11 Arms exports to authoritarian regimes
and Countries of concern worldwide
574. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports
to authoritarian regimes and Countries of concern worldwide can
be found at paragraphs 505-511 in Volume II of the Committees'
previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation
at paragraphs 123 and 124 of the Report.
575. The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation
on arms exports to authoritarian regimes and Countries of concern
worldwide in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's
Response (Cm8707) were as follows:
The Committees' Conclusion:
The Committees conclude that the Government's
answer, in response to the Committees' question, that it is satisfied
that none of its extant arms export licences to authoritarian
regimes and Countries of human rights concern worldwide contravenes
the Government's stated policy to the Committees on arms exports
and internal repression, or the UK's Consolidated Criteria on
arms exports, or the EU's Common Position on arms exports is welcome.
However, the Committees further conclude that the Government would
have done better to have accepted the Committees' Recommendation
in successive Reports that it should extend its arms export policy
review from countries in the Middle East and North Africa to authoritarian
regimes and Countries of human rights concern worldwide rather
than to have disagreed with the Committees' Recommendation and
then to have been obliged to extend its review worldwide in order
to be able to answer the Committees' subsequent questions.[531]
The Government's Response:
The Government notes the Committees' conclusions.
The Government has not conducted a review of all licences to authoritarian
regimes and countries of human rights concern worldwide. The Government's
consistent policy is to review extant licences for a country when
a change in circumstances in that country changes the risks under
the Consolidated Criteria, and to revoke extant licences if they
cross the risk thresholds in the Criteria. The events of the Arab
Spring meant that unusually the Government reviewed extant licences
to several countries concurrently during February/March 2011.
The Foreign Secretary announced a review of policy,
as opposed to individual licences, on 16 March 2011. Although
this review was inspired by events in the Middle East and North
Africa, the recommendations were applicable worldwide and have
now been implemented.[532]
The Committees' Recommendation:
Given that the Government has now acknowledged
that its new arms export suspension mechanism only applies to
licence applications that are still being processed and not to
military or dual-use goods that have already left the UK, the
Committees repeat their previous recommendation that the Government
should apply significantly more cautious judgements when considering
arms export licence applications for goods to authoritarian regimes
"which might be used to facilitate internal repression"
in contravention of the Government's policy, as stated to the
Committees by the Foreign Secretary on 7 February 2012.[533]
The Government's Response:
The Government does not accept the Committees'
recommendation as it made clear in its reply to the Committees'
2011 report (Cm 8079 of 2011) and also its reply to the Committees
of 7 January 2012 (Annex 11 of HC 419, page 267).
The Government's statements have always made
clear that the suspension mechanism does not apply to goods that
have already been shipped - it applies only to licence applications
that are still being processed and to any new applications that
may subsequently be submitted. Once an item has left the UK suspending
or revoking the licence will not result in the return of that
item. For extant licences, i.e. those that are wholly or partially
unused, we have the option of revocation or suspension should
that be deemed necessary.[534]
576. In the Westminster Hall debate on 21 November
2013 the Chairman of the Committees, Sir John Stanley, raised
the issue of the Government's record of arms exports to countries
of human rights concern and the introduction of the suspension
mechanism. He stressed that the Committees had recommended in
their last two Reports that the UK Government should take a more
cautious approach in the approval of arms export licences to countries
of human rights concern. He pointed out that the Government had
had to revoke over 200 arms export licences to countries predominately
in the Middle East and North Africa and that this was "the
clearest possible indication of the extent to which both this
Government and the previous Government misjudged the risks that
they were running in approving those exports in the first place."[535]
The BIS Minister responding to the debate, Michael Fallon, said:
The approach of case-by-case assessment [of arms
export licence applications] that I have set out remains, I believe,
the most effective way of balancing those concerns. There are
often difficult decisions to make, but we follow a well-established
procedure for each application and make the best possible assessment
based on the available evidence at the time. We have a robust,
efficient and transparent system that produces rational decisions,
but I recognise of course that the world is not static and, when
circumstances change in any country, we can and do act.
However, such action—there was one reference
to this in the debate—including revoking or suspending licences,
is not an admission of failure. On the contrary, the fact that
our export licensing system allows us to respond effectively to
changing circumstances is, I suggest to the House, a further sign
that our system works.[536]
577. When the Committees questioned the Foreign Secretary,
William Hague, at the Oral Evidence session on 8 January 2014
about whether the Government should take a more cautious approach
to approving arms export licences to authoritarian regimes he
replied:
We will apply the consolidated criteria, but
we do so with the benefit of experience all the time. There has
been quite a lot of experience in this subject over the last couple
of years, given the number of suspensions and revocations we have
had to make. We apply these things with that in mind, and we are
very conscious of what the Committee has said about this. We are
always cautious on this subject.[537]
When pressed to explain how this caution was manifested
in the Government's approach to arms export licensing, the Foreign
Secretary said:
We are very careful about all the licences. It
is a rigorous process—a process that has been improved over
recent years. It is informed by all FCO information—all
our understanding of the world—about what may happen in
a country; the risk of internal repression, and the risk of regional
or internal conflict. We are able to weigh all those things heavily,
so we use all the information available to us.[538]
578. I propose that the Committees conclude that
the fact that in the last 2½ years alone the Government has
been obliged by changed circumstances to revoke 209 export licences
to 17 countries, and has had to suspend 109 export licences to
3 countries, whilst welcome in itself, indicates that , with regard
to those items of military and dual-use goods that might be used
for internal repression being exported to authoritarian regimes,
the Government's arms export policy is essentially one of reacting
to events and not taking sufficient account of the nature of the
regimes concerned at the point when the decision is made to approve
the export licence or not.
579. I propose that the Committees further conclude
that whilst the Government's assertion that there is "no
evidence of any misuse of controlled military goods exported from
the United Kingdom" may be factually correct with regard
to a lack of evidence, this is not at all surprising and is of
little or no value as an assurance given that for the great majority
of the exported goods concerned — ammunition, small arms,
light weapons, components, communications equipment, surveillance
equipment technology and software, cryptographic equipment, technology
and software, and dual-use goods — it will be impossible
to identify that they are from the UK once the goods have left
the country.
580. I propose that the Committee, therefore,
repeat their previous Recommendation that the Government should
apply significantly more cautious judgements when considering
arms export licence applications for goods to authoritarian regimes
which might be used for internal repression.
531 HC (2013-14) 205, para 123 Back
532
Cm8707, p 59 Back
533
HC (2013-14) 205, para 124 Back
534
Cm8707, p 59 Back
535
HC Deb, 21 November 2013, col 409WH Back
536
HC Deb, 21 November 2013, col 422WH Back
537
Q 171 Back
538
Q 172 Back
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