The information you requested is attached in Annex B. The data provided is split into two sections:

·  a list of 17 revoked licences - either Standard Individual Export Licences or Open Individual Export Licences (OIELs) for single destinations

·  a list of 8 licences where specific countries have been removed from extant multiple destination OIELs or Open Individual Trade Control Licences (OITCLs)

Please note that data for licences revoked or countries removed in 2014 are not currently in the public domain. This includes two licences for Venezuela revoked in the last few days because of concerns about internal repression.[374]

Annex

	LICENCES REVOKED
Licence Type	Goods Summary	Goods Rating	End User Countries	Revoke Date	Refusal Reason
SIEL	equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a	Venezuela	28/05/2014	2,7
SIEL	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5D002a	Venezuela	28/05/2014	2,7
SIEL	components for combat helicopters	ML10a	Russia	12/05/2014	4
OIEL	technology for the production of unfinished products for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	ML22a	Russia	24/03/2014	4
OIEL	technology for air-to-air missiles, technology for anti-armour missiles, technology for anti-ship missiles, technology for combat aircraft, technology for combat helicopters, technology for countermeasure equipment for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for fire control equipment, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for general military vehicle components, technology for guided missile decoying equipment, technology for laser rangefinders, technology for laser warning detectors, technology for military combat vehicles, technology for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for optical target acquisition equipment, technology for optical target surveillance equipment, technology for periscopes, technology for tanks, technology for turrets, technology for weapon night sights, technology for weapon sights	ML22a	Russia	24/03/2014	4
OIEL	technology for the production of unfinished products for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	ML22a	Russia	24/03/2014	4
SIEL	body armour, components for body armour	ML13d	Ukraine	04/02/2014	2
SIEL	software replicating controlled telecommunications equipment, radio jamming equipment	5D001c, 5A001f2	Nigeria	15/11/2013	2
SIEL	radio jamming equipment	5A001f2	Nigeria	15/11/2013	2
SIEL	components for combat helicopters	ML10a	United States	25/10/2013	2
SIEL	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5D002a	Egypt	25/10/2013	2
SIEL	equipment for the use of military helicopters, components for military helicopters	PL5017, ML10b	Russia	25/10/2013	2
SIEL	components for ground vehicle military communications equipment	ML6a	Germany	19/07/2013	2
SIEL	ground vehicle military communications equipment	ML6a	Egypt	19/07/2013	2
SIEL	ground vehicle military communications equipment	ML6a	Egypt	19/07/2013	2
SIEL	components for machine guns	ML1a	Egypt	19/07/2013	2
SIEL	components for machine guns	ML1a	Egypt	19/07/2013	2
	COUNTRIES REMOVED FROM EXTANT LICENCES
Licence Type	Goods Summary	Goods Rating	End User Countries	Revoke Date	Refusal Reason
OIEL	imaging cameras	6A003b4b	Russia	24/03/2013	4
OIEL	components for military field engineer equipment, components for military support vehicles, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, military electronic equipment, military field engineer equipment, military support vehicles, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military support vehicles, technology for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for the use of military field engineer equipment	ML11a, ML17d, ML22a, ML4b1, ML6a	Russia	24/03/2014	4
OIEL	components for submersible equipment, components for submersible vehicles, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, high energy capacitors, metal alloy cylindrical forms, metal alloy tubes, submersible equipment	1C202a, 3A201a1, 6A001a2d, 8A002a2, 8A002a3, 8A002a4, 8A002c, 8A002i2	Russia	19/03/2014	4
OIEL	software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, technology for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment	ML21c, ML22a	Ukraine	26/02/2014	2
OIEL	software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, technology for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment	ML21c, ML22a	Ukraine	26/02/2014	2
OIEL	sporting guns	ML1a	Ukraine	26/02/2014	2
OIEL	components for military communications equipment, equipment for the production of military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, military communications equipment, software for military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment	ML11a, ML18a, ML21a, ML22a	Ukraine	26/02/2014	2
OITCL	gun mountings, gun silencers, small arms ammunition, sporting guns, weapon sights	ML1a, ML1d, ML3a	Ukraine	25/02/2014	2

414. Recent revocations to Egypt, Russia and the Ukraine can be found at paragraphs 550, 473 and 568 respectively.

415. Following analysis of the list of revocations provided by the Business Secretary's on 6 June 2014 against the quarterly pivot reports the Chairman of the Committees wrote the following letter to the Business Secretary:

On 17 April 2014 I wrote to you requesting a list of all export licence revocations for the period 14 May 2013 to the present. You replied to that request on 6 June, providing in an annex to your letter providing a total of 14 SIEL revocations and 3 OIEL revocations for single destinations and 7 OIEL and 1 OITCL revocations where specific countries have been removed from extant multiple destination OIELs or OITCLs.

However, on examining the ECO Pivot reports for Quarter 3 (July-September) and Quarter 4 (October-December) 2013 there appear to be some discrepancies between the data supplied in your letter of 6 June and the information contained in the Pivot Report. For example:

The Pivot report for Q3 2013 lists the following revocations not included in the list provided as an annex to your letter of 6 June:

Continental Shelf: SIEL for towed hydrophone arrays;

Pivot Report for Q4 2013 lists the following revocations not included in the list provided as an annex to your letter of 6 June:

Belgium: OIEL for components for military aero-engines and military aero-engines;

Latvia: OIEL for software for military communications equipment and technology for the use of software for military communications equipment;

Malaysia: OIEL for components for equipment for the use of military aero-engines, components for military aero-engines, components for test equipment for military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment and test equipment for military aero-engines;

Morocco: OIEL for software for military communications equipment and technology for the use of software for military communications equipment;

Nigeria: 2 SIELs for radio jamming equipment refused and a SIEL for radio jamming equipment and software replicating controlled telecommunications equipment;

Russia: SIELs for components for military helicopters and equipment for the use of military helicopters and an OIEL for software for military communications equipment and technology for the use of software for military communications equipment;

Tunisia: OIEL for software for military communications equipment and technology for the use of software for military communications equipment;

Turkey: OIEL for components for equipment for the use of military aero-engines, components for military aero-engines, components for test equipment for military aero-engines, environmental test facilities for military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment and test equipment for military aero-engines;

United Arab Emirates: OIELs for: military engineer vehicles; software for military communications equipment and technology for the use of military communications equipment; and components for equipment for the use of military aero-engines, components for military aero-engines, components for test equipment for military aero-engines, environmental test facilities for military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment and test equipment for military aero-engines;

Please could you explain why the above, and any other missing revocations, for arms export licences were not included in the annex to your letter of 6 June and please provide a full and comprehensive list of revocations for the period 13 May 2013 to the present.[375]

The Business Secretary replied on 30 June 2014 as follows:

Thank you for your letter of 12 June 2014 regarding discrepancies between the list of revoked licences I supplied to you in my letter of 6 June and the data published in the ECO's Pivot Reports for Q3 and Q4 2013.

First of all I should note that the following SIELs were included in my letter of 6 June and that there is no discrepancy with respect to these revocations:

2 SIELs for Nigeria - one for "software replicating controlled telecommunications equipment, radio jamming equipment" and one for "radio jamming equipment;" and

1 SIEL for Russia for "components for military helicopters and equipment for the use of military helicopters".

Turning now to the other licences you have identified it appears that in each case an error in the way that certain cases are processed within the SPIRE licensing system, or an error in the automated process by which the Pivot report is generated from the SPIRE data, has led to these licences being incorrectly reported in the Pivot Report as revoked. In fact no revocations took place in these cases. Clearly these errors are unacceptable. For some of the cases we need to do further work to identify the exact causes of the error and we may need to make changes to the SPIRE system or to the process for generating the Pivot Reports in order to prevent similar errors in future.

These errors affect 4 licences as follows:

1) Continental Shelf: SIEL for towed hydrophone arrays - this was one of 4 SIEL licences for towed hydrophone arrays converted from a Temporary Export to a Permanent Export licence during the period in question. It is not clear why one of the 4 licences is showing as revoked, as no revocation took place. Further investigation is required;

2) Open Individual Export Licence (OIEL) for the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for military engineer vehicles. When an OIEL nears its expiry date an exporter may request a short extension to the licence to allow exports to continue while a new (replacement) application is processed. In a few such cases the exporter will ask us to remove some of the goods lines from the extended licence. The way this request is processed within SPIRE causes the whole licence to appear in the Pivot Report as revoked, when in fact only specific goods lines have been removed;

3) A single OIEL for Latvia, Morocco, Russia, Tunisia and UAE for software for military communications equipment, technology for the use of software for military communications equipment. As above, these lines were removed from an extended licence;

4) A single OIEL for Belgium, Malaysia, Turkey and UAE for military aero-engines, components for military aero-engines, unfinished products for military aero-engines, military containers, equipment for the production of military aero-engines, components for equipment for the production of military aero-engines, test equipment for military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, components for test equipment for military aero-engines, components for equipment for the use of military aero-engines, environmental test facilities for military aero-engines, test equipment for military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, software for military aero-engines, technology for software for military aero-engines, technology for military aero-engines. In this case the exporter had asked for the coverage of the licence to be amended shortly after it was issued. The amendment has caused the licence to be reported as revoked, but no actual revocation took place.

Since my previous response to you there have been 7 revocations for Thailand. Annex A provides further detail. These will be published in the April - June 2014 pivot report in October 2014.

In light of the discrepancies described above I have included one further "revocation" in Annex A. This is not an actual revocation based on any change in circumstances in the destination country or any change in policy, but will nevertheless appear as a revocation in the Q2 (April - June) 2014 pivot report.

This particular licence was originally issued with Latvia as the end-user destination but subsequently reissued for the Central African Republic after it became apparent that an error was made by the exporter when submitting the original application. As the goods were being detained at the port by HM Revenue & Customs the most expedient way of amending the licence was to revoke and reissue the licence under the same SPIRE reference. The April - July 2014 pivot report is likely to show a licence for the Central African Republic as revoked, as this is the destination now showing under the live SPIRE reference. Annex A provides further detail.

While there is a statement on the Strategic Export Controls: Reports and Statistics website explaining why data found in these reports may differ from data published elsewhere it is of course of the utmost importance that our published reports are as accurate as possible. I am therefore grateful to you for bringing these errors to my attention. Please be assured that we will take the steps necessary to prevent these errors happening in the future.

I hope you find this information helpful.[376]

Annex.

Licence Type	Goods Summary	Goods Rating	End User Countries	Revoke Date	Revoke Reason
SIEL	small arms ammunition	ML3a	Thailand	13/06/2014	2
SIEL	civil body armour, body armour, components for body armour	1A005, ML13d	Thailand	13/06/2014	2
SIEL	civil body armour	1A005	Thailand	13/06/2014	2
SIEL	components for body armour	ML13d2	Thailand	13/06/2014	2
SIEL	anti-riot/ballistic shields	PL5001b	Thailand	13/06/2014	2
SIEL	body armour	ML13d1	Thailand	13/06/2014	2
SIEL	tear gas/irritant ammunition	ML3a	Thailand	13/06/2014	2
SIEL	military support vehicles, components for military support vehicles	ML6a	Central African Republic	11/06/2014	Licence was converted from a licence to export to Latvia to a licence to export to CAR

416. A full list of revocations from 2011 to present can be found at Annex 11.

417. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:

a)  the standard wording it uses to the exporters of controlled goods regarding its right to revoke export licences for controlled goods that it has approved;

b)  the grounds on which the Government has the right to revoke export licences for controlled goods that it has approved;

c)  the means by which the Government protects itself from financial liabilities if it exercises its right to revoke export licences for controlled goods that it has approved; and

d)  what specific steps have been taken to deal with the errors, rightly described as "unacceptable" by the Business Secretary in his letter to the Committees' Chairman of 30 June 2014, whereby extant licences are being described in the Government's Quarterly arms export Report as having been revoked when they have not been, and by what date these errors will have been eliminated for the future".

Arms export licence suspensions

418. Included in the package of changes proposed in the framework of the post-Arab Spring review of the UK defence and security export policy, the Foreign Secretary announced on 13 October 2011 a new procedure to:

Allow immediate licensing suspension to countries experiencing a sharp deterioration in security or stability. Applications in the pipeline would be stopped and no further licenses issued, pending Ministerial or departmental review.[377]

419. The UKWG informed the Committees in its Written Evidence that it welcomed this initiative initially, as it "could enhance the UK's export control system's capacity to respond more quickly to quickly changing circumstances by placing an immediate freeze on arms transfers that risk exacerbating instability; this would be especially useful in situations where the rapidly changing circumstances in the recipient country prevented adequate risk assessments from taking place." UKWG stated that in follow-up discussions with officials it was now clear that in its current form the suspension mechanism was not fit for purpose and required radical overhaul. The fundamental flaw in the system was that it appeared only to apply to new and pending license applications and not to extant export licences. This meant that in situations where the Government had decided that an unfolding crisis made it impossible to make a meaningful assessment of new licence applications, existing licences could nevertheless continue to be honoured. For example, in a situation where the Government had decided to suspend licence applications to a country's internal security units due to immediate concerns about the use of equipment in internal repression in a rapidly unfolding crisis, licences already granted to those same units would still be valid and transfers could continue. UKWG said that for the suspension mechanism to be meaningful, it must clearly apply to the whole arms transfer process and so must place an immediate freeze on all arms transfers, including all extant licences and any pending shipments due to take place.[378]

420. The UKWG also stated that it was unclear about how the suspension mechanism was triggered and the thresholds that were used when deciding to apply it. For example, despite the rapidly unfolding conflict and deteriorating security situation that took place in Mali in March 2012, the suspension mechanism appeared to have not been used. In fact, to date, as far as the UKWG understands, it has only been used in response to the very serious situation in Egypt in August 2013.[379] It believed that this suggested that the threshold that triggered the suspension mechanism had been set at a very high level, once armed conflict and instability had already reached crisis point; it therefore did not serve as the flexible response to rapidly developing and unfolding situations that UKWG had expected. UKWG recommended that for the process to be effective the Government must significantly enhance and expand its license suspension process to capture all stages of the arms transfer process. As well as current licence applications, the suspension must also apply to all extant licences and deliveries pending. It also recommended that the Government should outline its criteria and the threshold for invoking the suspension process.[380]

421. When the NGOs were questioned about the export licence suspension mechanism on 4 November 2013 Oliver Sprague (Amnesty UK) said:

As the UK Working Group, we have serious concerns about how the licence suspension mechanism is going to work. When we had initial discussions about it, it was meant to be an early warning system. It was meant to put an immediate freeze on deteriorating situations where it was impossible to ascertain proper risk assessment in licensing. It was supposed to be very much an early warning mechanism. It was not used in Mali, and it was used in Egypt only when, as far as we were concerned, it had already reached crisis point. It was not an early warning mechanism at all. It was imposed after the situation had already deteriorated to a pretty serious extent.
  I guess that that is not the only concern that we have with it. We question the logic of applying suspension only to pending licence applications. We think that that is a fundamental flaw. If you are going to suspend licensing, you should be suspending arms transfers, not just licensing. If there are pending shipments or extant licences, then you must have the ability to suspend those as well. To focus only on licence applications makes it entirely possible that a shipment to an end user who is already licensed will go ahead, even though a pending licence application to the same end user is subject to suspension.[381]

422. When asked how the current suspension system could be improved Oliver Sprague said:

Use it as it was intended, which is as an early warning mechanism. It was needed because it was argued that to revoke licences was quite a problematic process—that you had to cancel a licence and then go through the entire process of reapplying for the licence even if the decision to cancel it was, in hindsight, slightly ill-judged.
  The idea of a suspension mechanism, where you would put a temporary freeze on something while a situation was developing and unfolding, and answers were being sought, seems to be inherently sensible, so our advice would be to use it as it was originally intended: to lower the threshold for it being used; to use it when situations are deteriorating, and information about the conduct of the security forces is questionable or unknown; and to apply it to all of the transfer process. Apply it not only to pending licence applications but to extant licences and pending deliveries.[382]

423. Roy Isbister (Saferworld) added:

The only case that we are aware of where the suspension mechanism has been applied is Egypt. In that case, it seems that it has been applied to extant licences, which is not how it was explained to us; it also took a long time. As I said, five licences were revoked on 19 July, but the actual suspensions did not take place until 28 August. That is a pretty slow early warning mechanism.
  It has been quite confused since then. It was applied in a way that seems different from the message that we were given. There is also the change that Olly mentioned, with approximately 24 licences being unsuspended in the last couple of days. If you look at the notice to exporters, it says that the suspension mechanism has been modified. I shall quote from it, if I may. It states that we have "agreed to modify the way the suspension is applied. In future we will not adopt a blanket approach to the Egyptian organisations listed in paragraph (1) but consider each extant licence and new licence application on its merits." As far as I can see, that is a standard licensing policy. I do not understand how it is a suspension mechanism, but apparently the mechanism has been modified, not stopped. I do not understand how the Government are operating. [383]

424. Prior to the evidence session with the Foreign Secretary on 8 January 2014 the Foreign Secretary wrote to the Chairman of the Committees. The relevant text relating to the suspension of licences was as follows:

Recent events in Egypt highlighted the importance of responding quickly to a deteriorating security situation in a country. This was the first time we have deployed the Suspension Mechanism. In two important respects Egypt was a special case. First, we suspended extant licences as well as pending licence applications; this was an addition to the policy announced to Parliament by the Business Secretary on 7 February 2012, which referred only to suspension of pending licence applications. Secondly, we applied suspension to "equipment which might be used for internal repression". This is of course a lower threshold than Criterion 2 of the Consolidated Criteria, where the test is a "clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression". [384]

425. The Business Secretary wrote to the Chairman of the Committees on 3 February. The section of his letter referring to the licence suspension mechanism was as follows:

I have asked my officials to work with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence to review the Government's licensing suspension mechanism. Following the recent Egypt suspension it is my intention to widen the scope to include extant as well as new licences. To paraphrase the Foreign Secretary, when he appeared before the CAEC on the 8 January, there is now a greater willingness on the part of the Government to suspend licensing and we will not hesitate to do so if it proves impossible or extremely difficult to apply the Consolidated Criteria.[385]

426. The Government, following its decision to extend its suspension mechanism to extant arms export licence for Egypt, also decided to extend its suspension mechanism to extant arms export licences for Russia and Ukraine. This is dealt with in more detail in the section on Russia at paragraph 472 and the section on Ukraine at paragraph 567.

427. I propose that the Committees conclude that the Government's decision to apply the broad test of "equipment which might be used for internal repression" rather than the narrow test of "clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression" for deciding whether arms export licences should be suspended is welcome. The Committees further conclude that the Government's decision to apply its suspension mechanism not just to arms export licences applications that are under consideration but also to those that have been approved and are extant is also welcome.

428. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:

a)  the standard wording it uses to the exporters of controlled goods regarding its right to suspend export licences for controlled goods that it has approved;

b)  the grounds on which the Government has the right to suspend export licences for controlled goods that it has approved; and

c)  the means by which the Government protects itself from financial liabilities if it exercises its right to suspend export licences for controlled goods that it has approved.

Exports of gifted equipment

429. The Committees' previous scrutiny of exports of gifted equipment can be found at paragraphs 379-383 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendations at paragraph 96 of the Report.

430. The Committees' Recommendations on exports of gifted equipment in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

The Committees' Recommendation:
The Committees recommend that they are informed of all gifts of military goods requiring Parliamentary approval at the same time as the relevant Main or Supplementary estimate, or departmental Minute is laid. The Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response to this Report whether all gifted military goods are subject to the same arms export policy as commercial military goods, namely compliance with:
a)  the Government's stated policy that "We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression."; and
b)  the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position
and whether it is satisfied that this is still the case with all approved gifts of military goods that have not yet left the UK Government's control.[386]
The Government's Response:
In response to the Committees' recommendation, copies of Departmental Minutes relating to gifts that require Parliamentary approval will be sent to the Committees as they are laid in Parliament.
All proposals to gift controlled goods are assessed against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria in the same way as commercial applications and to the same degree of rigour. We are satisfied that this is the case with gifts that have not yet left the Government's control.
On one occasion such an assessment was not possible: this was in 2011 and related to the gifting of body armour to the Libyan Interim National Council. On this occasion a statement was made to the House setting out the reasons for not carrying out the assessment. The details were footnoted in Table 2.4 of the Annual Report on Strategic Export Controls 2011.[387]

431. Following publication of the Government's United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012 the Committees wrote to the Government asking two questions about exports of gifted equipment. The questions and answers were as follows:

The Committees' question:
The Government's Report states that all proposals from Government sponsors to gift controlled goods are assessed against the Consolidated Criteria in the same way as commercial applications and to the same degree of rigour. Please confirm therefore that all proposals to gift controlled goods are assessed not only against the UK's Consolidated Criteria but also against the Foreign Secretary's policy statement to the Committees on 7 February 2012 that the export would not be permitted of controlled goods "which might be used to facilitate internal repression".
The Government's answer:
Please refer to the Foreign Secretary's letter of 6 October. The statement in the Annual Report is correct.
The Committees' question:
The Government's Report states: "As a matter of policy, all proposals to gift controlled military equipment are assessed against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria by relevant Government departments in the same way as commercial applications and to the same degree of rigour." Why are Government gifts of military equipment not also being assessed against the Foreign Secretary's policy statement to the Committees on Arms Export Controls on 7 February 2012 that exports would not be permitted of goods "which might be used to facilitate internal repression"?
The Government's answer:
Please refer to the Foreign Secretary's letter of 6 October which clarifies this point.[388]

432. Since May 2013 the Government has laid Department Minutes for the gifting of equipment to other Governments as follows:

·  16 May 2013 - Jordan

·  27 June 2013 - Lebanon

·  15 July 2013 - Syria

·  18 November 2013 - Syria

·  18 November 2013 - Pakistan

·  18 November 2013 - Somaliland

·  18 November 2013 - Somaliland Police

·  23 January 2014 - Syria

·  6 February 2014 - Syria

·  12 February 2014 - Lebanese Armed Forces

·  20 March 2014 - Afghanistan

·  9 June 2014 - Syria

433. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it will assess all proposals to gift controlled goods not only against its Criteria for Arms Exports announced on 25 March 2014, but also against the "lower threshold" Criterion which the Government is using to suspend licences for arms exports, namely "equipment which might be used for internal repression" as stated in the Foreign Secretary's letter to the Chairman of the Committees of 6 January 2014.

434. I propose that the Committees further recommend that the Departmental Minutes relating to gifts that require Parliamentary approval state in respect of each item to be gifted which are on the Government's export controls Military List or Dual-Use List and which are not.


---

289   HC (2013-14) 205, para 86 Back



290   Cm8707, p 37 Back



291   Government Response to the Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of the Business, Innovation and Skills, Defence, Foreign Affairs and International Development Committees of Session 2010-11, Scrutiny of Arms Exports and Arms Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly Reports for 2010. Licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 8079, pages 4-5 Back



292   Committees on Arms Export Controls, Session 2012-13, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middles East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues, HC 419, Annex 11, page 267 Back



293   HC (2013-14) 205, para 87 Back



294   Cm8707, p 37 Back



295   The updated OSJA can be found at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/overseas-security-and-justice-assistance-osja-guidance  Back



296   Ev w201 - Letter from William Hague to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 26 February 2014 Back



297   HC Deb, 28 February 2014, col 38WS Back



298   HC (2013-14) 205, para 88 Back



299   Cm8707, p 37 Back



300   Ev w88 Back



301   HC (2013-14) 205, para 88, Ev w357 Back



302   "Private firms selling mass surveillance systems around the world, documents show", The Guardian, 19 November 2013 Back



303   HC Deb, 21 November 2013, col 412WH Back



304   Q 119 [Vince Cable] Back



305   Q 119 [Chris Chew] Back



306   Q 120 Back



307   Q 163 Back



308   Q 164 Back



309   Ev w215 - Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to William Hague dated 24 April 2014 Back



310   Ev w474 - letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 14 May 2014 Back



311   HC Deb, 21 November 2013, cols 407-408WH Back



312   The value of OIELs is not provided as they are open licences of unlimited quantity and value fof the goods exported under these licences.  Back



313   The value of OIELs is not provided as they are open licences of unlimited quantity and value fof the goods exported under these licences. Back



314   HC Deb, 21 November 2013, col 408WH Back



315   Q 180 Back



316   Q 181 Back



317   Q 182 Back



318   Ev w239 - Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 12 May 2014 Back



319   Ev w220 - Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to William Hague dated 24 April 2014 Back



320   Ev w474 - Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 14 May 2014 Back



321   HC (2013-14) 205, para 89 Back



322   Cm8707, p 38 Back



323   HC (2013-14) 205, para 90 Back



324   Cm8707, pp 38-39 Back



325   Ev w75 Back



326   Ev w474 - Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to Vince Cable dated 12 May 2014 Back



327   Ev w499 - Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 6 June 2014 Back



328   HC (2013-14) 205, para 91 Back



329   Cm8707, p 39 Back



330   Ev w140 - Letter from Michael Fallon to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 7 July 2013  Back



331   Annex 2 - The Committees' questions on the Government's United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012 (HC 561) and the Government's answers  Back



332   Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Open general trade control licence (maritime anti-piracy): list of registered companies, http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/eco/docs/eco-ogtcl-maritime-anti-piracy-registrations-list.pdf Back



333   ML1 goods are smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of less than 20mm, other firearms and automatic weapons with a calibre of 12.7mm or less and accessories; ML2 goods are smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of less than 20mm, other armament or weapons with a calibre greater than12.7mm, projectors and accessories. Back



334   Q 19 Back



335   Q 21 [Oliver Sprague] Back



336   Q 62 Back



337   Q 64 Back



338   Q 65 Back



339   Q 63 [Edward Bell] Back



340   Q 158 Back



341   Q 159 Back



342   Ev w199 - Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 3 February 2014 Back



343   Ev w474 - Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to Vince Cable dated 12 May 2014 Back



344   Ev w499 - Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 6 June 2014 Back



345   HC (2013-14) 205, para 92 Back



346   Cm8707, pp 39-40 Back



347   HC (2013-14) 205, Ev w97 Back



348   See: Committees on Arms Export Controls, Session 2012-13, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): Uk Strategic Export Controls Annual report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middles East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues, HC 419, paras 186-191; and HC (2013-14) 205, Ev 345-368  Back



349   The Written Answer can be found in full at Annex 5  Back



350   HC Deb, 20 October 2011, col 344WH Back



351   Foreign and Commonwealth Office Press Notice, "Foreign Office Minister comments on review of arms exports", http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?view=News&id=553955182#  Back



352   See: Committees on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues, HC 419, Q 109  Back



353   Q 130 Back



354   Ev w194 - Letter from William Hague to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 6 January 2014 Back



355   HC Deb, 25 March 2014, 9-14WS  Back



356   HC Deb, 25 March 2014, 10WS Back



357   Q 191 Back



358   Q 196 Back



359   Q 197 Back



360   Ev w222 - Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to Vince Cable dated 28 April 2014 Back



361   Ev w474 - Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls 14 May 2014 Back



362   HC (2013-14) 205, para 94 Back



363   Cm8707, p 40 Back



364   Ev w111 Back



365   The eight countries of human rights concern in the MENA region identified by the FCO were: Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, The Palestinian Occupied Territories, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen. Back



366   The three countries of concern for the CAEC within the MENA region were: Bahrain, Egypt and Tunisia) Back



367   Ev w112 Back



368   Q 8  Back



369   Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC 686, para 135 Back



370   Government Response to Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 8079, pp21-45  Back



371   HC (2013-14) 205, para 95 Back



372   Cm8707, p 41 Back



373   Ev w211- Letter from the Committees on Arms Export Controls to Vince Cable dated 17 April 2014 Back



374   Ev w499 - Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 6 June 2014 Back



375   Ev w505 - Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to Vince Cable dated 12 June 2014 Back



376   Ev w508 - Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 30 June 2014 Back



377  FCO Announcement, Foreign Office review of export policy, 13 October 2011, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-office-review-of-export-policy  Back



378   Ev w117 - AEC007 -UKWG, paras 80-81 Back



379   "UK suspends Egypt military export licences", The Guardian, 28 August 2013  Back



380   Ev w117 Back



381   Q 12 [Oliver Sprague] Back



382   Q 14 Back



383   Q 12 [Roy Isbister] Back



384   Ev w194 - Letter from William Hague to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 6 January 2014 Back



385   Ev w199 - Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 3 February 2014 Back



386   HC (2013-14) 205, para 96 Back



387   Cm8707, p 41 Back



388   Annex 2 - The Committees' questions on the Government's United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012 (HC 561) and the Government's answers  Back

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Prepared 23 July 2014