Annex 1: The Committees' quarterly licence
questions and the Government's answers (2012 Q4, 2013 Q1, Q2 and
Q3)
Following the quarterly publication of the list of
licence approvals, refusals and appeals by the Export Control
Organisation (ECO) within the Department for Business, Innovation
and Skills the Committees have compiled a series of questions
to obtain more information about the licences approved, rejected
or appealed.
Following discussions between the Committees and
Government Departments in 2011 it was agreed that the Committees
would publish the Committees' questions and the Government's non-classified
answers as from Q3 2010. The Committees' questions and the Government's
answers for the period covered by this Report are reproduced below.
Note: The Committees' questions are in normal type
and the Government's answers are in bold italic type.
| Note:
OIEL: Open Individual Export Licence; SIEL: Standard Individual Export Licence; OITCL: Open Individual Trade Control Export Licence; SITCL: Standard Individual Trade Control Export Licence
|
The Committees' 2012 Quarter 4 (October -
December) questions and the Government's answers
The Committees would be grateful for more information about why
the following licences were granted or refused during the fourth
quarter (October-December) of 2012:
Afghanistan: Given the current conflict in Afghanistan
and that Afghanistan was listed as a "Country of Concern"
in the FCO's 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, the Committees
wish to know why SIELs for body armour, components for body armour,
equipment employing cryptography and software for equipment employing
cryptography, and an OIEL for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic
protection were issued.
As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes, the arms embargo
sanctions in place for Afghanistan apply to those individuals
designated under UN Security Council Resolution 2082. Some of
the SIELs and the OIEL referred to above were for equipment to
be used by end users exempt from existing sanctions (e.g. International
Security Assistance Force/Diplomatic Missions/United Nations/recognised
NGOs). There were no other Criteria concerns about these exports.
The SIELs for equipment employing cryptography and software
for equipment employing cryptography were for equipment destined
for civil end use by commercial companies and raised no Criteria
concerns.
One of the SIELs for body armour was for use by a named
civil end user employed in close protection work. There were
no Criteria concerns.
Argentina: Given the current political tensions between
the United Kingdom and Argentina and the Foreign Secretary's letter
to the Chairman of 26 April 2012, the Committees wish to know
why were SIELs issued for small arms ammunition, equipment employing
cryptography and software for equipment employing cryptography
and OIELs for equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment
employing cryptography, cryptographic software and technology
for equipment employing cryptography issued?
As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes, no licences
shall be granted for any military or dual-use goods and technology
to be supplied to military end-users in Argentina, except in exceptional
circumstances. This decision will not affect licences for items
intended for end-users other than the Argentine military.
None of the licences under reference were for equipment
destined for military end users and there were no other Criteria
concerns about these exports.
Azerbaijan: Given the OSCE embargo of 1992 to Azerbaijan,
why were SIELs for cryptographic software and equipment employing
cryptography issued?
As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes, the UK interprets
the OSCE arms embargo for Armenia and Azerbaijan as prohibiting
the export of any military goods or technology to any person,
or to any destination, in Armenia or in Azerbaijan. It has been
UK practice occasionally to make an exemption in its interpretation
of the embargo by approving exports of non-lethal military goods
to humanitarian, media or peacekeeping organisations where it
is clear that the embargo was not intended to prevent those exports
and there is a strong humanitarian case for them.
These SIELs were for the export of equipment destined for
civil and commercial end use. The equipment was not military
rated and thus not covered by the UK interpretation of the OSCE
embargo. We had no other Criteria concerns.
Bahrain: Given the continued concerns regarding recent
human rights violations in Bahrain, why were SIELS for components
for machine guns, gun mountings, machine guns, equipment employing
cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography
and technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography
issued?
Three of these SIELs were for the export of equipment, software
and technology to enable secure communications for a military
end user. Our assessment of these licences was that a secure
communications system would assist in more effective command and
control. The end user's primary responsibility is external security
and therefore we assessed it unlikely that these goods might be
used for internal repression.
The SIEL for components for machine guns, gun mountings
and machine guns was for the export of equipment intended for
naval use or coastal defence by a military end user. We assessed
that it would be unlikely that this equipment would be deployed
in crowd control situations and therefore might be used for internal
repression.
One SIEL was for the temporary export of equipment employing
cryptography so that it could be demonstrated to a government
end user. The equipment was CCTV camera surveillance equipment
that would remain the responsibility of the UK exporter whilst
in Bahrain and was expected to remain there for approximately
four weeks before return to the UK. There were no Criteria concerns.
One of the SIELs for the export of equipment employing cryptography
and software for the use of equipment employing cryptography was
for use in upgrading mobile telephony systems by a commercial
end user. There were no Criteria concerns.
Belarus: Given that the EU adopted restrictions against
Belarus on the supply of arms and related material under Council
decision 2011/357/CFSP on 20 June 2011 and that Belarus was listed
as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2012 Human Rights
and Democracy Report, why was an OIEL for equipment employing
cryptography and software for equipment employing cryptography
issued?
This OIEL was for the export of telecommunications repeaters
for civil end use. These goods were not covered by the EU arms
embargo and we assessed that it was unlikely that they could be
used for internal repression.
Burma: Given the ban on the provision of all arms and related
material to Burma adopted under CFSP 2006/318 and renewed by EU
Council decision 2010/232/CFSP and that Burma was listed as a
"Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2012 Human Rights
and Democracy Report the Committees would like to know details
of the SIEL for equipment employing cryptography that was issued
This SIEL was for the export of equipment for civil end
use in the oil and gas sector and therefore not covered by the
embargo. There were no Criteria concerns.
China: Given the Madrid European Council arms embargo to
China and that China was listed as a "Country of Concern"
in the FCO's 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, why were
SIELs for components for ground vehicle military communications
equipment, military communications equipment, small arms ammunition
and weapon sights, and an OIEL for equipment employing cryptography
and software for equipment employing cryptography granted?
As stated in previous responses to the Committees, the UK
interpretation of the Arms Embargo on China, given in Parliament
on 3 June 1998, is that it applies to:
· Lethal
weapons, such as machine guns, large calibre weapons, bombs, torpedoes,
rockets and missiles. Specially designed components for these
and ammunition.
· Military
aircraft and helicopters, vessels of war, armoured fighting vehicles
and other such weapons platforms.
· Any
equipment which might be used for internal repression.
None of the goods and equipment under reference
was covered by the UK interpretation of the EU Arms Embargo.
The SIELs for the export of weapon sights and
military communications equipment were for goods to be returned
under warranty to the manufacturers for repair and/or re-working
and then return to UK-based users. There were no Criteria concerns.
The SIEL for the export of components for ground
vehicle military communications equipment was for equipment destined
for civil end-use in a satellite base station. There were no
Criteria concerns.
This OIEL was for the export of telecommunications
repeaters for civil end use. These goods were not covered by
the EU arms embargo and we assessed that it was unlikely that
they could be used for internal repression. There were no other
Criteria concerns.
Congo, Democratic Republic of:
Given that Arms sanctions against DRC are currently in place under
UN Security Council resolution 1807 (amended by UNSCR 1857, 1896,
1952 (2010 and 2021 (2011)) and the DRC was listed as a "Country
of Concern" in the FCO's 2012 Human Rights and Democracy
Report, why were SIELs for cryptographic software and equipment
employing cryptography issued?
In all these cases, the SIELs were for the
export of equipment intended for civil end use by commercial companies
in providing network security and/or connectivity. These dual
use goods were not military rated and therefore not covered by
the arms embargo and we had no other Criteria concerns.
Egypt: Given that the
Government previously revoked arms exports licences to Egypt and
the current unrest in the country, why were SIELs for assault
rifles, body armour, components for assault rifles, components
for body armour, components for ground vehicle military communications
equipment, components for military communications equipment, components
for pistols, components for sniper rifles, ground vehicle military
communications equipment, pistols, small arms ammunition, sniper
rifles and weapons sights issued?
Several of the SIELs under reference were granted
for equipment to be used by private security companies (PSCs)
for anti-piracy activities. Due to the increase in
armed piracy covering an area from the Gulf of Aden to the East
Coast of Africa and the Indian Ocean, PSCs are being asked to
provide armed guards by their clients to enable commercial vessels
to operate safely in these areas. Licences for weapons,
ammunition and protective equipment for anti-piracy applications
are considered thoroughly against the Criteria. The
supply of such anti-piracy equipment will only be authorised if
the following strict conditions are met: activity is limited
to vessels which are registered to a Flag State; the PSC
must have signed up to the International Code of Conduct for Private
Security Service Providers and operate under stringent Standard
Operating Procedures (SOPs) and Rules of Engagement for the Use
of Force (RoE) agreed with the appropriate Licensing Authority;
equipment may only be used by personnel of the named PSC; and
restrictions on the number and storage of firearms must be observed
(i.e. all firearms must be stored in secure designated armouries
when not in use).
A SIEL was issued for the export of ground
vehicle military communications equipment. This equipment was
to be used as spares for self-propelled howitzers by a military
end user. Heavy artillery had not been used during any of the
unrest in Egypt which began in February 2011. We assessed that
this equipment was unlikely to be used in maintaining public order.
We had no information that recent military action in Sinai had
been disproportionate and we assessed that this equipment would
not aggravate tensions. Therefore, we did not have sufficient
Criteria 2 and 3 concerns to refuse. In response to the increasing
levels of violence in Egypt, on 21 August all EU Member States
agreed to suspend all export licensing for equipment which might
be used for internal repression. This SIEL was one of the 48 licences
suspended by the Government as a result of this agreement. This
suspension will be kept under review until such time as conditions
in Egypt indicate that it is appropriate to lift these restrictions.
A SIEL was issued for components for military
communications equipment. These were high frequency antennae
and related kits to be used in repair and maintenance of existing
equipment. They were to be used by a military end user who had
a credible requirement to be able to transmit radio signals over
long distances. Although such equipment would be used for military
operations, we assessed that it was unlikely to be used in frontline
operations maintaining public order, where handheld radios would
have more utility. Therefore, we assessed that such equipment
was unlikely to be used for internal repression. We had no information
that recent military action in Sinai had been disproportionate
and we assessed that this equipment would not aggravate tensions.
Therefore, we did not have sufficient Criteria 2 and 3 concerns
to refuse.
A SIEL for the export of body armour and components
for body armour was issued so that a small quantity of equipment
could be sent to a government end user for evaluation purposes.
There were no Criteria concerns as this was for evaluation only.
Three SIELs for the export of components for
pistols and pistols were issued. This equipment was for individual
sporting end use so did not raise sufficient concerns under the
Criteria for refusal.
A SIEL was issued for the temporary export
of components for ground vehicle military communications equipment
and ground vehicle military communications equipment. This equipment
was intercom system units and accessories for use in tanks by
a military end user. As this equipment was for testing and subsequent
return to the UK, we assessed it unlikely that it would see active
service and might be used for internal repression or to aggravate
tensions. Therefore, we had no Criteria concerns.
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region:
The Committees wish to know what assurances have been received
by the British Government that the equipment for the following
SIELs that have been granted will not be diverted to China: anti
riot/ballistic shields, components for military communications
equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment,
technology for military communications equipment, cryptographic
software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment
employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing
cryptography, equipment for the use of weapon night sights and
weapon night sights.
The Government has not sought such assurances.
We take the risk of diversion to China into account when assessing
export licence applications for Hong Kong, including the strong
controls operated there. In some cases of applications for equipment
for civil end use, the exporters openly stated that the equipment
may be re-exported to China. We have minimal Criteria concerns
with the police, prison, customs, immigration or any other security
services that come under the control of the Government of the
Hong Kong SAR. Hong Kong also operates a robust export control
system. Exports of Wassenaar-controlled and certain military equipment
require a licence from the Hong Kong authorities regardless of
whether the goods are for mainland China, Macau or other destinations.
Iraq: Given that UNSCR
1546 (2004) continues the embargo on arms and related material
against Iraq and that Iraq was listed as a "Country of Concern"
in the FCO's 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, why were
SIELS approved for body armour, components for body armour, components
for military communications equipment, equipment for the use of
ground vehicle military communications equipment, equipment for
the use of military communications equipment, equipment for the
use of weapon sights and technology for equipment for the use
of weapon sights issued
The licences under reference were for exports
exempt under the UK interpretation of the Iraq arms embargo (see
Written Ministerial Statement of 11 November 2010).
A SIEL was issued for the export of body armour
for use by personnel protecting diplomatic staff. There were
no Criteria concerns.
The other SIELs under reference were all for
the export of goods and equipment to be used by government end
users or entities authorised by the Iraqi Government.
The SIELs for the export of equipment for the
use of ground vehicle military communications equipment and equipment
for the use of military communications equipment were destined
for use by security services. This equipment would be placed
on armoured vehicles but we assessed there was a credible requirement
for the security services to use such equipment and vehicles in
the hostile environment in which they operated. Therefore we
had no Criteria concerns.
The SIEL for the temporary export of components
for military communications equipment was so that this equipment
could be demonstrated to a potential government customer. Therefore,
we had no Criteria concerns.
The SIEL for the export of components for body
armour was intended for use in protecting the personnel of a commercial
end user operating in the oil and gas sector. Therefore, we
had no Criteria concerns.
The SIEL for the export of equipment for the
use of weapon sights and technology for equipment for the use
of weapon sights was destined for use in marksmanship training
by a security company. Therefore, we had no Criteria concerns.
Italy: Why was an OIEL
for components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats,
components for military aircraft ground equipment, components
for military parachutes, ejector seats, military aircraft ground
equipment, military electronic equipment, military parachutes,
signalling devices, technology for combat aircraft, technology
for ejector seats, technology for military aircraft ground equipment,
technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military
parachutes and technology for signalling devices revoked?
This OIEL was not revoked but Italy was removed
as a destination from this licence when dealing with an application
for an extension. Italy had been a destination on the original
OIEL application but the exporter had not included it as a destination
on the extension application and it was therefore removed from
the licence. For technical reasons this has shown up as a revocation
in the Quarterly Report and the Government is considering how
to address this issue in future Quarterly Reports.
Kenya: Given the imminence
of the Kenyan election, at the time under consideration, on 4
March 2013 and the possibility of political violence associated
with it, why were SIELs for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic
protection, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components
for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for
pistols, components for rifles, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition,
weapon night sights, cryptographic software and equipment employing
cryptography issued? Why was one SIEL for small arms ammunition
granted when another SIEL for small arms ammunition was refused?
A SIEL was issued for the temporary export
of military image intensifier equipment, weapon night sights and
weapon sights to a military end user for demonstration purposes.
We considered that the military had a credible and legitimate
need for this equipment given their role in AMISOM, the African
Union peacekeeping operation in Somalia, and this was consistent
with the stated end use. Although there have been reports of
human rights abuses by the armed forces in Kenya, there was a
lack of clear and unambiguous evidence that they had
been involved in such abuse. We also took into account the
armed forces' culture of accountability and the human rights training
that they have received. Therefore, we did not have sufficient
Criteria concerns for refusal.
There were several SIELs for the export of
equipment employing cryptography. These were all for civil end
use and raised no Criteria concerns.
A SIEL was issued for the export of an all-wheel
drive vehicle with ballistic protection. This vehicle was destined
for civil end use with a commercial company and there were no
Criteria concerns.
Two of the SIELs under reference were granted
for equipment to be used by private security companies (PSCs)
for anti-piracy activities. Due to the increase in
armed piracy covering an area from the Gulf of Aden to the East
Coast of Africa and the Indian Ocean, PSCs are being asked to
provide armed guards by their clients to enable commercial vessels
to operate safely in these areas. Licences for weapons,
ammunition and protective equipment for anti-piracy applications
are considered thoroughly against the Criteria. The
supply of such anti-piracy equipment will only be authorised if
the following strict conditions are met; activity is limited
to vessels which are registered to a Flag State; the PSC
must have signed up to the International Code of Conduct for Private
Security Service Providers and operate under stringent Standard
Operating Procedures (SOPs) and Rules of Engagement for the Use
of Force (RoE) agreed with the appropriate Licensing Authority;
equipment may only be used by personnel of the named PSC; and
restrictions on the number and storage of firearms must be observed
(i.e. all firearms must be stored in secure designated armouries
when not in use).
One of the SIELs issued for the export of equipment
for use in anti-piracy included small arms ammunition. Another
SIEL for the export of small arms ammunition was refused. In
the latter case, the goods were destined for resale by a firearms
dealer. There have been concerns expressed about the lack of
control over small arms from a number of sources including a recent
Kenyan Government report. This includes the discovery of illegal
stockpiles of ammunition. Therefore, we had Criterion 7 concerns
with this application and decided to refuse.
Lebanon: Given that arms
trade sanctions against Lebanon were adopted by UN Security Council
Resolution 1701, of 11 August 2006, and by European Council Common
Position 2006/625/CFSP, why were SIELS issued for the following
items: components for military communications equipment, weapon
sights, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography,
software for equipment employing cryptography and all-wheel drive
vehicles with ballistic protection?
Under UNSCR 1701 a ban on the sale, supply,
transfer or export of arms related material to Lebanon was put
in place.
The arms embargo does not apply to:
(i) The Government of Lebanon (and entities
authorised by the Government of Lebanon)
(ii) UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)
None of the licences under reference breached
the terms of the embargo as all of the equipment was intended
for use by UNIFIL or end users authorised by the Government of
Lebanon.
Libya: Given the arms
trade sanctions adopted by UN Security Council Resolution 1970
in February 2011, that Libya was listed as a "Country of
Concern" in the FCO's 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report,
and that the British Government has previously revoked arms export
licences to Libya why were SIELs for assault rifles, components
for assault rifles, components for pistols, equipment for the
use of assault rifles, equipment for the use of pistols, pistols,
small arms ammunition, cryptographic software, equipment employing
cryptography and software for equipment employing cryptography
issued to Libya?
A SIEL was issued for the export of assault
rifles, components for assault rifles, components for pistols,
equipment for the use of assault rifles, equipment for the use
of pistols, pistols and small arms ammunition. This equipment
was destined for use by an international security company in protecting
diplomatic staff and therefore exempt from the arms embargo.
There were no Criteria concerns.
There were several SIELs for the export of
goods including cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography
and software for equipment employing cryptography. All these
goods were to enable regular commercially available telephony
or broadband services. There were no Criteria concerns.
Madagascar: Given reports
of human rights abuses in Madagascar why were SIELS for assault
rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for assault rifles,
components for body armour, components for pistols, components
for rifles, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunitions and weapon
sights granted?
As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes
the equipment in these SIELs was intended for use in maritime
security. Due to the increase in armed piracy covering an area
from the Gulf of Aden to the East Coast of Africa and the Indian
Ocean, PSCs are being asked to provide armed guards by their clients
to enable commercial vessels to operate safely in these areas.
Licences for weapons, ammunition and protective equipment for
anti-piracy applications are considered thoroughly against the
Criteria. The supply of such anti-piracy equipment
will only be authorised if the following strict conditions are
met; activity is limited to vessels which are registered
to a Flag State; the PSC must have signed up to the International
Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers and operate
under stringent Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and Rules
of Engagement for the Use of Force (RoE) agreed with the appropriate
Licensing Authority; equipment may only be used by personnel
of the named PSC; and restrictions on the number and storage of
firearms must be observed (i.e. all firearms must be stored
in secure designated armouries when not in use).
Netherlands: Why was a
SIEL for NBC protective/defensive equipment refused?
The Government refused this application as
we judged that there was a risk that UK classified material/capabilities
would not be protected and this would be contrary to Criterion
5d. The activities of the intended recipient were not in direct
support of the Dutch Government.
Russia: Given that Russia
was listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2012
Human Rights and Democracy Report at the time, why were SIELs
for body armour, components for body armour, components for sniper
rifles, sniper rifles and weapon sights and OIELS for cryptographic
software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment
employing cryptography and technology for equipment employing
cryptography granted?
Several of these SIELs were for the export
of equipment for sporting and hunting use. Sport shooting
and hunting are popular activities in Russia and we assessed the
stated end use in these applications as credible. Therefore,
we had no Criteria concerns with these applications.
One SIEL was for the export of body armour,
components for body armour destined for use by a media company,
whose employees operate worldwide. Therefore, we had no Criteria
concerns.
Another SIEL was for the export of body armour
for personal use. Given that only one vest was covered by this
SIEL and the end user had a credible requirement to use it, we
assessed there were no Criteria concerns.
The OIELs for the export of cryptographic software,
equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing
cryptography and technology for equipment employing cryptography
were for goods destined for civil end use. We had no Criteria
concerns.
Saudi Arabia: Given that Saudi Arabia was listed
as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2012 Human Rights
and Democracy Report, why were SIELS for components for all-wheel
drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for machine
guns, components for military combat vehicles, components for
military communications equipment, crowd control ammunition, CS
hand grenades, equipment for the use of military communications
equipment, ground vehicle military communications equipment, hand
grenades, machine guns, military combat vehicles, military communications
equipment, military support vehicles, tear gas/irritant ammunition
and weapon night sights granted?
There are legitimate reasons for the Saudi
authorities to have this type of equipment. As stated in
the 2012 FCO Annual Report on Human Rights we assess that the
policing response to protests and demonstrations in the Eastern
Province appears to have been proportionate.
Several of the SIELs under reference were for
the temporary export of equipment to government end users for
demonstration and evaluation purposes. Equipment covered by these
SIELs included military combat vehicles, direct view imaging
equipment, imaging cameras, weapon night sights, weapon sight
mounts, weapon sights, components for machine guns, components
for turrets, equipment for the use of turrets, machine guns, turrets,
weapon cleaning equipment, equipment for the use of weapon night
sights, imaging cameras, military image intensifier equipment,
military infrared/thermal imaging equipment and military support
vehicles. These applications did not raise any Criteria concerns.
A SIEL was issued for the export of CS hand
grenades, tear gas/irritant ammunition and training tear gas/irritant
ammunition to a military end user. This end user had not been
involved in policing demonstrations and we assessed that they
were unlikely to be doing so in the future. Therefore, we had
no Criteria concerns.
A SIEL was issued for the export of equipment
for the use of military communications equipment to a military
end user. This end user had not been involved in policing demonstrations
and we assessed that they were unlikely to be doing so in the
future. Therefore, we had no Criteria concerns.
A SIEL was issued for the export of crowd control
ammunition, hand grenades, illuminators, signalling devices, smoke/pyrotechnic
ammunition, tear gas/irritant ammunition and training crowd control
ammunition to a military end user. This equipment was intended
for operational and training purposes and is also regularly used
in military operations. This end user had not been involved in
policing demonstrations and we assessed that they were unlikely
to be doing so in the future. Therefore, we had no Criteria concerns.
A SIEL was issued for the export of military
communications equipment to a military end user. This end user
had not been involved internal security in the past and we assessed
that they were unlikely to be doing so in the future. Therefore,
we had no Criteria concerns.
Somalia: Given the arms
trade sanctions against Somalia adopted by UN Security Council
resolution 733 in 1992 and amended in 2002 by Security Council
resolution 1425, resolutions 1356 (2001), 1772 (2007), 1851 (2008),
1907 (2009), 1916 (2010), 2002 (2011) and that Somalia was listed
as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2012 Human Rights
and Democracy Report, why were SIELs for body armour, components
for body armour, military support vehicles, cryptographic software,
equipment employing cryptography and software for equipment employing
cryptography issued?
As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes,
the sanctions in place for Somalia provide for exemptions for
supplies of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for
humanitarian or protective use, weapons and military equipment
for the support or use of AMISOM or the United Nations Political
Office for Somalia, or to be used against piracy, supplies and
assistance for developing Somali security sector institutions
or the Transitional Federal Government. Procedures vary: some
exports must be approved in advance by the Sanctions Committee.
The SIELs under reference were for the export
of goods and equipment either for end users or end uses exempt
from the arms embargo, or equipment that is not military rated
and therefore not caught by the UN arms embargo for Somalia.
Whilst Somalia is listed as a Country of Concern by the FCO, the
end users for these SIELs are involved in work attempting to improve
the humanitarian and human rights situation there and we had no
Criterion 2 concerns about these applications.
Sudan: Given that Sudan
was listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2012
Human Rights and Democracy Report, why were SIELs with a value
in excess of £7.3m for cryptographic software, equipment
employing cryptography and software for equipment employing cryptography
issued?
A SIEL for the export of cryptographic software,
equipment employing cryptography and software for equipment employing
cryptography was issued. The goods formed part of a business telephone
system allowing businesses to make and receive telephone calls
and utilize various telecoms type applications to improve business
efficiency. They were to be held in stock by the end user for
resale. The relatively high value of the SIEL was to cover potential
sales volumes over the 2 year period of the licence. We had no
Criteria concerns.
The other SIEL under reference for the export
of equipment using cryptography was issued for communications
equipment destined for use by UNAMID, the UN Mission in Darfur.
We had no Criteria concerns.
Syria: Given the current
internal conflict taking place in Syria and that Syria was listed
as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2012 Human Rights
and Democracy Report, why was a SIEL for components for all-wheel
drive vehicles with ballistic protection and a SITCL for all-wheel
drive vehicles with ballistic protection granted when an OITCL
for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection was refused?
As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes
for Syria in Q4 2012, the EU adopted restrictions against Syria
on the supply of arms and related materiel under
Council Decision 2011/273/CFSP. Although the
OITCL application stated that the vehicles covered by this licence
would be used by various NGOs and humanitarian organisations,
on assessing the application the Government was not satisfied
that there were reasonable grounds to grant an exemption to the
embargo in place at that time. There were also Criterion 7 concerns.
Therefore, the application was rejected.
The SIEL and SITCLs were for the export of
similar equipment for the use of UN agencies. These applications
were exempt from the embargo and there were no other Criteria
concerns.
Zimbabwe: Given that Zimbabwe
was listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2012
Human Rights and Democracy Report, why were SIELs cryptographic
software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment
employing cryptography and technology for cryptographic software
granted?
All these SIELs were for the export of equipment
that was not military rated and with a credible civil end use.
We had no Criteria concerns.
The Committees' 2013 Quarter
1 (January - March) questions and the Government's answers
Afghanistan: Given the
current conflict in Afghanistan and that Afghanistan was listed
as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2012 Human Rights
and Democracy Report the Committees wish to know why SIELs for
body armour, components for body armour, military helmets and
equipment employing cryptography; and a SIEL- Transhipment for
components for combat helicopters were approved.
As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes,
the arms embargo sanctions in place for Afghanistan apply to those
individuals designated under UN Security
Council Resolution 2082. Most of the SIELs
referred to above were for equipment to be used by end users exempt
from existing sanctions (e.g. International Security Assistance
Force/Diplomatic Missions/United Nations/recognised NGOs). There
were no other Criteria concerns about these exports.
Two of the SIELs for equipment employing cryptography
were for equipment destined for civil end use by commercial companies
and raised no Criteria concerns.
Argentina: Given the current
political tensions between the United Kingdom and Argentina and
the Foreign Secretary's letter to the Chairman of 26 April 2012,
the Committees wish know why were SIELs issued for small arms
ammunition, equipment employing cryptography and software for
equipment employing cryptography approved?
As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes,
no licences shall be granted for any military or dual-use goods
and technology to be supplied to military end-users in Argentina,
except in exceptional circumstances. This decision will not affect
licences for items intended for end-users other than the Argentine
military.
None of the licences under reference were for
equipment destined for military end users and there were no other
Criteria concerns about these exports.
Azerbaijan: Given the
OSCE embargo of 1992 to Azerbaijan why were SIELs for cryptographic
software and equipment employing cryptography approved?
As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes,
the UK interprets the OSCE arms embargo for Armenia and Azerbaijan
as prohibiting the export of any military goods or technology
to any person, or to any destination, in Armenia or in Azerbaijan.
It has been UK practice occasionally to make an exemption in its
interpretation of the embargo by approving exports of non-lethal
military goods to humanitarian, media or peacekeeping organisations
where it is clear that the embargo was not intended to prevent
those exports and there is a strong humanitarian case for them.
This SIEL was for the export of equipment destined
for civil and commercial end use. The equipment was not military
rated and thus not covered by the UK interpretation of the OSCE
embargo. We had no other Criteria concerns.
China: Given the Madrid
European Council arms embargo to China and that China was listed
as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2012 Human Rights
and Democracy Report, why were SIELs for components for military
communications equipment, technology for military communications
equipment and technology for military electronic equipment and
OIELs for cryptographic software and equipment employing cryptography
approved?
As stated in previous responses to the Committees,
the UK interpretation of the Arms Embargo on China, given in Parliament
on 3 June 1998, is that it applies to:
· Lethal
weapons, such as machine guns, large calibre weapons, bombs, torpedoes,
rockets and missiles. Specially designed components for these
and ammunition.
· Military
aircraft and helicopters, vessels of war, armoured fighting vehicles
and other such weapons platforms.
· Any
equipment which might be used for internal repression.
None of the goods and equipment under reference
was covered by the UK interpretation of the EU Arms Embargo.
All items not covered by the embargo are assessed
against the Consolidated Criteria.
One of the SIELs for the export of components
for military communications equipment was for equipment destined
for civil end use in search and rescue beacons. We had no Criteria
concerns.
The other SIELs were for the export of technical
information and components to be used in equipment and components
manufactured in China that would then be returned to the UK for
incorporation into the finished product. We had no Criteria concerns.
The OIELs were for the export of dual-use equipment
destined for civil and commercial end use. We had no Criteria
concerns.
Colombia: Given that Colombia
was listed as a Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2012 Human
Rights and Democracy Report, why was a SIEL for anti-riot/ballistic
shields approved?
This SIEL for the export of anti-riot/ballistic
shields was destined for use by a law enforcement agency in protecting
their personnel during operations. As noted in the FCO's
2012 report, the Government does have some human right concerns
about Colombia, but Colombian police all have a high level of
human rights training including anti-riots squads. Furthermore,
our assessment noted the improvement in the human rights record
of Colombian law enforcement agencies in recent years. Therefore,
we assessed that there was no clear risk that this export might
be used for internal repression and we had no other Criteria concerns.
Comoros: Please explain
the justification for the approval of licences for 800 assault
rifles, 150 combat shotguns and 200 rifles to a private maritime
security company for anti-piracy purposes.
As noted in the Quarterly Report footnotes
this SIEL was granted for equipment to be used by a private security
company (PSC) for anti-piracy activities.
Congo, Democratic Republic of:
Given that Arms sanctions against DRC are currently in place under
UN Security Council resolution 1807 (amended by UNSCR 1857, 1896,
1952 (2010 and 2021 (2011)) and the DRC was listed as a "Country
of Concern" in the FCO's 2012 Human Rights and Democracy
Report, why were SIELs for cryptographic software, equipment employing
cryptography , software for equipment employing cryptography and
technology for equipment employing cryptography approved?
In all these cases, the SIELs were for the
export of equipment intended for civil end use by commercial companies
in providing network security and/or connectivity. These dual
use goods were not military rated and therefore not covered by
the arms embargo and we had no other Criteria concerns.
Egypt: Given that the
Government previously revoked arms exports licences to Egypt and
the current unrest in the country, why were SIELs for components
for ground vehicle military communications equipment, components
for military auxiliary/support vehicles, components for military
communications equipment, ground vehicle military communications
equipment and military communications equipment approved?
A SIEL for the export of this equipment was
issued so that a small quantity of equipment could be sent to
a government end user for temporary demonstration and evaluation
purposes. There were no Criteria concerns as this was for temporary
demonstration and evaluation only.
France: Please explain
why a SIEL for components for military training aircraft to France
was refused.
This SIEL was for the export of equipment eventually
destined for export to several African countries. One of these
countries was Ivory Coast and these goods could not be exported
the terms of the current embargo. Therefore, the SIEL was refused
under Criterion 1.
Kenya: Given the imminence
of the Kenyan election, at the time under consideration, on 4
March 2013 and the possibility of political violence associated
with it, why were SIELs for acoustic devices for riot control,
body armour, components for body armour, small arms ammunition,
thunderflashes, assault rifles, components for assault rifles,
components for pistols, components for rifles, pistols, rifles,
weapon sights and components for all-wheel drive vehicles with
ballistic protection approved?
Several of the SIELs under reference were granted
for equipment to be used by private security companies (PSCs)
for anti-piracy activities.
Most of the remaining SIELs were for the export
of equipment to be used by various UN agencies in Somalia and
we had no Criteria concerns.
The SIEL for the export of thunderflashes was
for goods destined for civil end use by a government end user.
This end user had no involvement in policing or security operations
and therefore we assessed that there was no clear risk that these
goods might be used for internal repression.
Lebanon: Given that arms
trade sanctions against Lebanon were adopted by UN Security Council
Resolution 1701, of 11 August 2006, and by European Council Common
Position 2006/625/CFSP, why were SIELS approved for the following
items: all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, body
armour, components for body armour, components for sniper rifles,
gun mountings, gun silencers, military communications equipment,
small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, weapon night sights, weapon
sight mounts, weapon sights, components for radio jamming equipment,
equipment employing cryptography and radio jamming equipment.
As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes,
under UNSCR 1701 a ban on the sale, supply, transfer or export
of arms related material to Lebanon was put in place.
The arms embargo does not apply to:
(i) The Government of Lebanon (and entities
authorised by the Government of Lebanon)
(ii) UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)
None of the licences under reference breached
the terms of the embargo as all of the equipment was intended
for use by UNIFIL or end users authorised by the Government of
Lebanon.
Libya: Given the arms
trade sanctions adopted by UN Security Council Resolution 1970
in February 2011, that Libya was listed as a "Country of
Concern" in the FCO's 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report,
and that the British Government has previously revoked arms export
licences to Libya why were SIELs for anti-riot/ballistic shields,
assault rifles, body armour, command communications control and
intelligence software, components for all-wheel drive vehicles
with ballistic protection, components for assault rifles, components
for pistols, hand grenades, military communications equipment,
pistols, small arms ammunition, software for military communications
equipment and gun mountings approved. Why were other SIELs for
body armour, components for body armour and military helmets refused
when other SIELs for these same goods were approved?
A SIEL for the export of body armour and components
for body armour was issued. A small quantity of equipment was
to be exported for demonstration to government end users. We
assessed that this equipment met an exemption from the sanctions
regime as it would help to meet some of Libya's security requirements.
There were no other Criteria concerns as this equipment was for
evaluation only.
A SIEL for the export of anti-riot ballistic
shields, body armour and components for body armour was issued.
This equipment was destined for use by a government end user
involved in law enforcement. We assessed that this equipment
met an exemption from the sanctions regime as it would help to
meet some of Libya's security requirements. Although we had Criterion
2 concerns about the export of this equipment, recent failures
in policing/security operations had been due to poor organisation
and inadequate equipment rather than systematic abuse. We assessed
that that there was no clear risk that this equipment might be
used for internal repression, and that provision of such equipment
would enable a more measured and effective police/army response.
Furthermore, we did not assess that there was a sufficient risk
of diversion to reach the threshold for Criterion 7.
As noted above a SIEL for the export of similar
equipment was refused. We assessed that this equipment would
probably meet the requirements of an exemption from the sanctions
regime as it would help meet some of the Libya's security requirements.
However, we had other Criteria concerns. This equipment was
intended for export for demonstration purposes and then to be
left in-country with a military end user. Our assessment of this
particular end user led us to have concerns under Criteria 3 and
7. In particular, the intended end user's location in Libya led
to concern that the equipment could be diverted from them to an
undesirable end user and aggravate existing tensions in the area.
Therefore, we refused this application under Criteria 3 and 7.
The other SIELs under reference were for the
export of equipment for use by UN and diplomatic personnel and
therefore considered exempt from sanctions. There were no Criteria
concerns.
Madagascar: What justification
was given for the application for SIELs for 550 assault rifles,
50 combat shotguns, 100 pistols, 100 rifles and 200 sniper rifles
to private maritime security companies for anti-piracy purposes
given that previously SIELs for Madagascar were approved in 2012
for 3100 assault rifles, 550 combat shotguns, 240 pistols and
700 rifles to private maritime security companies for anti-piracy
purposes. Given that reports of human rights abuses in Madagascar
what assurances has the U.K. Government received that none of
these items will not be used for internal repression?
As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes
the equipment in these SIELs was intended for use in maritime
security.
The Government has not sought any assurances
about this equipment being used for internal repression but we
have seen no evidence that PSCs have been diverting equipment
intended for their end use to government agencies or any other
entities in Madagascar. Nor has there been any evidence of UK
supplied equipment being used for internal repression.
Oman: What justification
was given for the application for SIELs for 1800 assault rifles,
150 combat shotguns, 30 pistols and 200 rifles to private maritime
security companies for anti-piracy purposes? What assurances has
the U.K. Government received that these items will not be used
for internal repression?
As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes
the equipment in these SIELs was intended for use in maritime
security.
The Government has not sought any assurances
about this equipment being used for internal repression but we
have seen no evidence that PSCs have been diverting equipment
intended for their end use to government agencies or any other
entities in Oman. Nor has there been any evidence of UK supplied
equipment being used for internal repression.
As the Committees will note from previous responses
on Oman, it has embarked on a programme of comprehensive police
reform and the government has stated that it expects any response
to future demonstrations to be proportionate after isolated incidents
of overreaction early on during the 2011 protests.
Russia: Given that Russia
was listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2012
Human Rights and Democracy Report at the time, why were SIELs
for body armour, components for body armour, components for rifles,
components for small arms ammunition, components for sniper rifles,
equipment for the use of military communications equipment approved?
Most of these SIELs were for the export of
equipment for sporting and hunting use, including the body armour.
Sport shooting and hunting are popular activities in Russia and
we assessed the stated end use in these applications as credible.
Therefore, we had no Criteria concerns with these applications.
The SIEL for the export of equipment for the
use of military communications equipment was destined for commercial
end use in testing civil aircraft. Therefore, we had no Criteria
concerns.
Saudi Arabia: Given that
Saudi Arabia was listed as a "Country of Concern" in
the FCO's 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, why were SIELS
for command communications control and intelligence software,
components for ground vehicle military communications equipment,
components for machine guns, CS hand grenades, military communications
equipment, small arms ammunition, software enabling equipment
to function as military communications equipment, software for
ground vehicle military communications equipment tear gas/irritant
ammunition and technology for ground vehicle military communications
equipment approved?
There are legitimate reasons for the Saudi
authorities to have this type of equipment. As stated in
the 2012 FCO Annual Report on Human Rights we assess that the
policing response to protests and demonstrations in the Eastern
Province appears to have been proportionate.
All SIELs were for equipment destined for military
and government end users. None of these end users had been previously
involved in policing demonstrations and we assessed that they
were unlikely to be doing so in the future. Therefore, we had
no Criteria concerns.
Singapore: Why were SIELs
for radio jamming equipment and telecommunications software refused?
This equipment was ultimately destined for
export to China for use by provincial law enforcement agencies
there. We had Criterion 2 concerns about the export of this equipment
to China given its use for surveillance and eavesdropping, and
the clear risk that it might be used for internal repression.
Somalia: Given the arms
trade sanctions against Somalia adopted by UN Security Council
resolution 733 in 1992 and amended in 2002 by Security Council
resolution 1425, resolutions 1356 (2001), 1772 (2007), 1851 (2008),
1907 (2009), 1916 (2010), 2002 (2011) and that Somalia was listed
as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2012 Human Rights
and Democracy Report, why were SIELs for all-wheel drive vehicles
with ballistic protection, body armour and components for body
armour approved?
As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes,
the sanctions in place for Somalia provide for exemptions for
supplies of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for
humanitarian or protective use, weapons and military equipment
for the support or use of AMISOM or the United Nations Political
Office for Somalia, or to be used against piracy, supplies and
assistance for developing Somali security sector institutions
or the Transitional Federal Government. Procedures vary: some
exports must be approved in advance by the Sanctions Committee.
The SIELs under reference were for the export
of goods and equipment either for end users or end uses exempt
from the arms embargo. Whilst Somalia is listed as a Country
of Concern by the FCO, the end users for these SIELs are involved
in work attempting to improve the humanitarian and human rights
situation there and we had no Criterion 2 concerns about these
applications.
South Africa: Why was
a SIEL for small arms ammunition refused?
This SIEL was for the export of small arms
ammunition to be held in stock for resale. The end user had been
party to a previous export licensing application for similar goods
for onward transmission to Zimbabwe. This had been refused under
Criterion 1 as the goods were caught by the EU arms embargo.
We assessed that there was an unacceptable level of risk that
these goods would be diverted to Zimbabwe in breach of the embargo
and therefore refused the application under Criterion 7.
Sudan: Given that Sudan
was listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2012
Human Rights and Democracy Report, why was a SIEL for equipment
employing cryptography approved?
The SIEL for the export of equipment using
cryptography was issued for communications equipment destined
for use by UNAMID, the UN Mission in Darfur. We had no Criteria
concerns.
Sudan, South: Why was
a SITCL for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection
refused?
This SITCL was to cover the brokering of 2
vehicles from a third country to South Sudan where they were to
be used as demonstration vehicles until sold. We assessed these
vehicles as being covered by the arms embargo currently in place
for South Sudan. As there was no way of establishing who the
eventual end users of these vehicles would be, it was not possible
to establish whether the end user would be exempt under the terms
of the embargo. Therefore, we refused this licence under Criterion
1 and also Criterion 7 as there was a risk that the vehicles might
be diverted.
Turkey: Why was an incorporated
SIEL for components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment
refused?
This SIEL application was for the export of
equipment ultimately destined for use by the government of Turkmenistan.
The application was refused under Criterion 2.
United Arab Emirates: Why
was an OIEL for civil NBC protection equipment, civil riot control
agent protection equipment, components for civil NBC protection
equipment, components for civil riot control agent protection
equipment, components for NBC protective/defensive equipment,
equipment for the use of NBC protective/defensive equipment and
NBC protective/defensive equipment refused?
There were potential Criterion 2 concerns about
several destinations on this OIEL including the UAE. Some of
the equipment in this OIEL might be used for internal repression
and an open licence would not allow for the necessary degree of
scrutiny required i.e. specific end use and end user.
Zimbabwe: Given that Zimbabwe
was listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2012
Human Rights and Democracy Report, why were SIELs for cryptographic
software and equipment employing cryptography approved?
All these SIELs were for the export of equipment
that was not military rated and with a credible civil end use.
We had no Criteria concerns.
The Committees' 2013 Quarter
2 (April - June) questions and the Government's answers
Israel: As noted in footnote
4 of the entry for Israel in the Country Pivot Report and with
reference to the list of extant licences supplied to the Committee
by the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills
on 10 May 2013, a licence for equipment employing cryptography
and software for equipment employing cryptography to the value
of £7,765,450,000 was granted. The Committees wish to know
what equipment this is, what are the uses of this equipment and
who are the recipients of this equipment.
This licence permits the export of equipment
and software for building public mobile phone networks in residential
areas and for small businesses. These items are subject
to export control because of their encryption (information security)
capability. This capability is a standard feature of the mobile
phone network. The goods are for purely commercial end use.
The value of this licence does appear unusually
high and may not represent a realistic goal on the part of the
exporter. However the exporter confirmed that this was based on
an expectation of a very large number of orders over the two-year
validity period of the licence. Given the nature of the goods
and the end-use this was not considered to be of concern.
Afghanistan: Given the
current conflict in Afghanistan, the arms embargo sanctions under
UN Security Council Resolution 2082 and that Afghanistan was listed
as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2012 Human Rights
and Democracy Report the Committees wish to know why SIELs for
assault rifles, body armour, components for assault rifles, components
for body armour, components for pistols, machine guns, military
helmets, pistols, small arms ammunition, cryptographic software,
equipment employing cryptography, imaging cameras and software
for equipment employing cryptography and an OIEL for equipment
employing cryptography were approved.
As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes,
the arms embargo sanctions in place for Afghanistan apply to those
individuals designated under UN Security
Council Resolution 2082. Most of the SIELs
referred to above were for equipment to be used by end users exempt
from existing sanctions (e.g. International Security Assistance
Force/Diplomatic Missions/United Nations/recognised NGOs). There
were no other Criteria concerns about these exports.
The SIEL and the OIEL for equipment employing
cryptography were for equipment destined for civil end use by
commercial companies and raised no Criteria concerns.
Argentina: Given the current
political tensions between the United Kingdom and Argentina and
the Foreign Secretary's letter to the Chairman of 26 April 2012,
the Committees wish know why was a SIEL for equipment employing
cryptography approved?
As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes,
no licences shall be granted for any military or dual-use goods
and technology to be supplied to military end-users in Argentina,
except in exceptional circumstances. This decision will not affect
licences for items intended for end-users other than the Argentine
military.
The licence under reference was not for equipment
destined for military end users and there were no other Criteria
concerns about this export.
Armenia: Given the OSCE
embargo for Armenia prohibiting the export of any military goods
or technology to any person, or any destination, in Armenia why
was an OIEL for equipment employing cryptography approved?
As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes,
the UK interprets the OSCE arms embargo for Armenia and Azerbaijan
as prohibiting the export of any military goods or technology
to any person, or to any destination, in Armenia or in Azerbaijan.
It has been UK practice occasionally to make an exemption in its
interpretation of the embargo by approving exports of non-lethal
military goods to humanitarian, media or peacekeeping organisations
where it is clear that the embargo was not intended to prevent
those exports and there is a strong humanitarian case for them.
This OIEL was for the export of equipment destined
for civil and commercial end use. The equipment was not military
rated and thus not covered by the UK interpretation of the OSCE
embargo. We had no other Criteria concerns.
Azerbaijan: Given the
OSCE embargo of 1992 to Azerbaijan why were SIELs for cryptographic
software and equipment employing cryptography approved?
As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes,
the UK interprets the OSCE arms embargo for Armenia and Azerbaijan
as prohibiting the export of any military goods or technology
to any person, or to any destination, in Armenia or in Azerbaijan.
It has been UK practice occasionally to make an exemption in its
interpretation of the embargo by approving exports of non-lethal
military goods to humanitarian, media or peacekeeping organisations
where it is clear that the embargo was not intended to prevent
those exports and there is a strong humanitarian case for them.
This SIEL was for the export of equipment destined
for civil and commercial end use. The equipment was not military
rated and thus not covered by the UK interpretation of the OSCE
embargo. We had no other Criteria concerns.
Bahrain: Given the concerns
over human rights raised during the protests on-going since 2011
and the FCO's latest update on Human Rights concerns regarding
Bahrain why were SIELs for anti-riot/ballistic shields, assault
rifles (5,000), components for assault rifles, components for
equipment for the use of electronic countermeasures, components
for machine guns, components for sniper rifles, equipment for
the use of assault rifles, ground military vehicle components,
ground vehicle military communications equipment, gun silencers,
machine guns, pistols, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles and
weapon sights approved? Why was an OIEL for small arms ammunition
refused?
The SIEL for the export of anti-riot/ballistic
shields was for use by a military end user. This end user's primary
responsibility is external security and there was no evidence
of this end user being involved in public security despite the
continuing demonstrations in Bahrain. Therefore we assessed that
there was no clear risk that this equipment might be used for
internal repression.
Three of these SIELs were for the
export of equipment, software and technology to enable secure
communications for a military end user. Our assessment of these
licences was that a secure communications system would assist
in more effective command and control. The end user's primary
responsibility is external security and therefore we assessed
that there was no clear risk that these goods might be used for
internal repression.
Two SIELs for components for machine
guns, assault rifles, components for assault rifles, equipment
for the use of assault rifles, training equipment for assault
rifles and weapon cleaning equipment were for the export of equipment
intended for naval use or coastal defence by a military end user.
We assessed that it would be unlikely that this equipment would
be deployed in crowd control situations and therefore there was
no clear risk that it might be used for internal repression.
Three of these SIELs were for the
export of small arms ammunition, components for rifles, components
for sniper rifles, gun silencers, pistols, rifles and gun silencers
for personal end use in sport shooting. Therefore, we assessed
that there was no clear risk that these goods might be used for
internal repression.
One of the SIELs was for the export
of small arms ammunition intended for trial and demonstration
purposes by a military end user. The end user's primary responsibility
is external security and therefore we assessed that there was
no clear risk that these goods might be used for internal repression.
We have no record of an OIEL for small arms
ammunition for Bahrain being refused during Q3 2013. There was
a SITCL for small arms ammunition refused during this period.
The small arms ammunition was destined for end use by a government
end user involved in public security. We had continuing human
rights concerns about the policing of demonstrations and therefore
we assessed that there was a clear risk that these goods might
be used for internal repression. Furthermore, we assessed that
the export would risk aggravating existing tensions.
China: Given the Madrid
European Council arms embargo to China and that China was listed
as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2012 Human Rights
and Democracy Report, why were SIELs for components for ground
vehicle military communications equipment, components for military
communications equipment, military communications equipment, small
arms ammunition, technology for military electronic equipment
and technology for the production of military communications equipment
approved? Why were SIELs for components for radar equipment, software
for the use of radar equipment and technology for the use of radar
equipment revoked and why were the Committees not informed of
the revocations directly and when they occurred as recommended
in the Committees' latest Report (HC 205)?
As stated in previous responses to the Committees,
the UK interpretation of the Arms Embargo on China, given in Parliament
on 3 June 1998, is that it applies to:
· Lethal
weapons, such as machine guns, large calibre weapons, bombs, torpedoes,
rockets and missiles. Specially designed components for these
and ammunition.
· Military
aircraft and helicopters, vessels of war, armoured fighting vehicles
and other such weapons platforms.
· Any
equipment which might be used for internal repression.
None of the goods and equipment under reference
was covered by the UK interpretation of the EU Arms Embargo.
All items not covered by the embargo
are assessed against the Consolidated Criteria.
Two of the SIELs for the export
of components for military communications equipment and military
communications equipment were for equipment destined for civil
end use in search and rescue beacons. We had no Criteria concerns.
Two of the SIELs were for the export
of technical information and components to be used in equipment
and components manufactured in China that would then be returned
to the UK for incorporation into the finished product. We had
no Criteria concerns.
The two SIELs for the export of
small arms ammunition were both intended for sporting use. We
had no Criteria concerns.
A SIEL for the export of components
for radar equipment, software for the use of radar equipment and
technology for the use of radar equipment was revoked after the
Government received further information which led it to reassess
the risk in exporting these goods. Therefore, we revoked these
applications as there was risk of reverse engineering or unintended
technology transfer that might be used against UK forces or against
EU Member States, their allies or other friendly countries. We
also assessed there was a risk that the goods would be diverted
in country or re-exported under undesirable conditions. This
revocation pre-dates the recommendation in HC 205 and as the Committees
will be aware from the Government's Response (Cm 8707) we did
not in any event accept that recommendation and would not have
informed the Committees directly of this revocation.
Colombia:
Given that Colombia was listed as a Country of Concern" in
the FCO's 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, why were SIELs
for equipment employing cryptography, radio jamming equipment
and software for radio jamming equipment approved?
The two SIELs for the export of equipment employing
cryptography were for equipment intended for use in video conferencing
by a commercial end user. We had no Criteria concerns.
The SIEL for radio jamming equipment and software
for radio jamming equipment was for a temporary export to deliver
product demonstrations to potential customers including military
and law enforcement end users. This equipment can be used to
target mobile phones and could possibly be used for internal repression.
As noted in the FCO's 2012 report, the Government does have some
human right concerns about Colombia, but Colombian police all
have a high level of human rights training. Furthermore,
our assessment noted the improvement in the human rights record
of Colombian law enforcement agencies in recent years. Therefore,
we assessed that there was no clear risk that this export might
be used for internal repression and we had no other Criteria concerns.
Comoros: Why were SIEL
licences approved for 500 assault rifles, components for assault
rifles, components for pistols, components for rifles, 50 pistols,
100 rifles, small arms ammunition and weapon sights to private
maritime security companies for anti-piracy purposes? What assurances
have been received that these goods will not be diverted?
As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes
the equipment in these SIELs was intended for use in maritime
security.
The Government has not sought any assurances
about this equipment being used for internal repression but we
have seen no evidence that PSCs have been diverting equipment
intended for their end use to government agencies or any other
entities in Comoros. Nor has there been any evidence of UK supplied
equipment being used for internal repression.
However, as stated at the Business Secretary's
Oral Evidence Session with the CAEC on 18 December, HMG are planning
to review the SIELs issued for PSCs in view of the large quantities
of weapons approved.
Congo, Democratic Republic of:
Given that Arms sanctions against DRC are currently in place under
UN Security Council resolution 1807 (amended by UNSCR 1857, 1896,
1952 (2010 and 2021 (2011)) and the DRC was listed as a "Country
of Concern" in the FCO's 2012 Human Rights and Democracy
Report, why was a SIEL for equipment employing cryptography approved?
There were several SIELs for equipment employing
cryptography approved in Q2 2013. All these SIELs were for the
export of equipment intended for civil end use by commercial companies.
These dual use goods were not military rated and therefore not
covered by the arms embargo and we had no other Criteria concerns.
Djibouti: Why were SIEL
licences approved for 700 assault rifles, 150 combat shotguns,
components for assault rifles, components for pistols, components
for sporting guns, 30 pistols, small arms ammunition, 300 sporting
guns and weapon sights to private maritime securities company
for anti-piracy purposes? What assurances have been received that
these goods will not be diverted?
As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes
the equipment in these SIELs was intended for use in maritime
security.
The Government has not sought any assurances
about this equipment being used for internal repression but we
have seen no evidence that PSCs have been diverting equipment
intended for their end use to government agencies or any other
entities in Djibouti. Nor has there been any evidence of UK supplied
equipment being used for internal repression.
However, as stated at the Business Secretary's
Oral Evidence Session with the CAEC on 18 December, HMG are planning
to review the SIELs issued for PSCs in view of the large quantities
of weapons approved.
Egypt: Given that the
Government previously revoked arms exports licences to Egypt immediately
following the Arab Spring and further revocations as listed in
the letter to the Chairman of the Committees dated 30 July 2013
from the Business Secretary, and the current unrest in the country,
why were SIELs for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection
and general military vehicle components approved? Why were SIEL
licences approved for 700 assault rifles, 150 combat shotguns,
components for assault rifles, components for pistols, components
for sporting guns, 30 pistols, small arms ammunition, 550 sporting
guns and weapon sights to private maritime security companies
for anti-piracy purposes? What assurances have been received that
these goods will not be diverted?
The SIEL for the export of general military
vehicle components was for regulators for diesel engines for armoured
infantry fighting vehicles intended for a military end user.
At the time of the assessment, under the Morsi presidency, we
considered that there was no clear risk that this equipment might
be used for internal repression. In July, we reassessed this
application in light of the changing circumstances on the ground
in Egypt, and decided to revoke this licence. However, after
enquiring with the exporter we received confirmation that this
equipment had already been shipped and no further action could
be taken.
The SIEL for all-wheel drive vehicles with
ballistic protection was for the temporary export of an armoured
4x4 for demonstration to a potential client, who intended to market
these vehicles to military end users. We considered there was
no clear risk that this vehicle might be used for internal repression.
As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes
the equipment in the other SIELs under reference was intended
for use in maritime security.
The Government has not sought any assurances
about this equipment being used for internal repression but we
have seen no evidence that PSCs have been diverting equipment
intended for their end use to government agencies or any other
entities in Egypt. Nor has there been any evidence of UK supplied
equipment being used for internal repression.
However, as stated at the Business Secretary's
Oral Evidence Session with the CAEC on 18 December, HMG are planning
to review the SIELs issued for PSCs in view of the large quantities
of weapons approved.
Ethiopia: Why were SIELs
for radio jamming equipment and software for radio jamming equipment
refused?
This SIEL was for the export of radio jamming
equipment and software for radio jamming equipment intended for
end use in surveillance and security operations by a government
end user. As stated in the FCO's 2011 Human Rights Report, the
Government has serious concerns about Ethiopia's anti-terrorism
legislation and the human rights issues it raises. Therefore,
we assessed that there was a clear risk that this equipment might
be used for internal repression.
France: Why was a SIEL
for components for military training aircraft to France was refused.
We can find no trace of such a SIEL for France
in Q3 2013. A SIEL for Germany for the same equipment was refused.
The components covered by this SIEL were destined for use by
a military end user in Argentina. In light of our policy towards
exports to Argentina, announced by the Business Secretary on 26
April 2012, this licence was refused.
Guinea, Republic of: Given
the restriction in force in respect of EU Council Decision 2010/638/CFSP
which includes an embargo on, amongst other goods, equipment that
might be used for internal repression why were SIELs for acoustic
devices for riot control, body armour and components for body
armour approved?
This equipment was for use in protecting PSC
employees as they conduct risk mitigation and management services
including the protection and escort of merchant vessels involved
in legitimate trade and oil and gas exploration against pirate
attacks. The end user has signed the International Code of Conduct
for Private Security Providers. As noted in the Quarterly Report,
there are exemptions to the embargo for certain protective end
uses which applied to this equipment.
Israel: Given that Israel
was listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2012
Human Rights and Democracy Report at the time, why were SIELs
for anti-riot/ballistic shields, components for military communications
equipment, components for military support vehicles, general military
vehicle components and military communications equipment approved?
The SIEL for the export of components for military
support vehicles was for the return of parts to the manufacturer
after testing conducted in the UK. Therefore, we had no Criteria
concerns.
The SIEL for the export of anti/riot ballistic
shields was for a small quantity of equipment to be used in a
product demonstration. The commercial end user would be using
the equipment for marketing purposes. We had no Criteria concerns.
There was also a SIEL for the temporary export
of anti/riot ballistic shields, bomb suits and components for
body armour. This equipment was intended for exhibition at a
defence exhibition. We had no Criteria concerns.
The SIEL for the export of military communications
equipment was for equipment intended for use in testing and evaluation
by a commercial end user manufacturing a radio system. We had
no Criteria concerns. There was also a SIEL for the temporary
export of military communications equipment for the same purpose
and again we had no Criteria concerns.
The SIEL for the export of general military
vehicle components was for the temporary export of a generator
for investigation and repair. On repair the generator would be
returned to the UK. We had no Criteria concerns.
Ivory Coast: Given the
arms trade sanctions adopted by 2004/852/CFSP and UN Security
Council Resolution 1572 why were SIELs for equipment employing
cryptography and software for the use of equipment employing cryptography
approved? Given that the value of this equipment and software
was £2,388,300 please provide details of what this equipment
was and what was it to be used for.
The SIEL for the export of equipment employing
cryptography and software for the use of equipment employing cryptography
was for secure radios and supporting equipment intended for use
by government end users. This equipment was not covered by the
embargo which covers arms and related materiel. This is interpreted
by the UK as anything on the UK Military list and equipment which
might be used in internal repression as listed under Annex I of
EU Council Regulation No. 174/2005. This kind of equipment did
not feature on either list.
Although there were human rights concerns about
law enforcement and security forces, the Ivorian Government had
been addressing the poor management underlying these. We assessed
that the introduction of an effective, high-quality communications
system was likely to improve public security management and that
there was not a clear risk that this equipment might be used in
internal repression.
Kenya: Why were SIEL licences
approved for 100 assault rifles, 100 combat shotguns, components
for assault rifles, components for combat shotguns, components
for sporting guns, small arms ammunition, 200 sporting guns and
weapon sights to private maritime securities company for anti-piracy
purposes? What assurances have been received that these goods
will not be diverted?
As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes
this equipment was intended for use in maritime security.
The Government has not sought any assurances
about this equipment being used for internal repression but we
have seen no evidence that PSCs have been diverting equipment
intended for their end use to government agencies or any other
entities in Kenya. Nor has there been any evidence of UK supplied
equipment being used for internal repression.
However, as stated at the Business Secretary's
Oral Evidence Session with the CAEC on 18 December, HMG are planning
to review the SIELs issued for PSCs in view of the large quantities
of weapons approved.
Lebanon: Given that arms
trade sanctions against Lebanon were adopted by UN Security Council
Resolution 1701, of 11 August 2006, and by European Council Common
Position 2006/625/CFSP, why were SIELS approved for small arms
ammunition and sporting guns, and OIELs for equipment employing
cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography,
cryptographic software, software for equipment employing cryptography
and technology for cryptographic software approved?
As stated in the Quarterly
Report footnotes, under UNSCR 1701 a ban on the sale, supply,
transfer or export of arms related material to Lebanon was put
in place.
The arms embargo does not
apply to:
(i) The Government of Lebanon
(and entities authorised by the Government of Lebanon)
(ii) UN Interim Force in
Lebanon (UNIFIL)
None of the SIELs under reference breached
the terms of the embargo as all of the equipment was intended
for use by UNIFIL or end users authorised by the Government of
Lebanon.
None of the equipment covered by the OIELs
is military rated and therefore the arms embargo did not apply
in these cases.
Libya: Given the arms
trade sanctions adopted by UN Security Council Resolution 1970
in February 2011, that Libya was listed as a "Country of
Concern" in the FCO's 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report,
and that the British Government has previously revoked arms export
licences to Libya why were SIELs for all-wheel drive vehicles
with ballistic protection, combat shotguns, components for all-wheel
drive vehicles with ballistic protection, military support vehicles,
cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, anti-riot
helmets, body armour, components for body armour, military helmets,
military image intensifier equipment and projectile launchers
approved?
None of the equipment in
the several SIELs under reference for equipment employing cryptography
and cryptographic software was covered by the terms of the embargo
and in each case was for commercial end use. Therefore, we had
no Criteria concerns about these licences.
As stated in the Quarterly
Report footnotes there are various exemptions to UNSCR 1970 and
its amendments in place. All the other SIELs under reference
were exempt from the embargo.
The SIEL for the export of
components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection
was for equipment intended for use by UN personnel. We had no
Criteria concerns.
The SIEL for the export of
military support vehicles was for vehicles intended for civil
end use in the agricultural sector. We had no Criteria concerns.
The SIEL for the export of
combat shotguns was for equipment intended for use in disposing
of explosive ordnance by a government end user. The shotguns
were to be mounted on remotely operated vehicles for this purpose.
We had no Criteria concerns.
A SIEL for the export of
anti-riot helmets, body armour, components for body armour, military
helmets, military image intensifier equipment and projectile launchers
was refused during this quarter. We have no record of such a
SIEL being issued.
Madagascar: Why were SIEL
licences approved for 1,400 assault rifles, 150 combat shotguns,
components for assault rifles, components for pistols, components
for rifles, 100 pistols, 200 rifles, small arms ammunition, 150
sporting guns and weapon sights to private maritime security companies
for anti-piracy purposes given that previously SIELs for Madagascar
had already been approved for 3200 assault rifles, 600 combat
shotguns, 340 pistols, 800 rifles, 204 sniper rifles and 150 sporting
guns to private maritime security companies for anti-piracy purposes?
Given the reports of human rights abuses in Madagascar what assurances
has the U.K. Government received that none of these items will
not be used for internal repression?
As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes
this equipment was intended for use in maritime security.
The Government has not sought any assurances
about this equipment being used for internal repression but we
have seen no evidence that PSCs have been diverting equipment
intended for their end use to government agencies or any other
entities in Madagascar. Nor has there been any evidence of UK
supplied equipment being used for internal repression.
However, as stated at the Business Secretary's
Oral Evidence Session with the CAEC on 18 December, HMG are planning
to review the SIELs issued for PSCs in view of the large quantities
of weapons approved.
Maldives: Why were SIEL
licences approved for 700 assault rifles, 250 combat shotguns,
components for assault rifles, components for combat shotguns,
components for pistols, components for rifles, components for
sporting guns, 130 pistols, 200 rifles, small arms ammunition,
200 sporting guns, weapon night sights and weapon sights to private
maritime security companies for anti-piracy purposes?. What assurances
have been received that these goods will not be diverted?
As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes
this equipment was intended for use in maritime security.
The Government has not sought any assurances
about this equipment being used for internal repression but we
have seen no evidence that PSCs have been diverting equipment
intended for their end use to government agencies or any other
entities in Maldives. Nor has there been any evidence of UK
supplied equipment being used for internal repression.
However, as stated at the Business Secretary's
Oral Evidence Session with the CAEC on 18 December, HMG are planning
to review the SIELs issued for PSCs in view of the large quantities
of weapons approved.
Mauritius: Why were SIEL
licences approved for 700 assault rifles, 150 combat shotguns,
components for assault rifles, components for pistols, components
for rifles, 80 pistols, 650 rifles, small arms ammunition, 200
sporting guns and weapon sights to private maritime security companies
for anti-piracy purposes? What assurances have been received that
these goods will not be diverted?
As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes
this equipment was intended for use in maritime security.
The Government has not sought any assurances
about this equipment being used for internal repression but we
have seen no evidence that PSCs have been diverting equipment
intended for their end use to government agencies or any other
entities in Mauritius. Nor has there been any evidence of UK
supplied equipment being used for internal repression.
However, as stated at the Business Secretary's
Oral Evidence Session with the CAEC on 18 December, HMG are planning
to review the SIELs issued for PSCs in view of the large quantities
of weapons approved.
Morocco: Why was an OIEL
for components for military support aircraft and general military
aircraft components refused; and an OIEL for software for the
use of military communications equipment, software to simulate
the function of military communications equipment, technology
for the use of software to simulate the function of military communications
equipment revoked?
An OIEL for the export of components for military
support aircraft and general military components was issued during
this quarter. We have no record of such an OIEL being refused.
An OIEL for the export of software for the
use of military communications equipment, software to simulate
the function of military communications equipment, technology
for the use of software to simulate the function of military communications
equipment was refused rather than revoked. We have Criteria 2,
3 and 4 concerns about Morocco, particularly regarding reports
of human rights abuses by security forces in the disputed territory
of Western Sahara. As this was an open licence there were no
named end users so the equipment might be exported to specific
end users about whom we have concerns. We also considered the
fact that the licence would be valid for 5 years and whilst there
has been a long-established ceasefire in Western Sahara which
has not been broken since 1991, we still had concerns about issuing
a licence with such a long validity. In this case, it was considered
that applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to allow
more scrutiny, in particular of specific end users.
Oman: Why were SIEL licences
approved for 600 assault rifles, 150 combat shotguns, components
for assault rifles, components for pistols, components for rifles,
military helmets, 30 pistols, 200 rifles, small arms ammunition
and weapon sights to private maritime security companies for anti-piracy
purposes? What assurances has the U.K. Government received that
these items will not be used for internal repression?
As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes
this equipment was intended for use in maritime security.
The Government has not sought any assurances
about this equipment being used for internal repression but we
have seen no evidence that PSCs have been diverting equipment
intended for their end use to government agencies or any other
entities in Oman. Nor has there been any evidence of UK supplied
equipment being used for internal repression.
However, as stated at the Business Secretary's
Oral Evidence Session with the CAEC on 18 December, HMG are planning
to review the SIELs issued for PSCs in view of the large quantities
of weapons approved.
Saudi Arabia: Given that
Saudi Arabia was listed as a "Country of Concern" in
the FCO's 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, why were SIELS
for components for sniper rifles, gun mountings, gun silencers,
military communications equipment, sniper rifles, weapon night
sights and weapon sights approved?
There are legitimate reasons for the Saudi
authorities to have this type of equipment.
Saudi Arabia is at the heart of an unstable
region and has legitimate defence and security needs which the
Government seeks to support. The situation in Syria, turbulence
in Egypt, Iraq, its porous border with Yemen, and the threat from
international terrorism are legitimate reasons for Saudi Arabia
to protect its borders and be able to counter any acts of aggression.
As stated in the 2012 FCO Annual Report on Human Rights
we assess that the policing response to protests and demonstrations
in the Eastern Province appears to have been proportionate.
Three SIELs for the export of gun silencers,
components for sniper rifles, gun mountings, small arms ammunition,
sniper rifles, weapon sights and anti-armour ammunition were destined
for a government end user involved in policing demonstrations
and public security.
In each case these exports were for small quantities
of equipment for testing and evaluation - in two cases these were
temporary exports meaning the equipment would return to the UK.
Therefore, in each case we assessed that there was not a clear
risk that the equipment might be used for internal repression.
The remaining SIELs were for equipment destined
for military and government end users. None of these end
users had been previously involved in policing demonstrations
and we assessed that they were unlikely to be doing so in the
future. Therefore, we had no Criteria concerns.
Singapore: Why were SIELs
for components for NBC protective/defensive equipment and NBC
protective/defensive equipment refused?
This equipment was destined for eventual end
use in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao. We refused this application
as we judged that there was a risk that UK classified material/capabilities
would not be protected and this would be contrary to Criterion
5d.
Somalia: Given the arms
trade sanctions against Somalia adopted by UN Security Council
resolution 733 in 1992 and amended in 2002 by Security Council
resolution 1425, resolutions 1356 (2001), 1772 (2007), 1851 (2008),
1907 (2009), 1916 (2010), 2002 (2011) and that Somalia was listed
as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2012 Human Rights
and Democracy Report, why was an OIEL for equipment employing
cryptography approved?
The sanctions in place for Somalia provide
for exemptions for supplies of non-lethal military equipment intended
solely for humanitarian or protective use, weapons and military
equipment for the support or use of AMISOM or the United Nations
Assistance Mission in Somalia, or to be used by UN member states
against piracy, or supplies and assistance for developing the
security forces of the Federal Government of Somalia. Procedures
vary: some exports must be approved in advance by the Sanctions
Committee.
This equipment was a router for satellite broadband
destined for commercial end use. As the equipment was not military-rated
it was not covered by sanctions. Given the credible end use for
this equipment, we had no Criteria concerns.
South Africa: Why were
SIEL licences approved for 700 assault rifles, 350 combat shotguns,
components for assault rifles, components for combat shotguns,
components for pistols, components for rifles, components for
sniper rifles, 30 pistols, 500 rifles, small arms ammunition,
200 sniper rifles, 450 sporting guns and weapon sights to private
maritime security companies for anti-piracy purposes? What assurances
that these goods will not be diverted have been received? Why
was a SIEL for assault rifles, body armour, components for assault
rifles, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct
view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols, rifles, small
arms ammunition and weapon sights revoked?
As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes
this equipment was intended for use in maritime security.
The Government has not sought any assurances
about this equipment being used for internal repression but we
have seen no evidence that PSCs have been diverting equipment
intended for their end use to government agencies or any other
entities in South Africa. Nor has there been any evidence of
UK supplied equipment being used for internal repression.
The SIEL that was revoked was for equipment
intended for use in maritime security. The refusal of subsequent
SIEL for this end user, led a reassessment of the diversion risk
with previously issued SIELs. This led to the revocation of the
SIEL under reference.
South Sudan: Given the
arms trade sanctions against South Sudan adopted by UN Security
Council Resolution 1556 in 2004 and extended by Resolution 1591
in 2005, EU Council Decision 2011/423/CFSP and that South Sudan
was listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2012
Human Rights and Democracy Report, why were SIELs for equipment
employing cryptography and software for equipment employing cryptography
approved?
The UK interprets the sanctions to cover all
items on the UK military list. These goods are on the EU dual-use
list rather than military-rated and are therefore not covered
by the sanctions.
One of the SIELs under reference was for the
export of equipment employing cryptography and software for equipment
employing cryptography intended for use by the United Nations
Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS). We had no Criteria
concerns.
The other SIEL was for the export of equipment
employing cryptography intended for commercial end use in upgrading
network infrastructure. We had no Criteria concerns.
Syria:
Given that Syria was listed as a "Country of Concern"
in the FCO's 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, why was
a SITCL for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection
and an OITCL for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection
approved?
These vehicles were intended for the use of
UN and diplomatic personnel. Therefore, we had no Criteria concerns.
Tunisia: Why was an OIEL
for software for the use of military communications equipment,
software to simulate the function of military communications equipment
and technology for the use of software to simulate the function
of military communications equipment revoked?
An OIEL for the export of software for the
use of military communications equipment, software to simulate
the function of military communications equipment, technology
for the use of software to simulate the function of military communications
equipment was refused rather than revoked. Recent events meant
that we had human rights concerns for Tunisia, in particular with
exports to some government and law enforcement end users. The
export of communications equipment can cause us concerns under
Criterion 2 when they are destined for certain end-users, as we
view them to be of utility in some instances of internal repression.
As this was an open licence there were no named end users so
the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom
we have concerns. In this case, it was considered that applications
for SIELs would be more appropriate to allow more scrutiny, in
particular of specific end users.
Turkey: Why was a SIEL
for armoured plate refused?
This SIEL was for the export of armoured plate
to be fitted on armoured personnel carriers (APCs). The APCs
were destined for eventual end use by a military end user in Bahrain.
We had Criteria 2 and 3 concerns following the use of APCs by
the Bahraini authorities during the demonstrations during 2011.
We assessed that this military end user might be deployed to
reinforce the police during public order situations. We assessed
that there was a clear risk that this equipment might be used
for internal repression and that the export would risk aggravating
existing tensions.
United Arab Emirates:
Why were SIELs for equipment employing cryptography, military
communications equipment and naval communications equipment revoked?
This was in fact one SIEL. It was not revoked
but has shown up as being revoked in the Quarterly Report, which
is generated by SPIRE, the Government's export licensing database.
This was technical issue resulting from the processing of an
amended licence which did not contain all the goods lines in the
original licence. When the amendment is processed on to the system
it finds goods lines that were on the previous version of the
licence but do not exist on the new version of the licence. It
determines that as they no longer exist on the licence they must
have been revoked, and so creates revoke entries for them on the
database. We are addressing this issue with the help of our suppliers
in order to prevent these misleading entries appearing in the
Quarterly Report.
Zimbabwe: Given that Zimbabwe
was listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2012
Human Rights and Democracy Report, why were SIELs for equipment
employing cryptography approved? The Committees wish to know what
equipment this is, what are the uses of this equipment and who
are the recipients of this equipment.
One of these SIELs was for the export of HF
and VHF radio equipment to be used by an international humanitarian
organisation involved in mine clearance. We had no Criteria concerns.
The other SIEL was for the export of routers
to upgrade existing network infrastructure for a commercial end
user. We had no Criteria concerns.
The Committees' 2013 Quarter
3 (July - September) questions and the Government's answers
| Afghanistan: Given the current conflict in Afghanistan, the arms embargo sanctions under UN Security Council Resolution 2082 and that Afghanistan was listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report the Committees wish to know why SIELs for cryptographic software and equipment employing cryptography were approved?
|
| The SIEL was approved because the export was equipment for an international organisation for communication purposes. We had no Criteria concerns.
|
| Argentina: Given the current political tensions between the United Kingdom and Argentina and the Foreign Secretary's letter to the Chairman of 26 April 2012, the Committees wish know why was an OIEL including artillery ammunition, components for artillery, components for combat naval vessels, components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military radars, components for naval communications equipment, components for naval electrical/electronic equipment, components for naval engines, components for naval gun installations/mountings, components for naval guns, components for weapon control equipment, decoying/countermeasure equipment, general naval vessel components, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military radars, naval communications equipment, naval electrical/electronic equipment, signalling devices, smoke canisters, smoke/pyrotechnic ammunition, technology for artillery, technology for combat naval vessels, technology for decoying/countermeasure equipment, technology for general naval vessel components, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military radars, technology for naval communications equipment, technology for naval electrical/electronic equipment, technology for naval engines, technology for naval gun installations/mountings, technology for naval guns, technology for signalling devices, technology for smoke canisters, technology for weapon control equipment, training artillery ammunition and weapon control equipment approved?
The OIEL was approved because all items in the licence are for the sole use of a non-Argentinean naval mission and are not to be re-exported or sold for export to a Third Party. We had no Criteria concerns.
Azerbaijan: Given the OSCE embargo of 1992 to Azerbaijan why were SIELs for equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography and technology for equipment employing cryptography approved?
The UK interprets the OSCE arms embargo for Azerbaijan as prohibiting the export of any military goods or technology to any person, or to any destination, in Azerbaijan. It has been UK practice occasionally to make an exemption in its interpretation of the embargo by approving exports of non-lethal military goods to humanitarian, media or peacekeeping organisations where it is clear that the embargo was not intended to prevent those exports and there is a strong humanitarian case for them.
These SIELs were for the export of equipment destined for civil and commercial end use. The equipment was not military rated and thus not covered by the UK interpretation of the OSCE embargo. We had no other Criteria concerns.
Bahrain: Given the concerns over human rights raised during the protests on-going since 2011 and the FCO's latest update on Human Rights concerns regarding Bahrain why were SIELs for machine guns, sniper rifles and weapon night sights approved?
We approved a SIEL for sniper rifles and weapon sights because we assessed that there were no clear risk that these goods would be used for internal repression.
China: Given the Madrid European Council arms embargo to China and that China was listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, why were SIELs for components for artillery ammunition and military communications equipment approved?
Why was an OIEL for components for equipment employing cryptography and equipment employing cryptography approved?
|
| The UK interpretation of the Arms Embargo on China, given in Parliament on 3 June 1998, is that it applies to:
· Lethal weapons, such as machine guns, large calibre weapons, bombs, torpedoes, rockets and missiles. Specially designed components for these and ammunition.
· Military aircraft and helicopters, vessels of war, armoured fighting vehicles and other such weapons platforms.
· Any equipment which might be used for internal repression.
None of the goods and equipment under reference was covered by the UK interpretation of the EU Arms Embargo.
All items not covered by the embargo are assessed against the Consolidated Criteria.
The SIEL for the export of components for artillery ammunition was for equipment to be incorporated into detecting heads of mining drilling bits for civil end use. We had no Criteria concerns.
The SIEL for the export of military communications equipment was for equipment destined for end use in search and rescue missions. We had no Criteria concerns.
The OIEL was for the export of components for mobile phones for civil end use. We had no Criteria concerns.
Colombia: Given that Colombia was listed as a 'Country of Concern' in the FCO's 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, why were SIELs for weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts and weapon sights approved?
The SIELs were for a temporary export for product demonstration, trial and evaluation purposes to potential customers including military and law enforcement end users. As noted in both the FCO's 2012 and 2013 reports, the Government does have some human right concerns about Colombia, but Colombian police all have a high level of human rights training. Furthermore, our assessment noted the improvement in the human rights record of Colombian law enforcement agencies in recent years and that there was no evidence to support a clear risk of this sort of equipment being deployed in human rights violations, or that it had been used in internal repression to date. Therefore, we assessed that there was no clear risk that this export might be used for internal repression. We attached a note to the company explaining that approval of this temporary export did not fetter our discretion in considering future applications for permanent export of this equipment.
Congo, Democratic Republic of: Given that Arms sanctions against DRC are currently in place under UN Security Council resolution 1807 (amended by UNSCR 1857, 1896, 1952 (2010 and 2021 (2011)) and the DRC was listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, why was were SIELs for military support vehicles, equipment employing cryptography and technology for equipment employing cryptography and an OIEL for cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography and technology for equipment employing cryptography approved?
The SIEL for military support vehicles: whilst military-rated the equipment is intended solely for humanitarian use and therefore exempt from the arms embargo. The SIEL was granted following notification in advance of the export by the UK to the UN Sanctions Committee.
There were several SIELs for equipment employing cryptography approved in Q3 2013. All these SIELs were for the export of equipment intended for civil end use by commercial companies. These dual use goods were not military rated and therefore not covered by the arms embargo and we had no other Criteria concerns.
The OIEL was for the export of equipment intended for civil end use by commercial companies. These dual use goods were not military rated and therefore not covered by the arms embargo and we had no other Criteria concerns.
Egypt: Given that the Government previously revoked arms exports licences to Egypt immediately following the Arab Spring and further revocations as listed in the letter to the Chairman of the Committees dated 30 July 2013 from the Business Secretary, and the current unrest in the country, why was a SIEL for military support vehicles approved?
The SIEL was for a temporary export to deliver a product for demonstration to a potential client who intended to market these vehicles to military end users. We did not assess that temporary demonstration of one vehicle to a company in Egypt met the threshold for refusal. We recommended approval with a note to the company, highlighting the ongoing concerns in Egypt, and that approval of demonstration products did not guarantee future approval of exports.
Ghana: Why were OITCLs approved which included acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for body armour, components for rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition and weapon sights when the destination countries included Egypt?
The OITCL was granted for equipment to be used by a private maritime security company for anti-piracy activities.
Greenland: Why were OITCLs for gun mountings, gun silencers, small arms ammunition, sporting guns and weapon sights refused?
The OITCL was rejected for Greenland because the exporter did not have an established distributor in place for that country.
Israel: Why was a SIEL for equipment employing cryptography refused?
We refused this SIEL under Criterion 2 because the exporter did not provide sufficient information or assurances over potential ultimate recipients and end use. We therefore assessed there was a clear risk that the export might be used for internal repression.
Kenya: Why was a SIEL for pistols refused?
We refused this SIEL under Criterion 7 because of concerns over potential recipients and end use. We assessed there was a risk that the goods might be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions.
Lebanon: Given that arms trade sanctions against Lebanon were adopted by UN Security Council Resolution 1701, of 11 August 2006, and by European Council Common Position 2006/625/CFSP, why were SIELS for cryptographic software and equipment employing cryptography to the value of £9.8m approved?
Under UNSCR 1701, a ban on the sale, supply, transfer or export of arms related material to Lebanon was put in place.
However none of the equipment covered by the SIELs is military rated and it is for commercial end use. Therefore the arms embargo did not apply in this case.
Mauritius: Why were SIEL licences approved for 475 assault rifles, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for sniper rifles, 50 pistols, 100 rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles and weapon sights approved when goods of this type had previously been revoked due to "risk of diversion" (see letter from William Hague to CAEC Chairman dated 16 May 2013)?
The SIELS were granted for equipment intended for use in maritime security.
We have seen no evidence that private security companies have been diverting equipment intended for their end use to government agencies or any other entities in Mauritius.
However, as stated at the Business Secretary's Oral Evidence Session with the CAEC on 18 December, HMG is reviewing the SIELs issued for private security companies.
To qualify for a licence, private security companies must meet strict conditions. They must keep detailed records, provide training for staff and have clear lines of accountability. Their UK based
Mozambique: Why was an OITCL with a destination including Egypt for goods including acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for body armour, components for rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition and weapon sights approved?
The OITCL was granted for equipment to be used by a private maritime security company for anti-piracy activities.
Nigeria: Why were SIELs for components for tanks, military field generators, military support vehicles, radio jamming equipment and software for radio jamming equipment refused?
Why was an OITCL with a destination including Egypt for goods including acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for body armour, components for rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition and weapon sights approved?
The SIELs for components for tanks, military field generators, military support vehicles were refused under Criterion 7 because the exporters did not provide sufficient information or assurances over potential ultimate recipients and end use. We therefore assessed there was a risk that the goods will be diverted within the buyer country or re exported under undesirable conditions.
The SIEL for radio jamming equipment was refused under Criterion 2 because we assessed that there was a clear risk the export might be used for internal repression and might impact on human rights and fundamental freedoms in the country of final destination.
The OITCL was granted for equipment to be used by a private maritime security company for anti-piracy activities.
Oman: Given the large number of arms previously approved for maritime security companies why were SIEL licences approved for 300 assault rifles, 150 combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, 200 rifles, small arms ammunition, 100 sporting guns, weapon night sights and weapon sights to private maritime security companies for anti-piracy purposes? What assurances has the U.K. Government received that these items will not be used for internal repression?
Why were SIEL licences approved for assault rifles, components for rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition and weapon sights approved when goods of this type had previously been revoked due to "risk of diversion" (see letter from William Hague to CAEC Chairman dated 16 May 2013)?
Why were OITCLs with a destination including Egypt for goods including acoustic devices for riot control, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for rifles, components for sniper rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles and weapon sights approved?
The SIELS were granted for equipment to be used by a private maritime security company for anti-piracy activities.
The Government has not sought any assurances about the equipment not being used for internal repression as we have seen no evidence that private security companies have been diverting equipment intended for their end use to government agencies or any other entities in Oman. Nor has there been any evidence of UK supplied equipment being used for internal repression.
However, as stated at the Business Secretary's Oral Evidence Session with the CAEC on 18 December, HMG is reviewing the SIELs issued for private security companies.
To qualify for a licence, Private Security Companies must meet strict conditions. They must keep detailed records, provide training for staff and have clear lines of accountability. Their UK based offices are subject to regular inspection visits by BIS. They must be signed up to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers. The equipment must remain under the companies' control at all times and it must be stored securely when not in use.
The OITCL was granted for equipment to be used by a private maritime security company for anti-piracy activities.
Russia: Given that Russia was listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, why was a SIEL for civil riot control agent protection equipment approved?
Why was an OITCL with a destination including China for goods including gun mountings, gun silencers, small arms ammunition, sporting guns and weapon sights approved when similar licence applications for South Africa and Thailand were refused?
The SIEL was approved with a proviso. The equipment is to be used for product demonstration at a showroom. We do have Criterion 2 (human rights) concerns with some end users in Russia so, should an order be won, future applications will be assessed against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria, taking into account full end user details, specific end use, quantities and prevailing circumstances at that time.
We could find no trace of an OITCL for those components for China in Q3 2013. There was such a licence with a destination of Taiwan and this was approved as we had no Criteria concerns.
The OITCL was refused for South Africa and Thailand because of concerns over the legitimacy of unspecified end-users and/or because the exporter did not have an established distributor in place.
Saudi Arabia: Given that Saudi Arabia was listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, why were SIELS for components for components for sniper rifles, gun mountings, gun silencers, military communications equipment and military electronic equipment approved?
Why was an OITCL with a destination including Egypt for goods including acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for combat shotguns, components for body armour, components for rifles, components for sporting guns, rifles, small arms ammunition, sporting guns and weapon sights approved?
There are legitimate reasons for the Saudi authorities to have this type of equipment.
Saudi Arabia is at the heart of an unstable region and has legitimate defence and security needs. The situation in Syria, turbulence in Egypt, Iraq, its porous border with Yemen, and the threat from international terrorism are legitimate reasons for Saudi Arabia to protect its borders and be able to counter any acts of aggression. As stated in the 2012 FCO Annual Report on Human Rights, we assess that the policing response to protests and demonstrations in the Eastern Province appears to have been proportionate.
The SIEL for the export of guns was for sporting purposes.
The SIELs for the export of military electronic equipment & military communications equipment were for re-charging military radio batteries
The OITCL was granted for equipment to be used by a private maritime security company for anti-piracy activities.
Seychelles: Why were OITCLs with a destination including Egypt for goods including acoustic devices for riot control, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for rifles, components for sniper rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles and weapon sights approved?
The OITCL was granted for equipment to be used by a private maritime security company for anti-piracy activities.
Singapore: Why was an OITCL with a destination including Egypt for goods including acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for body armour, components for combat shotguns, components for rifles, components for sporting guns, rifles, small arms ammunition, sporting guns and weapon sights approved?
The OITCL was granted for equipment to be used by a private maritime security company for anti-piracy activities.
The OITCL was granted for equipment to be used by a private maritime security company for anti-piracy activities.
Slovakia: Why was an OITCL with a destination including China for goods including gun mountings, gun silencers, small arms ammunition, sporting guns and weapon sights approved when similar licence applications for South Africa and Thailand were refused?
We could find no trace of an OITCL for those components for China in Q3 2013. There was such a licence with a destination of Taiwan and this was approved as we had no Criteria concerns.
The OITCL was refused for South Africa and Thailand because of concerns over the legitimacy of unspecified end-users and/or because the exporter did not have an established distributor in place.
Somalia: Given the arms trade sanctions against Somalia adopted by UN Security Council resolution 733 in 1992 and amended in 2002 by Security Council resolution 1425, resolutions 1356 (2001), 1772 (2007), 1851 (2008), 1907 (2009), 1916 (2010), 2002 (2011) and that Somalia was listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, why were SIELs for cryptographic software and equipment employing cryptography approved?
The sanctions in place for Somalia provide for exemptions for supplies of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use, weapons and military equipment for the support or use of AMISOM or the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia, or to be used by UN member states against piracy, or supplies and assistance for developing the security forces of the Federal Government of Somalia. Procedures vary: some exports must be approved in advance by the Sanctions Committee.
The equipment to be exported will be used for communication purposes by international organisations in Somalia only. Given the credible end use for this equipment, we had no Criteria concerns.
South Africa: Why were SIELs for body armour and general military aircraft components refused?
Why were SIEL licences approved for assault rifles, components for assault rifles, pistols, components for pistols, military helmets, body armour, small arms ammunition and weapon sights approved when goods of this type had previously been revoked due to "risk of diversion" (see letter from William Hague to CAEC Chairman dated 16 May 2013)?
Why were OITCLs with a destination including Egypt for goods including acoustic devices for riot control, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for rifles, components for sniper rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles and weapon sights approved?
Why was an OITCL with a destination including China for gun mountings, gun silencers, small arms ammunition, sporting guns and weapon sights refused when similar OITCLs to Russia, Slovakia, Taiwan, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates and Uruguay were approved?
We refused the SIEL for general military aircraft components under Criteria 1 and 7 because the final end user was in Azerbaijan and the OSCE arms embargo prohibits the supply of such components.
We refused the other SIELs under reference under Criterion 7 because the exporter did not provide sufficient information to establish the ultimate end user(s). We therefore assessed there was a risk that the goods might be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions.
The OITCLs with a destination including Egypt were granted for equipment to be used by a private maritime security company for anti-piracy activities.
We can find no trace of such an OITCL for China in Q3 2013. Such a licence was approved for the other destinations as we had no Criteria concerns.
Sri Lanka: Given the large number of arms previously approved for maritime security companies why were SIEL licences approved for 1760 assault rifles, 450 combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for sniper rifles, 80 pistols, 360 rifles, small arms ammunition, 200 sniper rifles and weapon sights to private maritime securities company for anti-piracy purposes? What assurances have been received that these goods will not be diverted?
The equipment in these SIELs was intended for anti-piracy purposes in maritime security by civilian/commercial end users.
The Government has not sought any assurances about the equipment not being used for internal repression as we have seen no evidence that private security companies have been diverting equipment intended for their end use to government agencies or any other entities in Sri Lanka. Nor has there been any evidence of UK supplied equipment being used for internal repression.
However, as stated at the Business Secretary's Oral Evidence Session with the CAEC on 18 December, HMG is reviewing the SIELs issued for private security companies.
To qualify for a licence, Private Security Companies must meet strict conditions. They must keep detailed records, provide training for staff and have clear lines of accountability. Their UK based offices are subject to regular inspection visits by BIS. They must be signed up to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers. The equipment must remain under the companies' control at all times and it must be stored securely when not in use.
Sudan: Given the arms trade sanctions against Sudan adopted by UN Security Council Resolution 1556 in 2004 and extended by Resolution 1591 in 2005, EU Council Decision 2011/423/CFSP and that Sudan was listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, why were SIELs for equipment employing cryptography and software for equipment employing cryptography approved?
Why was an OITCL for acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, combat shotguns, components for body armour, components for combat shotguns, components for sporting guns, military helmets, military image intensifier equipment, rifles, small arms ammunition, sporting guns, weapon cleaning equipment and weapon sights to India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Thailand and United Arab Emirates refused?
The UK interprets the sanctions to cover all items on the UK military list. These goods are on the EU dual-use list rather than military-rated and are therefore not covered by the sanctions.
The SIELs under reference were equipment for communication purposes for use by an international organisation. We had no Criteria concerns.
Taiwan: Why was a SIEL for components for NBC protective/defensive equipment and NBC protect/defensive equipment refused?
Why was an OITCL with a destination including China for goods including gun mountings, gun silencers, small arms ammunition, sporting guns and weapon sights approved when similar licence applications for South Africa and Thailand were refused?
We refused the SIEL under Criterion 5d: the need to protect UK military classified information and capabilities.
We could find no trace of an OITCL for those components for China in Q3 2013. There was such a licence with a destination of Taiwan and this was approved as we had no Criteria concerns.
The licence was refused to South Africa & Thailand because of concerns over the legitimacy of unspecified end-users and/or because the exporter did not have an established distributor in place.
Tanzania: Why was an OITCL with a destination including Egypt for goods including acoustic devices for riot control, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for rifles, components for sniper rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles and weapon sights approved?
The OITCL was granted for equipment to be used by a private maritime security company for anti-piracy activities.
Thailand: Why was an OITCL with a destination including China for gun mountings, gun silencers, small arms ammunition, sporting guns and weapon sights refused when similar OITCLs to Russia, Slovakia, Taiwan, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates and Uruguay were approved?
We could find no trace of an OITCL for those components for China in Q3 2013. The OITCL for the other destinations were approved because we had no Criteria concerns.
Turkey: Why were SIELs for CS hand grenades and tear gas/irritant ammunition refused?
Why was an incorporated SIEL for components for military combat vehicles to Bahrain refused?
We refused the SIELs for CS hand grenades and tear gas/irritant ammunition under Criterion 2 because we assessed there was a clear risk that this export might be used for internal repression, given the previous and ongoing indiscriminate use of CS gas by the stated end user.
We refused the SIEL for components for military combat vehicles under Criteria 2 and 3 because the export was destined for ultimate end use by a government user in Bahrain involved in public security. We had continuing human rights concerns about the policing of demonstrations in Bahrain. We assessed that there was a clear risk that this equipment might be used with existing equipment for internal repression and that the export would risk aggravating existing tensions.
Ukraine: Why was an OITCL with a destination including China for goods including gun mountings, gun silencers, small arms ammunition, sporting guns and weapon sights approved when similar licence applications for South Africa and Thailand were refused?
We could find no trace of an OITCL for those components for China in Q3 2013. There was such a licence with a destination of Taiwan and this was approved as we had no Criteria concerns.
The licence was refused to South Africa & Thailand because of concerns over the legitimacy of unspecified end-users and/or because the exporter did not have an established distributor in place.
United Arab Emirates: Why was a SIEL for chemicals used for general laboratory work/scientific research refused?
We refused the SIEL under Criterion 7 because we assessed there was a risk that the goods might be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions.
United States of America: Why was an incorporated SIEL to Brazil for components for military training aircraft refused?
Why was an OIEL for components for electronic warfare equipment, components for military aircraft, ground equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military helicopters, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of military helicopters, general military aircraft components, military aircraft ground equipment, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, signalling devices, software for electronic warfare equipment, software for military communications equipment, software for military electronic equipment, software for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for electronic warfare equipment, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment and technology for signalling devices refused?
We refused the SIEL under Criterion 7 because we assessed there was a risk that the goods might be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions.
We refused the OIEL because it was for incorporation of military goods in the USA for ultimate end use in Egypt. We refused this application and requested SIEL applications instead as we are able to maintain oversight of exports to the Egyptian military on a case-by-case basis through SIEL applications.
Uruguay: Why was an OITCL with a destination including China for goods including gun mountings, gun silencers, small arms ammunition, sporting guns and weapon sights approved when similar licence applications for South Africa and Thailand were refused?
We could find no trace of an OITCL for those components for China in Q3 2013. There was such a licence with a destination of Taiwan and this was approved as we had no Criteria concerns.
The licence was refused to South Africa & Thailand because of concerns over the legitimacy of unspecified end-users and/or because the exporter did not have an established distributor in place.
Vessel, Platform in International Waters: Why was an OITCL with a destination including Egypt for goods including acoustic devices for riot control, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for rifles, components for sniper rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles and weapon sights approved?
Why was an OITCL for acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, combat shotguns, components for body armour, components for combat shotguns, components for sporting guns, military helmets, military image intensifier equipment, rifles, small arms ammunition, sporting guns, weapon cleaning equipment and weapon sights to India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Thailand and United Arab Emirates refused?
The first OITCL under reference was granted for equipment to be used by a private maritime security company for anti-piracy activities.
The second OITCL under reference was approved for India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Thailand and United Arab Emirates but refused for Vessel, Platform in International Waters after this destination was removed from the licence application at the exporters request.
Zimbabwe: Given that Zimbabwe was listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, why were SIELs for cryptographic software and equipment employing cryptography approved? The Committees wish to know what equipment this is, what are the uses of this equipment and who are the recipients of this equipment.
The SIELs were for the export of equipment to commercial end users to upgrade existing network infrastructure. We had no Criteria concerns.
REQUESTS FOR WRITTEN INFORMATION TO THE GOVERNMENT FROM THE COMMITTEES ON ARMS EXPORT CONTROLS ARISING FROM THE GOVERNMENT'S PIVOT REPORTS FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY 2010 - DECEMBER 2012 AND THE GOVERNMENT'S REPORTED EXPORTS IN THE UN REGISTER OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS FOR 2012
Ghana: The Committees would like an explanation for the apparent discrepancy between the pivot reports for the number of sniper rifles approved for export in the Pivot reports for the Q1 2010 - Q4 2012 and the Government's return to the UN Register of Conventional Weapons (UNROCA) for 2012. The pivot reports indicate that there were SIELs for 30 sniper rifles approved during this period, however the figure given in the UNROCA report for 2012 lists a total of 4080 sniper rifles exported to Ghana from the UK in that year.
Both the Government's pivot reports and the returns to UNROCA are based on the quantities of small arms licensed in the specified periods. The reported quantities should therefore be consistent in both reports. However the two reports are compiled using different procedures and we have identified a technical error which has led to errors in a small number of cases, as explained below.
The figure of 20 sniper rifles in the Government's pivot reports is correct (under "Mil" 20 x 1 licence). The figure in the UNROCA report is incorrect. We have informed UNROCA of the discrepancy and they confirmed they will correct the Report.
Madagascar: The Committees would like an explanation for the apparent discrepancy between the pivot reports for the number of combat shotguns, rifles and assault rifles approved for export in the Pivot reports for the Q1 2010 - Q4 2012 and the Government's return to the UN Register of Conventional Weapons (UNROCA) for 2012. The pivot reports indicate that there were SIELs for 750 (+ one unspecified quantity) combat shotguns, 1100 rifles and 3850 assault rifles approved during this period, however the figures given in the UNROCA report for 2012 lists a total of 1300 combat shotguns, 1500 rifles and 5850 assault rifles exported to Madagascar from the UK in that year.
Please see the Government's response to your question for Ghana on the type of data we report to UNROCA being based on the quantities of small arms licensed in the specified periods.
We have reviewed the data and found the following:
For combat shotguns the correct figure is 1500 units. Under "Mil" the unspecified licence has been amended to 200 and this will show up in our next quarterly pivot release. Other licences to tally in the pivot report under "Mil" include 150 x 8 licences and 100 x 1 licence. We have amended our records and informed UNROCA of the discrepancy;
For rifles, both reports are correct and show a figure of 1500 units (tally under "Mil" 200 x 6 licences and 100 x 1 licence; under "Mil & Other" 100 x 2 licences);
For assault rifles, both reports are correct and show a figure of 5850 units (tally under "Mil" 150 x 1 licence, 200 x 3 licences; 300 x 2 licences, 350 x 1 licence, 450 x 1 licence, 600 x 5 licences; under "Mil and Other" 200 x 2 licences and 300 x 1 licence).
Maldives: The Committees would like an explanation for the apparent discrepancy between the pivot reports for the number of combat shotguns, rifles, assault rifles and pistols approved for export in the Pivot reports for the Q1 2010 - Q4 2012 and the Government's return to the UN Register of Conventional Weapons (UNROCA) for 2012. The pivot reports indicate that there were SIELs for 360 combat shotguns, 1570 rifles, 4850 assault rifles and 380 pistols approved during this period, however the figures given in the UNROCA report for 2012 lists a total of 1350 combat shotguns, 4390 rifles, 10500 assault rifles and 1230 pistols exported to the Maldives from the UK in that year.
Please see the Government's response to your question for Ghana on the type of data we report to UNROCA being based on the quantities of small arms licensed in the specified periods.
We reviewed the data and found the figures in both the Government's pivot reports and the UNROCA Report to be correct, as follows:
For combat shotguns, both reports show a figure of 1350 units (tally under "Mil" 150 x 8 licences, 100 x 1 licence, 50 x 1 licence)
For rifles, both reports show a figure of 4390 units (tally under "Mil" 40 x 1 licence, 100 x 5 licences, 150 x 3 licences, 200 x 6 licences, 300 x 2 licences; under "Mil and Other" 100 x 16 licences)
For assault rifles, both reports show a figure of 10,500 units (tally under "Mil" 100 x 2 licences, 150 x 2 licences; 200 x 1 licences, 300 x 1 licences, 350 x 2 licences, 400 x 1 licence, 450 x 3 licences, 600 x 4 licences, 700 x 1 licence, 750 x 1 licence; under "Mil and Other" 200 x 16 licences)
For pistols, both reports show a figure of 1230 units (tally under "Mil" 30 x 6 licences, 50 x 1 licence, 100 x 2 licences; under "Mil & Other" 50 x 16 licences)
Mauritius: The Committees would like an explanation for the apparent discrepancy between the pivot reports for the number of combat shotguns, rifles, assault rifles and pistols approved for export in the Pivot reports for the Q1 2010 - Q4 2012 and the Government's return to the UN Register of Conventional Weapons (UNROCA) for 2012. The pivot reports indicate that there were SIELs for 560 combat shotguns, 3434 rifles, 6743 assault rifles and 565 pistols approved during this period, however the figures given in the UNROCA report for 2012 lists a total of 1354 combat shotguns, 5408 rifles, 10978 assault rifles and 1560 pistols exported to Mauritius from the UK in that year.
Please see the Government's response to your question for Ghana on the type of data we report to UNROCA being based on the quantities of small arms licensed in the specified periods.
We reviewed the data and found the figures in both the Government's pivot reports and the UNROCA Report to be correct, as follows:
For combat shotguns, both reports show a figure of 1354 units (tally under "Mil" 50 X 1 licence, 150 x 6 licences, 200 x 2 licences, 4 x 1 licence for smoothbore weapon. Please note UNROCA do not have a smoothbore weapon category and it was therefore added as a combat shotgun to ensure it was reported);
For rifles, both reports show a figure of 5408 units (tally under "Mil" 3 x 1 licence, 5 x 1 licence, 6 x 1 licence, 40 x 1 licence, 100 x 3 licences, 150 x 1 licence, 200 x 5 licence, 204 x 1 licence, 300 x 2 licences, 800 x 1 licence; under "Mil and Other" 100 x 23 licences);
For assault rifles, both reports show a figure of 10978 units (tally under "Mil" 9 x 1 licence, 100 x 3 licences, 200 x 2 licences, 300 x 3 licences, 350 x 1 licence, 569 x 1 licence, 600 x 4 licences, 700 x 1 licence, 800 x 1 licence; under "Mil and Other" section 175 x 2 licences, 200 x 19 licences, 400 x 1 licence);
For pistols, both reports show a figure of 1560 units (tally under "Mil" 30 x 6 licences, 50 x 1 licence, 80 x 1 licence,100 x 2 licences; under "Mil and Other" 50 x 21 licences).
Oman: The Committees would like an explanation for the apparent discrepancy between the pivot reports for the number of combat shotguns, rifles, assault rifles and pistols approved for export in the Pivot reports for the Q1 2010 - Q4 2012 and the Government's return to the UN Register of Conventional Weapons (UNROCA) for 2012. The pivot reports indicate that there were SIELs for 1320 combat shotguns, 3575 rifles, 6441 assault rifles and 1151 pistols (+one unspecified quantity) approved during this period, however the figures given in the UNROCA report for 2012 lists a total of 1600 combat shotguns, 6270 rifles, 12957 assault rifles and 2245 pistols exported to Oman from the UK in that year.
Please see the Government's response to your question for Ghana on the type of data we report to UNROCA being based on the quantities of small arms licensed in the specified periods.
We have reviewed the data and found the following:
For combat shotguns, the figures in the Government's pivot reports and the UNROCA report are correct. Both reports show a figure of 1600 units (tally under "Mil" 50 X 1 licence, 100 x 2 licences, 150 x 5 licences, and 200 x 3 licences);
For rifles, the figure of 6420 in the Government's pivot reports is correct (tally under "Mil" 40 x 1 licence, 50 x 1 licence, 100 x 7 licences, 150 x 3 licences, 200 x 8 licences; under "Mil & Other" 80 x 1 licence, 100 x 35 licences). The figure in the UNROCA report is incorrect. We have informed UNROCA of the discrepancy and they confirmed they will make the necessary corrections;
For assault rifles, the figure of 13107 in the Government's pivot reports is correct (tally under "Mil" 7 x 1 licence, 100 x 5 licences, 150 x 4 licences, 200 x 3 licences, 300 x 3 licences, 350 x 1 licence, 400 x 1 licence, 600 x 4 licences; under "Mil & Other" 100 x 1 licence, 175 x 2 licences, 200 x 33 licences, 300 x 1 licence). The figure in the UNROCA report is incorrect. We have informed UNROCA of the discrepancy and they confirmed they will make the necessary corrections;
For pistols, both reports show a figure of 2245 units (tally under "Mil" 2 X 1 licence, 4 x 1 licence, 19 x 1 licence, 30 x 3 licences, 50 x 1 licence, 80 x 1 licence and 100 x 2 licences; under "Mil & Other" 50 x 36 licences).
South Africa: The Committees would like an explanation for the apparent discrepancy between the pivot reports for the number of shotguns, rifles, assault rifles and pistols approved for export in the Pivot reports for the Q1 2010 - Q4 2012 and the Government's return to the UN Register of Conventional Weapons (UNROCA) for 2012. The pivot reports indicate that there were SIELs for 487 shotguns, 3700 rifles, 6545 assault rifles and 810 pistols approved during this period, however the figures given in the UNROCA report for 2012 lists a total of 950 shotguns, 5501 rifles, 10319 assault rifles and 1352 pistols exported to South Africa from the UK in that year.
Please see the Government's response to your question for Ghana on the type of data we report to UNROCA being based on the quantities of small arms licensed in the specified periods.
We reviewed the data and found the figures in both the Government's pivot reports and the UNROCA Report to be correct, as follows:
For shotguns, both reports have a figure of 950 units (tally under "Mil" 50 X 1 licence and 150 x 6 licences);
For rifles, both reports have a figure of 5501 units (tally under "Mil" 1 X 1 licence, 100 x 6 licences, 150 x 2 licences, 200 x 6 licences, 350 x 2 licences, 1000 x 1 licence; under "Mil & Other" 100 x 17 licences);
For assault rifles, both reports have a figure of 10319 units (tally under "Mil" 2 X 1 licence, 10 x 1 licence, 12 x 1 licence, 20 x 1 licence, 100 x 3 licences, 150 x 6 licences, 200 x 2 licences, 300 x 2 licences, 350 x 1 licence, 400x 1 licence, 450 x 1 licence, 500 x 1 licence, 800 x 1 licence and 600 x 3 licences; under "Mil & Other" 175 x 1 licence, 200 x 12 licences and 300 x 4 licences);
For pistols, both reports have a figure of 1352 units (tally under "Mil" 1 X 1 licence, 4 x 1 licence, 23 x 1 licence, 30 x 4 licences, 44 x 1 licence, 50 x 2 licences, 55 x 1 licence, 100 x 2 licences; under "Mil & Other" 5 x 1 licence and 50 x 16 licences).
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