House of Commons - Scrutiny of arms Exports and Arms Control

Scrutiny of arms Exports and Arms Control - Committees on Arms Export Controls Contents

10 Arms exports to Countries of concern

Extant arms export licences to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's (FCO) Countries of Human Rights concern worldwide, and to the Additional Countries of concern to the Committees

435. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to Countries of concern can be found at paragraphs 384-386 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Conclusions at paragraphs 97-100 of the Report.

436. In their 2012-13 inquiry the Committees on Arms Export Controls took a new initiative and asked the Government for the first time for details of the Government's approved extant arms export licences for each of the 27 countries listed by the FCO in its Human Rights Annual Report as being it countries of top human rights concern. These were: Afghanistan, Belarus, Burma, China, Colombia, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Fiji, Iran, Iraq, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Libya, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. The Committees also asked the Government for details of the Government approved extant arms export licences for an addition 5 Countries of concern to the Committees. These were: Argentina, Bahrain, Egypt, Madagascar and Tunisia.

437. The Committees' Conclusions and Recommendation on arms exports to Countries of concern in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

The Committees Conclusion:

The Committees conclude that in his letter of 10 May 2013, the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, states that there are over 3,000 Standard Individual and Open Individual Export Licences (SIELs and OIELs) that remain extant to the FCO's 27 Countries of human rights concern. According to the Business Secretary's letter the total value of the UK's SIELs to these 28 Countries is some £12,331,621,526 as set out below. The Government does not provide values for OIELs because of their open nature.

Country	Value of SIELs (£)	Number of extant licences (SIELs and OIELs)	Country	Value of SIELs (£)	Number of extant licences (SIELs and OIELs)
Afghanistan	23,847,337	80	Pakistan	49,802,833	219
Belarus	128,042	11	Russia	86,329,387	271
Burma	3,332,192	8	Saudi Arabia	1,863,182,251	417
China	1,486,415,462	1163	Somalia	1,914,694	26
Colombia	20,089,524	53	South Sudan	0	0
Cuba	0	3	Sri Lanka	8,084,759	49
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	0	0	Sudan	7,642,480	14
Democratic Republic of Congo	2,127,980	20	Syria	143,867	3
Eritrea	960,031	6	Turkmenistan	1,022,016	17
Fiji	35,555	4	Uzbekistan	7,405,718	19
Iran	803,440,351	62	Vietnam	13,371,242	74
Iraq	15,915,430	69	Yemen	64,784	10
Israel and Occupied Palestinian Territories	7,878,776,714	381	Zimbabwe	2,992,390	46
Libya	54,583,388	49	Total	12,331,621,526	3,074

389

The Government's Response:

390

The Committees' Conclusion:

Country	Value of SIELs (£)	Number of extant licences	Country	Value of SIELs (£)	Number of extant licences (SIELS and OIELs)
Argentina	7,543,100	57	Madagascar	24,348,066	40
Bahrain	13,630,375	105	Tunisia	7,062,299	51
Egypt	59,073,314	134	Total	111,657,154	387

391

The Government's Response:

392

The Committees' Recommendation:

393

a) contravenes the Government's stated policy that: "We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression"; or

394

The Government's Response:

The Government is satisfied that none of the currently extant licences for these countries contravenes its policy as outlined in paragraph 46 above [see the Government's Response to the Consolidated Criteria and EU Common Position above]. However, as was shown during the Arab Spring, circumstances can and do rapidly change, leading to a reassessment of risk and, in some cases, a different decision using the same criteria. In such cases the Government would revoke the licence.

The Government has access to a wide range of daily reporting including from its global network of Missions overseas. This enables the Government to respond swiftly to changes in risk.

395

438. In the Westminster Hall debate on the Committees' last Report (HC 205) held on 21 November 2013, the Chairman stated that: "the Committees' scrutiny of the Government's extant licences, particularly in countries where there is significant internal repression, will continue intensively."[396]

439. When the Committees questioned the Foreign Secretary, in the Oral Evidence session on 8 January 2014, about the 3,074 extant licences, to the values of over £12bn (as of May 2013[397]) to the FCO's Counties of concern he said that the items were not covered by sanctions and that they met the Consolidated Criteria. He continued by stating that "a huge amount of work goes into testing licences against the Consolidated Criteria". The Foreign Secretary stated that there had been a ten-fold increase in the number of licence applications referred to Ministers for decision in the last three years. He said:

398

Richard Tauwhere, Head of Arms Policy Unit, FCO, continued:

399

440. When the Foreign Secretary was asked if he had been surprised that the Committees had discovered that there had been over 3,000 extant licences with a total value of over £12billion for arms export licences to Countries of concern the Foreign Secretary replied: "Not really [...]. This is a large industry for this country and it is a legitimate trade. We do not have a trade ban with those countries of concern, so trade takes place between the UK and those countries. They involve some of the biggest economies in the world."[400] He continued:

401

441. On 10 April 2014 the Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Business Secretary requesting details of all extant licences to the FCO's Countries of Human Rights concern and, in addition, to Argentina, Bahrain, Egypt, Tunisia and Ukraine. The text of the letter was as follows:

1) Extant licences for the FCO Countries of Human Rights concern

402

Afghanistan

Belarus

Burma

Central African Republic (CAR)

China

Colombia

Cuba

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

Eritrea

Fiji

Iran

Iraq

Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories

Libya

Pakistan

Russia

Saudi Arabia

Somalia

South Sudan

Sri Lanka

Sudan

Syria

Turkmenistan

Uzbekistan

Vietnam

Yemen

Zimbabwe

2) Extant licences for other countries

Please could you state which UK strategic export control licences are currently extant, stating the application type, annual report summary and goods value in the case of each licence, to each of the five following countries:

Argentina

Bahrain

Egypt

Tunisia

403

The Business Secretary replied on 12 May 2014.[404] Details of the extant licences can be found at Annex 9. A summary of the extant licences is included in the Table 12 below.

Table 12 - Extant arms export licences to FCO Countries of Human Rights concern May 2014

Country Value of SIELs (£) Number of extant licences (SIELs and OIELs) Country Value of SIELs (£) Number of extant licences (SIELs and OIELs)

Afghanistan 19,222,964 72 Pakistan 49,745,940 255

Belarus 5,458,753 13 Libya 44,308,072 71

Burma 3,273,826 10 Russia 131,542,677 285

Central African Republic (CAR) 197,000 4 Saudi Arabia 1,677,486,389 486

China 1,688,716,748 1146 Somalia 4,261,022 33

Colombia 32,494,783 65 South Sudan 1,795,580 13

Cuba 0 4 Sri Lanka 49,645,755 79

Democratic People's Republic of Korea 8,340 1 Sudan 10,225,162 7

Democratic Republic of Congo 2,173,287 27 Syria 217,792 5

Eritrea 968,640 7 Turkmenistan 5,154,652 28

Fiji 37,720 5 Uzbekistan 3,171,133 14

Iran 41,826,894 53 Vietnam 28,447,422 74

Iraq 32,458,255 80 Yemen 1,596,408 12

Israel and Occupied Palestinian Territories 7,912,249,591 470 Zimbabwe 2,636,291 60

Total 11,915,310,330 3,379

Source: Ev w239 - Annex to letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 12 May 2014

It should be stressed that a number of the above extant licences will be for dual-use goods or military goods not readily usable for internal repression.

Table 13 - Extant arms export licences to Additional Countries of concern to the Committees—May 2014

Country Value of SIELs (£) Number of extant licences Country Value of SIELs (£) Number of extant licences (SIELS and OIELs)

Argentina 26,586,517 64 Tunisia 2,005,887 43

Bahrain 49,663,146 115 Ukraine 21,902,281 70

Egypt 65,825,601 129 Total 165,989,231 421

Source: Ev w239 - Annex to letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 12 May 2014

It should be stressed that a number of the above extant licences will be for dual-use goods or military goods not readily usable for internal repression.

442. The changes of note in the number and value of extant arms export licences to the FCO's countries of human rights concern were as follow:

i. Whilst the number of extant licence to China has fallen slightly the value of current extant licences by £200m in the last year;

ii. The value of extant licences to Colombia has risen 62% (from £20.1m to £32.4m);

iii. The value of extant licences to Iran has dropped from £803m to £41m;

iv. The value of extant licences has risen from £15.9m (69 licences) to £32m (80 licences);

v. The number of extant licences to Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories has risen from 381 (value £7.878billion) to 470 (value (£7.912billion) - 23%;

vi. The value of extant licences to Russia has increased from £86m (271 licences) to £131m (285 licences) - arise of 52.3%;

vii. The value of extant licences to Somalia has risen from £1.9m to £4.26m (22.5%);

viii. The value of extant licences to Sri Lanka has risen from £8.1m (49 licences) to £49.6m (79 licences) - a rise of 614%;

ix. The value of extant licences to Turkmenistan has risen from £1m (17 licences) to ££5.1m (28 licences) - a rise of 504%; and

x. The value of licences to Vietnam has risen from £13.4m to £28.4m (213%).

Whilst the number of extant licences has risen slightly by 305 (9.9%) the value of the extant licences has fallen by £41,631,119 (3.3%).

443. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it is satisfied that each of the 3,375 extant arms export licences to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's 28 Countries of Human Rights concern, valued at £11.9 billion, and each of the 421 extant arms export licences to the Committees' Additional 5 Countries of concern, valued at £166 million, are currently compliant with all of the Government's Arms Export Licensing Criteria with particular reference to:

a) Criterion One (Respect for the UK's international obligations and commitments, in particular sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council or the European Union, agreements on non-proliferation and other subjects, as well as other international obligations);

b) Criterion Two (The respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the country of final destination as well as respect by that country for international humanitarian law);

c) Criterion Three (The internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function of the existence of tensions or armed conflicts);

d) Criterion Four (Preservation of regional peace, security and stability); and

e) Criterion Six (The behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, as regards in particular to its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and respect for international law).

Extant arms export licences to certain individual countries within the FCO's list of 28 Countries of Human Rights concern

444. Specific evidence given to the Committees in relation to 12 of these 28 countries and the Committees' Conclusions and Recommendations in relation to those countries follows immediately below.

AFGHANISTAN

445. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to Afghanistan can be found at paragraphs 461-468 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendations at paragraphs 113 and 114 of the Report.

446. The Committees' Recommendations on Afghanistan in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

The Committees' Recommendation:

405

The Government's Response:

We publish details in the Annual Report on Strategic Export Controls of controlled military equipment gifted by the Government. There were no gifts of controlled military equipment to Afghanistan in 2012 and to date in 2013 that remains case.

If gifting equipment is an option, the Government only agrees to requests from foreign governments to gift them military equipment where to do so would assist our foreign and security policy aims. Gifting is not a frequent occurrence.

All proposals to gift controlled goods are assessed against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria in the same way as commercial applications.

406

The Committees' Recommendation:

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that none of its items of gifted military equipment and none of the 80 extant UK export licences to Afghanistan or any goods on the Strategic Exports Control lists gifted, or planned to be gifted, to Afghanistan:

b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position

407

The Government's Response:

The Government is satisfied that none of the currently extant licences for Afghanistan contravenes its policy as outlined in paragraph 46 above [see the Government's Response to the Consolidated Criteria and EU Common Position above]. However, as was shown during the Arab Spring, circumstances can and do rapidly change, leading to a reassessment of risk and, in some cases, a different decision using the same criteria. In such cases the Government would revoke the licence. The Government's answers to the Committees' Quarterly Questions, which can be found at Volume 2, Annex 1 of the Committees' Annual Report, provide more detail about individual licences.

There is an arms embargo in place for Afghanistan with sanctions applying to those individuals designated under the UN's 'Consolidated List'. All extant licences for Afghanistan were approved in accordance with the sanctions in place or for use by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)/Diplomatic Missions/United Nations/Recognised NGO.

408

447. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Afghanistan for assault rifles, body armour, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for machine guns, components for military combat vehicles, components for pistols, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, general military vehicle components, gun silencers, machine guns, military support vehicles, pistols, small arms ammunition and technology for military support vehicles are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licencing Criteria: One, Two, Three, Four and Six.

CHINA

448. A declaration by the Madrid European Council on 27 June 1989 established an arms embargo on China.[409]

449. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to China can be found at paragraphs 479-487 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendations at paragraphs 117 and 118 of the Report.

450. The Committees' Recommendations on China in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

The Committees' Recommendation:

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 1163 extant UK export licences to China:

b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position

410

The Government's Response:

The Government is satisfied that none of the currently extant licences for China contravenes its policy as outlined in paragraph 46 above [see the Government's Response to the Consolidated Criteria and EU Common Position above]. However, as was shown during the Arab Spring, circumstances can and do rapidly change, leading to a reassessment of risk and, in some cases, a different decision using the same criteria. In such cases the Government would revoke the licence. The Government's answers to the Committees' Quarterly Questions, which can be found at Volume 2, Annex 1 of the Committees' Annual Report, provide more detail about individual licences.

· As the Committees note below there is an EU arms embargo in place against China. The UK interpretation of Arms Embargo on China, given in Parliament on 3 June 1998, is that it applies to:

· Lethal weapons, such as machine guns, large calibre weapons, bombs, torpedoes, rockets and missiles. Specially designed components for these and ammunition.

· Military aircraft and helicopters, vessels of war, armoured fighting vehicles and other such weapons platforms.

· Any equipment which might be used for internal repression.

411

The Committees' Recommendation:

The Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it will seek to widen the EU arms embargo on China to include:

a) all military goods; and

412

The Government's Response:

413

451. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it remains the Government's policy to continue to support the maintenance of the EU embargo on China but not to widen the military or dual-use goods to which it applies.

452. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to China for components for equipment employing cryptography, components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for military communications equipment, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the production of equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, military communications equipment, small arms ammunition, software for cryptographic software, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for military communications equipment, technology for the production of military communications equipment and weapon sights are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licencing Criteria: One and Two.

IRAN

453. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to Iran can be found at paragraphs 404-406 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 103 of the Report.

454. The Committees' Recommendation on Iran in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

The Committees' Recommendation:

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 62 extant UK export licences to Iran:

b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position

414

The Government's Response:

The Government is satisfied that none of the currently extant licences for Iran contravenes its policy as outlined in paragraph 46 above [see the Government's Response to the Consolidated Criteria and EU Common Position above]. However, as was shown during the Arab Spring, circumstances can and do rapidly change, leading to a reassessment of risk and, in some cases, a different decision using the same criteria. In such cases the Government would revoke the licence. The Government's answers to the Committees' Quarterly Questions, which can be found at Volume 2, Annex 1 of the Committees' Annual Report, provide more detail about individual licences.

Sanctions against Iran now include wide restrictions on trade including the export of 'dual use' goods and goods that could contribute to Iran's nuclear programme as well as an arms embargo. There are also wide restrictions targeting the investment in Iran's energy including the supply of key equipment and the purchase of oil and gas. Furthermore there are wide prohibitions on dealings with large sections of the financial sectors including the freezing of funds and economic resources of certain individuals and entities, as well as restrictions on the provision of insurance to the Government of Iran and restrictions on the transfer of funds with Iranian banks.

415

455. Following publication of the Government's United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012 the Committees wrote to the Government asking a question about Iran. The question and answer were as follows:

The Committees' question:

Please list each new set of EU sanctions on Iran being referred to, and the specific licensing changes made by the present Government, or its predecessor, following each new set of sanctions.

The Government's answer:

United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012

COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 267/2012 of 23 March 2012 amended by:

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 350/2012 of 23 April 2012

Council Regulation (EU) No 708/2012 of 2 August 2012

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 709/2012 of 2 August 2012

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 945/2012 of 15 October 2012

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1016/2012 of 6 November 2012

Council Regulation (EU) No 1067/2012 of 14 November 2012

Council Regulation (EU) No 1263/2012 of 21 December 2012

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1264/2012 of 21 December 2012

COUNCIL DECISION 2010/413/CFSP of 26 July 2010 amended by:

Council Decision 2012/35/CFSP of 23 January 2012

Council Decision 2012/152/CFSP of 15 March 2012

Council Decision 2012/169/CFSP of 23 March 2012

Council Decision 2012/205/CFSP of 23 April 2012

Council Decision 2012/457/CFSP of 2 August 2012

Council Decision 2012/635/CFSP of 15 October 2012

416

456. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Iran for equipment employing cryptography are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licencing Criteria: One, Two, Three, Four and Seven.

IRAQ

457. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to Iraq can be found at paragraphs 407-409 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 104 of the Report.

458. The Committees' Recommendation on Iraq in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

The Committees' Recommendation:

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 69 extant UK export licences to Iraq:

b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position

417

The Government's Response:

The Government is satisfied that none of the currently extant licences for Iraq contravenes its policy as outlined in paragraph 46 above [see the Government's Response to the Consolidated Criteria and EU Common Position above]. However, as was shown during the Arab Spring, circumstances can and do rapidly change, leading to a reassessment of risk and, in some cases, a different decision using the same criteria. In such cases the Government would revoke the licence. The Government's answers to the Committees' Quarterly Questions, which can be found at Volume 2, Annex 1 of the Committees' Annual Report, provide more detail about individual licences.

418

459. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Iraq for anti-riot/ballistic shields, body armour, components for body armour, components for military support vehicles, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of ground vehicle communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, equipment for the use of weapon night sights, equipment for the use of weapon sights, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for anti-riot/ballistic shields, technology for body armour, technology for equipment for the use of weapon sights, weapon night sights and weapon sights are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licencing Criteria: One, Two, Three, Four, Six and Seven.

ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

460. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories can be found at paragraphs 410-416 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 105 of the Report.

461. The Committees' Recommendation on Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

The Committees' Recommendation:

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 381 extant UK export licences to Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories:

b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position

419

The Government's Response:

420

462. On 30 July 2013 the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, wrote to the Chairman of the Committees including within his letter updating a number of issues, the announcement that an Open General Export Licence (OGEL) licence had been issued for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) project. The relevant part of the Business Secretary's letter was as follows:

421

463. In the Westminster Hall debate on 21 November 2013 the issue of arms export licences for cryptographic equipment to Israel; was raised by Sir John Stanley MP and Ian Murray MP and in particular a single approved licence valuing the cryptographic equipment at £7.7billion.. In reply, the BIS Minister. Michael Fallon, said:

The licence was for "equipment employing cryptography" and "software for equipment employing cryptography" with a value of £7.7 billion.

The licence was granted in the first quarter of 2013, and it permits the export of equipment and software for building public mobile phone networks in residential areas and for small businesses. Those items are subject to export control because of their encryption—information security—capability. That capability, it must be said, is a standard feature of the mobile phone network. The goods are for purely commercial end use.

Again, we assessed the application against the consolidated and the national criteria. A licence would not have been issued where there was a clear risk that the proposed exports might be used for internal repression or to provoke or prolong internal conflict, or where they could be used aggressively against another state.

422

464. On 24 April the Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Foreign Secretary asking about information regarding the OECD's investigation of supplies to the Israeli security services from G4S. the text of the latter was as follows:

It was reported in The Independent on 7 January that the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) will be investigating supplies to Israeli security services from G4S.

423

The Business Secretary replied on 14 May 2014 in letter replying to a number of different requests for information. The section of the Business Secretary's letter relating to Israel was as follows:

G4S, Israel and the OECD

I believe that the news report you refer to relates to the complaints process under the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. As you may know, the Guideline are voluntary standards for responsible business conduct in areas including human rights, employment and the environment. Unfortunately, the news report does not reflect the complaints process accurately. Each government that adheres to the OECD Guidelines is required to maintain a National Contact Point (NCP) to consider complaints under the Guidelines. The UK NCP is maintained by the UK Government to meet this requirement. It is not part of the OECD and has no wider responsibilities for OECD functions. The UK NCP is staffed by a small team of officials based in the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), and operates independently of BIS Ministers in its consideration of complaints.

http://www.gov.uk/government/collections/uk-national-contact-point-statements

424

465. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories for anti-riot/ballistic shields, body armour, components for body armour, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for equipment employing cryptography, components for military combat vehicles, components for military communications equipment, components for military support vehicles, components for small arms ammunition, components for sniper rifles, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, general military vehicle components, military communications equipment, small arms ammunition, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for military communications equipment, technology for small arms ammunition, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, water cannon and weapon sights are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licencing Criteria: One, Two, Three and Four.

466. I propose that the Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response whether the entirety of the extant export licences to Israel for cryptographic equipment, software and technology valued at £7.8billion are fully compliant with arms export Criterion 2 (Respect for Human Rights) notwithstanding the fact that when the Committees asked in respect of an export licence application to Israel in Quarter 3 of 2013: "Why was a SIEL [Standard Individual Export Licence] for equipment employing cryptography refused?", the Government's answer was: "We refused this SIEL under Criterion 2 because the exporter did not provide sufficient information or assurances over potential ultimate recipients and end-use. We therefore assessed there was a clear risk that the export might be used for internal repression."

467. I propose that the Committees also recommend that the Government sends the Committees, when published, the Initial Assessment made by the UK National Contact Point of the complaint made under the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises with regard to supplies to Israel security services from G4S.

LIBYA

468. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to Libya can be found at paragraphs 417-422 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 106 of the Report.

469. The Committees' Recommendation on Libya in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

The Committees' Recommendation:

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 49 extant UK export licences to Libya:

b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position

425

The Government's Response:

The Government is satisfied that none of the currently extant licences for Libya contravenes its policy as outlined in paragraph 46 above [see the Government's Response to the Consolidated Criteria and EU Common Position above]. However, as was shown in Libya itself during the Arab Spring, circumstances can and do rapidly change, leading to a reassessment of risk and, in some cases, a different decision using the same criteria. In such cases the Government would revoke the licence. The Government's answers to the Committees' Quarterly Questions, which can be found at Volume 2, Annex 1 of the Committees' Annual Report, provide more detail about individual licences.

There is a UN arms embargo against Libya. There are exemptions to the embargo for supplies of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use, protective clothing for use by United Nations personnel, representatives of the media and humanitarian and development workers, arms and related material intended solely for security or disarmament assistance to the Libyan authorities and other sales or supply of arms and related materiel. Procedures vary: some exports must be approved in advance by the Sanctions Committee while others require notification and the absence of a negative decision.

426

470. Following publication of the Government's United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012 the Committees wrote to the Government asking a question about Libya. The question and answer were as follows:

The Committees' question:

In deciding whether or not to approve arms export licence applications to Libya what account is the Government taking of the Report of Experts to the UN on 9 March 2013 of what has happened to the Gaddafi arms stockpiles, to which the UK was a contributor? The Experts' Report stated: "The proliferation of weapons from Libya has continued at a worrying rate and has spread into new territory: West Africa, the Levant and, potentially, even the Horn of Africa. Since the uprising and the resulting collapse of the security apparatus, including the loss of national control over weapons stockpiles and the absence of any border controls, Libya has over the past two years become a significant and attractive source of weaponry in the region. Illicit flows from the country are fuelling existing conflicts in Africa and the Levant and enriching the arsenals of a range of non-State actors, including terrorist groups."

The Government's answer:

427

471. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Libya for anti-riot/ballistic shields, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of assault rifles, equipment for the use of pistols, hand grenades, military combat vehicles, military support vehicles, pistols, small arms ammunition, smoke/pyrotechnic ammunition, software for equipment employing cryptography and technology for equipment employing cryptography are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licencing Criteria: One, Two, Three, Four, and Seven.

RUSSIA

472. On 18 March 2014 the Foreign Secretary announced in the House of Commons that the Government was suspending arms exports licences to Russia.[428] The Export Control Organisation (ECO) subsequently issued a Notice to Exporters announcing that it had suspended a number of licences for incorporation in third countries of military and dual-use goods exported from the UK before subsequently being exported to Russia.[429]

473. On 24 April 2014 the Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Foreign Secretary requesting details of the arms export licences to Russia that had been suspended. The text of the letter was as follows:

Russia - suspended licences

In the debate on Ukraine on 18 March, you said: "We believe that in the current circumstances there is a compelling case for EU member states to act on defence export licences. The UK will now, with immediate effect, suspend all extant licences and application processing for licences for direct export to Russia for military and dual-use items destined for units of the Russian armed forces or other state agencies which could be or are being deployed against Ukraine. We will also suspend licences for exports to third countries for incorporation into equipment for export to Russia where there is a clear risk that the end product will be used against Ukraine. All such licences were reviewed following the Prime Minister's statement on 10 March, and so we are able to act immediately. We encourage other European nations to take similar action."

Please could you provide details of all licence suspensions, and of any subsequent revocations or re-instatements, to Russia made in the period 10 March 2014 to the present.

Please could you provide the information in the same format as in Annex 1 of Cm 8079 (SIELS/OIELS/etc., End User Country, Annual Report Summary, Rating, Reason for Revocation). Please could you state the date of suspension and the date of any subsequent revocation or re-instatement in each case.

430

The Business Secretary replied on 14 May 2014. The relevant section of his letter was as follows:

Russia - suspended licences

Information regarding suspended licences for Russia is provided in Annex 4. In each case the suspension was made because the export would be in breach of the policy announced in Parliament by the Foreign Secretary on 18 March, namely that the items were for direct export to Russia and were destined for units of the Russian armed forces or other state agencies which could be or are being deployed against Ukraine, or were for export to third countries for incorporation into equipment for export to Russia where there is a clear risk that the end product will be used against Ukraine. This suspension covers both military and dual use rated exports. Fifteen SIELs were suspended for direct exports and thirteen for indirect exports; in addition Russia was removed as a permitted destination from 6 OIELs (Russia was the only permitted destination for three of these licences and therefore they were revoked). All the suspensions took place on 19 March. No licences have been subsequently revoked or reinstated although one licence has now expired.

http://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/component/content/article/9-bis/carousel/666-commerce-department-anounces-expansion-of-export-restrictions-on-russia

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/04/225241.htm

431

Annex 4

Licences Suspended for Russia

1. Standard Individual Export Licences for direct export

Application Type Goods Annual Report Summary Goods Rating Total Goods Value (£)

SIEL (Permanent) components for combat aircraft, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for the use of combat aircraft ML10, ML11, ML22 275,051.98

SIEL (Permanent) general military vehicle components ML6 296,400.00

SIEL (Permanent) goods treated for signature suppression for military use ML17 7,513,132.00

SIEL (Permanent) general military vehicle components ML6 21,379.00

SIEL (Permanent) general military vehicle components ML6 28,240.00

SIEL (Permanent) general military vehicle components ML6 228,120.00

SIEL (Permanent) components for combat naval vessels ML9 22,472.00

SIEL (Permanent) equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography 5A002, 5D002 636,400.00

SIEL (Permanent) components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment ML4, ML4 12,640.63

SIEL (Permanent) goods treated for signature suppression for military use ML17 7,513,132.00

SIEL (Permanent) focal plane arrays 6A002 11,040,000.00

SIEL (Permanent) goods treated for signature suppression for military use ML17 7,513,132.00

SIEL (Permanent) body armour ML13 7,500.00

SIEL (Permanent) focal plane arrays 6A002 389,389.00

SIEL (Permanent) focal plane arrays 6A002 96,000.00

2. Standard Individual Export Licences for incorporation in third countries and onward supply to Russia

Application Type End User Countries Goods Annual Report Summary Goods Rating Total Goods Value

SIEL (Permanent) France components for military aircraft head-up/down displays ML10 £216,050.44

SIEL (Permanent) France components for military aero-engines ML10 £99,600.00

SIEL (Permanent) Italy general military vehicle components ML6 £80,189.00

SIEL (Permanent) France components for military aircrew protective equipment ML10 £51,950.00

SIEL (Permanent) Italy general military vehicle components ML6 £265,644.00

SIEL (Permanent) France military guidance/navigation equipment ML11 £148,566.00

SIEL (Permanent) France military aircraft head-up/down displays ML10 £330,620.96

SIEL (Permanent) Italy general military vehicle components ML6 £4,743.60

SIEL (Permanent) Italy general military vehicle components ML6 £230.00

SIEL (Permanent) France components for military guidance/navigation equipment ML11 £132,164.00

SIEL (Permanent) France targeting equipment ML5 £20,000.00

SIEL (Permanent) Italy military guidance/navigation equipment ML11 £22,315.67

SIEL (Permanent) South Africa components for military helicopters ML10 £20,480.00

3. Open Individual Licences revoked or re-issued without Russia

Application Type Action Goods Annual Report Summary Goods Rating

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)
Revoked
technology for the production of unfinished products for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment ML22

OIEL (Military / Dual Use) Re-issued imaging cameras 6A003

OIEL (Military / Dual Use) Re-issued components for military field engineer equipment, components for military support vehicles, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, military electronic equipment, military field engineer equipment, military support vehicles, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military support vehicles, technology for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for the use of military field engineer equipment ML11, ML17, ML22, ML4, ML6

OIEL (Military / Dual Use) Revoked technology for the production of unfinished products for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment ML22

OIEL (Military / Dual Use) Revoked technology for air-to-air missiles, technology for anti-armour missiles, technology for anti-ship missiles, technology for combat aircraft, technology for combat helicopters, technology for countermeasure equipment for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for fire control equipment, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for general military vehicle components, technology for guided missile decoying equipment, technology for laser rangefinders, technology for laser warning detectors, technology for military combat vehicles, technology for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for optical target acquisition equipment, technology for optical target surveillance equipment, technology for periscopes, technology for tanks, technology for turrets, technology for weapon night sights, technology for weapon sights ML22

OIEL (Military / Dual Use) Re-issued components for submersible equipment, components for submersible vehicles, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, high energy capacitors, metal alloy cylindrical forms, metal alloy tubes, submersible equipment 1C202, 1A201, 6A001, 8A002

474. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved and still extant arms export licences to Russia valued at £132 million, including for body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for small arms ammunition, components for sniper rifles, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, equipment for the use of sniper rifles, gun mountings, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, software for equipment employing cryptography, weapon night sights and weapon sights are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licencing Criteria: One, Two, Three, and Four.

SAUDI ARABIA

475. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to Saudi Arabia can be found at paragraphs 423-430 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation at paragraph 107 of the Report.

476. The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation on Saudi Arabia in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation:

The Committees have noted the Government's answer that it applies the same stated policy on arms exports and internal repression to Saudi Arabia as it does to the other states in the region and to states worldwide. However, the Committees conclude that that does not appear to have been so in the case of the deployment of Saudi forces in British armoured vehicles to Bahrain to protect installations, thereby enabling Bahraini security forces to end, sometimes violently, predominantly peaceful demonstrations. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 417 extant UK export licences to Saudi Arabia:

b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position

432

The Government's Response:

The Government questions the Committees' conclusion about its policy towards Saudi Arabia. As Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Alistair Burt made clear before the Foreign Affairs Committee on 18 June 2013, "there is no connection between the work done by the Saudi authorities to protect certain places in Bahrain and the behaviour of Bahraini security forces subsequently. That the Bahraini forces were able to go off and do their job is clear, but they could have handled it in a completely different manner. They could have handled it in the manner demanded by the international community." As stated in the Foreign Secretary's letter of 6 December 2012, the Government applies the same stated policy on arms exports and internal repression to Saudi Arabia as it does to the other states in the region and to states worldwide.

433

477. The Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) in their 2013-14 Report entitled The UK's relations with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain (HC 88) referred to arms export to Saudi Arabia. The FAC noted that several submissions to the inquiry highlighted a perceived contradiction between the UK Government designating Saudi Arabia as a "Country of concern" in its Human Rights report while at the same time promoting it as a priority market for arms exports. [434]The Report stated that witnesses had highlighted fears about equipment being used both in internal repression and in external action, such as the intervention in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia's alleged bombing of Yemen in 2009. The FAC concluded that: "The government must adhere strictly to its existing policy to ensure that defence equipment sold by UK firms are not used for human rights abuses or internal repression."[435] The Government's response to the FAC's conclusion was as follows:

[…] The export of arms and controlled goods to all destinations, including Saudi Arabia, is assessed on a case-by-case basis against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria.

436

478. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Saudi Arabia for anti-riot/ballistic shields, body armour, command communications control and intelligence software, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for body armour, components for ground vehicle communications equipment, components for machine guns, components for military combat vehicles, components for military communications equipment, components for sniper rifles, components for weapon sight mounts, crowd control ammunition, cryptographic software, CS hand grenades, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the production of machine guns, equipment for the use of weapon night sights, equipment for the use of weapon sights, ground vehicle communications equipment, gun mountings, gun silencers, hand grenades, military communications equipment, radio jamming equipment, small arms ammunition, smoke/pyrotechnic ammunition, sniper rifles, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for ground vehicle military communications equipment, software for radio jamming equipment, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, tear gas/irritant ammunition, technology for ground vehicle military communications equipment, wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts and weapon sights are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licencing Criterion: Two.

SRI LANKA

479. Arms exports to Sri Lanka for counter-piracy are at paragraph 375 above.

480. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to Sri Lanka can be found at paragraphs 493-500 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendations at paragraphs 120 and 121 of the Report.

481. The Committees' Recommendations on Sri Lanka in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

The Committees' Recommendation:

437

The Government's Response:

438

The Committees' Recommendation:

The Committees further recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 49 extant UK export licences to Sri Lanka:

b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position

439

The Government's Response:

440

482. In the Westminster Hall debate on 21 November 2013 Ian Murray MP questioned the Prime Minister's recent trade mission to Sri Lanka and said that "the perception may be that arms sales are at the top of agenda." He added: "It may only be a perception, but the Government should work hard to ensure that that perception is not carried through in practice."[441] In responding to the debate the Business Minister, Michael Fallon, replied:

[…] during the recent Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting, he [the Prime Minister]was the first foreign leader since independence in 1948 to give the local population the chance to be heard by an international audience. He shone a light on some of the human rights concerns in the aftermath of the recent prolonged civil conflict and demonstrated our commitment to reconciliation and accountability in Sri Lanka.

442

483. Following the Government's Quarterly report on arms exports from July to September 2013, The Committees put its question to the Government on exports to Sri Lanka as follows:

Given the large number of arms previously approved for maritime security companies why were SIEL licences approved for 1760 assault rifles, 450 combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for sniper rifles, 80 pistols, 360 rifles, small arms ammunition, 200 sniper rifles and weapon sights to private maritime securities company for anti-piracy purposes? What assurances have been received that these goods will not be diverted?

The Government response was:

The equipment in these SIELs was intended for anti-piracy purposes in maritime security by civilian/commercial end users. The Government has not sought any assurances about the equipment not being used for internal repression as we have seen no evidence that private security companies have been diverting equipment intended for their end use to government agencies or any other entities in Sri Lanka. Nor has there been any evidence of UK supplied equipment being used for internal repression.

However, as stated at the Business Secretary's Oral Evidence Session with the CAEC on 18 December, HMG is reviewing the SIELs issued for private security companies.

To qualify for a licence, Private Security Companies must meet strict conditions. They must keep detailed records, provide training for staff and have clear lines of accountability. Their UK based offices are subject to regular inspection visits by BIS. They must be signed up to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers. The equipment must remain under the companies' control at all times and it must be stored securely when not in use.

484. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Sri Lanka for assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for combat shotguns, components for pistols, components for sniper rifles, components for rifles, equipment employing cryptography, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, software for equipment employing cryptography, sporting guns and weapons sights are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licencing Criteria: One and Two.

SYRIA

Conventional arms exports and gifted equipment

485. In May 2011 the EU imposed sanctions on Syria. The sanctions included an embargo on the supply of arms, military equipment and equipment that might be used for internal repression. In January and June 2012 further EC Council decisions specified in more detail the items and services banned under the arms embargo. In November 2012 the EU decided to extend restrictive measures until 1 March 2013; these measures were extended for a further three months in February 2013, but eased restrictions on the provision of non-lethal support and technical assistance for the protection of civilians. In April 2013 the EU decided to allow the supply of certain equipment to Syrian opposition forces, such as "non-lethal equipment to the Syrian national Coalition for Opposition and Revolutionary forces when intended for the protection of civilians.[443]

486. A further extension of the EU arms embargo on Syria was prevented by Britain and France. On 28 May 2013the FCO issued a press notice announcing that the EU arms embargo to Syria would not be renewed. The Foreign Secretary stated: "It was important for Europe to send a clear signal to the Assad regime that it has to negotiate seriously, and that all options remain on the table if it refuses to do so. Tonight EU nations have done just that."[444]

487. On 3 June 2013 the Prime Minister made a Statement to the House of Commons in which he stated:

unless we do more to support the official opposition, the humanitarian crisis will continue, the political transition that we want to see will not happen, and the extremists will continue to flourish. That is why I believe it is right to lift the EU arms embargo on the Syrian opposition. There must be a clear sense that Assad cannot fight his way to victory or use the talks to buy more time to slaughter Syrians in their own homes and on their streets.

I regret to say that the EU arms embargo served the extremists on both sides. It did not stop Assad massacring his people, it did not stop the Russians sending him arms, and it did not stop Islamist extremists getting their hands on weapons either. It just sent a signal that for all its words, the EU had no real ability to support the reasonable opposition that could be the basis of an inclusive transition. That is why the Foreign Secretary and the French Foreign Minister secured agreement to lift the arms embargo in Brussels last week.

The Prime Minister continued:

445

488. On 19 June 2013 the Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Prime Minister requesting the full text of the EU agreed "common framework for those who, in future, may decide to supply it [the Syrian National Coalition] with military equipment and the full details of the "clear safeguards to ensure that any such equipment would be supplied only for the protection of civilians, and in accordance with international law" both of which were referred to in the Prime Minister's Statement on 3 June 2013.[446] The Foreign Secretary replied on 11 July 2013 as follows:

Thank you for your letter of 19 June to the Prime Minister about his statement to the House on 3 June on Syria.

With regards to your request for the fullest available text on the agreed EU common framework, I enclose a copy of the EU Council declaration agreed by the Foreign Affairs Council on 27 May, which may also be found at the following link at www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/137315.pdf

You also ask for details on the issue of safeguards referred to by the Prime Minister in his statement. Our priority remains advancing a political transition that ends the conflict in Syria, allows refugees to return to their homes, and prevents further radicalisation in the country. We will do all we can to ensure that the forthcoming US-Russia Geneva conference delivers that outcome.

I want to be clear that the UK has not yet made a final decision to provide lethal equipment to the National Coalition, but we now have the flexibility to respond in the future if the situation continues to deteriorate and if the Assad regime refuses to negotiate. We have said we would only provide lethal equipment in carefully controlled circumstances, and in accordance with our obligations under national and international law.

When the Foreign Affairs Council agreed to end the EU arms embargo and return decisions on arms provision to member states on 27 May, Ministers also agreed a framework of safeguards to guide those member states which might decide to provide arms: arms could only be sent to the National Coalition; they should be intended for the protection of civilians; there should be safeguards to ensure delivery to the right hands; and existing obligations under the EU Common Position for arms exports (CP944) remained in place.

447

489. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to Syria can be found at paragraphs 431-448 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraphs 108 to 110 of the Report

490. The Committees' Recommendations on Syria in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

The Committees' Recommendation:

448

The Government's Response:

449

The Committees' Recommendation:

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that neither of the 3 extant UK export licences to Syria or any goods on the Strategic Exports Control lists gifted, or planned to be gifted, to those in Syria:

b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position

450

The Government's Response:

The Government is satisfied that none of the currently extant licences for Syria contravenes its policy as outlined in paragraph 46 above [see the Government's Response to the Consolidated Criteria and EU Common Position above]. However, as was shown during the Arab Spring, circumstances can and do rapidly change, leading to a reassessment of risk and, in some cases, a different decision using the same criteria. In such cases the Government would revoke the licence. The Government's answers to the Committees' Quarterly Questions, which can be found at Volume 2, Annex 1 of the Committees' Annual Report, provide more detail about individual licences.

In May 2011 the EU adopted restrictions against Syria on the supply of arms and related materiel under Council Decision. There have been a number of revisions to these restrictive measures in 2012 and 2013. All extant licences for Syria were approved in accordance with the sanctions in place. […]

451

The Committees' Recommendation:

The Committee further recommend that in its Response the Government states:

a) whether, since the BIS Secretary of State's letter of 10 May 2013, any UK Strategic Export Control licences for goods to Syria have been approved stating the application type, Annual Report summary and goods value in the case of each licence;

b) whether, since the Written Ministerial Statement made by the Foreign Secretary on 15 April and his Oral Statement on 20 May, any additional non-lethal equipment, or any goods subject to UK Strategic Export Controls have been gifted to Syria, and, if so, to state the nature of the equipment and goods, and their value; and

452

The Government's Response:

Application Type	Goods	Total Goods Value (£)
SITCL	All-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection for use by UN personnel	117,783
SITCL	All-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection for use by UN personnel	919,432
OITCL	All-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection for use by diplomatic personnel	Unable to give a value for open licences

b) On 15th July 2013, the Foreign Secretary laid a minute before Parliament detailing plans to provide the Syrian opposition with equipment to help protect against chemical weapons attack. The Foreign Secretary made a written statement on the gift on 16th July 2013 and also wrote to the chairs of the Public Accounts Committee, the Committee on Arms Export Controls, the Defence Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee to alert them to the minute. The gift comprises 5,000 commercially available escape hoods, medical pre-treatment tablets (sufficient to treat up to 5,000 people for 6 months) and chemical weapons detector paper. The approximate total cost of the equipment in the gift is £656,800, which will be met by the Government's Conflict Pool Fund.

c) Robust and effective measures that control the export of military and dual-use equipment (as defined in the UK 'Consolidated Control List') to Syria and all other destinations remain in place. Licensable goods for export to Syria continue to be assessed against the Consolidated Criteria. These measures have not changed as a result of ending the EU Arms Embargo on 27 May [2013] at the EU Foreign Affairs Council.

Specifically, the Foreign Secretary agreed with his counterparts on 27 May that with all arms and internal repression items the following conditions would apply:

· The sale, supply, transfer or export of military equipment or of equipment which might be used for internal repression will be for the Syrian National Coalition and intended for the protection of civilians;

· Member States shall require adequate safeguards against misuse of authorisations granted, in particular relevant information concerning the end-user and final destination of the delivery; and

· Member States shall assess the export licence applications on a case-by-case basis, taking full account of the criteria set out in Council Common Position 2008/944.CFSP of 8 December 2008 (i.e. broadly the Consolidated Criteria) defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment.

453

491. UK Working Group, in its written submission, said that it was concerned at the UK Government's role in the loosening of the embargo, and had concluded that the actual supply of arms to any of the warring parties would be very hard to justify under existing UK and EU legislation.[454]

492. Since May 2013 the Government has laid Department Minutes for the gifting of equipment to Syria as follows:

· 15 July 2013 - Syria

· 18 November 2013 - Syria

· 23 January 2014 - Syria

· 6 February 2014 - Syria

· 1 May 2014 - Syria

· 9 June 2014 - Syria

Details of each Departmental Minute can be found in Annex 16.

493. In the Westminster Hall debate on 21 November 213 Ann McKechin MP said that she was "not convinced that, given the fragmented, chaotic and fast-changing situation in Syria, any arms exports could safely meet the criteria on end use. There is a real risk of weapons falling into the hands of the Syrian Government or extremist opposition groups."[455] Nia Griffith MP added later in the debate that many of her constituents were concerned about the possibility of the UK Government supplying arms to the Syrian opposition. She said that people in the UK did not want to see arms going to rebel forces when it was not known who they were or which groups they consist of. She called for the re-instatement of a full arms embargo to Syria, similar to that which existed prior to the EU decision in May 2013 to allow the supply of arms to the Syrian opposition.[456]

494. When the UK Working Group (UKWG) was asked by the Committees in the Oral Evidence session on 4 November 2013 about the lifting of the EU arms embargo of equipment to the Syrian opposition Martin Butcher (Oxfam) said:

457

495. On 11 December 2013 the US and UK Governments announced that they had suspended the supply of all non-lethal aid to the Syrian opposition after Islamist fighters had seized control of the headquarters and stores belonging to western-backed opposition forces.[458] The FCO Minister Hugh Robertson was quoted as saying: "It does make sense to suspend aid until we know exactly what's happening."[459]

496. Prior to the Oral Evidence session with the Foreign Secretary on 8 January 2014 the Foreign Secretary wrote to the Chairman of the Committees. The relevant text relating to Syria was as follows:

460

497. When the Committees questioned the Foreign Secretary about this on 8 January 2014 he stated:

461

When asked about the current UK position regarding the supply of arms to Syrian opposition groups the Foreign Secretary said: "Under our current policy there is no question of arming." He went on to confirm that lethal support has not been provided in the past and that the current policy is that it will not be provided at present, however the UK Government had provided non-lethal support to Syrian opposition groups. The foreign Secretary said:

462

498. The Foreign Secretary was asked whether the supply of even non-lethal equipment to the Syrian opposition was inconsistent with the Consolidated Criteria in that it could "provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts". He replied:

463

499. On 1 May 2014 the Foreign Secretary made a Written Ministerial Statement (WMS) relating to the gifting of non-lethal equipment to Syrian opposition forces. The WMS was as follows:

On 18 November 2013 I laid a departmental minute before the House of Commons on the gifting of non-lethal equipment to the supreme military council of the Free Syrian Army, which is closely aligned to the Syrian National Coalition. The gift consists of commercially available communications equipment, such as laptops with satellite internet connection, mobile telephones and push-to-talk radios; commercially available vehicles, such as pick-up trucks; fuel; portable generators less than 3 MW in power; logistics supplies such as clothing, rations and tents; and individual medical kits. The total cost of the gift is £1 million, which will be met by the Government's conflict pool fund. Use of these funds has been approved by me and the Secretaries of State for Defence and for International Development. During the period of 14 parliamentary sitting days beginning on the date on which the minute was laid before the House of Commons, no Member signified an objection, either by giving notice of a parliamentary question or of a motion in relation to the minute, or by otherwise raising the matter in the House.

Following fighting at Bab al-Hawa on 7 December 2013, UK Government plans to deliver equipment to the supreme military council in Syria were temporarily put on hold. I am now lifting the hold on those plans to deliver equipment to the supreme military council of the Free Syrian Army in Syria. Both the UK Government and the supreme military council are confident that the equipment can be delivered safely. This resumption of delivery clearly demonstrates our continued and long-standing support for the National Coalition and the supreme military council of the Free Syrian Army, who represent the majority of Syrians who support a political settlement and a democratic, pluralist future for their country. I wrote to the Foreign Affairs Committee on 28 March confirming my intention to resume the delivery of non-lethal equipment to the supreme military council of the Free Syrian Army in Syria. They have raised no objections and deliveries of non-lethal equipment will begin as soon as is practical.

464

500. I propose that the Committees conclude that the decision of the UK Government, together with the French Government, to end the EU arms embargo on Syria in May 2013 has thus far had no discernible impact on President Assad or on contributing to a peace settlement in Syria.

501. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government lists in its Response the items of equipment, which would be categorized as controlled goods if exported commercially, that have been gifted to Syria during the present Parliament stating in each case:

a) the quantity;

b) the recipient to whom it was gifted; and

c) whether the Government has any information as to whether the item has been on-sold or transferred to a third party, and, if so, the name of the third party.

502. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Syria for body armour, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection and components for body armour are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licencing Criteria: One, Two, Three and Four.

Dual-use chemical exports

503. The United Nations chemical weapons inspectors confirmed that on 21 August 2013 the nerve agent sarin had been used in an attack on the Ghouta agricultural belt around Damascus. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon told the UN Security Council that he believed the attack constituted a war crime. The UN report, he said, detailed the "most significant confirmed use of chemical weapons against civilians since Saddam Hussein used them" in Halabja in 1988.[465]

504. A complete account of the Committees' scrutiny of Government approved dual-use chemical exports to Syria was set out in the Chairman's letter to the Business Secretary of 9 September 2013. The Chairman's letter of 9 September 2013 was as follows:

Since the start of the civil war in Syria, the Committees on Arms Export Controls have been scrutinising in detail the Government's approval of export licences for both military and dual-use goods to that country.

With statements from both the British and the US Governments that sarin has been used in chemical attacks in Syria, I am returning to the Government's approval in January 2012 of export licences to Syria for potassium fluoride and sodium fluoride both of which are stated to be precursor chemicals in the manufacture of nerve gas.

I am setting out in full the exchanges between the Committees on Arms Export Controls (CAEC) and Ministers on this key issue to date.

In March 2012, I tabled a Written Parliamentary Question to yourself asking "Which UK strategic export control licences to Syria are currently extant; and what the nature and quantity of the licensed goods or services are under each licence". Your Minister Mark Prisk answered on March 27 that there were 9 such licences of which 7 were Standard Individual Licences and 2 were Open Individual Licences. Of the 7 Standard Individual Licences 2 were for "chemicals used for industrial/commercial processes", with the goods valued at £10,000 and £10,200 respectively.

Following publication of the Committees 2012 Report (HC 419) on July 13, I wrote to the Foreign Secretary five days later on July 18 putting to him a total of 55 requests for further information about the 9 extant UK Government approved arms export licences to Syria. Of these 55 requests, 10 related to the two Standard Individual Export Licences (SIEL) for "Chemicals used for industrial/commercial processes".

The 10 items of further information that the Committees required were:

1. The names of the individual chemicals for which UK Government export licence approval was given.

2. The reasons why each of the chemicals concerned are subject to export licence approval.

3. The internal repression purposes to which each of the chemicals concerned could be put.

4. The quantities of each of the chemicals concerned for which export licence approval was given.

5. The names of the individuals, companies or organisations to whom the chemicals were being exported.

6. The extent to which those named individuals, companies or organisations are subject to the influence, ownership or control of the Syrian Government.

7. The last known location in Syria of the chemicals for which UK Government export licence approval was given.

8. The dates of approval of each of the chemical export licences concerned, whether any have now been revoked and, if so, on what date.

9. Which, if any, of the chemical export licence applications concerned were put to Ministers for approval.

10. Copies of each of the chemical export licence applications concerned and of each of the approval decisions with any conditions attached - to be provided to the Committees on a classified or non-classified basis as necessary.

You replied to the Committees' requests for these 10 items of information in your letter to me of 6 September 2012 as follows:

"These licences were issued on 17 and 18 January 2012 and authorised the export of dual-use chemicals to a private company for use in industrial processes. The chemicals were sodium fluoride and potassium fluoride.

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In these cases the chemicals were to be used for metal finishing of aluminium profiles used for making aluminium showers, windows, etc. Each licence application was assessed against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria, including whether there was a clear risk that they might be used for internal repression or be diverted for such an end-use. The licences were granted because at the time there were no grounds for refusal.

Subsequently, the European Union imposed new sanctions on Syria via Council Regulation (EU) No 509/2012 which came into force on 17 June 2012. The sanctions included prohibitions on the sale, supply, transfer or export of certain dual-use items and chemicals (including sodium fluoride and potassium fluoride) which might be used for internal repression or in the manufacture of items which might be used for internal repression. As a result, these licences were revoked on 30 July 2012".

On 18 March this year [2013], I wrote again to you about the chemicals approved by the Government for export to Syria as follows:

"Thank you for your letter of 6 September 2012 responding to the Committees on Arms Exports' request for further information relating to extant arms export licences to Syria.

However, the answer provided to the Committees' question relating to the two SIELs for "chemicals used for industrial/commercial processes" has raised a further question. Your response stated that these licences had been revoked on 30 July 2012 as a result of the Council Regulation (EU) No 509/2012 imposing new sanctions on Syria coming into force on 17 June 2012. The Committees wish to know if the goods covered by these two licences were shipped to Syria before the licences were revoked."

You replied to my letter on April 10 2013 as follows:

"Thank you for your letter of 18 March requesting further information about extant arms export licences to Syria.

Both licence records showed that there were some goods remaining to be exported and that was why those licenses were revoked on 30 July 2012, to prevent export of the chemicals caught by the new EU sanctions on Syria which came into force on 17 June 2012. However, revocation could not prevent the shipment of chemicals already exported against those licences and, unfortunately, we do not have data showing what quantity of chemicals covered by these SIELs had already been shipped."

Please could you now respond to the following further questions and requirements for further information:

Please provide the Committees, numbered item by numbered item, with each of the 10 items of information originally requested about the two "chemicals used for industrial/commercial processes" SIELs as detailed in my original letter of 18 July 2012 to the Foreign Secretary much, if not most of which, was not provided in your reply to me of 6 September 2012. Please also provide the name of the company to whom your Department gave licence approval on 17 and 18 January 2012 to export potassium fluoride and sodium fluoride to Syria. The company's name cannot credibly be withheld from the Committees on grounds of commercial confidentiality given that both licences were revoked over a year ago.

Please also provide the name(s) of the company or companies to whom FCO Minister Alistair Burt has now stated five further export licences for sodium fluoride to Syria were issued between 2003 and the start of the conflict.

Syria has long been known to be a holder of chemical weapons and your Department were clearly fully aware that sodium fluoride and potassium fluoride are precursor chemicals in the manufacture of chemical weapons as you specifically stated this in your letter to me of 6 September 2012. Given that Syria was a known holder of chemical weapons, given that there was a civil war in Syria and given that both sodium fluoride and potassium fluoride were known by your Department to be precursor chemicals in the manufacture of chemical weapons, do you agree on reflection that both of these licences should have been refused?

You said in your letter to me of 6 September 2012 "The licence was granted because there were no grounds for refusal."

You also stated that "Each licence application was assessed against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export licensing Criteria, including whether there was a clear risk that they might be used for internal repression or be diverted for such an end-use." However, this is not an accurate or complete statement of the Government's policy on arms exports where the goods might be used for internal repression. The Foreign Secretary's statement of policy to the Committees on 7 February 2012 was as follows: "The long-standing British position is clear. We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression." The policy of not issuing export licences "which might be used to facilitate internal repression" is a substantially different, and materially tighter export control policy than "a clear risk that they might be used for internal repression". Do you and all your Department accept that the Foreign Secretary's statement of Government policy to the Committees on 7 February 2012 is the definitive Government policy on arms exports and internal repression? If so, why was that policy not complied with in relation to the export licence applications for potassium fluoride and sodium fluoride both of which "might be used to facilitate internal repression"?

On what date was the Government first aware that the EU's proposed Regulation for new sanctions on Syria was going to prohibit the export to Syria of both potassium fluoride and sodium fluoride? Why were these licences for potassium fluoride and sodium fluoride not revoked immediately at that date instead of only being revoked on 30 July 2012 - 6 weeks after the Regulation came into force on 17 June 2012?

On September 3 2013 your Department's "Statement on exports to Syria" stated in respect of the licences for sodium fluoride and potassium fluoride that "the chemicals were not exported to Syria." In addition, the previous day the Secretary of State for Defence stated in the House with regard to these two licences that "no such chemicals were exported" (Hansard 2 September 2013 Col. 10).

Both your Department's statement and that of the Secretary of State for Defence in the House are in direct contradiction with what you said in your letter to me of 10 April this year when you said: "Both licence records showed that there were some goods remaining to be exported and that was why those licences were revoked on 30 July 2012, to prevent export of the chemicals caught by the new EU sanctions on Syria which came into force on 17 June 2012. However, revocation could not prevent the shipment of chemicals already exported against those licences and, unfortunately, we do not have data showing what quantity of chemicals covered by these SIELs had already been shipped."

Please provide the Committees with the evidence you clearly had when you wrote to me on 10 April this year that some quantities of the potassium fluoride and sodium fluoride had already been exported.

Please provide details of all previous export licence approvals to Syria of potassium fluoride and sodium fluoride stating the value and quantity in each case and the date of licence approval.

Please provide details of all previous export licence approvals to Syria of all other chemicals included on the Australia Group chemical weapons precursor list and/or are listed in Annex 1 of EU Council Regulation 428/2009 stating the value and quantity in each case and the date of licence approval.

467

505. On 10 September 2013 the Business Secretary wrote to the Chairman of the Committees with an update on the export licences for chemicals to Syria. The relevant section of his letter was as follows:

Export licences for chemicals for Syria

I wrote to you on the 6 September last year about two licences to export dual use chemicals to Syria issued on the 17 and 18 January 2012. You will recall that the licences were for sodium fluoride (1000kg) and potassium fluoride (1000kg) and that they were subsequently revoked in July 2012 following the imposition of EU sanctions. HMRC has confirmed that the licences were not used before revocation. The chemicals are not listed by the Chemical Weapons Convention but are subject to export controls by virtue of our membership of the Australia Group and are listed in Annex I of Council regulation 428/2009.

I stand by what I wrote last year that the two licence applications in question were subject to proper assessment against the Consolidated EU and national Arms Export Licensing Criteria and were determined to be for legitimate commercial use. There was therefore no clear basis on which to refuse licences as this predated EU sanctions. Although the chemicals in question can be used as precursors for chemical weapons they also have a large number of commercial applications and the volumes licensed are consistent with commercial use.

In the light of the recent and shocking use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime in Syria I asked my officials to determine whether any other licences for chemicals had been granted for Syria over the last ten years. They identified five other licences, all for sodium fluoride, issued in July 2004, September 2005, March 2007, February 2009 and May 2010 (for, respectively, 50kg, 2000kg, 50kg, 2000kg and 50kg). These licences all pre-date the conflict in Syria. They were issued to two UK exporters for despatch to two Syrian companies. I am confident that each application was properly assessed to determine end use and that the exports were for legitimate commercial purposes, namely cosmetics and healthcare products. The volumes of sodium fluoride covered by these licences are consistent with commercial use.

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506. The Chairman of the Committees wrote a further letter to the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, on 11 September 2013 regarding the 5 additional licences to export dual-use chemicals to Syria approved between July 2004 and May 2010 as follows:

Thank you for your letter of September 10.

Please may I have your answers to the following further questions on British Government approval of export licences of chemicals to Syria?

In your letter to me of 6 September 2012, you acknowledged that the Government knew when your Department gave licence approval on January 17 and 18 that year for sodium fluoride and potassium fluoride exports to Syria that both chemicals could be used as precursor chemicals in the manufacture of chemical weapons.

In your latest letter, you say that 5 further licences were approved for the export of sodium fluoride for cosmetics and healthcare products as follows:

July 2004 50kg

September 2005 2000kg

March 2007 50kg

February 2009 2000kg

May 2010 50kg

With regard to these 5 further licences:

1. What quantity for each licence was actually exported from the UK to Syria?

2. What were the names of the two UK exporters to whom the export licences were granted?

3. What were the names of the two Syrian companies to whom the sodium fluoride were exported under these licences?

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507. On 11 October 2013 the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, replied as follows:

[The answers to numbered sub-paragraphs 1-5 immediately below relate to the two licences to export dual-use chemicals to Syria issued in January 2012.]

Thank you for your letters of 9 and 11 September.

In your letter of 9 September you ask seven specific questions. Here are the answers.

1. Points raised in previous correspondence.

1. Names of the chemicals:

Reasons why they are controlled and the purposes to which they were put.

They have legitimate commercial uses such as the manufacture of toothpaste, the fluoridation of drinking water, production in the metallurgical industry, and in the manufacture of pesticides. In these cases the stated end-use for both chemicals was in metal finishing of aluminium profiles used for making aluminium showers, window frames, etc. This is a credible and legitimate use for these chemicals and consistent with the quantities licensed.

Quantities:

Names of end-user:

Extent to which the end-user is under the influence of the Syrian Government.

Last known location in Syria.

Dates of approval and revocation.

Ministerial involvement in decision-making

Copies of the licences and any conditions

I am not disclosing the assessments that supported the decisions to approve these two licences. To do so would be likely to inhibit the free and frank provision of advice and the free and frank exchange of views for the purpose of deliberation. I have carefully considered the arguments in favour of disclosure, in particular that transparency in policy making may improve engagement between the public and government, and it is desirable that he public can satisfy themselves that decisions are taken on the basis of the best available information. However BIS, as the statutory licensing authority, makes decisions on export licence applications based on advice received from other Government Departments, and it is my view that releasing the advice received for specific export licence applications would impact adversely on the quality of the advice provided by other Departments and on the ultimate decisions taken.

After giving the matter careful consideration, and consulting the companies concerned, I have also decided not to disclose either the licence application forms or the names of the UK companies to which these licences were granted. I have taken the same decision in respect of the companies to which the other five licences covered in this letter were granted. I recognise that there is a public interest in knowing that the Government acted properly in this matter. But the companies behaved responsibly by applying for export licences and were engaged in legitimate transactions. We have taken into account strong feedback from some of the companies that they should not be exposed to reputational damage when they have acted in an entirely proper way. Their licence applications were submitted in confidence and it is important that the Government respects that fact and maintains that confidence in the integrity of the system.

2. Should the licences granted in January 2012 have been refused?

Each licence application was assessed on its own merits against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria taking into account all relevant information available to us at the time. The stated end-use of these chemicals was a legitimate commercial application. The media reporting about the end-user I referred to above did not suggest any link to chemical weapons. There was no information from either open or classified sources available at the time, and none that we have received since, to link the end-user to any chemical weapons programme in Syria, and we did not — and do not —have any information to indicate that Syria was actively seeking to acquire these chemicals for use in the manufacture of chemical weapons. Given the nature of the stated end-use and the lack of evidence that would justify refusal, the licences were granted. Having reviewed the information on which these decisions were based, I am satisfied that this was the correct decision.

3. Grounds for refusal

The position set out in your letter appears to be an over-interpretation of the statement made by the Foreign Secretary in the course of giving oral evidence to the Committees on 7 February 2012. I know that the Foreign Secretary is writing to you to set the record straight on this very important point.

clear risk

4. Delay in revoking licences

EU discussions about additional sanctions against Syria continued throughout the second half of 2011 and beyond (the original EU sanctions regulation was adopted on 9 May and amended on 10 occasions before the end of the year). In parallel with this, the participating states of the Australia Group (AG) had agreed in June 2011 that they should take steps to control the export to Syria of chemicals potentially usable in the manufacture of chemical weapons, over and above those included on the AG chemical weapons precursors list. There were also discussions within the EU about how to implement these additional controls. However the actual decision to pursue sanctions targeted against the manufacture and use of chemical weapons was not finally taken until 23 April 2012 (Council decision 2012/206/CFSP). Article 1 of the decision said:

"The sale, supply, transfer or export of certain other equipment, goods and technology which might be used for internal repression or for the manufacture and maintenance of products which could be used for internal repression, to Syria by nationals of Member States or from the territories of Member States or using their flag vessels or aircraft, shall be prohibited, whether originating or not in their territories.

"The Union shall take the necessary measures in order to determine the relevant items to be covered by this paragraph."

Negotiation of the Regulation that would implement this provision — and which would include the list of items covered by it — began shortly thereafter. It was clear from an early stage in the negotiation of the Regulation that it was likely to include both potassium fluoride and sodium fluoride, but this could not be known for certain by the until the text was finalised at working group level on 12 June. The Regulation was finally adopted by the Council on 15 June and came into force on 17 June. This is the earliest we could have revoked the licences. I accept that the fact the licences were not revoked immediately after that date was an oversight, and that we should have acted more quickly following the entry into force of the Regulation.

Since that time we have reviewed our procedures to ensure that revocations take place as soon as possible after the adoption of any EU sanctions or other restrictive measures. For example, following the decision at the 21 August Foreign Affairs Council to suspend certain export licensing for Egypt, we reviewed and suspended 48 extant licences by 28 August.

5. Clarification of earlier remarks on export of the chemicals

There is no contradiction between my letter of 10 April and the statements on 2 and 3 September, though I can see there was scope for confusion. Let me explain why.

As you know, a Standard Individual Export licence (SIEL) permits the export of a specified quantity of items to a named recipient and is usually valid for up to 2 years. The licence is valid until the full quantity of items is shipped — at which point it is said to be "exhausted" — or until the 2-year validity period is reached — at which point it is said to be "expired". A licence which neither exhausted nor expired is "extant". An extant licence is therefore one which is wholly or partially unused and of course only an extant licence can be revoked. The licensing database (SPIRE) shows a licence's status, but for extant licences it does not show with any certainty what quantity — if any — has been shipped or what quantity remains to be shipped.

My statement of 10 April the "unfortunately, we do not have data showing what quantities of chemicals covered by these SIELs had already been exported" was meant to reflect this uncertainty. It was not meant to suggest that we had actual evidence that some quantities has actually been exported. We had no such evidence, and as my answer to point 1.7 above makes clear, no chemicals were in fact exported.

To avoid confusion in the future, we will, when revoking licences, always ask HMRC to check its records and we will contact the exporter directly to seek confirmation of licence use. We adopted this approach when we recently revoked export licences for Egypt.

6. Details of previous export licences.

The five licences for sodium fluoride that I referred to in my letter of 10 September are the only other licences granted since 2003 for the export to Syria of chemicals included on the Australia Group chemical weapons precursor list and listed in Annex 1 of Council regulation 428/2009. Information regarding these five licences is given in Annex 1 to this letter. In each case the end-use was for the manufacture of toothpaste.

7. Countries holding stockpiles of chemical weapons

There are four states that have acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention, have declared their stockpiles, and are now participating in OPCW-verified destruction programmes: Iraq, Libya, Russia and the United States. The information requested in respect of these states is at Annex 2.

not

Please note that all chemicals included on the Australia Group chemical weapons precursor list are included in entry 1C350 of Annex I to Council Regulation 428/2009, with the exception of 3 chemicals which are listed at ML7c1 and ML7c2 of the Military List. Furthermore some chemical weapons precursors not included on the Australia Group list are listed at entry 1C450 of Annex I of Council regulation 428/2009. Annex 3 therefore includes all licences granted for the supply to the 10 states named above of chemicals listed in entries 1C350, 1C450, ML7c1 and ML7c2. Note also that all chemicals listed in entry 1C350 may be exported to the USA under the terms of the EU General Export Authorisation No. EU001. This accounts for the relatively small number of individual licences granted for the USA.

Your letter of 11 September.

All the information you requested in your letter of 11 September — with the exception of the exporter names which I am not disclosing for the reasons given above — is included in Annex 1.

Conclusions

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Annex 1 — Details of 5 licences for export to Syria of sodium fluoride granted between 2004 and 2010

[All the information in Annex I is incorporated into the Table on page 253 headed "British Government approvals of dual-use, i.e. civil or military use, chemicals to Syria 2004-2012" which gives all the publicly available information about all 7 of the Government approved licences.]

Annex 2 — details of licences granted to specified destinations for chemicals listed in the Australia Group chemical weapons precursors list and/or listed in Annex I of Council regulation 428/2009

Destination Good Rating Chemical name Goods Quantity Total Goods
Value (£)
Date licence granted

1 Burma 1C350.43 Sodium Fluoride 500g 19.4 15/08/2005

2 DPRK 1C350.50 Sodium sulphide 500g 8.15 04/02/2003

3 Egypt 1C350.24 Hydrofluoric acid 200L 1262 25/04/2003

4 Egypt 1C350.24 Hydrofluoric acid 1200L 11844 25/04/2006

5 Egypt 1C350.43 Sodium Fluoride 1000kg 17600 06/08/2007

6 Egypt 1C350.46 Polyethanolamine 1025L 2480 08/06/2009

7 Egypt 1C350.24 Hydrofluoric acid 1000L 6128 01/10/2009

8 Egypt 1C350.24 Hydrofluoric acid 50L 304.2 06/01/2011

9 Egypt 1C350.43 Sodium Fluoride 300kg 2715 30/08/2011

10 Egypt 1C350.43 Sodium Fluoride 200kg 1810 25/11/2011

11 Egypt 1C350.43 Sodium Fluoride 2000kg 18100 17/11/2011

12 Egypt 1C350.24 Hydrofluoric acid 66L 6.5 16/11/2012

13 Egypt 1C350.43 Sodium Fluoride 25kg 270 25/03/2013

14 Egypt 1C350.43 Sodium Fluoride 2000kg 8000 19/04/2013

15 Egypt 1C350.43 Sodium Fluoride 6000kg 30000 10/052013

16 Iraq 1C350.43 Sodium Fluoride 50g 13.57 17/04/2008

17 Israel 1C350.16 Dimethylamine 600 tonnes 275000 14/11/2003

18 Israel 1C350.46 Polyethanolamine 120 tonnes 39000 18/03/2004

19 Israel 1C450a5 Cyanogen Chloride 1kg 5500 08/04/2005

20 Israel 1C350.46 Polyethanolamine 200 tonnes 170000 11/10/2005

21 Israel 1C350.24 Hydrogen Fluoride 32.4kg 660 08/10/2009

22 Israel 1C350.24 Hydrogen Fluoride 32.4kg 660.98 29/01/2010

23 Israel 1C350.9 Thionyl chloride 500ml 33.67 04/04/2013

24 Libya 1C350.24 Hydrofluoric acid 100L 1796 06/02/2003

25 Libya 1C450b8 Methyldiethanolamine 64000kg 134824.01 18/08/2003

26 Libya 1C350.24 Hydrofluoric acid 10L 271.8 12/05/2004

27 Libya 1C350.24 Hydrofluoric acid 200L 2400 24/05/2004

28 Libya 1C350.24 Hydrofluoric acid 100L 958.82 18/06/2004

29 Libya 1C350.24 Hydrofluoric acid 3000ml 50.58 07/06/2005

30 Libya 1C350.45 Sodium cyanide 3kg 621 07/04/2006

31 Libya 1C350.24 Hydrofluoric acid 6L 115.68 03/04/2006

32 Libya 1C350.24 Hydrofluoric acid 20L 331.4 28/07/2006

33 Libya 1C350.14 Potassium Fluoride 500g 125.61 05/02/2008

34 Libya 1C350.24 Hydrofluoric acid 6L 46.87 11/07/2008

35 Libya 1C350.46 Triethanolamine 1L 21.46 04/08/2008

36 Libya 1C350.24 Hydrofluoric acid 1L 27.30 12/08/2009

1C350.43 Sodium Fluoride 1kg 31.34

37 Libya 1C350.24 Hydrofluoric acid 10L 472.3 12/12/2012

38 Russia 1C350.17 Diethyl ethyl phosphonate 6kg 300 28/01/2004

39 Russia 1C450b4 2-Diethylaminoethyl chloride hydrochloride 140kg 1903.19 02/12/2013

40 Russia 1C350.43 Sodium Fluoride 2700kg 10500 01/04/2004

41 Russia 1C350.14 Potassium Fluoride 6400kg 12837.5 29/10/2004

42 Russia 1C350.43 Sodium Fluoride 10000kg 38900 19/11/2004

43 Russia IC350.14 Potassium Fluoride 1600kg 3209.4 10/02/2005

44 Russia 1C350.2 Phosphoryl Chloride 1.5L 1469.59 28/09/2005

45 Russia 1C350.43 Sodium Fluoride 25000kg 52567 11/11/2005

46 Russia IC350.14 Potassium Fluoride 20kg 2 17/11/2005

1C350.14 Potassium Fluoride 20kg 2

47 Russia 1C450b4 2-(Diethylamino)ethyly chloride hydrochloride 700kg 8750 08/02/2006

48 Russia 1C350.14 Potassium Fluoride 20000kg 28300 1-/01/2006

49 Russia 1C450b1 Dilsopropyl methylphosphonate 100g 71 21/02/2006

50 Russia 1C350.14 Potassium Fluoride 19000kg 39235 15/05/2006

51 Russia 1C350.14 Potassium Fluoride 28400kg 58646 11/07/2006

52 Russia 1C350.43 Sodium Fluoride 45000kg 175050 15/08/2006

53 Russia 1C350.14 Potassium Fluoride 19200kg 39744 31/08/2007

54 Russia 1C350.14 Potassium Fluoride 20kg 257 12/10/2007

55 Russia 1C350.43 Sodium Fluoride 45000kg 175050 09/01/2008

56 Russia 1C450b4 2-(Diethylamino)ethyly chloride hydrochloride 1000kg 12650 19/03/2008

57 Russia 1C450b4 2-(Diethylamino)ethyly chloride hydrochloride 1000kg 12400 10/06/2008

58 Russia 1C350.3 Dimethyl methylphosphonate 10kg 624 26/01/2009

59 Russia 1C450b4 2-(Diethylamino)ethyly chloride hydrochloride 500kg 6200 15/01/2009

60 Russia 1C350.48 Disopropylamine 100L 662 23/03/2009

61 Russia 1C450b4 2-(Diethylamino)ethyly chloride hydrochloride 1000kg 15500 11/05/2009

62 Russia 1C350.43 Sodium Fluoride 45000kg 123750 07/09/2009

63 Russia 1C450b4 2-(Diethylamino)ethyly chloride hydrochloride 1000kg 15500 17/03/2010

64 Russia 1C350.43 Sodium Fluoride 45000kg 123750 13/04/2010

65 Russia 1C450b4 2-(Diethylamino)ethyly chloride hydrochloride 1000kg 15500 11/05/2009

66 Russia 1C450b4 2-(Diethylamino)ethyly chloride hydrochloride 2000kg 31000 29/09/2010

67 Russia 1C450b4 2-(Diethylamino)ethyly chloride hydrochloride 50kg 1100 09/02/2011

68 Russia 1C350.43 Sodium Fluoride 45000kg 145332 01/08/2011

69 Russia 1C450b4 2-(Diethylamino)ethyly chloride hydrochloride 2000kg 33000 14/10/2011

70 Russia 1C450b4 2-(Diethylamino)ethyly chloride hydrochloride 2500kg 38750 30/07/2012

71 Russia 1C350.43 Sodium Fluoride 45000kg 140445 07/03/2013

72 Russia 1C450b4 Diethylaminoethylchloride hydrochloride 3500kg 42000 10/05/2013

73 USA 1C350.41 Mixture of Potassium hydrogen difluoride and hydrogen fluoride 350kg 2768.5 28/01/2003

74 USA 1C350.46 Polyethanolamine 1,560,000kg 450000 10/11/2003

75 USA 1C350.48 Disopropylamine 34800kg 45600 21/07/2005

76 USA 1C350.24 Hydrogen Fluoride 500000kg 850000 17/08/2010

508. The letter to the Chairman of the Business Secretary of 11 October 2013 immediately above constituted a revised version of his original reply dated 4 October 2013, because the Business Secretary had been informed that the original contained a statement that may be misleading. The statement in question related to one of the named end-users in Syria of UK Government approved exports of dual-use chemicals - Awad Ammora. The Business Secretary explained this revision in a further letter to the Chairman of the Committees on 11 October 2013 which read as follows:

I wrote to you on 4 October in response to your letters of the 9 and 11 September. I am now sending you a revised version of my response. I have been informed that the original contained a statement that may be misleading. I want to be completely open with the committee over this sensitive issue and I am therefore sharing my latest information with you.

I refer to the section of my letter ("1. Points raised in previous correspondence"), specifically point 6 ("Extent to which the end-user is under the influence of the Syrian Government").

The closing sentence of my original letter reads, "The Government was aware of these reports when the licences were granted in 2012 and appropriate checks were carried out which confirmed that there were no grounds for refusing these licence applications". This refers to media reports about the end user for the licences issued in January 2012.

471

The checks and media reports to which the Business Secretary refers immediately above related to the Syrian company Awad Ammora. The Business Secretary's original description of these media reports are in paragraph 507 above.

509. On 23 October 2013 the Chairman of the Committees wrote a further letter to the Business Secretary as follows:

Thank you for your letter of 11 October in reply to my letters of 9 and 11 September on the licence approvals given by both the present and previous Governments between 2004 and 2012 for the export of dual-use chemicals to Syria which could be used as precursor chemicals for the manufacture of chemical weapons, including sarin.

The Committees on Arms Export Controls will be pursuing further a number of issues raised by the information in your reply. However, there is one answer you gave that I must take up with you immediately as it is of significance not just for the Committees' current inquiry but for the House of Commons as a whole. It is your refusal to provide the Committees with the names of the companies who were given Government licence approval to export to Syria the dual-use chemicals sodium fluoride and potassium fluoride, which can be used to manufacture sarin.

Under Standing Orders, House of Commons Select Committees are empowered "to send for persons, papers and records" (S.O. 152(4)). The effect of your decision to refuse to provide the Committees with the names of the companies concerned is to deny the Committees the ability to take Evidence from those companies.

Your reply of 11 October in my view provides no substantive justification for refusing to provide the Committees with the names of the companies.

The Committees fully accept that the companies concerned, in applying for export licences for the export of these dual-use chemicals to Syria, were acting in an entirely proper way.

With regard to "possible reputational damage", the prime object of the Committees' scrutiny of this key issue, is not the companies but the Government—your own Department in particular.

There is no way that revealing the names of these companies will be prejudicial to their future exports of sodium fluoride and potassium fluoride to Syria. An EU embargo on the export of these chemicals to Syria is now in place. The Prime Minister revealed on 29 August 2013 that there had been at least 14 previous uses of chemical weapons in Syria prior to the appalling attack on 21 August. It is self-evident that there are not going to be any further British Government approvals for the export of sodium fluoride or potassium fluoride to Syria for the foreseeable future.

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510. The Business Secretary replied to the Chairman of the Committees further on 25 October 2013 explaining his reasons for not disclosing the names of the British companies which applied for the licences to supply dual-use chemicals to Syria as follows:

Thank you for your letter of the 23 October about the disclosure of the names of the exporters granted licences for dual use chemicals for Syria between 2004 and 2012.

In deciding whether to disclose the names of the exporters we thought it was important to establish whether they were willing to be publicly interrogated on this issue, given that they had shared information with us on a confidential basis. We used the framework provided by the Freedom of Information (FoI) Act as a basis on which to make this decision.

Two of the three exporters raised compelling objections. In particular they argued, and we agreed, that they were reputable British companies that had done nothing wrong. Specifically they were engaging in the legitimate trade of sodium fluoride used for the manufacture of toothpaste, not chemical weapons. One company cited the potential risk of physical danger to their employees both in the UK and in their US parent company. They also cited commercial confidentiality and reputational damage which might have an impact on their financial interests. I judged on this basis that the balance of the argument was not in favour of public disclosure in this case.

473

511. In the Westminster Hall debate on 21 November 2013 Ann McKechin MP noted that the Government's export ban of dual-use chemicals to Syria had been implemented a couple of months after the original decision to grant the export licences. She questioned the manner in which the original decision to grant the two licences in January 2012 had been made. She commented:

474

In his reply to the debate the Business Minister, Michael Fallon, said:

475

He continued by saying: "The exporter has confirmed that shipments were not made prior to those sanctions coming into force, so no goods were actually exported under those licences."[476] The Minister stated:

477

512. When the Committees questioned the Business Secretary, in the Oral Evidence session on 18 December 2013, about his Department's process of approving the two licences for dual-use chemicals to Syria in January 2012 he said:

478

513. When the Foreign Secretary was asked about the licence approval process for the two licences for dual-use chemicals to Syria in January 2012, and specifically that at the time of the approval Syria was known to be major holder of chemical weapons, the chemicals were precursors for the production of sarin gas, that Syria was not a signatory, or had not ratified, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and that a civil war was in progress in Syria at the time, why the licence had been approved he said: "These were considered, and I think considered correctly, by officials at the time, because they were not covered by the sanctions at the time."[479] When asked specifically about the dual-use chemicals being precursor for sarin gas he replied: "These would not be considered by Ministers at the time."[480]

514. On 20 January 2014 the Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Business Secretary asking if he had reconsidered providing the names of the companies who had been granted licences for dual-use chemicals to Syria to enable the Committees to take evidence in public from those companies. The text of the letter was as follows:

At your Oral Evidence session with the Committees on December 18, I put to you the reasons why we would wish you to reconsider your prohibition on the companies that were given licence approval to export dual-use chemicals to Syria by both the present and the previous Government giving evidence in public to the Committees. You said that you would reflect on this.

481

The Business Secretary replied to the Chairman of the Committees on 3 February 2014. The section of his letter referring to the names of the companies granted licences for dual-use chemicals for Syria was as follows:

Thank you for your letter of 20 January 2014 about the names of the companies granted licences to export dual-use chemicals to Syria.

I have of course given further consideration to my earlier decision not to make public the names of the companies granted licences to export sodium fluoride and potassium fluoride to Syria between 2004 and 2012. In doing so I have reviewed the arguments put forward by you and your Committee, as well as the companies themselves, regarding the harm to their legitimate commercial interests that disclosure might cause, and the potential harm to employees. I find that these latter arguments remain compelling. I have also taken account of the fact that export licence applications are made in confidence. As a result, I still believe that on balance the argument is not in favour of public disclosure.

482

515. With regard to the Business Secretary's claim that he had to act within the framework of the Freedom of Information Act,[483] the Committees took advice from the Clerk of the House who confirmed "that House of Commons Select Committees are not governed or circumscribed by the Freedom of Information Act with regard to the evidence they seek in the course of their inquiries."[484]

516. The Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Business Secretary on 6 March 2014 as follows:

Thank you for your letter of January 3 (assumed to be in error for February 3 when it was received).

It is regrettable that you continue to refuse to put into the public domain the names of the companies that were given UK Government approval to export to Syria dual-use chemicals which could be used as precursor chemicals in the manufacture of sarin. The effect of your decision, as you are clearly aware, is to prevent the Committees on Arms Export Controls from taking Oral Evidence in public from the companies concerned.

Given the position you have adopted the Committees will therefore be taking Evidence from the companies "in camera" as you have proposed.

The information already obtained by the Committees regarding the 7 Government approved export licences for dual-use chemicals to Syria is set out in the Table below.

British Government approvals of exports of dual-use, i.e. civil or military use, chemicals to Syria 2004-2012

Date of licence approval Type of chemical Qty (kg) Value (£) Usage Stated end-use Stated end-user

1 15/7/2004 Sodium Fluoride 50 228.5 Unknown - No records available Manufacture of toothpaste MADA for Industry & Commerce

2 28/9/2005 Sodium Fluoride 2,000 6,220 2,000kgs exported - but not known on which date or in how many shipments as records no longer available Manufacture of toothpaste Kaadan &Sioufi

3 15/3/2007 Sodium Fluoride 50 695 Unknown - No records available Manufacture of toothpaste MADA for Industry & Commerce

4 3/2/2009 Sodium Fluoride 2,000 6,220 Five shipments totalling 2,000kg:
13/2/2009 - 150kg
18/6/2009 - 1,000kg
15/4/2009 - 100kg
3/7/2009 - 100kg
13/1/2011 - 650kg
Manufacture of toothpaste Kaadan &Sioufi

5 11/5/2010 Sodium Fluoride 50 345 One shipment of 50kg on 16/8/2010 Manufacture of toothpaste MADA for Industry & Commerce

6 17/1/2012 Sodium Fluoride 1,000 10,000 No shipments made Metal finishing of aluminium profiles for aluminium showers, window frames Awad Ammora Co. & Partners, Nashabia, Damascus, Syria

7 18/1/2012 Potassium fluoride 1,000 10,200 No shipments made Metal finishing of aluminium profiles for aluminium showers, window frames Awad Ammora Co. & Partners, Nashabia, Damascus, Syria

Sources: Written Answer from the Business Minister Mark Prisk to the Chairman of CAEC, Sir John Stanley, on 27 March 2012, col. 1137W and the letters from Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable, to the Chairman of CAEC, Sir John Stanley, dated 4 October 2013 (Ev w162) and 11 October 2013 (Ev w173).

485

The Business Secretary's reply of 25 March 2014 providing the names of the companies concerned was marked "CONFIDENTIAL" and cannot therefore be published.

517. The Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Foreign Secretary on 24 April 2014 requesting clarification about the Government's refusal to release information about what precursor chemicals that have been or could be used for the manufacture of chemical weapons had been declared by the Syrians. The text of the letter was as follows:

In the Oral Evidence you gave to the Foreign Affairs Committee on March 18 on Syria, we had the following exchange:

Q19 Sir John Stanley

Mr Hague:

Notwithstanding your reply, you declined to provide the information I had requested. In your follow-up letter to the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee you said: "Sir John Stanley asked for details of precursor chemicals that have been or could be used for the manufacture of chemical weapons that have now been declared by the Syrians. This information is proliferation sensitive and classified under the Chemical Weapons Convention's confidentiality regime, so I cannot include it in a letter."

I fail to understand how the withholding of this information can be justified on grounds of confidentiality given the following two factors.

First, the precursor chemicals that can be used for the manufacture of chemical weapons have been put by Governments into the public domain internationally for many years. For example they are listed in EU Council Regulation (EC) No 2432/2001 of 20 November 2001 amending and updating Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports of dual-use items and technology and are also listed in the Australia Group Export Control List: Chemical Weapons Precursors.

Second, Ministers have already put a substantial quantity of detailed information into the public domain on the Government's approval of exports of dual-use chemicals to Syria in the period 2004 - 2012 as set out in the Table I attached to my letter of 6 March to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, a copy of which I attach for convenience.

486

[The table attached to the Chairman's letter to the Foreign Secretary is that in paragraph 516 above.]

The Foreign Secretary replied on 4 June 2014 as follows:

In your letter of 24 April you asked me to make public which precursor chemicals that have been or could be used for the manufacture of chemical weapons have been declared by the Syrian regime.

As my earlier response made clear, the information provided by Syria in its declarations to the OPCW is classified under the Chemical Weapons Convention's confidentiality regime.

Article 4 states:

"Each State Party shall treat information which it receives from the Organisation in accordance with the level of confidentiality established for that information." All declarations received by the OPCW are confidential.

For operational reasons and with Syria's agreement the OPCW have put some of this information into the public domain. I attach a table with these details.

Full details of the chemicals listed in the Syrian declaration were provided to you by officials at a confidential briefing on 29 April.

487

Annex

	CHEMICAL NAME	QUANTITY TO BE DESTROYED (metric tonnes)
1	TRIETHYLAMINE	30
2	TRIMETHYL PHOSPHITE (TMP)	60
3	DIMETHYL PHOSPHITE (DMP)	5
4	MONOISOPROPYLAMINE	40
5	DI-ISOPROPYL AMINOETHANOL	5
6	2-CHLOROETHANOL	5
7	BUTAN-1-OL	5
8	METHANOL	3
9	HYDROGEN FLUORIDE	60
10	PHOSPHORUS PENTASULPHIDE	10
11	PHOSPHORUS TRICHLORIDE	30
12	PHOSPHORUS OXYCHLORIDE	15
13	HYDROCHLORIC ACID	45
14	PROPAN-2-OL	120
15	HEXAMINE	80
16	SODIUM-O-ETHYL METHYL PHOSPHONOTHIONATE	130
17	N (2-CHLOROETHYL)-N- ISOPROPYL PROPAN-2-AMINE (SALT)	40
18	N (2-CHLOROETHYL)-N- ISOPROPYL PROPAN-2-AMINE (SOLUTION 23-64%)	90
19	N (2-CHLOROETHYL)-N-ETHYL PROPAN 2 AMINE (SOLUTION 23-64%)	25

518. In his letter to the Chairman of the Committees of 25 March 2014 the Business Secretary stated that there were 3 companies which had been given approval to export dual-use chemicals to Syria since 2004 - 2 companies in the period 2004-2010 and a further company in 2012. The Committees were required by the Business Secretary to keep the names of the companies "CONFIDENTIAL". The Committees took Oral Evidence on 12 May 2014 from two of these companies who were given Government approval to export dual-use chemicals to Syria in the period 2004-2010. The evidence was taken "in camera" in accordance with the pre-condition stipulated by the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, before he agreed to give the companies names to the Committees. Both of these companies turned out to be brokers rather than manufacturers of chemicals in the UK with both companies having single-figure numbers of staff in this country.

519. The Committees used their best endeavours to take Oral Evidence from the third company to whom the Business department, at official level only, had given approval in January 2012 to export the dual-use chemicals sodium fluoride and potassium fluoride to Syria — both of which can be used as precursor chemicals in the manufacture of chemical weapons. However, the company concerned appears currently to have only one member of staff in the UK working as a Personal Assistant. The executive from whom the Committees sought to take evidence was stated by the company not to be in the UK during the entire period from the receipt of the Business Secretary's letter in March 2014 to the finalisation of the Committees' Report in July. The Committees were therefore unable to take evidence from the company in question. The company appears to be a "Brass Plate" company.

520. On 9 July 2014 the Foreign Secretary made a Written Ministerial Statement as follows:

The Historical Role of UK Companies in Supplying Dual Use Chemicals to Syria

The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (William Hague):

- several hundred tonnes of the chemical dimethyl phosphite (DMP) in 1983 and a further export of several hundred tonnes in 1985;

- several hundred tonnes of trimethyl phosphite (TMP) in 1986;

The Export of Goods (Control) Order was amended to control DMP in July 1985, and TMP and HF in June 1986.

488

521. I propose that the Committee conclude that given the fact that Syria was a known holder of chemical weapons and a known non-signatory of the Chemicals Weapons Convention, banning the manufacture or use of chemical weapons, and given also the nature of the Assad regime, the decision of the previous Government to give 5 export licence approvals for a dual-use chemical to Syria between July 2004 and May 2010 was highly questionable.

522. I propose that the Committees further conclude that the decision of the present Government to give 2 export licence approvals for dual-use chemicals to Syria in January 2012 after the civil war had started in Syria in 2011 was irresponsible.

523. I propose that the Committees also conclude that given that:

a) Syria was a known holder of chemical weapons;

b) that Syria was a known non-signatory of the Chemical Weapons Convention;

c) the nature of the Assad regime;

d) that a civil war was raging in Syria;

e) that sodium and potassium fluoride were both listed by the Australia Group and the EU in its Dual-Use Regulations as precursor chemicals in the manufacture of chemical weapons; and

f) the company concerned appears to be a "Brass Plate " one

the present Government's claim that at the time the two dual-use chemical export licences for sodium fluoride and potassium fluoride to Syria were approved in January 2012 "there were no grounds for refusal" is grossly inaccurate.

524. I propose that the Committees also conclude that, given the factors a) to f) in paragraph 523 above, there was a serious failure of due process within the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills in that neither of the licence applications for the export of sodium fluoride or potassium fluoride to Syria in January 2012 was put to Ministers for approval.

525. I propose that the Committees conclude that the arguments advanced by the Government against the Committees taking evidence from the dual-use chemical export licence applicant companies in public were either invalid or outweighed by the public interest that parliamentary proceedings should be conducted in public unless there are compelling reasons for not doing so.

526. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government should state in its Response whether it will adopt a policy of a very strong presumption against approving licence applications for dual-use chemical exports to countries that:

a) are known holders of chemical weapons;

b) have not signed and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention; and

c) are not participating in an Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-verified destruction programme.

and for any proposals to approve such licence applications being put to Ministers for decision.

527. I propose that the Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response whether the OPCW has agreed that further information contained in the Syrian declaration of its chemical weapons and the chemicals used, including precursor chemicals, in their manufacture can be placed in the public domain, and, if so, to provide the Committees with that information.

528. Following the Written Ministerial Statement made by the Foreign Secretary on 9 July 2014 on "The Historical Role of UK Companies in Supplying Dual Use Chemicals to Syria", the Committees also recommend that the Government stets in its response whether the existing export controls over dual-use chemicals need to be widened and strengthened, and, if so, in what ways.

UZBEKISTAN

529. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to Uzbekistan can be found at paragraphs 501-504 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 122 of the Report.

530. The Committees' Recommendation on Uzbekistan in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

The Committees' Recommendation:

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 19 extant UK export licences to Uzbekistan or any goods on the Strategic Exports Control lists gifted, or planned to be gifted, to Uzbekistan:

489

The Government's Response:

The Government is satisfied that none of the currently extant licences for Uzbekistan contravenes its policy as outlined in paragraph 46 above [see the Government's Response to the Consolidated Criteria and EU Common Position above]. However, as was shown during the Arab Spring, circumstances can and do rapidly change, leading to a reassessment of risk and, in some cases, a different decision using the same criteria. In such cases the Government would revoke the licence. The Government's answers to the Committees' Quarterly Questions, which can be found at Volume 2, Annex 1 of the Committees' Annual Report, provide more detail about individual licences.

490

531. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Uzbekistan for body armour and components for body armour are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licencing Criterion: Two.

YEMEN

532. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to Yemen can be found at paragraphs 455-460 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 112 of the Report.

533. The Committees' Recommendation on Yemen in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

The Committees' Recommendation:

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that neither of the 10 extant UK export licences to Yemen:

contravenes the Government's stated policy that: "We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression"; or

is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position

491

The Government's Response:

492

534. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Yemen for acoustic devices for riot control, assault rifles, body armour, components for assault rifles and components for body armour are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licencing Criterion: Two.

Extant arms export licences to the 5 Additional Countries of concern to the Committees

535. In addition to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's 28 Countries of Human Rights concern listed in the FCO's Human Rights Annual Report 2013 (Cm8842) published in April 2014, the Committees have concerns about arms export to 5 additional countries - Argentina, Bahrain, Egypt, Tunisia and Ukraine.

536. Specific evidence given to the Committees in relation to these 5 countries and the Committees' Conclusions and Recommendations in relation to those countries follow immediately below.

ARGENTINA

537. On 26 April 2012, the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, announced a tightening of arms export controls to Argentina in a Written Ministerial Statement. The Business Secretary's Written Ministerial; Statement was as follows:

Export Control Policy

The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills (Vince Cable):

I would like to inform the House of a change of policy on the licensing of exports of, and trade by British persons (trafficking and brokering) in, controlled goods and technology to military end-users in Argentina. Previous policy dating from 1998 required the refusal of licences for exports and trade which would enhance Argentine military capabilities but permitted licences for goods which maintained existing capability. In practice this has meant the authorisation of the export and trade of components for maintenance purposes.

The Government have reviewed this policy in the light of recent actions by the Argentine Government aimed at harming the economic interests of the Falkland Islanders. We are determined to ensure that no British licensable exports or trade have the potential to be used by Argentina to impose an economic blockade on the Falkland Islanders or inhibit their legitimate rights to develop their own economy.

493

538. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to Argentina can be found at paragraphs 469-478 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation at paragraphs 115 and 116 of the Report.

539. The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendations on Argentina in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation:

494

The Government's Response:

495

[The policy stated by the Foreign Secretary in his letter of 6 January 2012 was as follows:

496

[In Oral Evidence on 19 December 2012 the Foreign Secretary said:

"Our policy was changed in response to the steady change in Argentine actions, which have been aimed at harming the economic interests of the Falkland Islands. We have a particular interest in that as the United Kingdom. We expect all countries to take the actions of the Argentine Government into account when considering export licence applications, but they have to make their own assessments of that.

497

The Committees' Recommendation:

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 57 extant UK export licences to Argentina:

b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position

498

The Government's Response:

499

540. Following publication of the Government's United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012 the Committees wrote to the Government asking two questions about Argentina. The questions and answers were as follows:

The Committees' question:

500

The Government's answer:

501

The Committees' question:

Why was the value of arms export licences to Argentina in 2012 nearly 5 times greater than it was in 2011, notwithstanding the fact that in April 2012 the Business Secretary announced that the Government would no longer grant licences for any military or dual-use goods and technology for military end-users in Argentina, other than in exceptional circumstances?

The Government's answer:

502

541. I propose that the Committees continue to conclude that it is reprehensible that the Government, given the relatively recent history of British ships being sunk in the Falklands War by missiles supplied by a fellow NATO member and the statement by the Argentinian Foreign Minister, as reported on 5 February 2013, regarding Argentinian control of the Falkland Islands, when he said "I don't think it will take another 20 years", is unwilling to lobby other Governments to make the same change in arms exports policy to Argentina as that announced by the British Government on 26 April 2012. The Committees recommend that the Government should do so.

542. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response which other NATO member countries, and other arms exporting countries to Argentina have now made the same change in arms exports policy to Argentina as that announced by the British Government on 26 April 2012.

543. Following the Government's arms exports Quarterly Report for July-September 2013, the Committees put the following questions to the Government regarding exports to Argentina:

Given the current political tensions between the United Kingdom and Argentina and the Foreign Secretary's letter to the Chairman of 26 April 2012, the Committees wish know why was an OIEL including artillery ammunition, components for artillery, components for combat naval vessels, components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military radars, components for naval communications equipment, components for naval electrical/electronic equipment, components for naval engines, components for naval gun installations/mountings, components for naval guns, components for weapon control equipment, decoying/countermeasure equipment, general naval vessel components, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military radars, naval communications equipment, naval electrical/electronic equipment, signalling devices, smoke canisters, smoke/pyrotechnic ammunition, technology for artillery, technology for combat naval vessels, technology for decoying/countermeasure equipment, technology for general naval vessel components, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military radars, technology for naval communications equipment, technology for naval electrical/electronic equipment, technology for naval engines, technology for naval gun installations/mountings, technology for naval guns, technology for signalling devices, technology for smoke canisters, technology for weapon control equipment, training artillery ammunition and weapon control equipment approved?

The Government response was:

The OIEL was approved because all items in the licence are for the sole use of a non-Argentinean naval mission and are not to be re-exported or sold for export to a Third Party. We had no Criteria concerns.

I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government in its Response explains:

a) what use the non-Argentinian naval mission has for items such as artillery ammunition and components for artillery;

b) how export approval of the above goods for export to Argentina can be reconciled with the Business Secretary's change of policy on arms exports to Argentina in his Written Ministerial Statement of 26 April 2012 in which he said: "In future no licences will be granted for military or dual-use goods for military end users in Argentina unless there are compelling exceptional reasons to do so"; and

c) why the Government approved the above goods to be exported to Argentina rather than to the country of the non-Argentinian naval mission referred to.

BAHRAIN

544. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to Bahrain can be found at paragraphs 388-397 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 101 of the Report.

545. The Committees' Recommendation on Bahrain in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

The Committees' Recommendation:

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 105 extant UK export licences to Bahrain:

b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position

503

The Government's Response:

504

546. In the Westminster Hall debate on 21 November 2013 the Chairman of the Committees raised the issue of arms exports to Bahrain when he said:

505

In responding to the debate the BIS Minister, Michael Fallon, said:

Since the events of the Arab spring, the Government continue to monitor the situation in Bahrain closely. We assess all export licence applications case by case against the consolidated and the national criteria. The assessment considers all those factors, including the risk of the proposed exports being used for internal repression and in any developing internal tensions.

Since February 2011, we have approved a number of licences for the Bahrain air force, navy and defence force where we have been satisfied that there is no clear risk of items being used in human rights abuses or internal repression. We have refused licences for the Bahrain internal security forces where we have not been satisfied about the risk in respect of internal repression.

506

547. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Bahrain for anti-riot/ballistic shields, assault rifles, components for assault rifles, components for gun mountings, components for machine guns, components for military communications equipment, components for pistols, components for sporting guns, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of assault rifles, equipment for the use of machine guns, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, general military vehicle components, gun mountings, gun silencers, hand grenades, machine guns, military communications equipment, pistols, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for telecommunications jamming equipment, sporting guns, technology for military communications equipment, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, telecommunications jamming equipment, weapon night sights and weapon sights are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licencing Criteria: Two, Four, and Seven.

EGYPT

548. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to Egypt can be found at paragraphs 398-403 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 102 of the Report.

549. The Committees' Recommendation on Egypt in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

The Committees' Recommendation:

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 134 extant UK export licences to Egypt:

b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position

507

The Government's Response:

Annual Report Summary	Rating	Reason for revocation
Components for military communications equipment	ML11	Criterion 2
Components for machine guns	ML1a	Criterion 2
Components for machine guns	ML1a	Criterion 2
Ground vehicle military communications equipment	ML6a	Criterion 2
Ground vehicle military communications equipment	ML6a	Criterion 2

[A complete list of all the Government's Revocations, suspensions, un-suspensions and re-instatements of arms exports licences to Egypt are at Annex 11.]

As referred to in paragraph 94 above [see the Government's Response to the Government's Arab Spring arms export policy review above], the Government also suspended 48 licences on 28 August as a result of the EU agreement of 21 August which announced the suspension of exports which might be used for internal repression. These licences were for a wide range of equipment including spares for helicopters and aircraft, specialist software and communications equipment.

508

550. On 30 July 2013 the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, wrote to the Chairman of the Committees to update the Committees on a number of issues prior to the release of the Government's official response to the Committees' last report (HC 205). The section of the letter relating to licence revocations to Egypt was as follows:

Export Licence revocations for Egypt

As I announced on 19 July I have revoked 5 export licences for Egypt. This followed a review of all extant licences for Egypt in the light of the recent actions of the military and police in crowd control and the possibility of further violent clashes in which the military will play an active role. While at the time the licences were granted they were assessed to be fully consistent with the Consolidated Criteria we judge that there is now a clear risk that the specific equipment in the 5 revoked licences might contribute to internal repression.

The revoked licences were for armoured personnel carrier components, radios and base station, vehicle aerials, machine gun components, components for tracked armoured fighting infantry vehicles and communications equipment for tanks. The armoured personnel carrier components were for the Ministry of Interior, the other equipment was for the Egyptian Ministry of Defence and the Army. The Annex to this letter identifies the 5 specific licences that have been revoked.

The Government did consider a suspension of licensing for Egypt. However it was decided that we were still able to make informed assessments against the Criteria and therefore a suspension was unnecessary.

Annex - Export Licence Revocations for Egypt

Four of the revoked licences were include in the list of extant licences provided to the Committees on 10 May 2013 and reproduced on page Ev 570 of Vol II of the Committees report, as follows:

Application Type Goods (Egypt) Total Goods Value (£)

SIEL (Permanent) components for machine guns 128,662

SIEL (Permanent) components for machine guns 181,820

SIEL (Permanent) ground vehicle military communications equipment 142,880

SIEL (Permanent) ground vehicle military communications equipment 764,850

The fifth revoked licence was for supply of components to Germany for incorporation into other equipment that was ultimately to be supplied to Egypt:

Application Type Goods (Egypt) Total Goods Value (£)

SIEL (Permanent) ground vehicle military communications equipment 3050

509

551. On 23 August 2013 the Export Control Organisation, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, issued a Notice to Exporters announcing that on 21 August, in response to increasing levels of violence in Egypt, the member States of the European Union had agreed to suspend all export licensing to Egypt for equipment which might be used for internal repression. The Notice stated that ECO was currently reviewing extant licences to determine which ones considered to be for equipment that might be used for internal repression, and therefore subject to suspension.[510] On 28 August ECO issued a further Notice to Exporters, announcing the suspension of export licensing for Egypt of any equipment which might be used for internal repression. It stated that following an initial review ECO had suspended 48 extant licences for Egypt.[511]

552. On 10 September the Business Secretary again wrote to the Chairman of the Committees, providing more information relating to the suspension of export licensing to Egypt. The relevant section of his letter was as follows:

Suspension of export licensing for Egypt

At the Foreign Affairs Council on the 21 August EU Member States agreed to suspend export licensing for any equipment which might be used for internal repression and to reassess export licences of equipment covered by Common Position 2008/944/CFSP.

Following advice from the FCO we moved quickly to suspend 48 extant licences (the initial figure was 49 but one was reinstated following investigation). These licences cover a wide range of equipment, including spares for helicopters and other aircraft, specialist software and communications equipment. This followed a decision in July to revoke five licences for crowd control equipment. In addition we have republished a number of Open General Export licences to exclude Egyptian end users.

The suspension applies to new licence applications as well as extant ones and will continue until further notice. This has been communicated directly to the licence holders affected by the suspension and there have been wider communications through a BIS press statement and an ECO Notice to Exporters.

We are now assessing whether any of the suspended licences should be permanently revoked. I expect advice on this in the near future.

The application of the licensing suspension is wide and all activities of the Egyptian Army, Air Force and Internal Security Forces or Ministry of the Interior are being interpreted as ones which might, at this time, involve internal repression. This reflects the decision of the FAC [the EU Foreign Affairs Council] to apply suspension to all licences "which might be used for internal repression" — which you will appreciate is a lower threshold than that set out in Criterion 2.

HMRC is keeping a watch for any attempts to export to these entities, The FCO will continue to monitor the situation in Egypt very closely to determine how long the suspension should remain in place.

512

553. On 25 October 2013 ECO issued a further Notice to Exporters that announced the outcome of the review of extant licences to Egypt. ECO announced that of the 48 suspended licences: 24 had had the suspension lifted as they were not judged that they might be used for internal repression; 7 licences would be revoked as there was a clear risk that the goods might be used for internal repression; and the remaining 16 licences would remain suspended because they might be used for internal repression.[513]

554. In its Written Evidence UK Working Group (UKWG) stated that:

514

555. UKWG did not argue that all licences issued for arms exports to these countries were problematic, however it suggested that "little has changed in terms of UK licensing practice as a consequence of the Arab Spring or subsequent transfer control reviews."[515]

556. When the Committees questioned UKWG in about changes in the Government's licensing practice since the Arab Spring, Roy Isbister (Saferworld) said at the Oral Evidence session on 4 November 2013:

516

He continued:

It would be helpful in cases like this, if the Government think that there is a big enough change to provoke this response, if they not only gave the number of licences being refused, suspended or revoked, but said what is still licensed for transfer to Egypt. We understand that nothing was being licensed to the army, the air force or the Ministry of the Interior, but quite a number of open licences were never suspended. Open licences do not name the permitted end user, so how did the Government know that this equipment was not going to those end users?

517

557. When we questioned UKWG on licence suspensions Roy Isbister (Saferworld) said:

The only case that we are aware of where the suspension mechanism has been applied is Egypt. In that case, it seems that it has been applied to extant licences, which is not how it was explained to us; it also took a long time. As I said, five licences were revoked on 19 July, but the actual suspensions did not take place until 28 August. That is a pretty slow early warning mechanism.

518

558. In the Westminster Hall debate on 21 November 2013 Nia Griffith MP stated that there was a need to re-examine "exactly which arms are being transferred to Egypt, who the end-users are, to what use are those arms are being put and what licences there are for Egypt." She asked the Minister to re-examine those matters and to attempt to set out a clear strategy to ensure that those items are not misused or diverted. She asked what the "UK policy is for arms exports to Egypt, because the situation there is extremely volatile."[519] In responding to the debate the BIS Minister, Michael Fallon, said:

[…] in response to increasing levels of violence in Egypt, the Foreign Affairs Council of the European Union agreed to suspend all export licensing to Egypt for equipment that might be used for internal repression. That is a lower threshold than the consolidated criteria that we applied, whereby the test is whether there is a clear risk that goods might be used for internal repression. The UK fully supported the Foreign Affairs Council decision and, as a precautionary measure, we applied that suspension to all licences to the Egyptian army, air force and internal security forces. That resulted in 47 extant licences being suspended and a hold placed on new applications for those entities.

As the situation in Egypt has become clearer, we have been able to revert to a case-by-case assessment. As a result, following a further review, on 25 October we decided permanently to revoke seven of the suspended licences, because we then judged that there was a clear risk that the goods might be used for internal repression. A further 24 licences were removed from suspension, because we no longer judged that the goods might be used for internal repression. The remaining 16 licences will remain suspended until we are in a position to determine whether they should be revoked or restored.

I am pleased that we took firm action to revoke licences in July and that our precautionary action in the light of the Foreign Affairs Council decision, at a time when we were considering further unilateral action, allowed time for a proper assessment of conditions on the ground, which in turn means that we can now consider each case properly on its own merits.

520

559. Prior to the evidence session with the Foreign Secretary on 8 January 2014 the Foreign Secretary wrote to the Chairman of the Committees. The relevant text relating to the suspension of licences to Egypt was as follows:

Recent events in Egypt highlighted the importance of responding quickly to a deteriorating security situation in a country. This was the first time we have deployed the Suspension Mechanism. In two important respects Egypt was a special case. First, we suspended extant licences as well as pending licence applications; this was an addition to the policy announced to Parliament by the Business Secretary on 7 February 2012, which referred only to suspension of pending licence applications. Secondly, we applied suspension to "equipment which might be used for internal repression". This is of course a lower threshold than Criterion 2 of the Consolidated Criteria, where the test is a "clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression".

521

560. On 24 April 2014 the Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Business Secretary requesting details of the arms export licences to Egypt that had been suspended and/or re-instated or revoked since 14 May 2013 when this information was last obtained from the Department. The text of the letter was as follows:

Egypt -suspended licences

The Foreign Secretary in his letter to me of 6 January provided an update to your own letters to me of 30 July 2013 and 10 September 2013 on arms export licences to Egypt that had been suspended and in some cases subsequently re-instated.

Please could you provide details of all licence suspensions, and of any subsequent revocations or re-instatements, to Egypt made in the period 14 May 2013 to the present.

522

The Business Secretary replied on 14 May 2014 in letter replying to a number of different requests. The section of the Business Secretary's letter relating to Egypt was as follows:

Egypt - suspended licences

On 19 July 2013 we reviewed all extant licences against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export licensing Criteria in lights of the deteriorating situation in Egypt. As a result of this review we revoked 5 Standard Individual Export Licensing (SIELs) because we assessed that the proposed export would be in breach of Criterion 2, i.e. that there was a clear risk that the goods might be used for internal repression.

On 21 August 2013, the EU Foreign Affairs Council stated that the "Member States agreed to suspend export licences on equipment which might be used for internal repression and reassess export licences for equipment covered by Common Position 2008/944/CFSP". This is a lower threshold than that set out in the Consolidated Criteria ("might be used" rather than "clear risk") and as a result we reviewed all extant licences. On 27 August we suspended 39 SIELs and removed Egypt as a permitted destination from 9OIELs (one of these OIELs was reinstated as on further inspection it was judged not to fall within the terms of the EU suspension). A further review was carried out in October; following this review 24 licences were reinstated as our assessment was that there was no longer a risk that the goods might be used for internal repression; two were revoked as we determined that there was a clear risk that the goods might be used for internal repression and that the licences therefore breached Criterion 2. Two had expired since being suspended so no further action was required. Sixteen licences remain suspended, these actions were completed on 25 October.

523

Annex 1

Licence Suspensions and Revocations for Egypt since 14 May 2013

Licence Type	Destination Country	Goods Summary	Rating	Date of action taken	Reason
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	ground vehicle military communications equipment	ML6a	Revoked 19th July 2013	Criterion 2
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	ground vehicle military communications equipment	ML6a	Revoked 19th July 2013	Criterion 2
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for machine guns	ML1a	Revoked 19th July 2013	Criterion 2
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for machine guns	ML1a	Revoked 19th July 2013	Criterion 2
SIEL (Permanent)	Germany	components for ground vehicle military communications equipment	ML6a	Revoked 19th July 2013	Criterion 2
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for combat helicopters	ML10b	Suspended 27th August 2013; Licence subsequently surrendered by exporter
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military aero-engines	ML10d	Suspended 27th August 2013; Licence expired whilst suspended, no further reviewing required.
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military aero-engines	ML10d	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October 2013
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	software for military guidance/navigation equipment	ML21a	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October 2013
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for combat helicopters	ML10a	Suspended 27th August 2013; Licence subsequently surrendered by exporter, no further reviewing required.
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for combat helicopters	ML10a	Suspended 27th August 2013
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for combat helicopters	ML10a	Suspended 27th August 2013
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for combat helicopters	ML10a	Suspended 27th August 2013
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for combat helicopters	ML10a	Suspended 27th August 2013
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for combat helicopters	ML10a	Suspended 27th August 2013
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for combat helicopters	ML10a	Suspended 27th August 2013
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for combat helicopters	ML10a	Suspended 27th August 2013
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for combat helicopters	ML10a	Suspended 27th August 2013
SIEL (Permanent)	United States	components for combat helicopters	ML10a	Suspended 27th August 2013, Licence Revoked on 25th October 2013	Criterion 2
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for combat helicopters	ML10a	Suspended 27th August 2013
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military helicopters	ML10b	Suspended 27th August 2013
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military helicopters	ML10b	Suspended 27th August 2013
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military helicopters	ML10b	Suspended 27th August 2013
SIEL (Permanent)	Russia	components for military helicopters	ML10b	Suspended 27th August 2013, Licence Revoked on 25th October 2013	Criterion 2
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military helicopters	ML10b	Suspended 27th August 2013
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military parachutes and equipment, military parachutes and equipment	ML10h1	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October 2013
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	general military vehicle components	ML6a	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October 2013
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military combat vehicles	ML6a	Suspended 27th August 2013; Licence expired whilst suspended, no further reviewing required.
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military radars	ML5b	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October 2013
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military radars	ML5b	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October 2013
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	training small arms ammunition	ML3a	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October 2013
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military communications equipment	ML11a	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October 2013
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	military aircrew protective equipment	ML10g	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October 2013
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military training aircraft	ML10b	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October 2013
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military support aircraft	ML10b	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October 2013
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military support aircraft	ML10b	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October 2013
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military training aircraft	ML10a	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October 2013
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	general military aircraft components	ML10a	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October 2013
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military helicopters, military guidance/navigation equipment	ML10b, ML11a	Suspended 27th August 2013
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military helicopters	ML10b	Suspended 27th August 2013
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	military aero-engines	ML10d	Suspended 27th August 2013
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	cryptographic software	5D002c1	Suspended 27th August 2013; Licence expired whilst suspended, no further reviewing required.
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5D002a	Suspended 27th August 2013, Licence Revoked on 25th October 2013	Criterion 2
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a	Suspended 27th August 2013; Licence expired whilst suspended, no further reviewing required.
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Egypt	software for military communications equipment, technology for the use of software for military communications equipment	ML21c, ML22a	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October 2013
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Egypt	aerial target equipment, components for aerial target equipment, components for missile scoring equipment, decoy flares, missile scoring equipment, software for the use of aerial target equipment, technology for the use of aerial target equipment	ML14, ML21a, ML22a, ML4b1	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October 2013
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Egypt	components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for military surveillance aircraft, components for military training aircraft, components for military transport aircraft, components for military utility aircraft, components for military utility helicopters, components for tanker aircraft	ML10a, ML10b	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October 2013
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Egypt	components for military aero-engines	ML10d	Suspended 27th August 2013, reinstated on 28th August 2013
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Egypt	components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for military electronic equipment, ejector seats, equipment for the use of ejector seats, equipment for the use of general military aircraft components, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, technology for ejector seats, technology for general military aircraft components, test models for ejector seats, test models for general military aircraft components	ML10a, ML10f, ML10g, ML11a, ML17n, ML22a, ML4a, PL5017	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October 2013
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Egypt	aircraft bladders, aircraft diaphragms, aircraft gaskets, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft seals, aircraft valve seats, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew breathing equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military support aircraft	1A001c, ML10, ML10b, ML10d, ML10f, ML10g, ML11a, ML15d, ML22a, ML5b, PL5017	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October 2013
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Egypt	components for military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of aircraft missile protection systems, software for aircraft missile protection systems, technology for aircraft missile protection systems	ML11a, ML21a, ML22a, PL5017	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October 2013
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Egypt	components for military radars, components for weapon control equipment, equipment for the use of military radars, equipment for the use of weapon control equipment, software for military radars, software for weapon control equipment, technology for military radars, technology for weapon control equipment	ML11a, ML21a, ML22a, ML5a, ML5b, ML5d, PL5017	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October 2013
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Egypt	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5E002b	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October 2013

561. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Egypt for acoustic devices for riot control, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for military communications equipment, components for pistols, components for radio jamming equipment, components for sniper rifles, components for sporting guns, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, general military vehicle components, military communications equipment, pistols, radio jamming equipment, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for military communications equipment, sporting guns and weapon sights are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licencing Criteria: One, Two and Three.

562. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government in its Response provides an update of Annex 1 to the Business Secretary's letter of 14 May 2014 listing the Government's subsequent revocations, suspensions, un-suspensions and re-instatements of export licences to Egypt.

563. The Committees scrutiny has established that there were 9 countries in Africa and the Middle East to which the Government gave approval in July to September 2013 of Open Individual Trade Control Licences (OITCLs) for goods that could be used for internal repression all with destinations which included Egypt. The Committees questions in relation to each of the 9 countries were:

Ghana: Why were OITCLs approved which included acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for body armour, components for rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition and weapon sights when the destination countries included Egypt?

Mozambique: Why was an OITCL with a destination including Egypt for goods including acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for body armour, components for rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition and weapon sights approved?

Nigeria: Why was an OITCL with a destination including Egypt for goods including acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for body armour, components for rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition and weapon sights approved?

Oman: Why were OITCLs with a destination including Egypt for goods including acoustic devices for riot control, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for rifles, components for sniper rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles and weapon sights approved?

Saudi Arabia: Why was an OITCL with a destination including Egypt for goods including acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for combat shotguns, components for body armour, components for rifles, components for sporting guns, rifles, small arms ammunition, sporting guns and weapon sights approved?

Seychelles: Why were OITCLs with a destination including Egypt for goods including acoustic devices for riot control, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for rifles, components for sniper rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles and weapon sights approved?

Singapore: Why was an OITCL with a destination including Egypt for goods including acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for body armour, components for combat shotguns, components for rifles, components for sporting guns, rifles, small arms ammunition, sporting guns and weapon sights approved?

South Africa: Why were OITCLs with a destination including Egypt for goods including acoustic devices for riot control, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for rifles, components for sniper rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles and weapon sights approved?

Tanzania: Why was an OITCL with a destination including Egypt for goods including acoustic devices for riot control, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for rifles, components for sniper rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles and weapon sights approved?

The Government's response to each of the 9 questions was: "The OITCL was granted for equipment to be used by a private maritime security company for anti-piracy activities." I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response why, when the EU Foreign Affairs Council agreed on 21 August 2013 to suspend export licences to Egypt for equipment which might be used for internal repression, the Government continued to approve OITCL licences for the above goods with Egypt as a destination after that date.

TUNISIA

564. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to Tunisia can be found at paragraphs 449-454 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 111 of the Report.

565. The Committees' Recommendation on Tunisia in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

The Committees' Recommendation:

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 51 extant UK export licences to Tunisia:

b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position

524

The Government's Response:

525

566. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Tunisia for components for military communications equipment, components for military support vehicles, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, military communications equipment and small arms ammunition are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licencing Criteria: Two and Seven.

UKRAINE

Arms exports

567. In response to the deteriorating political situation and increasing violence within the Ukraine the EU Foreign Affairs Council introduced targeted sanctions against certain individuals from that country. On 20 February 2014 the EU Council also agreed to reassess export licences of equipment covered by the EU Common Position on arms exports. As a result of the review the ECO issued a Notice to Exporters on 24 February announcing that all extant licences to the Ukraine were being examined to determine which covered equipment that could be used for internal repression and would therefore be subject to suspension.[526]

568. On 24 April the Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Business Secretary requesting details of the arms export licences to Ukraine that had been suspended. The text of the letter was as follows:

Ukraine - suspended licences

The ECO Notice to Exporters (2014/04) issued on 24 February 2014 announced a review of strategic export licences to Ukraine in the light of the recent levels of violence and internal repression in the country. Please could you provide details of any licences that have been suspended as a result of that review.

Please could you provide details of all licence suspensions, and of any subsequent revocations or re-instatements, to Ukraine made in 2014.

527

The Business Secretary replied on 14 May 2014. The relevant section of his letter was as follows:

Ukraine - suspended licences

On 4 February 2014, in response to the worsening situation in Ukraine, we revoked one export licence. The reason for revocation was that the export was no longer consistent with Criterion 2, i.e. we assessed that there was now a clear risk that the goods might be used for internal repression.

On 20 February, at the EU Foreign Affairs Council, the "Member States agreed to suspend export licences on equipment which might be used for internal repression and reassess export licences for equipment covered by Common Position 2008/944/CFSP". As with Egypt this is a lower threshold than that set out in the Consolidated Criteria ("might be used" rather than "clear risk") and as a result we reviewed all extant licences. On 25 February we suspended 22 SIELs and on 26 February we removed Ukraine as a permitted destination from 5 OIELs. In each case the reason for suspension was that the proposed export was inconsistent with EU suspension. None of these licences have subsequently been revoked or reinstated although three have now expired.

528

Annex 2

Licence Revoked for Ukraine

Date of revocation: 04/02/2014;

Reason for revocation: Criterion 2 (clear risk the goods might be used for internal repression)

Application Type Goods Annual Report Summary Goods Rating Total Goods Value (£)

SIEL (Permanent) body armour, components for body armour ML13 398,620.12

Licences Suspended for Ukraine

1. Standard Individual Export Licences

Date of suspension: 25/02/2014;

Reason for suspension: agreement by Member States at the Foreign Affairs Council of the EU on 20/02/2014 to "suspend licences for equipment which might be used for internal repression".

Application Type Goods Annual Report Summary Goods Rating Total Goods Value (£)

SIEL (Permanent) gun silencers, sporting guns (15), sporting guns (20) ML1 19200

SIEL (Permanent) gun silencers ML1 119000

SIEL (Permanent) gun silencers ML1 140000

SIEL (Permanent) sporting guns (2) ML1 112000

SIEL (Permanent) sporting guns (1) ML1 65000

SIEL (Permanent) sporting guns (1) ML1 69805

SIEL (Temporary) sporting guns (1) ML1 198000

SIEL (Permanent) sniper rifles (1) ML1 2500

SIEL (Permanent) sporting guns (20) ML1 10000

SIEL (Permanent) sporting guns (10) ML1 10000

SIEL (Permanent) components for rifles ML1 6000

SIEL (Permanent) sporting guns (5) ML1 16000

SIEL (Permanent) sniper rifles (3) ML1 16000

SIEL (Permanent) components for sniper rifles, sniper rifles (3) ML1 30000

SIEL (Permanent) sporting guns (2), sporting guns (20), sporting guns (5), sporting guns (6) ML1 37500

SIEL (Permanent) rifles (1), rifles (2), rifles (3), rifles (4) ML1 19588

SIEL (Permanent) sniper rifles (5) ML1 22500

SIEL (Permanent) sniper rifles (3), sporting guns (1), sporting guns (3), sporting guns (6) ML1 36500

SIEL (Permanent) gun silencers ML1 80000

SIEL (Permanent) components for sporting guns ML1 15000

SIEL (Permanent) components for sniper rifles ML1 8400

SIEL (Permanent) body armour, components for body armour, military helmets ML13 346000

2. Open Individual Licences re-issued without Ukraine as a permitted destination

Date of suspension: 26/02/2014;

Reason for suspension: agreement by Member States at the Foreign Affairs Council of the EU on 20/02/2014 to "suspend licences for equipment which might be used for internal repression".

Application Type Action Goods Annual Report Summary

Goods Rating

OIEL (Military / Dual Use) Re-issued sporting guns ML1

OITCL Re-issued gun mountings, gun silencers, small arms ammunition, sporting guns, weapon sights ML1, ML3

OIEL (Military / Dual Use) Re-issued military communications equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, equipment for the production of military communications equipment, software for military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment ML11, ML18, ML21, ML22

OIEL (Military / Dual Use) Re-issued software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, technology for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment ML21, ML22

OIEL (Military / Dual Use) Re-issued software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, technology for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment ML21, ML22

569. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Ukraine for body armour, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of weapon sights, small arms ammunition and weapon sights are currently compliant the decision of the EU Foreign Affairs Council on 20 February 2014 on arms exports to Ukraine and with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licencing Criteria: Three and Four.

Sniper rifles

570. On 24 April 2014 the Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Foreign Secretary as follows:

In your Oral Evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee on 18 March on Ukraine we had the following exchange:

Q7: Sir John Stanley:

Mr Hague:

I attach in Ukrainian a copy of the article that appeared in "Minding Russia" on the internet on 24 February 2014. I also reproduce immediately below what we have been told is the article's translation into English:

Rada Commission Determines Who Shot People in Kiev

Author Voronz, Vsk, 23/02/2014 - 13:22

The Verkhovna Rada [parliamentary] commission to investigate the massacre in Kiev, chaired by Hennadiy Moskal, deputy from the Bitkivshchina [Fatherland] Party, has determined that the sniper rifles with which people were shot in Kiev on the morning of 20 February were purchased for the Crimean Territorial Department of Internal Forces, UNIAN reported, citing a statement from commission chairman Moskal.

This special sub-division was created personally by Stanislav Shulyak, a commander of the Ukrainian internal troops; its commander is Col. Sergei Asavalyuk, Moskal stated.

Vestnik gosudarstvennykh zakupok Ukrainy

Finally, please could you provide details of all UK Government export licence approvals of sniper rifles to Ukraine from the beginning of 2010 giving the same information as in the Table to my letter to the Business Secretary of March 6, a copy of which is attached for convenience, i.e. providing the following information in respect of each licence approved namely: date of licence approval, type of sniper rifle, quantity, value, usage (i.e. how many were exported to Ukraine), stated end-use, stated end-user.

Annex 1 - original Ukrainian article

Êîìèññèÿ Ðàäû âûÿñíèëà, êòî ðàññòðåëèâàë ëþäåé â Êèåâå

Àâòîð Voronz, Âñê, 23/02/2014 - 14:22

Ìîñêàëü Ãåíà

Êîìèññèÿ Âåðõîâíîé Ðàäû ïî ðàññëåäîâàíèþ áîéíè â Êèåâå ïîä ïðåäñåäàòåëüñòâîì äåïóòàòà îò ïàðòèè «Áèòüêèâùèíà» Ãåííàäèÿ Ìîñêàëÿ âûÿñíèëà, ÷òî ñíàéïåðñêèå âèíòîâêè, èç êîòîðûõ áûëè ðàññòðåëÿíû ëþäè â Êèåâå óòðîì 20 ¼åâðàëÿ, áûëè çàêóïëåíû äëÿ Êðûìñêîãî òåððèòîðèàëüíîãî óïðàâëåíèÿ âíóòðåííèõ âîéñê Óêðàèíû.

Îá ºòîì ñîîáùàåò ÓÍ²ÀÍ ñî ññûëêîé íà çàÿâëåíèå ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ êîìèññèè Ìîñêàëÿ.

Ýòî ñïå½ïîäðàçäåëåíèå áûëî ñîçäàíî ëè÷íî êîìàíäóþùèì âíóòðåííèõ âîéñê Óêðàèíû Ñòàíèñëàâîì ¾óëÿêîì, åãî êîìàíäóþùèì ÿâëÿåòñÿ ïîëêîâíèê Ñåðãåé Àñàâàëþê, çàÿâèë íàðîäíûé äåïóòàò.

Ïî ñîîáùåíèþ äåïóòàòà îò ïàðòèè «Áàòüêèâùèíà», áîé½û êðûìñêîãî ñïå½íàçà áûëè îòñíÿòû íà âèäåî æóðíàëèñòàìè, à èõ ðàäèîïåðåãîâîðû çàïèñàíû». Äàííûå î çàêóïêå 80 àíãëèéñêèõ ñíàéïåðñêèõ âèíòîâîê òèïà ÀÂÊ äëÿ äàííîãî ïîäðàçäåëåíèÿ åñòü â «Âåñòíèêå ãîñóäàðñòâåííûõ çàêóïîê Óêðàèíû».

529

571. The Business Secretary replied to the Chairman's letter on 14 May 2014. The relevant section of his letter was as follows:

Ukraine - sniper rifles

Following a thorough search of our records, and having consulted our Post in Kiev and weapons specialists in MOD, I have been unable to verify any of the claims regarding the UK made in the article to which you refer. What I can say is that:

We are not aware of the existence of any UK-made weapon known as an "AVX sniper rifle", and we have no record of having granted any export licence for a weapon described in these terms.

The phrase "AK variant" is routinely used to describe weapons; however these are not made in the UK. The images we have seen from Ukraine appear to show marksmen using Dragonov SVD sniper rifles which are a derivative of the AK series of weapons and are produced by Russia and in other former communist states under licence.

We have no record of ever having granted any export licence where the Crimean Territorial Department of Internal Forces was named as end-user, consignee or third party on the licence application.

Since 2010 we have granted 17 licences for export of a total of 83 sniper rifles to Ukraine. The stated end-use in each case was for hunting or sports shooting and the end-users were authorised gun dealers or private individuals. Information about these licences is given at Annex 3.

The only licence granted for supply of sniper rifles to the Ukrainian government was in November 2000. This was for 10 rifles and the end-user was named as "the Security Service of the Ukraine".

530

Annex 3

Export licences for sniper rifles for Ukraine, 2010-2013

Date Licence Granted	Goods Description	Quantity	Total Licensed Value (£)	End-User
28/09/2010	Stock System, Rifle Calibre .300, Rifle Calibre .308, 700 Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .308	6	15000	Arm Elit
14/01/2011	Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .338	10	36000	Arm Elit
27/06/2011	Hunting Rifle Calibre .308	5	15000	Arm Elit
30/06/2011	NATO Model Rifle Calibre 7.62 x 51	5	15000	Arm Elit
06/07/2011	Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .308, Ammunition Calibre .300, Ammunition	15	113400	Arm Elit
19/08/2011	Hunting Rifle Calibre .308	5	15000	Arm Elit
26/09/2011	Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .308	6	18000	Arm Elit
27/10/2011	Semi Automatic Rifle Calibre .308, Spare Magazine, Suppressor.	3	11605	Arm Elit
14/03/2012	Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .300	1	2500	Arm Elit
15/08/2012	Repeating Target Rifle (6.5x47mm) with 2 spare barrels.	3	1500	Private Individual
21/12/2012	Bolt Action Rifle. Calibre .338	3	16000	Arm Elit
07/01/2013	Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .338 with interchangeable spare barrels in calibre .300 & .308	3	30000	Arm Elit
15/04/2013	Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .308	5	22500	Arm Elit
12/04/2013	Desert Tactical Arms SRS Chassis System with Conversion Kit, Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .308 22" Barrel	6	24000	Arm Elit
23/07/2013	Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .338 with Spare Barrel Calibre .338	3	7000	Private Individual
26/07/2013	Bolt Action Rifle .338	1	5300	Private Individual
24/09/2013	Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .22-250, Bolt Action Rifle Calibre 6.5-284	3	36500	Arm Elit

572. I propose that the Committees conclude that the Government's concerns about the use of hunting and sporting weapons in the disturbances in the Ukraine including those described as "sniper rifles" are welcome.

573. I propose that the Committees recommend that at the Government in its Response provides updated information on UK Government export licence approvals of sniper rifles, and of hunting and sporting weapons, to Ukraine following the Business Secretary's letter of 14 May 2014.

HC (2013-14) 205, para 97

Back

390 Cm8707, p 42 Back

391 HC (2013-14) 205, para 98 Back

392 Cm8707, p 42 Back

393 The Committees made individual recommendations on 16 of the 27 FCO's Countries of concern and the 5 Committees' countries of concern. This recommendation refers to the remaining 16 Countries of concern. Back

394 HC (2013-14) 205, para 100 Back

395 Cm8707, p 43 Back

396 HC Deb, 21 November 2013, col 408WH Back

397 See: HC (2013-14) 205, Ev 209 Back

398 Q 176 Back

399 Q 177 [Richard Tauwhare] Back